Spotlight

September 2025

HIGHLIGHTS

You Can’t Break the Laws of Economics

Nearly every week, someone writing for a major news outlet argues that economics has failed. Our models are too abstract. Our predictions are always wrong. . . .

Nearly every week, someone writing for a major news outlet argues that economics has failed. Our models are too abstract. Our predictions are always wrong. President Trump’s recent firing of Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner Erika McEntarfer is the latest notable example of this anti-economics sentiment.

Let me make what appears to have become a radical argument: Simple economics is surprisingly good at making real-world predictions.

Read the full piece here.

AI Partnerships and Competition: Damned if You Buy, Damned if You Don’t

In this paper, we examine the rise of strategic partnerships between large technology firms and AI startups, arguing that these arrangements—often structured to avoid . . .

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the rise of strategic partnerships between large technology firms and AI startups, arguing that these arrangements—often structured to avoid traditional merger-control thresholds—have sparked undue antitrust concern despite limited evidence of competitive harm. Situating these “AI partnerships” within the broader framework of competition policy, we contend that such collaborations are frequently procompetitive, enabling startups to access capital, infrastructure, and distribution channels necessary to scale innovation in a rapidly evolving market. While regulators have raised theoretical concerns about foreclosure, switching costs, and concentration, empirical evidence to date suggests that AI markets remain dynamic, with robust entry, falling prices, and intensifying rivalry across the ecosystem. We further argue that expanding merger-control rules to capture non-controlling partnerships risks undermining legal certainty and deterring efficiency-enhancing collaborations. Ultimately, we conclude that AI partnerships are more likely to promote, rather than hinder, competition and innovation, cautioning against regulatory overreach that could stifle the development of emerging AI markets.

A Europe Fit for the Age of Startups: Rhetoric and Reality in the EU’s Digital Package

I. Introduction Europe is at a crossroads. While the global hegemony that it enjoyed into the 20th century continues to erode, the continent remains an . . .

I. Introduction

Europe is at a crossroads. While the global hegemony that it enjoyed into the 20th century continues to erode, the continent remains an important—albeit diminished—source of economic output, productivity, innovation, and technology.[1] European policymakers have expressed growing alarm in recent years that the continent’s weak economic dynamism and productivity may lead it to fall further behind global leaders like the United States and China.[2] Against this backdrop, the next decade will be of pivotal importance: can Europe reclaim its place at the technological frontier, or will the coming years seal Europe’s fate as a spent force that can no longer compete on the global stage?

These fears were reflected in a recent report on European competitiveness written by former Italian Prime Minister and European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi (“Draghi Report”).[3] The report painted a sobering picture of a competitiveness and innovation gap that, unless promptly addressed, is expected to only compound Europe’s decline over the coming years and decades.[4] According to the report:

Across different metrics, a wide gap in GDP has opened up between the EU and the US, driven mainly by a more pronounced slowdown in productivity growth in Europe. Europe’s households have paid the price in foregone living standards. On a per capita basis, real disposable income has grown almost twice as much in the US as in the EU since 2000.[5]

These challenges likely have multiple causes. The Draghi Report identifies several contributing factors, including high energy costs, fragmented capital markets, unfavourable conditions for venture-capital investment, low startup activity, and overregulation. To date, European policymakers have acknowledged some of these issues and expressed an at least nominal commitment to address them. For instance, fostering home-grown startups is a key goal of the current EU administration and a priority under the recently unveiled Competitiveness Compass (“Compass”).[6] At the same time, the EU has aimed to position itself as a leader in digital rulemaking, enacting a series of pioneering regulations—including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), Digital Services Act (DSA), Data Act (DA), and Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act)—that are known collectively as the “Digital Package”.[7] According to Ursula Von der Leyen, who in July 2024 renewed her mandate as president of the Commission until 2029, these new regulations are needed to create “A Europe fit for the Digital Age”.[8]

Unfortunately, it appears these two pillars of the EU’s industrial policy—expansive digital regulation and startup promotion—may be working at cross purposes or, worse still, reinforcing each other in misguided directions. The Draghi Report suggests a correlation between overregulation and poor economic performance, including EU startups’ limited ability to scale. Moreover, the EU’s focus on promoting startups over fostering innovation itself reflects a misplaced emphasis on who drives innovation, rather than on innovation outcomes. This approach risks stifling progress by neglecting valuable contributions from other sources, including large firms and established incumbents—a misstep that could paradoxically deprive startups of the very innovations upon which they often build.

Indeed, R&D investments and productivity tend to increase with size,[9] and large tech firms are among the most productive and innovative segments of the modern economy.[10] This reality challenges the narrative that policymakers should focus primarily on facilitating innovation from tech startups (“TSUs”).[11] Large firms also often provide vital exit strategies for digital-market startups, many of which are formed with acquisition explicitly in mind.[12] Foreclosing this avenue risks deterring the creation of TSUs in the first place, in addition to forfeiting the benefits  that acquisition by an incumbent may yield, such as access to superior managerial capabilities,[13] greater scale, and the integration of the TSU’s innovative projects into the acquirer’s “ecosystem”.[14]

Some of the EU Digital Package’s regulations aim to hobble large players under the misguided premise that hindering incumbents would automatically elevate TSUs.[15] But in the complex net of competitive and cooperative relations that characterize the digital economy,[16] disruptions to the central digital platforms can harm the many firms that depend on them for cumulative and generative innovation. For example, when a TSU is acquired by a DMA-designated “gatekeeper”, it must automatically comply with the DMA. This means the gatekeeper is required to share certain competitive advantages and is restricted in its ability to expand into additional markets.[17] This, in turn, can affect a TSU’s ability to scale, as well as the investments it can hope to receive from gatekeepers. To the extent that the DMA deprioritizes economic efficiency and consumer welfare, reducing a platform’s attractiveness—such as through a deprecated user experience or diminished convenience[18]—may also harm the business prospects of startups that depend on it.[19]

This approach, and the underlying political and regulatory zeal against “Big Tech” that underpins it, is likely to conflict with key pillars of the Draghi Report. Where the report emphasizes strong support for startups and for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), its primary concern is with removing the obstacles that prevent companies from scaling to compete globally.[20] In other words, size is seen as vital to the EU’s competitiveness strategy. As the report finds:

The lack of a true Single Market also prevents enough companies in the wider economy from reaching sufficient size to accelerate adoption of advanced technologies. There are many barriers that lead to companies in Europe to “stay small” and neglect the opportunities of the Single Market.[21]

Further:

However, there is a close link between the size of companies and technology adoption. Evidence from the US show that adoption rises with firm size for all advanced technologies. Likewise, while in 2023 30% of large businesses in the EU had adopted AI, only 7% of SMEs had done the same. Size enables adoption because larger companies can spread the high fixed costs of AI investment over greater revenues, they can count on more skilled management to make the necessary organisational changes, and they can deploy AI more productively owing to larger data sets.[22]

Against this backdrop, this paper examines whether and to what extent the EU’s goals of fostering startups and regulating digital markets align, as well as the role that promoting digital startup activity and investment has played in the design of the Digital Package. The Draghi Report called for an impact assessment of the effect of regulations on small companies,[23] an area where it finds the Commission has traditionally fallen short.[24] Echoing similar concerns, fellow former Italian Prime Minister Enrico published a similar report mere months before the Draghi Report (“Letta Report”), which found that SMEs and deep-tech startups were disproportionately hampered by regulation, bureaucratic red tape, and overlapping and overly complex rules.[25]

Our analysis reveals mixed degrees of attention paid to TSUs in the design of the Digital Package. In fact, the impact assessments of key legislation like the DMA, Data Act, and AI Act at times appear to overlook the effects these regulations would have on startups. This omission is particularly problematic for several reasons:

  1. European policymakers have widely cited these measures as essential to promote startup activity;
  2. There is growing anecdotal evidence to suggest that these regulations may harm startups; and
  3. A robust body of empirical research demonstrates that digital regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) have contributed to increased market concentration and a decline in startup investment.

Thus, while startup creation was and remains a clear goal for European policymakers (and a key weakness identified in the Draghi Report), the actual consideration that the Digital Package gives to TSUs may not be commeasure with those policy commitments. This could mean two either that the Digital Package was not intended to primarily or significantly benefit tech startups or, alternatively, that EU policymakers incorrectly assumed the Digital Package would make everyone better off, including TSUs. The former highlights a seeming contradiction between EU leaders’ public rhetoric and the real motivations driving the enactment of digital regulations. The latter suggests a faith-based assumption that digital regulations would benefit TSUs that has proven unsupported by the impact assessments.

This lack of focus on TSUs fails to align with either EU policymakers’ strong rhetoric or the priorities outlined in the Compass. It is also unlikely to effectively address the concerns raised in the Draghi Report regarding the relationship between regulation and innovation.

If tech startup growth is a key component of the Digital Age, as EU policymakers have repeatedly claimed, failing to adequately consider how the Digital Package will affect TSUs—as well as innovation from other sources—could ultimately serve to make Europe unfit for the Digital Age, pushing the continent even further from the technological frontier.

II. Why Tech Startups Are Relevant for the Digital Package

Given the absence of a unified EU definition for TSUs, this paper will draw from common understandings of the term employed in the literature. Startups and scaleups are generally understood as recently established entities focused on new technological developments, often relying on collaboration, open systems, and networks. They are characterized by innovative business models, scalable products or services, significant investment needs, equity-based capital structures, rapid growth potential, and ambitions to scale. They also tend to have a high tolerance for risk, rely heavily on intangible assets (such as data and intellectual property), and employ a small but highly skilled workforce.[26] Accordingly, in this paper, “TSU” will be used as a shorthand for small, young, and innovative firms with growth potential in digital markets—commonly referred to as startups or scaleups.

There are three key reasons why the EU’s Digital Package should not overlook TSUs. First, there is a strong policy push to strengthen TSUs in Europe. This is underpinned by a sense that startup activity is a driver of a healthy economy, a sentiment evident in the Draghi report.[27] Second, evidence suggests that regulation can negatively affect investment and startup activity. It would thus be reasonable to expect the Digital Package to be sensitive to the potential chilling effects of regulation on startups and innovation, including TSUs. Third, there have been indications that EU regulations—including the Digital Package—have already hindered startup activity. For instance, there is emerging evidence the DMA may have harmed the online-advertising industry, which often serves as a key source of revenue for tech startups. In short, there are important reasons for the Digital Package to be cognizant of startup activity.

A. The Policy Push for TSUs in Europe

EU leaders have long called for a focus on TSUs and their exceptional needs. According to France Digitale’s Manifesto for the 2024 European Elections (“France Digitale Manifesto”) and the European Parliament’s Joint Motion for a Resolution on the State of the SME Union (“SME Resolution”),[28] these include access to high-quality data; high levels of collaboration; open systems and interoperability; the need to attract significant investment; the ability to manage rapid growth; and minimal regulatory burdens. These needs require specific attention.

Both the France Digitale Manifesto and the SME Resolution call for establishing a coherent European definition of startups distinct from the existing definition of SMEs, as many startups do not fit the definition of an SME. This would not only enable targeted action more responsive to TSUs’ needs (on such topics as compliance burdens, visas, funding, and public procurement) but would also address the exclusion of TSUs with more than 250 employees from certain relevant European programs—notably, the accelerator program.[29]

The EU Recommendation on the Definition of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2003/361/EC) defines SMEs based on headcount and turnover thresholds. [30] While all startups qualify as small or medium-sized businesses, the reverse is not necessarily true: not all SMEs are startups. Indeed, there is a vast difference between a typical family-owned small company and a technology startup. This is not to say that, at the margin, one of these activities necessarily contributes more to economic growth and competitiveness than the other. Rather, the issue is that the type of activity that policymakers typically want to protect and encourage is narrower than what the SME label encompasses.

The lack of a unified legal definition in the EU, or a consensus on which key components should be included or which methodologies should be applies, makes it difficult for European regulations to consider the specific interests of such a distinct group of SMEs; it also constitutes the first hurdle in formulating coherent EU-wide TSU policies.[31] Moreover, it undermines the effectiveness of existing policies intended to foster startup growth.[32]

A charitable explanation for this oversight is that the lack of a unified TSU definition is a byproduct of “tech” vernacular, which is itself rife with opaque terms such as “scaleup”, “unicorn”, “digital entrepreneur”, or “nascent competitor”, which can be vague, overlapping, and sometimes used interchangeably. Conversely, the oversight could also indicate that European policymakers have been less focused on promoting TSUs than their policy pronouncements might suggest, especially given the general proclivity for definitions and categorizations in the EU.

In support of the latter interpretation, France Digitale—the largest startup association in Europe—has argued that European TSUs and their investors “don’t get the same recognition and support of their counterparts in America and Asia, which makes their development more complex and hampers their competitiveness”. France Digitale also contends that “more than a third of the Commission’s impact assessments do not provide enough details on the needs of SMEs” and that, despite dialogue with policymakers, “these discussions are not always translated into efficient measures”. Amid what it characterizes as challenging investment conditions over the past five years, France Digitale claims that “Europe has focused on establishing the regulatory framework for the twin green and digital transition, rather than on promoting innovation”.[33]

A recent Stripe survey of digital startups regarding the key challenges they face[34] found that respondents report “the intended benefits [of the EU’s initiatives to improve the regulatory environment] are not yet being felt on the ground. Eighty-three percent of startups believe policymaking is geared toward incumbents and want policymakers to focus on changes that will save them time and money, so they can make the most of limited resources”.

France Digitale has called for additional measures to address these shortcomings, including regulatory “breathing space” to allow TSUs to comply with new regulations. The group proposes extending protections for TSUs beyond the 12 months found in the DSA and Data Act, and broadening the moratoria on burdens imposed on TSUs to include companies’ efforts to comply with prior regulations.[35] As France Digitale member and software-as-a-service company (SaaS) Mirakl argued, the next European Commission (EC) mandate (2024-2029) should allow TSUs “time to comply with the previous regulations before introducing new constraints that will not ensure a level playing field with the American and Asian tech players”.[36]

France Digitale also highlighted the sharp decline in EU M&A activity in 2023.[37] It emphasized the need to find alternative ways to attract investors and support growth to mitigate potential negative impacts on innovation in Europe. It called for fostering a European exit culture by exploring alternatives to existing market exit strategies; and it identified the recruitment of skilled personnel as the top challenge for most TSUs.[38]

The SME Resolution similarly put forward proposals to foster European startups, including using startups’ innovation to promote EU competitiveness and to achieve climate targets. The Parliament likewise called for a formal legal definition of TSUs. The SME Resolution argued that such EU policy must consider TSU interests in minimizing regulatory compliance burdens, as well as pragmatic suggestions to expand TSUs’ access to public and private capital, public procurement, and the talent pipeline.[39]

While the SME Resolution does not touch on digital market competition, per se, Parliament expressed in its Innovation Resolution that it was “of the view that regulatory mechanisms must adapt to and evolve in sync with technological advancements and market shifts to uphold competitiveness and innovation, especially in relation to European start-ups”.[40] The Innovation Resolution also called on the European Commission and EU member states to foster a European-led ecosystem of marketplaces for non-personal data.[41]

For its part, the Commission has itself vowed to foster the growth of TSUs. New Commissioners, for example, have a mandate to implement the Draghi Report’s recommendations, which highlight TSUs’ importance in reigniting growth and achieving technological leadership.[42] In particular, the report highlights inconsistent and restrictive regulations that have bogged down European startups, especially their ability to scale.[43] The report also details problems EU startups have experienced in attracting capital, noting that 61% of global funding for AI startups goes to U.S. companies, 17% to Chinese companies, and just 6% to those in the EU.[44]

Among the Draghi Report’s proposed remedies is to create an “Innovative European Company” statute that would provide a single digital identity valid throughout the EU.[45] This proposal underscores that the report views inconsistent laws as an impediment to fostering startups in the EU. “Innovative European Companies” would have access to harmonized legislation concerning corporate law and insolvency, as well as a few key aspects of labour law and taxation.[46] But in line with France Digitale’s observations, the report also proposes that:

The EU should carry out a thorough impact assessment of the effect of digital and other regulation on small companies, with the aim of excluding SMEs from regulations that only large companies are able to comply with.[47]

The Draghi Report offers this suggestion is made in the context of helping “inventors to become investors” by supporting the transition from invention to commercialization, which the report identifies as one of the EU’s primary comparative weaknesses. Elsewhere, the Draghi Report is more direct in asserting that digital regulations could hinder TSUs and other innovative companies, finding that “we continue to add regulatory burdens onto European companies, which are especially costly for SMEs and self-defeating for those in the digital sectors”.[48] The report also notes that regulatory barriers “to scaling up are particularly onerous in the tech sector, especially for young companies”.[49] Further, the report finds that:

EU regulation imposes a proportionally higher burden on SMEs and small mid-caps than on larger companies, yet the EU lacks a framework to assess these costs. About 80% of Commission Work Programme items are relevant to SMEs but only around half of impact assessments substantially focused on these companies. The EU also lacks a commonly agreed definition of small mid-caps and readily available statistical data.[50]

In her “Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission”,[51] Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need to allow EU TSUs to scale. The guidelines document asserts that:

European companies and start-ups should not be forced to look at the United States, Asia or other markets to finance their expansion. They should be able find what they need to grow here in Europe too.[52]

A key means to help small companies grow and scale is to simplify relevant regulations and alleviate the TSUs’ bureaucratic burden.[53] Indeed, an overarching theme of the Political Guidelines is making business easier by creating a simpler, more coherent legal framework is an overarching theme of Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines.[54] Accordingly, they recommend that:

Each Commissioner will be tasked with focusing on reducing administrative burdens and simplifying implementation: less red tape and reporting, more trust, better enforcement, faster permitting.[55]

The guidelines frame this as a general principle, rather than one meant to apply solely to TSUs. They do, however, appear to recognize that startups and small firms may be disproportionately harmed by the burden of complying with a heavy and overlapping regulatory load.[56] These themes were carried through to the mission letters issued to the new EU commissioners (Mission Letters)[57] and the more recent Compass document.[58]

The Compass, in particular, identifies innovative, disruptive startups as key to European competitiveness.[59] It also highlights concerns raised in the Draghi Report, such as the difficulties startups face in scaling, overcoming regulatory barriers, and accessing capital. [60] In response, the Compass proposes a series of measures, among which is a dedicated startup and scaleup strategy that proposes to “address the obstacles that are preventing new companies from emerging and scaling up”.[61] The strategy would include innovation support and a “28th legal regime” meant to harmonize and simplify applicable rules.[62]

The principles underlying these recent policy statements can also be found in a wide range of past EU policies related to TSUs. These policies have traditionally focused on access to investment capital, creating innovation networks, and building capacity. Some examples include the Start-Up and Scale-Up Initiative (SSI) from 2016, which sought to provide a supportive ecosystem that would help TSUs access capital;[63] the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), which mobilizes private investment in strategic projects;[64] 2021’s Startup Europe project, which looked to strengthen networking opportunities for “deep tech”;[65] the New European Innovation Agenda (2022), which focused on funding scaleups in order to create regional “innovation valleys”, develop a solid talent base, and improve policymaking tools;[66] the European Innovation Council (EIC), whose 2023 work programme included more than €1 billion in funding for startups with breakthrough ideas to help bring their innovations to market;[67] and the recently created European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) Fund of Funds, which commits more than €3.75 billion to support European high-tech companies with late-stage growth capital.[68]

Despite these efforts, however, there remain concerns among the EU’s TSU community. In response to the Commission’s 2023 New European Innovation Agenda and roadmap for startup growth, for example, Stripe published a report exploring whether proposed changes in European policy and regulation addressed key TSUs challenges. It noted that:

The intended benefits [of the EU’s initiatives to improve the regulatory environment] are not yet being felt on the ground. Eighty-three percent of startups believe policymaking is geared toward incumbents and want policymakers to focus on changes that will save them time and money, so they can make the most of limited resources.[69]

It is not surprising that stakeholders continue to argue for the EU to adopt more coherent startup and scaleup strategies.[70] As the Draghi Report noted, many European entrepreneurs:

Prefer to seek financing from US venture capitalists and scale up in the US market. Between 2008 and 2021, close to 30% of the “unicorns” founded in Europe — startups that went on to be valued at over USD billion — relocated their headquarters abroad, with the vast majority moving to the US.[71]

Consistent with these concerns, the European Parliament’s Innovation Resolution [72] called for a range of capacity-building measures that would focus on more traditional needs. But even as it called for comprehensive strategies to deploy innovation enabled by startups, the report suggested that the EU lacks such strategies. Furthermore, if the Innovation Resolution reflects policies that European startups would wish to see prioritized, it is notable that Parliament did not see the Digital Package as the means to achieve those goals. Possible explanations include either that the package fails to address more fundamental challenges that TSUs face, or that it does not provide TSUs with specific opportunities.

B. Evidence that Regulation Can Harm Startups

Regulating digital markets has been a major focus of the EU’s efforts over the past five years. But the Draghi Report, the Letta Report, the Compass, and several other recent policy statements all suggest that EU regulation can be a hurdle for TSUs. The Draghi Report even called for regulators to exercise “self-restraint” and consider “doing less”.[73] The Letta Report adds that the EU’s heavy, “risk-averse” regulatory framework imposes an “unsustainable” burden on startups (e.g., compliance costs for a typical SME in sectors like business services can reach up to €10,000[74]); which the report in turn identifies as a principal hurdle for the future of the Single Market:

Moreover, the tendency – present at all levels in Europe and among Member States following the economic and financial crisis – towards a risk-averse regulatory approach has led to a surplus of overlapping regulations, creating legal uncertainty and imposing substantial compliance costs. This scenario has adversely affected the business environment and economic activities, hitting SMEs the hardest. Thus, addressing these regulatory challenges is not merely a task of reform but a crucial necessity to unlock the full potential of the Single Market.[75]

Indeed, a mounting body of evidence suggests that these fears are not misplaced, and that regulation can lead to significant inefficiencies and unintended consequences. For example, while the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was designed to strengthen data privacy, empirical studies find that it has had significant unintended effects on competition and startup innovation. [76] A study by Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin, and Liad Wagman finds that, within a year of the GDPR’s enforcement, European tech startups experienced a 26.1% drop in monthly venture-funding deals compared to their U.S. counterparts.[77]

This decline in investment was not just a short-term shock. Follow-up analysis by the same authors shows a persisting reduction in the number of funding deals for nascent European tech ventures relative to U.S. counterparts through at least 2020.[78] This contraction in venture-capital investment appears to have been most acute for data-driven startups, as well as new and early-stage startups (ages zero to three years).[79] Business-to-consumer (B2C) businesses also saw more marked declines in the EU.[80] These findings suggest that the GDPR’s compliance burdens—from costly consent requirements to data-handling obligations—disproportionately deterred investment in young, data-centric firms, which are precisely the sorts of startups that European policymakers elsewhere seek to foster.

There is also evidence that the GDPR has disproportionately favoured incumbent firms, thereby increasing market concentration. A study by Garrett A. Johnson, Scott K. Shriver, and Samuel G. Goldberg found that, immediately after the GDPR took effect, websites curtailed their use of third-party digital tools and advertising vendors, dropping many smaller ad-tech providers. The result was a 15% reduction in overall web-technology vendors used for EU visitors and a 17% increase in market concentration among those service providers.[81] In practice, the GDPR prompted websites to rely more on a few large vendors—notably, those owned by Google and Facebook—with resources to comply with the new rules, while cutting ties with smaller analytics and advertising firms:

Google-owned vendors grow from 28.8% to 31.9% of site-vendor pairs in the short run, and Facebook grows from 3.4% to 3.6%.[82]

As Michal S. Gal and Oshrit Aviv put it:

The GDPR limits competition and increases concentration in data and data-related markets, and potentially strengthens large data controllers. It also further reinforces the already existing barriers to data sharing in the EU, thereby potentially reducing data synergies that might result from combining different datasets controlled by separate entities.[83]

These findings were echoed in an empirical study by Chinchih Chen, Carl B. Frey, and Giorgio Presidente, which concludes that:

The GDPR had the unintended consequence of harming the profitability of companies targeting European consumers through the cost channel. Technology firms experienced a 2.1% decline in profits, but not in sales. The GDPR increased extra expenses, added to firms’ wage bills, and accelerated patenting in GDPR-related technology fields. The main burdens have been borne by smaller companies.[84]

Likewise, a paper by Yu Zhao, Pinar Yildirim, & Pradeep K. Chintagunta found that the GDPR led to increased online friction, a growing disparity between large and small firms, and a less-competitive environment.[85] They conclude that:

For policy-makers, our results highlight the unintended consequences of GDPR on consumers and firms. For firms, the post-GDPR environment is anticompetitive as smaller firms see reduced consumer traffic, while for larger domains, both consumer visits and consumer checkouts increase relative to the non-EU benchmark. The higher cost of compliance for smaller domains may have exacerbated the inequality between large and small domains, as evident from the differential effects of GDPR on domain traffic and e-commerce checkout volumes.[86]

These empirical patterns underscore a key unintended consequence: privacy regulation may inadvertently entrench incumbent firms, who can comply at-scale, while raising obstacles for startups that lack similar compliance resources. Indeed, this is consistent with the alarm raised by the Draghi Report, which similarly identifies the GDPR as one of the regulations that has hindered EU companies due to its fragmented implementation.[87] The Draghi Report also cites the GDPR as an example of how compliance burdens, complexity, and inconsistencies among overlapping regulations—such as the GDPR and the AI Act—can undermine advancements in artificial intelligence.[88]

Beyond its effects on investment and competition, some authors have found indications that the GDPR has also slowed innovation output. Rebecca Janssen, Reinhold Kesler, Michael E. Kummer, and Joel Waldfogel identify a “lost generation” of apps in the EU mobile ecosystem following GDPR’s implementation. Using data on 4.1 million Google Play apps, they estimate the GDPR led approximately one-third of existing apps to exit the EU market, and the rate of new app entries fell by roughly half in the subsequent quarters:

When it took effect, GDPR precipitated the exit of over a third of available apps; and following its enactment, the rate of new entry fell by 47.2 percent, in effect creating a lost generation of apps.[89]

The authors show these changes led to significantly less consumer choice and lower usage, effectively reducing consumer surplus by roughly one-third relative to a no-GDPR scenario.[90] In their words:

Whatever the benefits of GDPR’s privacy protection, it appears to have been accompanied by substantial costs to consumers, from a diminished choice set, and to producers from depressed revenue and increased costs.[91]

Other studies reinforce this theme. Klaus M. Miller, Julia Schmitt, and Bernd Skiera find that the GDPR depressed user engagement on websites and that more popular sites lost fewer users, suggesting the regulation diverted activity to dominant platforms:

Our results show that the GDPR negatively affected online usage per website on average; specifically, weekly visits decreased by 4.88% in the first 3 months and 10.02% after 18 months post-enactment. At the 18-month mark, these declines translated into average revenue losses of about $7 million for e-commerce websites and nearly $2.5 million for ad-based websites. Nonetheless, the GDPR’s impact varied across website size, industry, and user origin, with some large websites and industries benefiting from the regulation. Notably, the largest 10% of websites pre-GDPR suffered less, suggesting that the GDPR has increased market concentration.[92]

Together, these empirical studies paint a consistent picture: The GDPR’s well-intended privacy safeguards inadvertently slowed startup innovation and market entry, while diminishing competitive dynamism. The evidence of fewer new firms, reduced product offerings, and users consolidating toward larger providers highlights a key tradeoff: stringent data protection can, and often does, come at the expense of competition and innovation. Policymakers in other areas should weigh these costs against the purported privacy benefits, as the GDPR experience demonstrates how sweeping regulation may create barriers to entry or encourage market exit among small tech firms.

The voices against the GDPR have recently gotten louder, following the EU’s “crusade against overregulation” in light of the Draghi Report.[93] The Commission is now reportedly exploring ways to scale back a law widely regarded as one of “Europe’s most complex pieces of legislation by the technology sector”.[94] The anticipated simplification package would ease reporting requirements for organizations with less than 500 people.[95] As Politico has reported:

For small and cash-strapped businesses, the reams of documentation the GDPR asks companies to produce has long been a gripe. Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath said the key takeaway from a review of the GDPR last summer “is the need for greater support [for] businesses, especially SMEs, in their compliance efforts.”[96]

The regulations that make up the EU’s Digital Package could produce adverse effects similar to those seen with the GDPR. Economic theory suggests that there are reasons to believe the higher compliance costs associated with digital regulations may particularly hamper nascent firms and dampen entrepreneurs’ incentives to pursue new ventures.

For example, building on the political momentum of the GDPR, the EU recently enacted the DMA and DSA, which aim to promote fair competition and safer online spaces, respectively.[97] The DMA targets large online “gatekeeper” platforms with ex-ante obligations—e.g., requiring interoperability and limits on self-preferencing—to ensure “contestable and fair” digital markets in which smaller competitors can thrive. The DSA updates rules for online intermediaries and content moderation, seeking to protect users while harmonizing responsibilities across platforms.

Because both acts are recent, these is not yet much rigorous empirical analysis of their outcomes. EU officials predict these regulations will open new opportunities for startups and scaleups by curbing the allegedly exploitative practices of Big Tech. For instance, the Commission asserts that, under the DMA, “innovators and technology start-ups will have new opportunities to compete… without having to comply with unfair terms and conditions” imposed by dominant platforms.[98]

By seeking to prevent gatekeepers from abusing their market power (e.g., by unfairly blocking access to data or markets), the DMA seeks to level the playing field and enable nascent firms to reach users on more meritocratic terms. Similarly, the DSA’s backers argue that clearer liability and transparency rules for online services will increase trust and safety, which could benefit emerging companies in the long run by improving the online environment for all businesses.

Many observers caution, however, that these new regulations also introduce hurdles for startups, echoing some patterns seen with GDPR. Because the DMA squarely targets the business models of Big Tech firms, there is concern about indirect effects on the startup ecosystem that interacts with those “gatekeepers”. One worry is that restricting large platforms’ behaviour might reduce important avenues for startups, such as acquisitions or platform partnerships.

Venture investors note that many startups see acquisition by a major tech company as a common exit strategy. Thus, if the DMA makes large firms more hesitant or constrained in acquiring emerging competitors (see, e.g., Art 14 DMA), the pool of venture capital and startup valuations in Europe could decline, as investors may anticipate a more difficult path to profitable exits.[99]

The DMA might also stifle TSUs by making gatekeepers’ platforms less attractive to users—such as by, e.g., limiting gatekeepers’ ability to restrict access to the platform. This could degrade platforms’ incentives to innovate and their ability to curate content in ways that maximize the platform’s total value to users.[100] In addition, the DMA’s cumbersome privacy requirements might also reduce competition—not just in advertising, but across the board. As Carmelo Cennamo and Juan Santaló contend:

It does not look like too much of a stretch to assume that the DMA implementation may have similar distortive effects in the targeted advertising markets benefitting some gatekeepers while castigating others. The risk is that in between, the real casualties will be the SMEs (and their direct-to-consumer model). Apps/webpages that have a larger user base can indeed better monitor consumer behavior and offer targeted advertising with a higher ROI than apps with a smaller user base. Overall, this may reinforce the competitive advantage of big players (with direct access to consumer’s data) at the expense of smaller ones. Note hence that the unintended effect of the DMA may be to consolidate the dominant position of big established platforms instead of making digital markets more contestable.[101]

A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) similarly notes that, while the EU intends the DMA to help European tech firms scale up, “a regulatory disabling of U.S. tech giants… could lead to perverse and unintended consequences for European businesses”, potentially benefiting “European incumbents and subsidized Chinese competitors” more than EU startups.[102]

In short, unless the DMA is carefully calibrated, it might protect competitors rather than competition, inadvertently favouring firms that are already mid-sized or well-connected over scrappy young innovators.

For the DSA, the potential burden of compliance is a key concern. The DSA imposes obligations (such as faster removal of illegal content, audits of algorithms, and new transparency requirements) that scale up with a platform’s size (with the most stringent rules for “Very Large Online Platforms”). Even so, smaller startups fear the DSA could add complex compliance costs at-odds with their limited resources. Early commentary has stressed that, if not designed with proportionality, the DSA might force startups to divert precious time and money into content moderation and legal compliance instead of innovation. As a recent GLOBSEC report argued:

The new legislation could add extra hurdle for startups, which will have to deal with complex rules regarding illegal content, regardless of their size and resources. As a result, they would not be able to focus on their core business and grow at the desired pace.[103]

For example, a young platform may struggle if it is expected to “monitor or filter all content users upload” or meet short takedown deadlines across EU jurisdictions.[104] Such requirements could slow a startup’s ability to scale, especially if they need to rapidly hire compliance staff or implement costly filtering technology.

Advocates for startups have therefore argued for graduated obligations and a “sandbox” approach to ensure that new ventures can grow without being immediately crushed by regulatory overhead. It remains to be seen how the DSA will be enforced in practice, but the principle of proportional enforcement will be crucial. As one observer noted, “small startups shouldn’t be penalized just because they don’t have the content monitoring resources of companies like Google or Facebook”.[105]

A common theme in analysing the GDPR, DMA, and DSA is that regulations often have unintended consequences. Empirical studies strongly suggest that well-intentioned regulations can inadvertently hinder competition and innovation, particularly affecting startups and new market entrants. Europe’s experience with the GDPR should serve as a cautionary tale. While it strengthened users’ privacy rights, it also coincided with a decline in venture-capital investment, fewer new market entrants, and increased concentration in various digital sectors.

Startups, which often drive disruptive innovation, appear to have been the most negatively affected by the GDPR, given their reliance on data-driven business models and dependence on external capital.[106] That policymakers did not anticipate these outcomes illustrates the tradeoffs inherent in digital market regulation.[107] As Gal and Aviv observed, the GDPR was enacted with little attention to its potential competitive side effects, which “may well constitute an unintended and unheeded welfare-reducing consequence”.[108]

Unintended effects can include not only dampened startup activity, but also shifts in competitive dynamics that favour the very incumbents that regulations seek to rein in. Large tech firms often have compliance departments and diversified data assets that allow them to adapt to new rules relatively unscathed, while a two-person startup would face a much higher relative cost. This dynamic was evident when GDPR’s implementation drove many small ad-tech vendors out of the European market, reinforcing the dominance of Google and Facebook’s ad services.[109] In the long run, such compliance-driven market concentration can reduce consumer choice and slow the pace of innovation, as fewer new firms attempt to challenge incumbents.[110]

Similar concerns are now being raised about the cumulative impact of the EU’s new digital regulations—the DMA, DSA, and AI Act—on Europe’s startup ecosystem. Many in the tech community stress vigilance to avoid repeating the GDPR’s pitfalls. Surveys of investors already indicate anxiety. For example, most European venture capitalists foresee that expansive regulatory regimes could make EU startups less competitive on the global stage. According to American Edge Project:

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) led to less investment in startups after 2018. Newer regulation such as potential AI rules and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) exacerbate that state of affairs; for instance, it is likely that the recently passed AI legislation will require costly and protracted updates to carve out certain exceptions for some businesses.[111]

Academic research on incentives for innovation also suggests that, if exit opportunities (like acquisitions) are curtailed or compliance costs rise, venture funding and entrepreneurship could shift to less regulated jurisdictions.[112] Ultimately, the challenge for regulators is to strike a balance: safeguarding consumer interests without inadvertently stifling the agile competition that startups provide. The competitive and innovative vitality of digital markets hinges on getting this balance right.

The literature underscores that regulatory interventions must be coupled with careful monitoring and periodic evaluation. If evidence shows a rule is unduly harming startup formation or investment, policymakers may need to adjust thresholds, provide exemptions for small firms, or offer guidance and support to reduce the burden. The EU’s bold regulatory moves will require ongoing assessment to ensure that “fair and open” markets[113] materialize in practice—delivering not only compliance by big platforms, but also more room for Europe’s next generation of startups to grow and compete.

III. Tech Startups’ Place in the EU’s Digital Package

Given the pitfalls of EU digital regulations discussed in the previous section, the question arises whether the Digital Package makes any concessions to TSUs or acknowledges the need to simplify rules and reduce their regulatory burden, as emphasized in the Draghi Report. Such acknowledgements would be a sign that policymakers were cognizant of, and took measures to avert, the sorts of unintended consequences discussed above.

In this section we survey the impact statements for the rules that comprise the EU’s Digital Package, which reveal varying degrees of acknowledgment and interest on the part of the regulations’ drafters for the position of TSUs. The following sub-sections assess each of the Digital Package’s regulations individually.

A. Digital Markets Act

The DMA has primary objectives, which are set out in Art. 1:

To ensure contestability and fairness for the markets in the digital sector in general, and for business users and end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers. Contestability relates to “the ability of undertakings to effectively overcome barriers to entry and expansion and challenge the gatekeeper on the merits of their products and services.[114] (emphasis added)

“Fairness”, in turn, relates to:

…an imbalance between the rights and obligations of business users where the gatekeeper obtains a disproportionate advantage. Market participants … should have the ability to adequately capture the benefits resulting from their innovative or other efforts.[115]

Overall, the obligations placed on the DMA’s designated gatekeepers are intended to lower entry barriers into the incumbents’ core and adjacent markets, thereby making it easier for TSUs to compete. The DMA aims to create new opportunities for TSUs to monetize products and services when on gatekeeper platforms by ensuring increased visibility in search rankings or product listings; enhanced ability to improve products and services through user consent, data portability, and interoperability to key services and access to APIs;[116] and to ensure better terms and conditions.[117]

One European SME lobby group noted:

For innovative SMEs, the DMA will finally create the space and level playing field they need to be competitive … For business users, this would mean being able to offer their services without being forced to comply with unfair terms and conditions forcing them to innovate according to the rules dictated by the gatekeepers.[118]

EU policymakers have frequently cited startups as key beneficiaries of the DMA. At the same time, however, the DMA’s substantive provisions do not meaningfully address TSUs. One possible exception is the act’s the high quantitative thresholds, which effectively exempt most companies—including TSUs—from the obligation to comply with the DMA. Unlike “gatekeepers”, TSUs are not required to share their infrastructure, resources, investments, or competitive advantages with third parties.

Another possible exception is Art. 14, which requires gatekeepers to inform the European Commission of any planned merger or acquisition involving a core platform service—or, indeed, any other services that enable data collection.[119] Art. 14 DMA also requires the Commission to inform national competition authorities of such transactions. The Commission can also claim jurisdiction over such transactions from a national competition authority, regardless of either the transaction value or the target company’s turnover, by triggering the referral mechanism in Art. 22 of the EU Merger Regulation.[120] This includes circumstances in which the Commission “invites” national authorities to make such a referral.

While none of the DMA’s provisions include elements expressly specific to TSUs, Art. 53 DMA establishes that, when evaluating whether the law’s aims have been achieved, the European Commission must assess not only whether regulated markets are contestable and fair, but also the impact “on business users, especially SMEs, and end users”.

The Commission’s impact assessment for the DMA (DMA IA) likewise offered little in the way of specific focus on TSUs, but it did state that “an ex ante measure which explicitly seeks to address unfair contract terms and prevent foreclosure, should provide benefits to a multitude of small businesses and start-up companies, and in turn to their employees and customers”.[121] The DMA IA further opined that SMEs would benefit from the law creating a more “innovative and competitive business environment”. The impact assessment concluded that the benefits flowing to SMEs, startups, and consumers were likely to substantially exceed the measure’s costs of the measure. David J. Teece and Henry J. Kahwaty, however, characterized these conclusions as little more than conjecture, unsupported by academic research or empirical analysis and “inconsistent with many tenets of the literature on the management of innovation”.[122]

For its part, the EU Council credits the DMA with “promoting innovation and a fairer online platform environment for technology start-ups” and “[making] it easier for smaller companies and start-ups to enter the digital market, innovate and compete”.[123] Recital 8 of the DMA offers claims that the regulation will make the economy (in general) and consumers (in particular) better off, even as it explicitly disavows economic efficiency and consumer welfare as relevant factors in delineating permissible and impermissible conduct.[124]

Claims that the DMA will benefit startups more likely reflects politically expedient language, rather than a firm legal commitment or a cognizable antitrust harm. In this way, they are typical of EU policy documents. The Commission’s Annual Reports on Competition Policy, for example, often make broad claims that competition policy has contributed to all or most of the EU’s strategic goals and priorities.[125]

Of course, the DMA could have gone further. Various provisions in the act acknowledge SMEs’ specific interests,[126] despite the lack of provisions that specifically promote those interests. There is likewise a paucity of Commission documents detailing how the DMA would foster the needs of TSUs, as distinct from the interests of other players. [127] While it is asserted that TSUs will benefit from the opportunities the DMA would create, on the question of how much weight their interests should be granted relative to end users, business users, competitors, or consumers, the DMA is silent.

Perhaps the answer can be found in the DMA’s measures of success: the yardsticks used to measure the DMA’s effects could reveal what outcomes the new regulation seeks to achieve.[128] But what makes measuring the DMA’s impact on TSUs difficult is that the act does not dictate any specific market outcome. As Director-General of Competition Olivier Guersent has noted: “DMA obligations create opportunities rather than prescribe market outcomes”.[129] In other words, once gatekeepers comply with their DMA obligations, they are not, in principle, responsible for competitors’ or users’ decisions. Guersent further noted that:

The scale of the impact of DMA will also depend on the take up of the newly created opportunities by market players, and/or the switching by end-users to alternative service providers.[130]

This is consistent with the DMA’s review provision (Art. 53). The article focuses on assessing the law’s impact against its original objectives, which were to ensure contestability and fairness for core-platform-services users and competitors. Alas, improvements in contestestability would need to be measured to be accounted for, and the law ostensibly fails to prescribe any particular outcomes. An additional difficulty in measuring fairness and contestability is that entry and expansion are affected by factors well beyond the gatekeepers’ control—such as, e.g., access to capital or skilled labour.[131]

B. Digital Services Act

The DSA imposes obligations on very large online platforms to actively mitigate illegal activities and the spread of harmful products.[132] The act covers online intermediaries and platforms such as marketplaces, social networks, content-sharing platforms, app stores, and online travel and accommodation platforms. According to the European Commission, the DSA’s goals are to foster innovation, growth, and competitiveness, and to facilitate “the scaling up of smaller platforms, SMEs and start-ups”.[133]

The Commission’s DSA impact assessment (DSA IA) concluded that the regulations “are expected to have a positive impact on competitiveness, innovation and investment in digital services, in particular European Union start-ups and scale-ups proposing platform business models” and that “the legal certainty provided by the intervention would likely encourage investments in European Union companies”.[134] The European Parliament also noted that ex-ante regulatory remedies on the largest online platforms had “the potential to open up markets to new entrants, including SMEs, entrepreneurs, and start-ups, thereby promoting consumer choice and driving innovation beyond what can be achieved by competition law enforcement alone”.[135]

To date, however, it appears that the DSA’s primary benefit for startups is that microenterprises and small enterprises are excluded from compliance obligations.[136] This follows from the DSA IA, which noted that:

Legal burdens [resulting from national regulation of online platforms and online intermediaries at national level] create new barriers in the internal market and lead to high direct and opportunity costs, notably for SMEs, including innovative start-ups and scale-ups. This leads to a competitive advantage for the established very large platforms and digital services, which can more easily tackle higher regulatory compliance costs, and further limits the ability of newcomers to challenge these large digital platforms.[137]

To avoid imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller firms, Art. 15(2) DSA excludes microenterprises and small companies that provide intermediary services from the annual content-moderation reporting obligation. Similarly, Art. 29 DSA exempts these firms from obligations to enable consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders. Art. 19 DSA adds additional exemptions, such as setting up an effective internal-complaint-handling system.[138]

The DSA also extends the exemptions to relatively small enterprises that provide online platforms and have scaled to the point that they no longer qualify as microenterprises or small enterprise under Recommendation 2003/361/EC. Under Art. 19 DSA, such entities continue to benefit from the exemptions for 12 months following the loss of that status (unless they are designated as very large online platforms under Art. 33 DSA). Extending the period during which companies can retain SME status aims to address startups’ concerns about losing protection if they scale up.[139]

As with the DMA, the European Commission is required in its formal evaluation to review scope of DSA obligations on small enterprises and microenterprises.[140] But the DSA goes further than the DMA in requiring the Commission to undertake (by 18 February 2027) a separate and targeted impact assessment of the DSA “on the potential effect of this Regulation on the development and economic growth of small and medium-sized enterprises”.[141] One could therefore argue that the DSA is more sensitive to TSUs’ needs in that it addresses two of their core concerns: compliance costs and the dynamic nature of the transition from startup to scaleup, on the one hand, and requiring the Commission to conduct an SME-specific review, on the other. By contrast, this language is lacking in the DMA.

C. The Data Act

The EU’s Data Act[142] aims to facilitate the seamless transfer of valuable nonpersonal or industrial data within the EU by creating a legal framework on permissible data sharing. It includes several provisions specifically related to SMEs, including microenterprises and startups. This is especially noteworthy, as high-quality data is a critical resource for startups and SMEs to better understand both their own products or services and their customers. The Data Act notes that:

In sectors characterised by the presence of microenterprises, small enterprises and medium-sized enterprises … there is often a lack of digital capacities and skills to collect, analyse and use data, and access is frequently restricted where one actor holds them in the system or due to a lack of interoperability between data, between data services or across borders.[143]

The Data Act also notes that “start-ups, small enterprises … struggle to obtain access to relevant data”.[144] The Data Act therefore aims to “facilitate access to data for those entities, while ensuring that the corresponding obligations are as proportionate as possible to avoid overreach”. [145]

Among the Data Act provisions specific to microenterprises or small enterprises are that the various B2C and B2B data-sharing obligations outlines in Chapter 2[146] do not apply to data generated through the use of connected products manufactured or designed by a microenterprise or small enterprise, or related services provided by such enterprises.[147] Recital 41 clarifies that: “Given the current state of technology, it would be overly burdensome on microenterprises and small enterprises to impose further design obligations in relation to connected products manufactured or designed, or the related services provided, by them”.[148]

As with the DSA, a 12-month grace period is applied to enterprises that have grown from a microenterprise or small enterprise to a medium-sized enterprise, thus allowing them to adjust and prepare before facing market competition for services related to the connected products. This period is not available, however, where a newly medium-sized enterprise has a large investor.

Art. 9, which covers compensation principles for making data available, limits costs for data recipients that are SMEs (as well as not-for-profit research organizations). Such firms and organizations can only be asked to pay for costs directly related to making the relevant data available—i.e., the costs necessary for formatting, dissemination, and storage (per Art. 9(2)(a)). Following Recital 49, this is necessary “to protect SMEs from excessive economic burdens which would make it commercially too difficult for them to develop and run innovative business models”.

Recital 49 also recognizes that there may be “directly related costs” attributable to tailoring data to specific SME requests, such as the costs of necessary technical interfaces, software, and connectivity required on a permanent basis by the data holder.[149] Recital 51 stresses the need for price transparency and requires the data holder to provide sufficiently detailed information to the SME for the calculation of the compensation to ensure that the data holder’s compensation request is reasonable.[150] While 12-month grace period excludes medium-sized entities, thereby benefiting startups and scaleups, the provisions concerning costs do also cover medium-sized enterprises.

The Data Act also imports the “gatekeeper” notion from the DMA and excludes designated gatekeepers from benefiting from the act’s data-access rights on the basis that “[s]uch inclusion would also likely limit the benefits of this Regulation for SMEs, linked to the fairness of the distribution of data value across market actors”.[151]

Art. 15 Data Act, concerning entities with an “exceptional need to use data”, allows public-sector and certain European Union entities (the Commission, European Central Bank, and various EU bodies) to access data when performing their duties in public-emergency situations. Under Art. 20(1)(a), access to such data is generally to be provided free of charge. The Data Act acknowledges that these data-access provisions create a burden on businesses, including microenterprises and small enterprises. Thus, the obligation to provide data in public-emergency situations is limited to those circumstances in which public-sector or EU bodies have exhausted all other means at their disposal to obtain such data “in a timely and effective manner under equivalent conditions” (Art. 15(1)(b)(ii)) and Recital 63).

Art. 20(2) Data Act allows for limited compensation in circumstances not covered by Art. 20(1)(a), but for most entities, this would apply only for nonpersonal data and where technical and organizational costs were incurred to comply with the request—e.g., the costs of anonymization, pseudonymization, aggregation, and/or technical adaptation, plus a “reasonable margin”. Art. 20(3) does, however, note that the fair-compensation requirements “shall also apply where a microenterprise and small enterprise claims compensation for making data available” to public-sector or EU bodies, as the obligation to provide data “might constitute a considerable burden” for these smaller entities.[152]

In addition, the Data Act also aims to create a framework for customers to effectively switch between different cloud-services providers. On the latter point, the impact assessment for the Data Act Impact (DA IA) notes that: “SMEs and start-ups would be the greatest beneficiaries from an intervention on cloud switching, as users of cloud and edge services but also as providers of such services”.[153] This is, the DA IA asserts, because regulatory intervention to facilitate cloud switching across the EU would most benefit high-tech SMEs and startups, given the technical problems associated with a lack of standardization (e.g., application portability). In addition, according to the DA IA, “the smaller, often EU-native providers of cloud and edge services will benefit most” from intervention on cloud switching, because they generally lack the resources to move their digital assets to new platforms, as these often use proprietary standards.[154]

Chapter IV of the Data Act makes certain contract terms related to data access unenforceable. Among the areas where this would apply are terms governing contractual liability and remedies for breach or termination of data-related obligations “unilaterally” imposed by one of the parties—e.g., terms that exclude or limit the liability or the remedies, or that grant the exclusive right to determine whether the data supplied data conform with the terms of the contract. As explained in Recital 58, the Data Act seeks to prevent the exploitation of contractual imbalances that “harm all enterprises without a meaningful ability to negotiate the conditions for access to data, and which may have no choice but to accept take-it-or-leave-it contractual terms”.[155]

Recital 111 calls on the Commission to help enterprises draft and negotiate contracts and develop nonbinding model contractual terms, which “should be primarily a practical tool to help in particular SMEs to conclude a contract”.[156] This provision stems from the public-consultation finding that “microenterprises and SMEs ranked ‘unfair contract terms’ second amongst the main difficulties for companies when requesting access to data” and that “contractual imbalances between data holders and data requestors affect, in particular, SMEs and start-ups”.[157]

The scope of the Data Act’s SME provisions is based on the European Parliament’s SME Recommendation definition. A lingering question is whether the rights and obligations contained within the Data Act would be materially different if the SME Recommendation included a specific definition of startup, as called for by various EU bodies. TSUs clearly have different needs than other SMEs, including access to high-quality data; their high levels of collaboration, open systems, and interoperability; and the expectation that continued rapid growth will require significant investment. The Data Act does include provisions to address some of these issues—e.g., excluding microenterprises and small enterprises from data-sharing obligations, minimizing the cost of acquiring data, and providing a 12-month grace period after a microenterprise or small enterprise grows to a medium-sized enterprise. But whether these are provisions are sufficient is another matter altogether.

Of course, the Data Act should be seen in the broader context of the EU’s 2020 European Strategy for Data[158], of which it is one pillar, as is the Data Governance Act. The Strategy for Data recognizes that data “is an essential resource for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing products and services”, given existing market imbalances in firms’ access to and use of data. The strategy does provide some relief for TSUs, most notably in making more public data accessible.

Interestingly, the European Parliament’s recent calls for action to support European SMEs do not focus on the Digital Package. For example, in discussing market access and competition, the Parliament did not touch on digital market competition per se, but noted that it was “of the view that regulatory mechanisms must adapt to and evolve in sync with technological advancements and market shifts to uphold competitiveness and innovation, especially in relation to European start-ups”.[159] The only notable reference was one that called on the Commission to “ensure the harmonised and effective implementation of recent digital regulations”. The Parliament also called on the Commission and member states to foster a European-led ecosystem of marketplaces for nonpersonal data.[160]

D. The Artificial Intelligence Act

The EU’s AI Act[161] applies obligations to providers and users of artificial-intelligence systems, with the goal of balancing AI innovation with ensuring that AI systems are ethical and trustworthy, and that they respect EU values and fundamental rights. The act prohibits the implementation and use of AI systems that present unacceptable risks; permits the use of AI systems that present high risks, subject to compliance with specific requirements and obligations; and allows the use of limited-risk systems subject to transparency obligations. By establishing a regulatory framework for AI systems, the AI Act aims to provide legal certainty and enhance the deployment of trustworthy AI solutions.

Given their important role in the European innovation ecosystem, the AI Act aims to safeguard the interests of startups and SMEs.[162] As the Draghi Report notes, between 2008 and 2021, there were 147 “unicorns” founded in Europe—i.e., startups valued at more than $1 billion. But of these, 40 relocated their headquarters abroad, with the vast majority moving to the United States.[163] The report found that “the lack of growth potential in Europe is particularly relevant for tech-based innovative ventures, and even more so for deep tech ones”, adding that 61% of total global funding for AI startups goes to U.S. companies, 17% to those in China, and just 6% to those in the EU.[164]

The Commission’s impact assessment for the AI Act (AI IA) offers several salient points relevant to these issues. It recognizes, for example, that “without a clear legal framework, start-ups and developers working in this field will not be able to attract the required investments. Similarly, without certainty on applicable rules and clear common standards on what is required for a trustworthy, safe and lawful AI, developers and providers of AI systems and other innovators are less likely to pursue developments in this field”.[165] In particular, the AI Act highlighted the fragmented regulatory landscape across the AI single market as a key problem. The impact assessment noted that:

The impact of this increasing fragmentation is disproportionately affecting small companies. This is because large companies, especially global ones, can spread the additional costs for operating across an increasingly fragmented single market over their larger sales, especially when they already have established a dominant position in some markets. Meanwhile, SMEs and start-ups which do not have the market power or the same resources may be deterred from entering the markets of other Member States and thus fail to profit from the single market. This problem is further exacerbated since big tech players have not only a technological advantage but also exclusive access to large and quality data necessary for the development of AI.[166]

The AI Act creates compliance burdens, including for TSUs, but it also contains measures and protections intended to benefit TSUs.[167] The act’s TSU-specific provisions include:

  • Recital 73 notes the importance of taking the interests of small-scale providers and users of AI systems into account, with an emphasis on capacity building and setting appropriate conformity-assessment fees. For example, given translation-related costs, the recital proposes that EU member states should chose documentation language “which is broadly understood by the largest possible number of cross-border users”.
  • The act promotes regulatory sandboxing schemes to experiment with various AI applications. Recital 72 states: “Regulatory sandboxes should be widely available throughout the Union, and particular attention should be given to their accessibility for SMEs, including startups”. Recital 72 also notes that “The objectives of the regulatory sandboxes should be to foster AI innovation by establishing a controlled experimentation and testing environment in the development and pre-marketing phase with a view to ensuring compliance of the innovative AI systems with this Regulation and other relevant Union and Member States legislation; to enhance legal certainty for innovators and the competent authorities’ oversight and understanding of the opportunities, emerging risks and the impacts of AI use … and to accelerate access to markets, including by removing barriers for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups”.
  • 55 requires member states to grant eligible small-scale providers and startups priority access to AI regulatory sandboxes. It also promotes applying the AI Act in ways tailored to the needs of small-scale providers and users. These would include support for capacity-building efforts; facilitating networking among small providers, users, and other innovators; and encouraging SMEs to participate in the development of standards. Finally, it asserts that small-scale providers’ specific interests and needs should be considered when a relevant national body sets fees for conformity assessment, reducing those fees proportionately to the TSU’s size and the size of the market.
  • The Council and Parliament agreed to a new Art. 55a that would permit certain derogations for specific operators—notably, that qualifying microenterprises (as defined by SME Recommendation 2003/361) may fulfil elements of the quality-management system under Art. 17 in order “to ensure proportionality considering the very small size of some operators regarding costs of innovation”.[168] The article directs the Commission to develop guidelines specifying how microenterprises could fulfil the elements of the quality-management system in this simplified manner. In developing guidelines, the article directs the Commission to consider microenterprises’ needs without affecting the overall level of protection provided by the AI Act or the compliance requirements for high-risk AI systems.
  • 71 AI Act requires EU member states to set out rules on penalties—including administrative fines—for infringement of the act, as well as to ensure that they are properly and effectively implemented. Art. 71 notes that such penalties must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, but that such penalties “shall take into account the interests of SMEs including start-ups and their economic viability”.
  • Finally, under new Art. 34a, the relevant “notified bodies” responsible for administering the AI Act at the national level—such as verifying conformity by high-risk AI systems—should avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on providers. This is to include taking due account of their size, the sector in which they operate, their structure, and the degree of complexity of the AI system in question. It further establishes that “[p]articular attention shall be paid to minimising administrative burdens and compliance costs for micro and small enterprises as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC”.

The Commission’s January 2024 Communication on Boosting Startups and Innovation in Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence[169] offered a broader TSU policy framework around the AI Act, laying out the “actions and investments in 2024 that will help startups and industries in Europe fulfil their potential of becoming global frontrunners in trustworthy advanced AI models, systems and applications”. The communication focused on six principal areas of action:

  1. To facilitate access to European supercomputers that can accelerate the training of AI models (“AI factories”) to “bolster the leadership of European startups and stimulate the emergence of competitive AI ecosystems in the Union”.[170] This would include access to data storage, given the prohibitive expense of large commercial cloud-computing resources;
  2. To facilitate access to high-quality data, leveraging the Data Act and accelerating the development of Common European Data Spaces;
  3. To support trustworthy AI solutions;
  4. To strengthen the EU’s generative-AI talent pool;
  5. To promote the widespread uptake and use of generative-AI applications, notably by public bodies; and
  6. To encourage public and private investment in AI startups and scaleups, leveraging existing instruments like the European Innovation Council and InvestEU that are designed to de-risk and crowd-in private investors.

The framework’s objective is to ensure sufficient investment in the training of AI models, to accelerate the deployment of advanced AI solutions, and to scale up European TSU activities in ways that would enable them to become globally competitive. The communication stresses the Commission’s desire to empower AI TSUs to compete “confidently” on the global stage.[171]

The Commission also published a staff working document (SWD) that sets out an EU initiative on the next technological transition on Web 4.0 and virtual worlds.[172] The SWD notes that: “Web 4.0 SMEs and start-ups in the EU are also faced with a fragmented ecosystem, which leads to challenges in establishing collaborations, sharing knowledge and best practices within the sector. The lack of awareness and visibility of actors along the value chains is a major issue for cooperation. This hinders innovation and leads to other difficulties such as finding the right partner to set up consortia for calls, an issue particularly relevant for securing EU funding. Addressing these issues would build stronger collaborations across hubs and borders”.[173]

The framework proposes a broad range of measures to support AI startups and innovation, including a proposal to provide privileged access to the network of European high-performance computers, reconfigured for rapid machine learning and training large general-purpose AI models. It also envisions the launch of AI factories to support the development, testing, evaluation, and validation of large-scale AI models. These facilities would serve as one-stop shops for AI startups to create advanced AI models and applications.

In addition, the framework proposes that financial support will be provided through EU instruments like Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe Programme, mobilizing about €4 billion in additional public and private investment by 2027. It received a cautious welcome from the EU startup community.[174]

IV. The EU’s Digital Package: What’s in It for Tech Startups?

What we notice in reviewing the EU’s Digital Package is a very mixed bag for TSU interests—bearing in mind that what TSUs need, at a bare minimum, is a reduced compliance burden. This may explain why TSU lobbyists do not generally focus on the recent package of European digital regulations, nor have they often found it necessary to touch on topics related to those regulations.

A. The Digital Markets Act

While the specific interests of SMEs are acknowledged in various parts of the DMA, there are no provisions that would specifically promote the interests of SMEs, let alone startups or entrepreneurs. As discussed in Section III, the principal provision related to designated gatekeepers’ obligations vis-à-vis TSUs is laid down in Art. 14 DMA, though it remains unclear whether that provision will have the intended effect of encouraging the emergence and expansion of TSUs.

Pursuant to Art. 14 DMA, designated gatekeepers must inform the Commission of any intended merger or acquisition involving a gatekeeper’s core platform services—or, indeed, any other services in the digital sector or that entail the collection of data. Art. 14 DMA’s obligation to furnish information to the Commission, coupled with the requirement that the Commission inform national competition authorities of such transactions, effectively allows the EU to seek jurisdiction over the merger no matter how low the transaction value or turnover of the target company. The obligation is enabled through a broad reading of the referral mechanism in Art. 22 of the EU Merger Regulation,[175] under which the Commission can “invite” national authorities to refer mergers with a national scope to the Commission’s jurisdiction.

Assuming Art. 14 remains in place following the European Court of Justice’s Illumina/Grail ruling, which curtailed the Commission’s ability to review mergers that fall below the national-notification thresholds,[176] the Commission’s 2021 Guidance on Art. 22 offers insight into how it might approach a review initiated under Art. 14 DMA.

The Commission’s guidance notes an increase in acquisitions of companies that generate little or no turnover, which it asserts “appear[s] particularly significant in the digital economy, where services regularly launch with the aim of building up a significant user base and/or commercially valuable data inventories, before seeking to monetise the business”.[177] The Commission also provided an illustrative list of cases that will normally be appropriate for a referral under Art. 22, including cases where the undertaking “is a start-up or recent entrant with significant competitive potential that has yet to develop or implement a business model generating significant revenues (or is still in the initial phase of implementing such business model)”. Other relevant considerations include circumstances in which the target is an important innovator; is conducting potentially important research; provides key inputs for others; or has access to significant assets, such as data or intellectual-property rights.[178]

The DMA’s transaction-notification requirements should be seen in the context of concerns about a supposed trend toward rising concentration in digital markets and active acquisition strategies by larger digital players that are alleged to include seeking to buy “promising, innovative start-ups”. As Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson has noted, “[w]hile many observers have dubbed these ‘killer acquisitions’, these are often more like zombie acquisitions: the innovation of the start-up is not killed off, but incorporated into the powerful digital platform”.[179]

In any event, some commentators have speculated that, given these new powers, the Commission may be expected to review more mergers in the digital sector.[180] Indeed, the Commission noted in its SWD on the EU initiative on Web 4.0 and virtual worlds that:

While there are many SMEs and start-ups that are developing innovative and creative technology, the global market is dominated by a small number of large companies accountable for most developments. It is quite common practice that SMEs and start-ups in the EU are acquired by non-EU bigger players, formally removing EU companies from the overall ecosystem. This phenomenon prevents companies from growing and scaling-up in the EU and further exacerbates the challenges linked to accessing funding.[181]

Art. 14 DMA would thus appear intended to limit acquisitions by gatekeepers, in a bid to encourage the independent expansion of homegrown (European) TSUs. This approach could backfire, however, and end up stifling the same TSUs it aims to foster. For example, in the context of TSUs active in the AI space, Tomada suggests that mergers and acquisition between TSUs and larger players should be encouraged “so that the established businesses can buy out or absorb the small-business innovative activity thereby taking over all related conformity requirements and responsibilities”.[182]

It has also been suggested that the anticompetitive threat of so-called “killer acquisitions” in digital markets has been greatly exaggerated[183] and, furthermore, that such transactions are often procompetitive.[184] Recent policy statements indicate that the Commission holds a different view.[185]

Emblematic of the tension between startups’ exit strategies and proposals for an enhanced merger-control regime was a 2020 French parliamentary debate to consider amendments to the French competition act’s merger-review provisions.[186] The amendments would have granted power to the French competition authority to designate certain large players as being of “structural” importance. Thereafter, such players would be required to inform the authority of any planned transaction, including those below existing merger thresholds. In the event the authority were to investigate a transaction and express serious concerns, while there would still be an in-depth review, a presumption of anticompetitive effect would apply. The company would have had the burden to disprove the presumption and demonstrate the procompetitive nature of the transaction. The law did not come into effect only because it was superseded by the DMA.

The French parliamentary debate offers some insight into the thinking that underpins the desire to have gatekeeper-like firms undergo closer scrutiny of their transactions. During the debate, Cédric O—the secretary of state to the minister of the economy responsible for digital affairs—discussed broader concerns related to startups.[187] He bemoaned the lack of startup growth and investment in Europe, compared to the United States and China, and acknowledged that much was left to be done for startups to be able to achieve. O further argued that France and Europe needed to create the fiscal, regulatory, and investment conditions that would allow new champions to emerge: “our very own Google and Facebook”.[188] The startup question was thus considered an issue of economic sovereignty for the French government. This was the context to grant the competition authority more powers to prohibit “predatory acquisitions” by “certain platforms”—i.e., non-European, mostly U.S.-based firms.

The secretary argued that a key question for French startups was their market-exit strategy, noting that 90% of startups in the digital economy were ultimately subject to takeovers. He recognized that, if Europe’s global ecosystem was to grow, there was little choice in the short and medium term but see digital startups bought by foreign buyers, partly because large European incumbents are rarely acquisitive. O noted that, while many regret that French startups are often bought out by U.S. companies, he also regretted that he could not force French companies to buy them back. O also suggested encouraging these startups to be listed on the stock exchange.

The French government proposed a bill to limit French startups’ exit strategies, knowing that acquisition is one of the principal methods upon which startups and their investors rely.[189] Indeed, many TSUs and startups are created with the specific goal of being acquired by an incumbent.[190] Yet the French government did not propose how to fill the investment gap that would be created if the usual acquirers were prohibited or disincentivized from offering an exit strategy.

The EU’s approach with the DMA appears to hinge on the same questionable assumption—namely, that inhibiting acquisitions of EU startups is the optimal strategy to nurture their growth. This stance, however, risks eliminating a crucial exit strategy for these startups, which could ultimately undermine their ability to thrive in the competitive global market.

The Draghi Report underscores a pressing requirement for EU TSUs: increased investment and better access to capital. By restricting acquisition opportunities, the DMA might inadvertently stifle investor interest and diminish the potential for these startups to scale and become European TSUs. Instead of fostering a robust ecosystem for innovation, such regulations could lead to the opposite outcome—reducing the number of successful European TSUs capable of competing on a global scale. In this sense, it seems that the DMA is more concerned with hobbling gatekeepers than enhancing TSUs.[191]

B. The Digital Services Act

The DSA does not contain substantive TSU-focused provisions. Indeed, the European Parliament argued for specific measures to protect smaller players and proposed that:

The DSA should put forward a proposal for a new separate instrument aiming at ensuring that the systemic role of specific online platforms will not endanger the internal market by unfairly excluding innovative new entrants, including SMEs, entrepreneurs and start-ups, thereby reducing consumer choice.[192]

This was not, however, taken up in the final text.

The DSA’s main TSU focus is to shield microenterprises and small enterprises from disproportionate compliance burdens—such as, e.g., the annual content-moderation reporting obligation for intermediary service providers and online-platform service providers. There is consensus that startups and their investors must have the ability to assess regulatory costs, given that such costs can be prohibitive, with legal risks having “a chilling effect on investment and [ability to] dissuade businesses from expanding and growing in the single market-ups”.[193]

The DSA extends these exemptions to TSUs that have scaled up beyond the definition of microenterprise or small enterprise for 12 months following the loss of that status, thereby acknowledging TSUs’ tendency for “hyper-growth”. It is likely that a formal TSU definition would help the Commission to provide even more responsive protections for scaling TSU, which might include an exemption beyond the 12-month time horizon. It might therefore seem that the DSA is a step in the right direction, although the lack of focus or legal definition continues to hamper TSU interests.

Moreover, it has been argued that “The DSA still operates with complex compliance obligations that will heighten entry barriers in comparison with other parts of the world” and that the additional operational costs imposed by European digital regulations could result in TSUs choosing non-EU states to establish their business (an “innovation-cooling effect”), thereby depriving European users of the latest digital solutions and platform services. [194]

C. The Data Act

Like the DSA, the Data Act contains several provisions specifically responsive to TSU needs, including reduced compliance and cost burdens on SMEs, microenterprises, and startups. This includes TSUs, as data recipients would only be asked to pay data providers for costs directly related to making data available.

The Data Act offers further protections to TSUs as data providers, making contractual terms unilaterally imposed on them unenforceable. This provision follows in the wake of SMEs and microenterprises ranking unfair contract terms as second among the major difficulties they face when requesting access to data. The Data Act also excludes SMEs from various data-sharing obligations considered overly burdensome. In addition, TSUs are entitled to fair compensation if obliged to provide data to certain public bodies under the “exceptional need” provision (whereas other data providers receive only limited compensation). While this is welcome, it is notable that, as France Digitale member Mirakl, noted: “every new digital legislation is costing us a million euro, obliging us to do a trade-off between compliance and innovation”.[195]

As with the DSA, TSUs remain covered by the SME definition for 12 months after they grow beyond that category. But as France Digitale noted, TSUs’ tendency for “hyper-growth” means that they can quickly find themselves facing the requirement to abide by the same standards as larger established companies without having the capacity or maturity to manage such compliance burdens.[196]

D. The AI Act

In its provisions prioritizing TSUs’ access to national AI sandboxes, building AI capacity, requiring sensitivity to TSU interests when codes of conduct are developed, and showing sensitivity to costs and fine levels, the AI Act goes well beyond the other acts in the EU’s Digital Package. The AI Act permits certain derogations or simplifications for qualifying TSUs and reduces conformity-assessment fees for small-scale providers. Administrative bodies are asked to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on TSUs, and any penalties imposed must consider TSUs’ interests and their economic viability (although the latter merely reflects the principle of proportionality).

Yet the AI Act is not devoid of criticism. Tomada believes the act’s regulatory-compliance requirements for running high-risk AI systems will pose particular challenges for TSUs, and that “both the administrative and organisational costs and the time required to undergo the conformity assessment procedure may hinder the process from ideation to deployment, and this can be particularly challenging for small scale businesses”.[197] Cristiano Codagnone and Linda Weigl posit that the AI Act will create more obstacles for innovative SMEs than for large incumbents. [198] They highlight “the impression that there is an excessive reliance on regulation without a thorough appraisal of the costs imposed on businesses to deal with administrative burden, conformity tests, and audits” on TSUs.[199]

Tomada also notes that the act’s provisions to support TSUs “may not be sufficient for comprehensively supporting the business in undergoing the entire cumbersome procedure that will enable its product or service to reach the market”.[200]  In addition, a considerable penalty or risk thereof may well cause the business to fail or even impede their access to the market”.[201] She predicts that the act’s failure to address a range of TSU-specific concerns will likely mean that “small-businesses will likely keep being discouraged from deploying their AI innovations in light of the risks of considerable penalties and liability they still may face”.[202]

The EU’s AI Continent Action Plan, published in April 2025, recognizes the need to simplify rules to enable startups to scale and grow—especially the AI Act.[203] Among the measures proposed are an AI Act Service Desk, specifically to serve the needs of smaller AI-solution providers and deployers by offering practical advice to understand and comply with the act;[204] a public consultation to identify areas where regulatory uncertainty might hinder the development and adoption of AI, particularly for smaller companies;[205] and other simplification measures meant to streamline procedures and facilitate compliance (e.g., templates, webinars, guidance, etc.).[206]

It is apparent from these measures that the Commission is aware that compliance with the AI Act may divert significant resources from TSUs and stifle their development. Whether the simplification measures contemplated in the AI Continent Action Plan will ultimately work is an open question. But the fact that the Commission is already seeking to ease the regulatory burden on startups less than a year after the act’s adoption suggests that EU regulators are not only aware of this burden but acknowledge its potentially serious impact. Conversely, it also suggests that these tradeoffs are given insufficient consideration during the inception stages of major European regulations.

V. Conclusion

This white paper explores whether the EU’s recent package of digital regulations responds to TSUs’ needs. The answer appears to be that there is a high level of heterogeneity, with some acts attempting to address TSU-specific concerns and others barely acknowledging them.

One aspect that the acts in the Digital Package have in common is that they all generally provide some carveouts for SMEs to assuage their regulatory and compliance burdens. These range from the DMA only applying to large “gatekeepers” to the more comprehensive pro-startup provisions laid down in the AI Act. Of course, the more targeted a regulation is to a particular sector or sectors—as in the case of the AI Act—the easier it is for the European Commission to develop provisions that support TSUs.

Despite the various TSU-related carveouts, European policy regarding startups and innovation more generally continue to be undermined by the Digital Package’s many contradictions. These both hinder coherent efforts to support SMEs and increase compliance burdens for TSUs and other firms, all of which may harm competition, investment, and innovation. Likewise, despite some attempts in the Digital Package to acknowledge TSUs’ needs, there remain several areas where the EU is failing, and where adjustments will be necessary to address the concerns outlined in the Draghi and Letta reports.

First, the need for an agreed-upon legal definition of TSUs is obvious. This would allow for tailored exceptions to be developed that support TSUs’ specific needs. This is not a new concern, nor can it necessarily be set out in sectoral regulation; rather, it may deserve its own instrument.

Second, there is a need for the European Commission to more rigorously consider the specific perspectives and structural constraints of TSUs in its impact assessments. The impact assessments supporting the Digital Package are highly inconsistent in their focus on TSUs. Teece and Kahwaty, for instance, argue that the DMA IA’s conclusion that the benefits to SMEs, startups and consumers would substantially outweigh the costs was largely speculative.[207] This may reflect the fact that TSU interests are not always a genuine priority, despite frequent policy statements claiming otherwise.

Third, the TSU exemptions or exceptions across the Digital Package are often timid and fail to fully address TSUs’ core concerns, such as the distraction and cost compliance burdens created by the EU’s complex matrix of digital regulation. In addition, where primary legislation may not be the best vehicle to address other concerns—such as capacity-building support or easier access to procurement markets—they should be provided via flanking measures, as we see in the AI context. This should happen as a matter of course, and in parallel to the development of the regulatory framework.

Finally, there is a case to be made that TSU growth is a symptom, rather than the cause, of thriving tech industries. If true, this constitutes a further indictment of the impact assessments that led up to key pieces of European legislation. These assessments often appear to overlook important tradeoffs inherent to economic regulation, such as reduced investment and increased barriers to entry. These obstacles undermine not just the TSUs that policymakers otherwise seek to protect but also the broader industry, where many players of varying sized may be important sources of competition or innovation.

In conclusion, while European policymakers have consistently voiced a strong commitment to fostering the growth of TSUs, the design of the EU’s Digital Package—comprising the DMA, DSA, Data Act, and AI Act—demonstrates a mixed and often insufficient consideration for their specific needs and constraints. This lack of tailored attention is compounded by evidence from the Draghi Report and academic literature clearly demonstrating that misguided or excessive regulations can impose significant compliance burdens and have a chilling effect on investment. As seen in the experience with the GDPR, this limits startups’ ability to scale and hinders further innovation.

Among the crucial insights highlighted by the Draghi Report was one often overlooked in the policy focus on small companies: size matters for performance, innovation, and ultimately, European competitiveness. To the extent that the Digital Package imposes burdens on large companies and, through compliance costs and potentially restricted exit opportunities, increases the hurdles for tech startups to grow beyond a certain size, it could inadvertently run counter to the stated goal of fostering competitive European firms and reclaiming a leading position at the technological frontier.

[1] See, e.g., Frederik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, & Oscar du Roy, Keeping Up with the US: Why Europe’s Productivity Is Falling Behind, Eur. Cent. Int. Polit. Econ. (2024), at 1, https://ecipe.org/publications/keeping-up-with-the-us-why-europes-productivity-is-falling-behind. (According to the report, “[t]he European Union stands at a crossroads. For decades, the EU’s productivity growth has consistently lagged the United States, leading to slower growth in living standards and decline in global economic power”. This is due to lower R&D investment, weaker intangible capital growth, and slower business dynamism, which together hinder innovation and technology adoption. Additionally, despite being more open to trade, the EU attracts less foreign direct investment, which has limited access to global technological advancements).

[2] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — Part A, Eur. Comm’n (9 September 2024), at 12, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en. (“Yet growth in the EU has been slowing, driven by weakening productivity growth, calling into question Europe’s ability to meet its ambitions… EU economic growth has been persistently slower than in the US over the past two decades, while China has been rapidly catching up. The EU-US gap in the level of GDP at 2015 prices has gradually widened from slightly more than 15% in 2002 to 30% in 2023, while on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis a gap of 12% has emerged”.)

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id., at 5.

[6] A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, Eur. Comm’n (29 January 2025),  https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en. See also, e.g., Ursula von der Leyen, Opening Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Innovation Council Launch Ceremony, Eur. Comm’n (24 March 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/speech_21_1241. (Von der Leyen described the rationale of the European Innovation Council: “With our European Innovation Council, we make EUR 10 billion available until 2027: We fund small- and medium-size companies with high risk but also with high potential. We support innovative researchers that have ideas for the next breakthrough technology. And we offer coaching, matchmaking and support them to set up a business. The European Innovation Council is also part of our answer to the equity-funding gap in Europe. Currently, many European start-ups cannot find the risk capital they need. Experts estimate that this funding gap is as large as EUR 70 billion. Our new EIC Fund is a good start. It alone brings EUR 3 billion to the table. With the EIC Fund, the Commission is for the first time investing directly in start-ups and SMEs”).

[7] Kai Zenner, J. Scott Marcus, & Kamil Sekut, A Dataset on EU Legislation for the Digital World, Bruegel (16 November 2023) https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/dataset-eu-legislation-digital-world.

[8] A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, Eur. Comm’n (2024) ?https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age_en.

[9] See Anne Marie Knott & Carl Vieregger, Reconciling the Firm Size and Innovation Puzzle, 31 Org. Sci. 477 (2020). (Finding that “both R&D spending and R&D productivity increase with firm size. Thus, large firms seem to be acting rationally in their increasing R&D investments, as one would expect”). The classic study of the subject remains Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942).

[10] See Robert Armstrong & Ethan Wu, What Big Tech Antitrust Gets Wrong: An Interview with Herbert Hovenkamp, Financ. Times (19 January 2024) https://www.ft.com/content/4eec8bc3-c892-4704-ae66-a4432c6d4fd7. (“With Big Tech, we’re looking at probably the most productive part of the economy. The rate of innovation is high. They spend a lot of money on R&D. They are among the largest patent holders”). For instance, in 2023, Amazon topped the list of R&D spending at $85.6 billion, followed by Alphabet (Google) at $45.4 billion, Meta at $38.5 billion, Apple at $29.9 billion, and Microsoft at $27.2 billion. Brian Buntz, Top 30 R&D Leaders of 2023: Big Tech Spending Hits new Heights, R&D World (17 June 2024), https://www.rdworldonline.com/top-30-rd-spending-leaders-2023-big-tech-firms-hit-new-heights.

[11] Knott & Vieregger, supra note 9.

[12] Geoffrey A. Manne, Samuel Bowman, & Dirk Auer, Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 86 Mo. L. Rev. 1048, 1066-67 (2022).

[13] Id., at 1055.

[14] See, e.g., Jacques Cre?mer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, & Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy For The Digital Era Final Report, Eur. Union (2019), at 117-118, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21dc175c-7b76-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.

[15] See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, Lazar Radic, & Dirk Auer, Regulate for What? A Closer Look at the Rationale and Goals of Digital Competition Regulations, 22 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 201 (2025).

[16] See, e.g., Sara Guidi, Innovation Commons for the Data Economy, 2 Dig. Soc. 30, 31 (2023).

[17] For example, Arts 5(7) and (8) DMA restrict gatekeepers from tying or bundling their core platform services with other services; Art 6(5) DMA prohibits gatekeepers from favouring their own products or services.

[18] Dirk Auer, The Broken Promises of Europe’s Digital Regulation, Truth Mark. (12 March 2024), https://truthonthemarket.com/2024/03/12/the-broken-promises-of-europes-digital-regulation.

[19] Manne et al., supra note 15, at 249 et seq.

[20] Draghi, supra note 2, at 7, 12, 30, 33.

[21] Id., at 30.

[22] Id.

[23] Id., at 33.

[24] Id., at 69. (“EU regulation imposes a proportionally higher burden on SMEs and small mid-caps than on larger companies, yet the EU lacks a framework to assess these costs. About 80% of Commission Work Programme items are relevant to SMEs but only around half of impact assessments substantially focused on these companies. The EU also lacks a commonly agreed definition of small mid-caps and readily available statistical data”).

[25] Enrico Letta, Much More Than a Market, Eur. Council (Apr. 2024), available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf.

 

[26] For a full exploration, see European Startup Scoreboard – Feasibility Study 4, Eur. Comm’n (2023), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/70fe2318-fb72-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en (“Feasibility Study”).

[27] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — Part B, Eur. Comm’n (9 September 2024), at 232, 242, 247, available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ec1409c1-d4b4-4882-8bdd-3519f86bbb92_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness_%20In-depth%20analysis%20and%20recommendations_0.pdf (e.g., the proposals to improve the innovation ecosystem begin with “a better financing environment for disruptive innovation, start-ups and scale-ups”).

[28] Joint Motion for a Resolution on the State of the SME Union (RC-B9-0346/2023), Eur. Parl. (2023) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0346_EN.html.

[29] European Innovation Council (EIC) Accelerator, Eur. Comm’n, https://eic.ec.europa.eu/eic-accelerator_en (last visited 28 May 2025).

[30] Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 124), Eur. Comm’n (2003), at 36, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:124:0036:0041:en:PDF.

[31] See also Letizia Tomada, Start-Ups and the Proposed EU AI Act: Bridges or Barriers in the Path from Invention to Innovation?, 13 J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L. 53 (2022). (The Commission, presumably aware of this conceptual shortcoming, recently launched an initiative to harmonize definitions related to startups, scaleups and deep-tech innovation, publishing the results of its Feasibility Study for a European Startup Scoreboard in 2023. The feasibility study found that certain key concepts in the startup ecosystem lack definitional coherence and “…the only concepts present in all categories of sources are startups and scale-ups”). See European Commission, supra note 26.

[32] For example, see Commission Communication on A New European Innovation Agenda, COM(2022) 332 final, Eur. Comm’n (5 July 2022), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0332; see also Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission Communication on A New European Innovation Agenda, Eur. Comm’n (5 July 2022) at 187, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0187; Spain Drives Technological Entrepreneurship Leadership in Europe, La Moncloa (19 October 2023), https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2023/20231019_esna-meeting.aspx; European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2023 on Increasing Innovation, Industrial and Technological Competitiveness Through a Favourable Environment for Start-Ups and Scale-Ups (2023/2110(INI)), Eur. Parl. (14 December 2023), Points 1-4, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0480_EN.html.

[33] EU 2024-2029: For a Competitive, Innovative and Sustainable Europe, France Digitale’s Manifesto for the 2024 European Elections, France Digitale (December 2023), available at https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2023/11/28111529/France-Digitale-2024-European-Manifesto-web-1.pdf.

[34] European Tech Voices, Stripe (July 2022), available at https://assets.ctfassets.net/fzn2n1nzq965/as5AW9rw46xEysdTl9Ie8/19b71550059812fcbe2a78b2c2b438f7/Stripe-European_Tech_Voices.pdf.

[35] France Digitale, supra note 33.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Parliament’s SME Resolution, supra note 28, at paras. (i), 48 and 49.

[40] Parliament’s Innovation Resolution, supra note 32,  para 36.

[41] Id., para 38.

[42] Draghi, supra note 27.

[43] Draghi, supra note 2, at 6. (“The problem is not that Europe lacks ideas or ambition. We have many talented researchers and entrepreneurs filing patents. But innovation is blocked at the next stage: we are failing to translate innovation into commercialisation, and innovative companies that want to scale up in Europe are hindered at every stage by inconsistent and restrictive regulations”).

[44] Id., at 79.

[45] Draghi, supra note 27, at 254.

[46] Id.

[47] Draghi, supra note 2, at 33.

[48] Id., at 8.

[49] Id., at 30.

[50] Id., at 69.

[51] Ursula von der Leyen, Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024–2029, Eur. Comm‘n, (18 July 2024), available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.

[52] Id., at 11.

[53] Id., at 7.

[54] Id. (“We need to make business easier and faster in Europe…I will make speed, coherence and simplification political priorities in everything we do”).

[55] Id.

[56] Id., at 6. (“We need a new momentum to complete the Single Market in sectors like services, energy, defence, finance, electronic communications and digital. This will allow our companies – especially our small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – to scale up and make the most of the market”).

[57] Ursula von der Leyen, Mission Letter to Ekaterina Zaharieva, (17 September 2024), at 5, available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/130e9159-8616-4c29-9f61-04592557cf4c_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20ZAHARIEVA.pdf (“I would like you to develop an EU start-up and scale-up strategy that improves the framework conditions for start-ups and scale-ups”).

[58] Von der Leyen, supra note 6.

[59] Id., at 4. (“The Draghi report shows that productivity growth is the result of a combination of two forces: disruptive innovation brought about by new, dynamic start-ups challenging incumbents”).

[60] Id.

[61] Id.

[62] Id., at 4-5.

[63] European Commission, Europe’s Next Leaders: The Start-Up and Scale-Up Initiative, Eur. Comm’n (22 November 2016), at 733, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2016%3A733%3AFIN.

[64] Regulation 2015/1017, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 169) 1 (EU).

[65] Startup Europe: Strengthening Networking for Deep Tech Scaleups and Ecosystem Builders, Eur. Comm’n, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/startup-europe (last visited 28 July 2025).

[66] European Commission, A New European Innovation Agenda, Eur. Comm’n (5 July 2022), at 332, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13437-A-New-European-Innovation-Agenda_en.

[67] The European Innovation Council approved €1 billion in funding for 159 deep-tech startups in its first year. See European Innovation Council (EIC), Eur. Comm’n, https://eic.ec.europa.eu (last visited 28 July 2025).

[68] Launch of New Fund of Funds to Support European Tech Champions, Eur. Invest. Bank (13 February 2023), https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-056-launch-of-new-fund-of-funds-to-support-european-tech-champions.

[69] Stripe, supra note 34, at 11.

[70] EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy: A Roadmap for European Tech Leaders, France Digitale (15 May 2025), available at https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2025/03/14182410/France-Digitale-EU-Startup-and-Scaleup-Strategy-.pdf.

[71] Draghi, supra note 2, at 2; see also id., at 25-6. (“The lack of growth potential in Europe is particularly relevant for tech-based innovative ventures, and even more so for deep tech ones. For example, 61% of total global funding for AI start-ups goes to US companies, 17% to those in China and just 6% to those in the EU. For quantum computing, EU companies attract only 5% of global private funding compared with a 50% share attracted by US companies”).

[72] European Commission, supra note 32, at para 20.

[73] Draghi, supra note 2, at 18. (“There are still other areas where the EU should do less, applying the subsidiarity principle more rigorously and showing more ‘self-restraint’. It will also be crucial to reduce the regulatory burden on companies. Regulation is seen by more than 60% of EU companies as an obstacle to investment, with 55% of SMEs flagging regulatory obstacles and the administrative burden as their greatest challenge”).

[74] Letta, supra note 25, at 107.

[75] Id., at 120. (In addition, the report finds that: “The dynamism and efficiency of the Single Market are currently being significantly impeded by a complex web of challenges, primarily due to the excessive regulatory burden and bureaucratic red tape. These issues have not only created an intolerable barrier to the effective implementation of Single Market rules but have also severely undermined business competitiveness, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises… This over-regulation places significant additional costs on businesses, proving unsustainable for SMEs and inadvertently favouring non-European companies that are not bound by the same stringent rules”).

[76] For a short overview of this literature, see Adam Thierer, GDPR & European Innovation Culture: What the Economic Evidence Shows, Medium (5 February 2023). https://medium.com/@AdamThierer/gdrp-european-innovation-culture-what-the-economic-evidence-shows-b19d2309de07#:~:text=websites%20internationally,and%20vendor%20concentration%20dissipate%20by. For an overview of research concerning privacy laws, more generally, see William Rinehart, What Is the Cost of Privacy Legislation?, Cent. Growth Oppor. (17 November 2022), https://www.thecgo.org/benchmark/what-is-the-cost-of-privacy-legislation.

[77] Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin, & Liad Wagman, The Persisting Effects of the EU General Data Protection Regulation on Technology Venture Investment, Antitrust Source (June 2021), at 2, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-magazine-online/2021/june-2021/jun2021-jia.pdf#:~:text=time%2C%20through%202020,As%20a. (“[A]fter the GDPR’s rollout, the number of monthly financing deals for EU technology ventures declined by 26.1 percent compared to their U.S. counterparts”).

[78] Id., at 1. (“Using venture investment data, we examine how the regulation may have affected investments in European technology ventures over time, through 2020. Our findings indicate a persisting reduction in the number of investment deals in nascent European technology ventures following the implementation of the legislation in comparison to technology ventures in the United States. As a result, policymakers considering tighter data regulations should weigh these costs against the potential benefits”).

[79] Id., at 4-5. (“We find evidence that the negative effect from the GDPR on EU technology venture investment persists 2.5 years after the rollout of the GDPR, although the magnitude of the effect is decreasing over time. EU technology firms, relative to their U.S. counterparts, experienced an average decline of 21.51 percent in their number of venture investment deals”). See also at 2-3. (“The negative effects are larger in the 6-month period immediately after the GDPR’s rollout in 2018, but some of them are sustained in 2019. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that such negative effects are more pronounced for younger ventures, consumer-facing ventures, earlier funding rounds, and for technology ventures that are more reliant on data”).

[80] Id., at 5. (“We also find that consumer-facing (B2C) ventures incur larger declines than business-facing (B2B) ventures. This difference between B2C and B2B ventures is potentially because consumer-facing products have more exposure to the regulation”).

[81] Garrett A. Johnson, Scott K. Shriver, & Samuel G. Goldberg, Privacy and Market Concentration: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the GDPR, 69 Mgmt. Sci. 5695, 5696 (2023).

[82] Id., at 5708.

[83]  Michal S. Gal & Oshrit Aviv, The Competitive Effects of the GDPR, 16 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 349, 352 (2020).

[84] Chinchih Chen, Carl B. Frey, & Giorgio Presidente, Privacy Regulation and Firm Performance: Estimating the GDPR Effect Globally, 62 Econ. Inquiry (2024): 1074, 1075 (2024).

[85] Yu Zhao, Pinar Yildirim, & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Privacy Regulations and Online Search Friction: Evidence from GDPR (Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series Report No. 23-141, 2023).

[86] Id., at 15.

[87] Draghi, supra note 2, at 69.

[88] Draghi, supra note 27, at 79.

[89] Rebecca Janssen, Reinhold Kesler, Michael E. Kummer, & Joel Waldfogel, GDPR and the Lost Generation of Innovative Apps, (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 30028, 2022), at 2.

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Klaus M. Miller, Julia Schmitt, & Bernd Skiera, The Impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on Online Usage Behavior, arXiv (18 November 2024), at 1, https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.11589.

[93] Ellen O’Regan, Europe’s GDPR Privacy Law Is Headed for Red Tape Bonfire Within “Weeks”, Politico (3 April 2025), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-gdpr-privacy-law-europe-president-ursula-von-der-leyen. (“Europe’s most famous technology law, the GDPR, is next on the hit list as the European Union pushes ahead with its regulatory killing spree to slash laws it reckons are weighing down its businesses”).

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Regulation 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1; Regulation 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1.

[98] The Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets, Eur. Comm’n https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en (last visited 15 May 2025).

[99] See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, Invited Statement of Geoffrey A. Manne on House Judiciary Investigation Into Competition in Digital Markets (17 April 2020), at 44, available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Manne_statement_house_antitrust_20200417_FINAL3-POST.pdf. (“There is little evidence for ‘killer acquisitions’ in digital markets, and it would be nearly impossible to identify which acquisitions are ‘killer’ before the fact. Acquisitions are often investors’ and founders’ ‘exit strategy,’ and the evidence suggests that deterring acquisitions in tech would chill investment in startups and harm innovation”); Statement of Scott Kupor, Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: FTC Hearing #3 Day 1: Multi-Sided Platforms, Labor Markets, and Potential Competition, FTC Transcript 183 (15 October 2018), (“[L]arge players play a significant role as acquirers of venture-backed startup companies, which is an important part of the overall health of the venture ecosystem”); La Actual Propuesta Sobre DMA Impacta Negativamente en el Ecosistema Europeo de Startups, Asociación Española de Startups, https://asociacionstartups.es/la-actual-propuesta-sobre-dma-impacta-negativamente-en-el-ecosistema-europeo-de-startups (last visited May 15, 2025), (“Net VC numbers could plunge in Europe for a period still to be estimated, as the impact of the DMA on the ecosystem and the uncertainty it can generate keeps under assessment. The impact could be greater and deeper in more risk-averse investment models such as corporate ventures and regular M&A”).

[100] Carmelo Cennamo & Juan Santaló, Potential Risks and Unintended Effects of the New EU Digital Markets Act (Open Internet Governance Institute Paper Series No. 4, February 2023), available at https://www.esade.edu/ecpol/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/AAFF_EcPol-OIGI_PaperSeries_04_Potentialrisks_ENG_v5.pdf.

[101] Id., at 11.

[102] Meredith Broadbent, Implications of the Digital Markets Act for Transatlantic Cooperation, Cent. Strateg. Int. Stud. (15 September 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-digital-markets-act-transatlantic-cooperation.

[103] Will the Digital Services Act Help Startups Succeed?, GLOBSEC (16 July 2020) https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/commentaries/will-digital-services-act-help-startups-succeed.

[104] Id.

[105] GLOBSEC, supra note 103.

[106] Thierer, supra note 76.

[107] Jia, Zhe, & Wagman, supra note 77. (“Data regulation, however, entails tradeoffs. On the one hand, consumers who value privacy and the ability to more readily exercise control over their data could benefit from enhanced data regulation. On the other hand, these same consumers may also encounter new market conditions that they do not like, such as higher prices or fewer innovations. Indeed, data regulations increase firms’ compliance costs, and existing economic theories also show that compliance costs can disproportionately impact nascent firms and dampen entrepreneurs’ incentives to pursue innovations as new ventures. Because these economic costs can reduce profitability, they may also affect the ability of new, innovative companies to receive funding from investors”).

[108] Gal & Aviv, supra note 83.

[109] Johnson, Shriver, & Goldberg, supra note 81, at 5695. (“The week after the GDPR’s enforcement, website use of web technology vendors falls by 15% for EU residents. Websites are more likely to drop smaller vendors, which increases the relative concentration of the vendor market by 17%. Increased concentration predominantly arises among vendors that use personal data such as cookies, and from the increased relative shares of Facebook and Google-owned vendors, but not from website consent requests”).

[110] Thierer, supra note 76.

[111] American Innovation Under Siege: Venture Capital Data Reveal Risks From Rising Global Regulatory Overreach, Am. Edge Proj. (March 2024), at 8, available at https://americanedgeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/AEP-and-PitchBook-Study-March-2024.pdf.

[112] Id., at 7.

[113] European Commission, supra note 98.

[114] DMA, recital 32.

[115] DMA, recital 33.

[116] The DMA IA does touch apps developers, many of whom may be TSUs who would benefit directly from Apple’s App Store being designated as a core platform service. The DMA IA notes at 27 that: “We have also calculated that, if the commission charged by the Apple App Store is excessive and those charges were reduced by half (from 30% to 15%), this could increase EU consumer surplus by €490m if the benefits are passed onto consumers through lower prices, or create the potential for additional investment and innovation by app developers”.

[117] For example, fair ranking (art. 6(5)); restrictions on gatekeepers using data generated by business users on their platforms—e.g., when business users seek to develop competing apps or services (art. 6(2)); data-portability provisions allowing end users to port their data from gatekeeper platforms (art. 6(9) & (10)), thus enabling end users to move their data to competitors and for business users to secure “free of charge… effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time access to, and use of, aggregated and non-aggregated data” generated by their apps, “giving competitors & new entrants a chance to capture new demand”;[117] access to anonymized “ranking query click & view” data (art. 6(11)) from gatekeeper search engines, assisting new search engines to improve their performance.

[118] Eleonor Bonel, New Rules for Digital Markets: A Roadmap to the Digital Markets Act, Eur. Digit. SME Alliance (7 July 2022), https://www.digitalsme.eu/new-rules-for-digital-markets-a-roadmap-to-the-digital-markets-act.

[119] DMA, art. 14(1): “A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest”. One of the DMA’s revolutions was to grant the Commission power under art. 18 to, for a limited time, prohibit gatekeepers from collecting data or entering any concentration in the digital sector. This remedy is likely to be exceptional, as it can only be applied in the event of a finding of systemic noncompliance and must both proportionate and necessary to maintain or restore fairness and contestability.

[120] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (the European Commission Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.

[121] The Commission’s Impact Assessment for the Digital Services Act sees the DMA as particularly relevant for innovative startups and scaleups. See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act), SWD(2020) 348 final (15 December 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020SC0348. (“The Digital Markets Act intervention focuses on large online platforms, which have become gatekeepers and whose unfair conduct in the market may undermine the competitive environment and the contestability of the markets, especially for innovative start-ups and scale-ups”).

[122] David J. Teece & Henry J. Kahwaty, Is the Digital Markets Act the Cure for Europe’s Platform Ills? Evidence From the European Commission’s Impact Assessment, in The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets 5 (Frank Fagan & James Langenfeld eds., 2023).

[123] See Digital Markets Act, Eur. Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-markets-act (last visited 18 January 2025).

[124] DMA, recitals 10, 23.

[125] See, e.g., Annual Competition Report 2024, Eur. Comm’n (25 April 2024), at 2, available at https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/12ef50fd-eee5-43f1-b81b-ac014b226bdc_en?filename=annual-competition-report_2024_report_part1_en.pdf (“[T]he European Commission…and its Directorate General for Competition continued to develop EU competition policy to achieve the objectives of a green, digital, and resilient European economy, as well as to actively enforce competition rules” (emphasis added)); Annual Competition Report 2023, Eur. Comm’n (6 March 2024), at 2, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/53a4d34f-f3f6-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1. (“EU competition policy was one of many tools successfully used for the continued crisis response, the economic recovery, as well as delivering on the green and digital transitions” (emphasis added)).

[126] For example, recital 68 notes that “the Commission should publish online a link to the non-confidential summary of the [gatekeeper’s compliance] report, as well as all other public information based on information obligations under this Regulation, in order to ensure accessibility of such information in a usable and comprehensive manner, in particular for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)”. Art. 9 also required that the Commission take SME interests into account when it considers whether to suspend the application of specific DMA obligations in exceptional circumstances that are beyond the gatekeeper’s control.

[127] Eoghan O’Neill, EU’s Digital Markets Act: Opportunity Engine for Startups, Eur. Comm’n (December 2023), available at https://assets-global.website-files.com/60143b5f4bfa6c7e7f2266fb/657f926d3ca04deb2fffc368_2023%20DMA%20-%20startup%20opportunity%20engine%20(Dublin).pdf.

[128] See Giuseppe Colangelo & Alba Ribera Martinez, The Metrics of DMA’s Success, 1 Eur. J. Risk. Reg. 20-21 (2024), (Arguing that “although contestability and fairness are the proclaimed protected legal interests, they do not represent the outcomes the EU legislator aimed to embed in the Regulation”. The DMA’s success must instead be measured against its real goals, which are “market modelling, openness, neutralizing competitive advantages, and enhancing transparency”).

[129] Olivier Guersent, Keynote Speech at the Annual CRA Brussels Conference, Eur. Comm’n (6 December 2023), available at https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/20231206_CRA_conference_Olivier-Guersent_speech.pdf.

[130] Id.

[131] Letizia Tomada, Start-ups and the Proposed EU AI Act: Bridges or Barriers in the Path from Invention to Innovation?, 13 J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & ELEC. Com. L. 53 (2022).

[132] Regulation 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1.

[133] The Digital Services Act: Ensuring a Safe and Accountable Online Environment, Eur. Comm’n, available at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en (last visited 22 April 2025).

[134] Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, SWD (2020) 348 final (15 December 2020), para 182.

[135] European Parliament Resolution of 20 October 2020 with Recommendations to the Commission on the Digital Services Act: Improving the Functioning of the Single Market (2020/2018 (INL)), para 73.

[136] The European Parliament took note of the need for specific measures to protect smaller players and proposed that “the DSA should put forward a proposal for a new separate instrument aiming at ensuring that the systemic role of specific online platforms will not endanger the internal market by unfairly excluding innovative new entrants, including SMEs, entrepreneurs and start-ups, thereby reducing consumer choice”. Id., Annex VII.

[137] DSA IA, supra note 134, at 23.

[138] Others include involvement in dispute resolution (art. 21) and “trusted flaggers” (art. 22); a suspension process for manifestly illegal content (art. 23); reporting obligations for providers of online platforms (art. 24); obligations to avoid deceiving or manipulating the recipients of their service (Art. 25); transparency of online advertising (art. 26); transparency on recommender systems (Art. 27); and obligations to put in place measures to protect minors (art. 28). Under art. 24(3), however, micro or small enterprises may still have to provide information on EU average monthly active users if requested by the established digital-services coordinator or the European Commission.

[139] See Brussels, 28.9.2021 SWD(2021) 279 Final Commission Staff Working Document Evaluation of Recommendation of 6 May 2003 Concerning the Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2003/361/EC), SWD(2021) 280 final. The Commission also noted, however, that: “Problems related to operating cross-border and access to finance are actually bigger obstacles preventing SMEs from scaling-up than the loss of the SME status”.

[140] DSA, art. 91(2)(d).

[141] DSA, art. 91(1).

[142] Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on Harmonised Rules on Fair Access to and Use of Data and Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828, 2023 O.J. (L 2854) 1 (Data Act).

[143] Data Act, recital 3.

[144] Data Act, recital 40, referring to SMEs as defined in art. 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC (SMEs), Op. Cit.

[145] Id.

[146] Notably, the obligation to make product data and related service data accessible to the user (art. 3); the rights and obligations of users and data holders with regard to access, use, and making available product data and related service data (art. 4); the user’s right to share data with third parties (art. 5); and third parties’ obligations when receiving data at the request of the user (art. 6). Microenterprises or small enterprises are covered, so long as they do not have a business partner that holds more than 25% of their capital or voting rights (excluding public and venture-capital investors, “business angels” or, with some limits, universities and nonprofit research centres and institutional investors).

[147] Per art. 3 of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC. Op. Cit.

[148] Data Act, recital 41.

[149] Data Act, recital 49.

[150] Data Act, recital 51.

[151] See art. 5(3) and recital 40.

[152] Data Act, recital 75.

[153] Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Harmonised Rules on Fair Access to and Use of Data (Data Act), SWD (2022) 34 final (23 February 2022), 56.

[154] Id.

[155] Data Act, recital 58.

[156] Data Act, recital 111.

[157] European Parliament, supra note 153, at 18.

[158] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European Strategy for Data COM(2020)66 final (19 February 2020).

[159] European Parliament, supra note 135, para 36.

[160] Id., para 38.

[161] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), 2024 O.J. (L 1689) 1.

[162] Tomada, supra note 131.

[163] Draghi, supra note 2.

[164] Id., at 29-30.

[165] Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, SWD (2021) 84 final, pt. 1 (21 April 2021), at 23.

[166] Id., at 26.

[167] See Ian Mundell, The Ecosystem: Start-ups Give Cautious Welcome to Artificial Intelligence Innovation Package, Science Business (13 February 2024), https://sciencebusiness.net/news/ai/ecosystem-start-ups-give-cautious-welcome-artificial-intelligence-innovation-package.

[168] New recital 74a.

[169] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Boosting Startups and Innovation in Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, COM (2024) 28 final (24 January 2024).

[170] Id., at 4.

[171] Id.

[172] Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An EU Initiative on Web 4.0 and Virtual Worlds: A Head Start in the Next Technological Transition, SWD (2023), 250 final, pt. 1 (11 July 2023), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023SC0250.

[173] Id., at 17.

[174] Mundell, supra note 166.

[175] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (the European Commission Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.

[176] Joined Cases C-611/22 P and C-625/22 P, Illumina and Grail v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677. (Finding that the Commission had overstepped its authority by accepting referral requests under art. 22 from national competition authorities that did not have jurisdiction to review the merger under their own national laws).

[177] Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Application of the Referral Mechanism Set Out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to Certain Categories of cases, 2021 O.J (C 113) 1, 2 para 9, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021XC0331%2801%29.

[178] Id., para 19.

[179] Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson, The Future of Digital Markets in a Post-DMA World, 44 Eu. Comp. L. Rev. 447 (2023).

[180] See, e.g., Christophe Carugati, Which Mergers Should the European Commission Review Under the Digital Markets Act?,  Bruegel Policy Brief (9 December 2022), https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/which-mergers-should-european-commission-review-under-digital-markets-act. Indeed, the European Parliament’s lead committee reviewing the DMA proposed an amendment to the merger provisions. While not ultimately adopted, the proposed amendment signalled concerns about gatekeeper M&A strategies. See Report on the Proposal for a Regulation on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), A9-0332/2021 Amendment 5, Eur. Parl. (15 December 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0332_EN.html. (“Systematic mergers and acquisitions should have a clear and legal threshold to put an end to killer acquisitions where big companies buy start-ups and growing companies in order to suppress any possible competition. A special attention should be given to takeovers in important sectors such as health, education, defence and financial services”).  

[181] European Commission, supra note 171, at 3.2.

[182] Tomada, supra note 31, at 65.

[183] Marc Ivaldi, Nicolas Petit, & Selcukhan Unekbas, Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from EC Merger Cases in Digital Industries (TSE Working Paper No.13-1420 1, 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4407333. (“Pursuant to the theory of killer acquisitions, some of these cases should have led to reduced competition. Focusing on publicly available information through financial disclosures, our analysis suggests that no transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation. Skepticism about the killer acquisitions theory should prevail”); Jonathan Barnett, “Killer Acquisitions” Reexamined: Economic Hyperbole in the Age of Populist Antitrust, 3(1) Chi. Bus. L. Rev. 39, 39 (2024). (“A review of the relevant body of evidence finds that these widely-held views concerning incumbent/startup acquisitions rest on meager support, confined to ambiguous evidence drawn from a small portion of the total universe of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical market and theoretical models of acquisition transactions in information technology markets”).

[184] Id., Ivaldi, Petit, & Unekbas, at 26-29. (Finding that, in six cases of potential “killer acquisitions”, output increased, and concluding that “[i]n summary, in very few cases, a merger appeared to have been followed by a weakening, let alone a killing, of competition. The competitive landscape post-merger remained vibrant in most cases, invalidating one key condition required for the killer acquisition theory to be plausible”); id., Barnett, at 39, 70-83.

[185] See, e.g., Statement on Competition Policy in the Digital Sector, Eur. Comm’n (10 May 2024), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_24_4525. (“A company with limited turnover may still play a significant competitive role on the market, as a start-up with significant potential, or as an important innovator. Killer acquisitions seek to neutralize small but promising companies as a possible source of competition”); Lewis Crofts, Tackling Killer Acquisitions Is Most Compelling Concern, EU’s Ribera Says, MLex (15 October 2024), https://www.mlex.com/mlex/dealrisk/articles/2321350/tackling-killer-acquisitions-is-most-compelling-concern-eu-s-ribera-says (indicating that Commissioner for Competition Teresa Ribera views the acquisitions of startups by “big tech” firms as one of the EU’s most pressing competition concerns).

[186] The Autorité Publishes Its Contribution to the Debate on Competition Policy and the Challenges Raised by the Digital Economy, Autorité de la Concurrence (February 2020), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/communiques-de-presse/autorite-publishes-its-contribution-debate-competition-policy-and-challenges.

[187] Comptes Rendus de la Commission des Affaires Économiques, Audition de M. Cédric O, secrétaire d’État chargé du numérique (22 January 2020), https://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20200120/ecos.html#toc2.

[188] Id.

[189] See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 182, at 39 (“[T]he emergent regulatory and scholarly consensus fails to take into account the rich body of evidence showing the critical function played by incumbent/startup acquisitions in supplying a monetization mechanism that induces venture-capital investment and promotes startup entry in technology markets. The prospect of an acquisition transaction in the case of technical and commercial success generally promotes innovation and competition by providing a transactional device that expands startups’ access to the capital inputs required to undertake R&D and the commercialization services required to convert R&D outputs into commercially viable products. At the same time, these acquisitions enable incumbents to access the specialized innovation capacities of smaller firms”); see also at 72 (“incumbents in technology markets regularly acquire emerging firms, and emerging firms regularly seek to be acquired by incumbents, principally because this constitutes an efficient mechanism for executing the innovation and commercialization process… Rather than representing a presumptively anticompetitive strategy to extinguish competitive threats, incumbent/startup acquisitions are best construed as part of a broader set of transactional mechanisms that firms use to efficiently execute the innovation and commercialization process in response to competitive forces”).

[190] Id., at 77 (finding that, following the investments made by acquiring companies in scaling and integrating targets, “it is no surprise that smaller firms would seek to be acquired by large platforms that can offer these powerful commercialization capacities and accelerate monetization of a target’s innovation assets”).

[191] On this point, see Manne, Radic, & Auer, supra note 15 (arguing that one of the central goals of ex-ante digital competition rules like the DMA is to level gatekeepers downward); Colangelo & Ribera, supra note 138 (arguing that the DMA is intended to neutralize gatekeepers’ competitive advantages); and Oles Andriychuk, Do DMA Obligations for Gatekeepers Create Entitlements for Business Users?, 11 J. Antitrust Enforc. 123,126-129 (2023), (arguing that the nature of the DMA’s obligations is punitive).

[192] European Parliament, supra note 136.

[193] DSA IA, supra note 135, at 24.

[194] Bala?zs Hohmann & Bence Kis Kelemen, Is There Anything New Under the Sun? A Glance at the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act from the Perspective of Digitalisation in the EU, 19 Croat. Y.B. Eur. L. Pol’y. 225 (2023).

[195] EU 2024–2029: France Digitale’s Manifesto for the 2024 European Elections, France Digitale (December 2023), at 6, available at https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2023/11/28111529/France-Digitale-2024-European-Manifesto-web-1.pdf.

[196] Id., at 26.

[197] Tomada, supra note 31, at 61.

[198] Cristiano Codagnone & Linda Weigl, Leading the Charge on Digital Regulation: The More, the Better, or Policy Bubble? 2 Digital Soc’y 1 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1007/s44206-023-00033-7.

[199] Id., at 17.

[200] Tomada, supra note 31, at 64.

[201] Id., at 61.

[202] Id., at 65.

[203] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, AI Continent Action Plan COM (2025) 165 final, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-continent-action-plan.

[204] Id., at 21.

[205] Id., at 22.

[206] Id.

[207] Teese & Kahwaty, supra note 122.

SHORT FORM WRITTEN OUTPUT

Antitrust at the Agencies: Moderation in All Things Edition

Judge Amit P. Mehta’s memorandum opinion in the Google Search case has dropped. It’s 230 pages, and I’ve merely skimmed it. A careful discussion–from me or anyone else–will wait . . .

Judge Amit P. Mehta’s memorandum opinion in the Google Search case has dropped. It’s 230 pages, and I’ve merely skimmed it. A careful discussion–from me or anyone else–will wait a bit. For now, the remedies are quite a bit more than Google had proposed, but at the same time, a good deal less than the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) wanted.

Among other things, Judge Mehta rejected the DOJ’s proposed structural relief, and for good reasons. He does not order the divesture of the Chrome browser, in part because: “Plaintiffs do not satisfy the Circuit’s ‘clearer indication of a significant causal connection’ test for structural remedies.” He also doesn’t order the divestiture of Android (one of the DOJ’s contingent proposals).

Read the full post here.

Comparing the EU DMA to the Search-Query Data-Sharing Remedy in US v Google

The “user-side” search-query data remedy carved out by U.S. District Court Judge Amit Mehta in the just handed-down U.S. v Google decision appears to be animated by a . . .

The “user-side” search-query data remedy carved out by U.S. District Court Judge Amit Mehta in the just handed-down U.S. v Google decision appears to be animated by a similar intuition (search quality depends on large volumes of click-and-query signals) as the EU Digital Markets Act’s Article 6(11), but they also diverge in important ways. Where Judge Mehta’s approach is narrower, more tethered to proven competitive harm, and deliberately cabined by process safeguards (including a cap and technical oversight), Article 6(11) DMA is ex ante, continuous, and tied into a notoriously suboptimal process managed by the European Commission.

One key problem with the DMA process is that we still don’t know how the privacy safeguards on sharing query data are meant to be interpreted, depending on how one reads “anonymised.” I set out those differences below, using the D.C. District Court’s final remedies opinion, as well as my earlier analysis and comments on the DMA compliance workshops (2024 and 2025).

I also flag a particularly telling bridge between the two regimes: the U.S. court explicitly acknowledges that DMA-style anonymization can wipe out the overwhelming majority of queries, but nonetheless appears to treat that possibility as an acceptable feature of the privacy constraint on data sharing.

Read the full piece here.

Foreign Trade Barriers Threaten American Space Dominance

A recently issued White House executive order aims to boost competition and innovation in America’s commercial space industry by cutting state and federal red tape, and . . .

A recently issued White House executive order aims to boost competition and innovation in America’s commercial space industry by cutting state and federal red tape, and by streamlining the permitting and licensure process for launching and receiving spacecraft. Across the pond in the European Union (EU), however, new legislation that unduly singles out U.S. companies could hamper these efforts.

At a time when China’s space sector is making immense strides, the Trump administration should use the ongoing U.S.-EU trade negotiations to oppose these trade barriers that imperil U.S. space leadership. Potentially at-stake are not only national security, but more than $1 trillion in economic benefits and opportunities for Americans.

Read the full piece here.

The EU Proposes a DMA for Space

The European Union has a well-established playbook for regulating industries dominated by U.S. firms: Identify a market where American companies are global leaders; Draft sweeping . . .

The European Union has a well-established playbook for regulating industries dominated by U.S. firms:

  1. Identify a market where American companies are global leaders;
  2. Draft sweeping legislation grounded in vague principles like “fairness” or “sustainability”; and
  3. Create a regulatory structure that imposes disproportionate burdens on the largest and most successful (and usually foreign) companies.

The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) is an exemplar of this playbook in action. Now, with its proposed EU Space Act (EUSA), the EU is poised to launch this playbook into space.

In recent comments, the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) concludes the EUSA functions as a nontariff barrier designed to protect and promote European firms at the expense of their American competitors. While cloaked in the language of safety and sustainability, the proposal is better understood as an act of strategic industrial policy—a “DMA for Space” that aims to reshape the competitive landscape of the satellite industry.

Read the full piece here.

Self-Preferencing Isn’t a Sin. It’s Often the Way Competition Works.

Paris has decided that 2025 is the year to crack down on “autopréférence,” with the Autorité de la Concurrence opening a public consultation in June under France’s . . .

Paris has decided that 2025 is the year to crack down on “autopréférence,” with the Autorité de la Concurrence opening a public consultation in June under France’s new law “to secure and regulate the digital space.” The inquiry asks interested parties to identify cases where a cloud-computing service provider treats its own software better than its rivals, and to suggest fresh legal tools to stop it. A final report is scheduled to be delivered to Parliament in November.

Read the full piece here.

You Can’t Break the Laws of Economics

Nearly every week, someone writing for a major news outlet argues that economics has failed. Our models are too abstract. Our predictions are always wrong. . . .

Nearly every week, someone writing for a major news outlet argues that economics has failed. Our models are too abstract. Our predictions are always wrong. President Trump’s recent firing of Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner Erika McEntarfer is the latest notable example of this anti-economics sentiment.

Let me make what appears to have become a radical argument: Simple economics is surprisingly good at making real-world predictions.

Read the full piece here.

How Fixing Immigration Can Improve Competition and Create Opportunities for the US AI Workforce

The White House’s recently released AI Action Plan aims to secure U.S. dominance in artificial intelligence by abolishing red tape and fostering innovation, AI adoption, infrastructure building, and domestic chip . . .

The White House’s recently released AI Action Plan aims to secure U.S. dominance in artificial intelligence by abolishing red tape and fostering innovation, AI adoption, infrastructure building, and domestic chip manufacturing. To equip and develop the future AI workforce, it pledges public investments in research labs, manufacturing, and technical training programs, as well as tax incentives for businesses to upskill workers and funding cuts to states whose laws unduly hamper AI.

These policies share the commendable goal of creating jobs and uplifting U.S. workers’ living standards, while ensuring that American innovation leads the world. But they’ll be less effective in meeting these objectives without fixing the nation’s broken immigration system, whose deep-seated flaws favor neither America’s economy nor its workers.

Read the full piece here.

Truth Cartels? The DOJ’s Misguided Leap into Viewpoint Regulation

In a surprising move, the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division has thrown its weight behind a lawsuit that could reshape how courts—and antitrust enforcers—think . . .

In a surprising move, the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division has thrown its weight behind a lawsuit that could reshape how courts—and antitrust enforcers—think about competition in digital media. The agency’s statement of interest filed last month in Children’s Health Defense v. Washington Post doesn’t merely take up the legal merits of a questionable claim, but signals a distinct philosophical shift, with the DOJ now arguing that the Sherman Antitrust Act can and should protect “viewpoint diversity” in news markets.

This is a dangerous turn. If accepted, the theory would transform the Sherman Act into a regulatory tool for adjudicating ideological disputes, exposing publishers and platforms to antitrust liability for “suppressing” dissenting views. That’s not competition law; it’s compelled distribution masquerading as enforcement. As the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board rightly put it: “curating information is now an antitrust violation.”

Moreover, the risk isn’t merely legal overreach; it’s the weaponization of antitrust law to regulate speech, editorial judgment, and private standards-setting under the guise of competition enforcement.

Read the full piece here.

Lessons for Deference From the Telephone Consumer Protection Act

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in?McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp.?is ostensibly about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the 1990s-era law that—also ostensibly—makes robocalls and junk . . .

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in?McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp.?is ostensibly about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the 1990s-era law that—also ostensibly—makes robocalls and junk faxes illegal. But the opinion’s real importance is to reinforce last year’s decision in?Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. That decision formally overruled?Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, and with it the era of default deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.

McLaughlin expands Loper Bright’s holding: Courts—not agencies—bear primary responsibility for interpreting statutes, unless the U.S. Congress expressly provides otherwise. Justice Brett Kavanaugh explained that “fundamental principles of administrative law establish the proper default rule: In an enforcement proceeding, a district court must independently determine for itself whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct.”

Read the full piece here.

Getting Real on the NO FAKES Act

As the technology landscape moves further into a world of artificial intelligence (AI) and large language models (LLMs), there are questions of how well the . . .

As the technology landscape moves further into a world of artificial intelligence (AI) and large language models (LLMs), there are questions of how well the law will be able to keep up.

Sponsored by Sens. Chris Coons (D-Del.), Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), the NO FAKES Act of 2025 (short for “Nurture Originals, Foster Art, and Keep Entertainment Safe”) attempts to be forward-looking about the potential threat of so-called AI “deepfakes” by granting individuals a federal right over their likenesses to prevent “digital replicas.”

Under terms of the bill, an “online service” could be held liable for the “[t]he public display, distribution, transmission, or communication of, or the act of otherwise making available to the public, a digital replica without authorization by the applicable right holder.” The bill creates a safe harbor for online services that distribute such replicas if they create a notice-and-removal system and terminate accountholders that promulgate such replicas.

U.S. House version has also been introduced by Reps. Maria Salazar (R-Fla.), Madeleine Dean (D-Pa.), Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas), Becca Balint (D-Vt.), and Joe Morelle (D-N.Y.).

In this post, I will consider the NO FAKES Act using the same criteria I previously employed to examine the TAKE IT DOWN Act: whether the proposed legislation solves a genuine problem, what its potential for collateral censorship might be, and whether it might conflict with the First Amendment.

Read the full piece here.

AMICUS BRIEFS

ICLE Brief to the 9th Circuit Supporting Motion for Rehearing in Epic Games v Google

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI ICLE is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. . . .

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI

ICLE is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy.  ICLE promotes the use of law and economics methodologies and economic learning to inform policy debates and has longstanding expertise evaluating antitrust law and policy.

ICLE has an interest in ensuring that antitrust law promotes the public interest by remaining grounded in sensible rules informed by sound economic analysis.  That includes advising against far-reaching legal remedies that could hinder competition between mobile ecosystems, thereby harming the interests of consumers and app developers.[1]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The antitrust laws provide a framework for protecting “competition, not competitors.” They are neither a tool nor an excuse for judicial redesign of complex markets. As the Supreme Court has recognized time and again, two principles should guide their application: first, antitrust analysis must be grounded in economic reality; and second, remedies must be carefully calibrated to cure a proven harm without inflicting greater damage on competition than the conduct they seek to remedy. The panel’s decision in this case violates both principles. The injunction it affirms is not designed to allow competition, to give a broad class of market actors the opportunity to compete ¾an opportunity they already have under the current terms and conditions of the Android OS and Google Play Store. Rather, it seeks to grant specific actors a certain market share and a “fair share” of revenue.

Rehearing would offer the opportunity to correct the perverse incentives created by the decision below, which risk transforming antitrust law from a shield for competition into a sword for competitors. This amicus brief makes two central arguments in support of rehearing.

First, the panel’s decision creates an analytical paradox. In this Court’s recent decision in Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2023), recognition of vigorous competition from Google Play—“the App Store’s ‘main competitor,’” id. at 985—was a decisive factor in this Court’s conclusion that Apple was not a monopolist. The Court recognized the commercial reality that these two app stores engage in fierce head-to-head competition for both users and developers. In the present case, by contrast, the panel affirmed a verdict premised on the fiction that Apple’s app store and payment processing do not exert any meaningful competitive pressure on Google, thus creating an artificial “Google Play Store-only” market. While the panel noted that the doctrine of issue preclusion may not formally apply, this procedural point cannot erase the underlying factual contradiction or the market definition principles that led the court to reject Epic’s market definition in its suit against Apple. A legal framework that treats two companies as fierce rivals in one case and as occupants of separate universes in the next—despite parallel suits in which a common plaintiff pleads identical facts and market realities—is fundamentally incoherent.

Second, the injunction itself poses an extraordinary threat to the entire mobile ecosystem. It is not a remedy, but a radical restructuring that will harm competition, consumers, and developers. By forcing Google to host rival app stores and share its proprietary catalog, the injunction also impairs the security, privacy, and user trust that are cornerstones of the Android platform’s value. Consumers will face greater risks of malware and fraud, while developers will face a fragmented and less reliable marketplace. Most troublingly, the injunction imposes an unprecedented “duty to deal” that runs contrary to the core principles of antitrust law articulated by the Supreme Court in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).

The injunction also runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s view of universal injunctions, affirmed most recently in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. __ (2025). That decision makes clear the general impropriety of sweeping, system-wide relief affecting non-parties with heterogeneous interests and that courts should not use universal injunctive “relief” to achieve de facto regulation. Yet the injunction would redesign Android for over 100 million non-party U.S. users and more than 500,000 non-party app developers, potentially exposing them to lax data security, ecosystem fragmentation, increased risks of fraud and piracy, and the degradation of platform value these entail.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision is Based on an Incorrect Market Definition and Market Power Assessment

A sound antitrust decision can spring only from a sound assessment of the competitive landscape alleged to be harmed. In this case, however, both the finding of liability and the remedy rest upon an inaccurate picture of the competitive landscape and an erroneous assessment of market power.

The panel’s decision that issue preclusion does not apply—and, therefore, that the District Court could find a different relevant market in the case at hand than it did given essentially the same facts in Epic v. Apple undercuts a central purpose of issue preclusion (“minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions”). Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).  It also ignores the central competitive dynamic of the mobile industry—a dynamic this very Court recognized in the Apple litigation. The Epic v. Apple litigation resulted in extensive judicial fact-finding—at both the trial and appellate level—that established the inter-brand competition between the Google Play Store and Apple’s App Store ecosystems as the central dynamic of the market.

Notwithstanding this prior analysis, the panel observed that “the market-definition issue in Epic’s two lawsuits was not ‘identical’ for the purposes of issue preclusion, because Epic’s claims against Apple involved meaningfully different commercial realities and theories of harm from its claims against Google,” (Op. 20, Dkt. No. 200.1) and points out to different “commercial realities” highlighting Apple’s and Google’s different business models (“walled garden” vs. “open distribution”) (id. at 20–21).

The panel’s determination does nothing to illuminate these purportedly different “market realities.” It was based, instead, on a formalistic adherence to market definition. Id. at 20. But market definition is not the end of antitrust analysis; it is the beginning and a means to determine the nature of competition at issue and the presence or extent of market power.  “Alleging the relevant market in an antitrust case does not merely identify the portion of the economy most directly affected by the challenged conduct; it identifies the competitive process alleged to be harmed.” Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78 Antitrust L.J. 729, 741 (2013).

The suggestion that “the commercial realities are different,” Op. 20, is particularly puzzling given this Court’s recognition that both cases were filed on the same day, by the same plaintiff, marketing the same game, “to undermine Apple’s control over software distribution and payment processing on iOS devices, as well as Google’s influence over Android devices.” Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th at 969. As this Court recognized, Epic’s complaint in this case was the twin of its complaint against Apple, targeting Google’s “policies regarding the Google Play Store on Android devices—i.e., smartphones and tablets that use the main operating-system alternative to iOS.” Id. at 969 n.3 (emphasis added) (citing Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 3:20-cv-05671 (filed Aug. 13, 2020 N.D. Cal.).

The fact that Apple and Google have different business models does not illuminate a different set of choices for game or app consumers on one side of the market or app developers on the other. It does not mean their app stores are not in competition with each other. Product differentiation is a central and ubiquitous form of competition, not a departure from it. Antitrust law does not require that products be identical clones to be considered competitors; reasonable interchangeability suffices. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395, 400 (1956).  Moreover, the relevant market for antitrust purposes is not limited to immediate substitutes, but must include “the area of effective competition,” FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 992 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529, 543 (2018)—i.e., “the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist.” Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997). Competitive constraints may arise from outside the narrowly-defined market in which challenged conduct takes place. But “‘[t]he definition of the relevant market’ must ‘correspond to the commercial realities’ of the industry.” Ohio, 585 U.S. at 543–544 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 336–37 (1962).

This Court has already recognized parallels between Epic’s antitrust and state law challenges to Google Play’s policies and Apple’s App Store policies. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 67 F.4th at 969 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023), and it has rightly rejected Epic’s assertion of a single-brand market. Id. at 980–81. The finding of a multi-brand market in Epic v. Apple was correct. It should apply here, too. Ignoring the broader competition between the Apple App Store and Google Play (and other app stores available on Android phones) creates a false sense of Google’s market share, as Google and Apple compete for apps and, importantly, to have app developers develop apps for their platforms.

The panel decision claims that “[i]t is of little consequence that Apple and Google were previously found to compete in the market for ‘digital mobile gaming transactions’ in the Apple litigation,” Op. 23, because “[r]ecognizing distinctions between overlapping markets is not ‘inherently contradictory.’” To support this, the panel quotes the DOJ and FTC’s amicus brief stating that “‘[j]ust because parties compete in one market does not mean, as a matter of law, that there cannot be a narrower or overlapping market in which the parties do not compete.’” Op. 24 (quoting DOJ and FTC Br. 27–28, Dkt. 151.1).

That abstraction is of little help with the concrete facts of the matter, and the panel’s analogy to hamburger versus chicken sandwich markets is inapt. Op. 23. Epic’s complaints were about the conditions under which it could market a single game, Fortnite, via competing, differentiated platforms. The better analogy would be two fast-food chains that both sell hamburgers but compete using different business models—one as a franchise, the other as a corporate-owned chain. Their business models are different, and so, of course, are their hamburgers: Burger King doesn’t sell its hamburgers at McDonald’s restaurants, nor vice versa. But the fact of their competition remains. Just as a diner decides which hamburger to eat before choosing a restaurant, consumers decide which ecosystem they prefer—and which apps, at which prices, and under what terms they can acquire there—before buying a smartphone. So too, do developers decide which ecosystem (or ecosystems) they prefer to develop apps for—and at what cost and under what terms they may offer them—before offering their apps for sale there.

Moreover, each restaurant’s choice of soda provider is an element of its competition with the other. McDonald’s choice to offer Coke products and Burger King’s (one-time) choice to offer Pepsi are not insulated from the broader competition between the restaurants just because soda isn’t a substitute for hamburgers.  We would never assess the consequences of these choices solely in terms of a hypothetical restaurant-specific soda “submarket”; rather, we would understand them as elements of the overall competition between the restaurants.

The flaw in the district court’s analysis is further underscored by the very origins of this litigation. Epic’s campaign began with a single coordinated strategy (“Project Liberty”) against both Google and Apple, deliberately breaching each platform’s terms of service to provoke enforcement of contract terms by the platforms, with that enforcement providing a pretext for parallel antitrust lawsuits filed the very same day. See supra p. 7. This identical treatment reveals Epic’s own market perception: for a major game developer seeking to reach a global audience on mobile devices, there are two leading, competing distribution channels: the Google Play Store and the Apple App Store. The claim that these two app stores do not compete is fundamentally incompatible with the real-world business strategy that precipitated this case.

The consequence of such contradictory jurisprudence is not merely academic. The panel’s decision would, effectively, punish Google for its comparatively open business model. As the panel notes, Google allows multiple app stores on its platform and permits “sideloading.” Op. 12. By deeming Google’s ecosystem an “Android-only” market, the Court is sending a clear message: open ecosystems are uniquely exposed to antitrust scrutiny.  We do not suggest that “open” systems are necessarily better than “closed” systems:  both involve tradeoffs for consumers and developers to analyze when choosing a system.  But if more “openness” were necessary for competition, the decision below does not establish it and it is, in any event, inherently inconsistent with the court’s finding in Epic v. Apple that Apple’s comparatively more closed system does not violate the antitrust laws.

II. The Injunction is Over-Broad and risks harm tO consumers in a competitive two-sided market

A. The Injunction Threatens Irreparable Harm to the Entire Mobile Ecosystem

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned courts to fashion remedies that avoid inadvertently impeding competition. NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 102 (2021). The objective is to restore the competitive process, not to engage in judicial central planning that may yield perverse and unintended consequences. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 408 (noting that judges are ill-suited to act as “central planners” for complex industries). But the panel ignores this caution, as the injunction imposes uniquely burdensome and invasive obligations on Google’s app store, threatening the quality and even viability of the platform.

The injunction mandate that Google fundamentally re-engineer its platform to actively assist its direct competitors, requiring it to share its proprietary app catalog and host rival app stores directly on the Google Play Store. By imposing such antitrust obligations on Google Play Store, but none on Apple’s App Store, the injunction effectively removes product differentiation as a source of competition, redesigning one of them via a haphazard judicial mandates.

The central concern here is competition, not competitors or, in particular, the defendant. The paradoxical import of the injunction is a remedy that purports to increase intra-platform competition (i.e., among app stores within the Android ecosystem), but is almost certain to decrease the more vital inter-platform (inter-brand) competition between app stores and their payment processing systems—and “it is ‘the promotion of interbrand competition,’ after all, that ‘is the primary purpose of the antitrust laws.’” Ohio v. American Express, 585 U.S. at 552 (cleaned up). To ignore this principle risks doing more harm than good.

This Court has recognized that an injunction constitutes an abuse of discretion when it imposes a remedy that is itself anticompetitive. For example, in Kodak, this Court struck the part of an injunction that promoted “free-riding,” noting that remedies must not inadvertently stifle competition. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d at 1225 (9th Cir. 1997). In this case, the injunction enables free-riding by allowing Epic Games (and other developers) to use Google’s platform and catalog for less than their market value. Such free-riding introduces market distortions that go well beyond Google. The injunction’s most pernicious aspect is its assault on the incentives to create and sustain the very platforms that drive the digital economy. By severing—for one competitor—the link between the use of a platform and the means by which it is monetized, the remedy sets a dangerous precedent: it signals that returns on massive, long-term platform investments are subject to judicial confiscation and rent-shifting. This fundamentally misunderstands the nature of platform competition. Building a successful digital ecosystem is not a single act of creation but a continuous process of innovation and refinement—one that requires ongoing investment. Platform operators must remain perpetually attentive to users and developers on both sides of the market by investing in system maintenance and security, as well as new and improved features. A legal regime that allows the fruits of this ongoing investment to be siphoned off by free-riding competitors undercuts the incentive to make such investments. Market dynamism is thereby diminished.

The harms from this injunction will also be borne by non-parties whose interests the antitrust laws are designed to protect.

For consumers, the injunction introduces a host of security, privacy, and usability problems. A core, pro-competitive feature of a modern app store is its function as a trusted gatekeeper. That is no less true for a relatively open store, like Google’s, than it is for a so-called “walled garden.” Platforms like the Google Play Store invest enormous resources in vetting applications to protect users from malware, fraudulent schemes, data theft, and other malicious content. This curation provides a safety baseline safety that encourages consumers to engage with the digital marketplace, just as this Court recognized in Epic v. Apple, 67 F.4th at 990 (upholding the district court’s finding that “Apple’s security-and privacy-related restrictions ‘provide[ ] a safe and trusted user experience on iOS, which encourages both users and developers to transact freely.’”).

The injunction systematically dismantles this protective function in two critical ways. First, the mandate that Google host third-party app stores creates what is, in effect, a forced endorsement. Consumers have been conditioned to see the Play Store as a safe and curated space. When they download an app store from the Play Store, they will reasonably assume it has met Google’s standards of safety, privacy, and reliability. Yet the injunction requires Google to carry these rival stores even if they employ vastly different and potentially inferior security protocols and privacy protections. This creates a significant risk of consumer confusion and harm.

Second, the “catalog access” remedy exacerbates this danger by providing a powerful tool for malicious actors. It forces Google to allow rival stores to display and offer Google Play’s entire catalog of millions of apps. A fraudulent app store could use this feature to create a veneer of legitimacy, populating its storefront with thousands of well-known, trusted applications from Google’s catalog to appear credible. This would make it substantially more difficult for consumers to distinguish a legitimate alternative store from a sophisticated trap designed to distribute malware or phish for sensitive information. As security experts and former national security officials have warned, these provisions create a “more dangerous mobile ecosystem” by lowering the barriers for bad actors to reach consumers. The panel’s conclusion that the district court had a “robust record” on these risks, Op. 64, is cold comfort when the remedy it affirmed actively increases those risks for over 100 million U.S. users at the behest of an individual plaintiff.

For developers, the injunction introduces a new era of fragmentation, uncertainty, and cost. The current “centralized” model provides immense benefits to the developer community, particularly to small and independent creators. It offers a single, predictable set of rules, a secure and reliable global distribution channel, and a trusted monetization system. This lowers barriers to entry and allows developers to focus on their core competency: building innovative software. The injunction threatens to fragment this landscape.

Moreover, the injunction’s “opt-out” mechanism for catalog sharing imposes a significant burden on the developer community. The remedy’s default allows any third-party app store to list a developer’s app from the Google Play catalog. To prevent this, a developer must affirmatively opt out. This shifts the burden of policing intellectual property from the platform owner to over 500,000 individual developers. A developer who does not want its application appearing in an unknown or untrustworthy third-party store must constantly monitor the ecosystem and manage its distribution preferences on a store-by-store basis. This is a substantial new cost of doing business on the Android platform.

B. The Panel’s Holding Is Inconsistent with Supreme Court Jurisprudence

A broad injunction may well be warranted when it is difficult to separate the parties affected by the enjoined conduct from those that are not. See Trump v. CASA, Slip Op. at 16 (“[W]hile the court’s injunction might have the practical effect of benefiting nonparties, ‘that benefit [is] merely incidental.’”) (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 717 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).  But that is not the case here. The identity of the parties that have supposedly been harmed is clear—they are, at most, Epic and the approximately 100 developers that use the Epic Store. Even if the district court’s conclusions regarding harm to Epic and other developers with apps on the Epic Store were correct, it would be easy—and necessary—to carve a much narrower remedy than the one the district court imposed. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2354–55 (2020).

Indeed, “[i]n no circumstance can a court award relief beyond that necessary to redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. Trump v. CASA, (Thomas, J. & Gorsuch, J. concurring), Slip Op. at 2. See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996) (“[G]ranting a remedy beyond what [is] necessary to provide relief to [the plaintiff is] improper.”). As several Justices have warned, doing so creates constitutional concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1980 (2023) (Gorusch, J., concurring); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); Trump v. CASA, (Thomas, J. & Gorsuch, J. concurring), Slip Op. at 2 (“This limitation follows from both Article III and traditional equitable practice. Because Article III limits courts to resolving specific ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ it requires that any remedy ‘be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s particular injury.’”) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48 at 73).

Trump v. CASA confirms that injunctive relief must be tailored to the parties before the court and may not be used to deliver de facto, class-wide remedies to non-parties.  In CASA, the court drew a sharp line between (i) injunctions that give plaintiffs “complete relief between the parties” even if they incidentally advantage others, and (ii) injunctions designed to confer direct relief on absent persons.  Trump, Slip Op. 17 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 at 702 (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” (emphasis added by CASA Court)).

The existence of viable, less drastic alternatives in the form of the settlements between Google and the consumer plaintiffs, Match Group, and the states is compelling evidence that the district court’s remedy is not equitably tailored and goes far beyond what is necessary to restore competition. Indeed, Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes injunctions to prevent “threatened loss or damage” to the plaintiff, not to redesign an industry for the benefit of non-parties.  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1960) (“[Section] 16 of the Clayton Act, which was enacted by the Congress to make available equitable remedies previously denied private parties, invokes traditional principles of equity and authorizes injunctive relief upon the demonstration of ‘threatened’ injury.”).

CASA underscores that any injunction should be limited to eliminating the challenged restraints as to the named plaintiffs’ proven antitrust injury.  Market-wide relief for all app developers or all app store providers is improper.  See CASA, Slip Op. 12–15 (rejecting attempts to use universal injunctions as a shortcut around class procedures). While an Epic-specific order here may properly yield incidental marketplace effects, equity forbids crafting an order for the purpose of conferring direct benefits on millions of non-parties.  Yet that is precisely what the injunction does in mandating platform-wide entitlements for “all developers.”

The panel’s reliance on Zenith is misplaced.  Zenith does not confer carte blanche to impose any remedy that might promote competition. While the remedy in Zenith went beyond the specific source of harm identified, it was applied to the same locus of harm—i.e., against likely conduct by the same defendant against the same plaintiffZenith, 395 U.S. at 131; id. at 132 (quoting NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435 (1941)).  But an injunction designed to prevent an end-run around the court’s ruling with respect to the specific plaintiff whose injury had been adjudicated is worlds apart from a market-wide injunction based on the claim of a single market participant.

Likewise, the claim that “district courts are ‘clothed with “large discretion” to . . . pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints’” is misapplied.  Op. 42 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573, 577–78 (1972)).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished between the government’s role in obtaining broad, structural relief (as in Ford Motor) and the constraints on private plaintiffs who must show antitrust injury, and whose relief must be tethered to their threatened loss. And even the government faces limits.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 at 103, 106–07 (vacating remedy obtained by the U.S. Department of Justice).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we urge the Court to grant’s Google motion for rehearing.

[1] The amici represent that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, no party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief, and no person—other than amici and their counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.

Brief of Scholars and Former Judges and Officials to US District Court in Arbutus v Moderna

Interest of Amicus Curiae Amici curiae are 16 former judges, former federal officials, and academic scholars who have expertise in patent law, takings law, or both. They have an interest...

Interest of Amicus Curiae

Amici curiae are 16 former judges, former federal officials, and academic scholars who have expertise in patent law, takings law, or both. They have an interest in ensuring the integrity of the patent system and the proper application of the federal government’s eminent domain power to patented inventions. Amici have no stake in the parties or in the outcome of this case. A full list of signatories to this brief is set forth in Addendum A.[1]

Summary of Argument

This Court previously and correctly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) is inapplicable to a private company that enters into a contract with the federal government for payment of vaccine doses distributed by private companies for use by private citizens. See Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. CV 22-252, 2023 WL 2455979 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2023). In the context of a federal payment or subsidy of private transactions, the use of a patented invention between the private parties is not “‘for the Government’ which is . . . a necessary factor under § 1498(a).” Id. at *2. As this Court’s prior decision recognized, the text, legislative history, and judicial interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) establish this is an eminent domain statute with no applicability to the portion of the contract between Moderna and the federal government that subsidized vaccine doses for the general public, as opposed to the federal government’s purchase of vaccine doses for military personnel or federal employees.

The C-100 contract between Moderna, Inc. and the federal government states that the federal government will pay for the manufacture and use of vaccine doses “for the United States Government (USG) and the US population.” In this case, Moderna elides the express distinction in the C-100 contract between the federal government’s payment for vaccine doses for its own employees and military personnel and payment for the vaccine doses “for . . . the US population.” The federal government’s decision to subsidize vaccine doses “for. . . the US population” does not meet the statutory requirement in § 1498(a) that a patented invention is made or used “by or for the United States” or that a contractor like Moderna made or used a patented invention “for the Government.”

Section 1498(a) is an eminent domain statute that is inapplicable to the federal government’s policy decisions to subsidize private transactions in the marketplace, such as paying for the costs of private citizens receiving vaccine doses from private companies. This statute authorizes the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate a claim by a patent owner for “reasonable and entire compensation” when its patented invention is “used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, this Court should hold again as a matter of law that § 1498(a) is inapplicable to the patent infringement claim by Arbutus Biopharma Corporation against Moderna for the unauthorized manufacture and use of vaccine doses “for the . . . US population,” as distinguished from the express portion of the C-100 contract in which vaccine doses were manufactured and used “for the United States Government.”

Argument

I. Section 1498(a) is an Eminent Domain Statute

A. The Provenance of § 1498(a)

The provenance of § 1498(a) is found in many nineteenth-century federal court decisions that patents are private property rights secured under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In these decisions, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts consistently held that patents are private property secured under the Constitution. They include, for example:

  • “[T]he government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual, without license of the inventor or making compensation to him.” United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. 246, 252 (1870).
  • A patent owner can seek compensation for the unauthorized use of his patented invention by federal officials because “[p]rivate property … shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876).
  • “Inventions secured by letters-patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to protection as any other property. . . . Private property, the constitution provides, shall not be taken for public use without just compensation . . . .” Brady v. Atlantic Works, 3 F. Cas. 1190, 1192 (C.C.D. Mass. 1876) (Clifford, Circuit Justice), rev’d on other grounds, 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
  • A patent is not a “grant” of special privilege; the text and structure of the Constitution, as well as court decisions, establish that patents are property rights secured under the Takings Clause). McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 421 (1878).

Despite these many court decisions, courts expressed confusion at the turn of the twentieth century concerning their jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings claim by a patent owner. See Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 712-14 (2007). Congress thus enacted in 1910 the predecessor statute to § 1498(a) to resolve this constitutional confusion. See Act of June 26, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, 851-52 (1910) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)). The text and legislative history confirm that this is an eminent domain statute.

The modern Supreme Court has confirmed the long-standing rule that patents are property rights secured under the Takings Clause and Due Process Clauses. Roughly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court held that patents are “property” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642–43 (1999). In 2015, the Supreme Court approvingly quoted an 1882 decision stating that “[a patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser.” Horne v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)).

B. The Legislative History of § 1498(a) Confirms it is an Eminent Domain Statute

The House committee report for the bill that became § 1498(a) expressly stated that the federal government was using patents without authorization “in flat violation of [the Takings Clause] and the decisions of the Supreme Court.” H.R. Rep. No. 61-1288, at 3 (1910). During the congressional debates leading up to the enactment of § 1498(a), the bill’s sponsor, Representative Currier, emphasized that the legislation “does not create any liability; it simply gives a remedy upon an existing liability.” 45 Cong. Rec. 8755, 8756 (1910). Throughout the congressional debates, legislators repeatedly referenced the earlier-cited court decisions, (see supra Part I.A), that consistently stated that patent owners have a constitutional remedy under the Takings Clause to receive just compensation for an unauthorized use of their patents by federal officials. See H.R. Rep. No. 61-1288, at 1-4.

C. The Text of § 1498(a) Confirms it is an Eminent Domain Statute

The court precedents and legislative history confirm the plain meaning of the text of § 1498(a), which simply authorizes claims of reasonable compensation arising from exercises of the government’s eminent domain power. Section 1498(a) states that a patent owner can sue the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims (originally the Court of Claims) for “recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation” when a patented invention is “used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner.”

In 1918, after extensive federal procurement efforts with contractors during World War One, Congress amended § 1498(a) to authorize lawsuits by patent owners for reasonable compensation from the government when federal contractors infringe their patents. See Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)). This amendment added the “used or manufactured by or for the United States” that currently exists in § 1498(a). Id. Consistent with its function as an eminent domain statute, the statute was amended  again shortly after the U.S. entered World War Two, requiring suits against the government for compensation for patent infringement by federal contractors, but again this amendment is limited to only when contractors make or use a patented invention “for the Government.” Act of October 31, 1942, Pub. L. 768, § 6, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., 56 Stat. 1013, 1014 (1942) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. 1498(a)).

In this case, the C-100 contract between Moderna and the federal government expressly distinguishes between the vaccine doses acquired for use by the federal government versus the vaccine doses acquired for use by private citizens in the general public. In the C.1 Scope provision, the contract states that the federal government is paying for “manufacturing of vaccine doses . . . for the United States Government (USG) and the US population” (emphasis added). (D.I. 520-1 § C.1.) In provision C.1.1.1, the C-100 contract further stipulates that the federal government is paying for “large scale manufacturing so that vaccine doses . . . are immediately available for nationwide access . . . and the medical countermeasures are authorized for widespread use.” (Id. § C.1.1.1.)

The federal government’s payment of manufacture and use of vaccine doses “for the . . . US population” and “for nationwide access” is not an example of a contractor making and using a patented invention “for the United States,” 35 U.S.C. § 1498(a), because these vaccine doses were distributed by private companies for use by private healthcare patients. The “by and for the United States” text in § 1498(a) limits its applicability to manufacture or use of patent inventions by the federal government, or by federal contractors acting “for the Government,” such as the unauthorized use of patented inventions for the U.S. military in the nineteenth century. See Burns, 79 U.S. at 251-54 (unauthorized use of patented tent by U.S. military); McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 417 (unauthorized use of a patented cartridge by U.S. military).

The twentieth-century lawsuits brought by patent owners under § 1498(a) confirm the express limitation of this statute to classic examples of the federal government’s exercise of its eminent domain power in acquiring property for the use by the U.S. military or federal agencies. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, 625 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1980); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Croll-Reynolds Co. v. Perini-Leavell-Jones-Vinell, 399 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1050 (1969). One famous § 1498(a) case arose from the U.S. military’s unauthorized use of a patented battery during World War Two. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).

In sum, the plain text of § 1498(a) and its legislative history make clear that it does not apply to products and services that are paid for by the public fisc but are ultimately made for private companies to distribute for “widespread use” by private citizens across the nation. (D.I. 520-1 § C.1.1.1.) Although the C-100 contract provides for the authorization or consent of the Government, this consent triggers this statute’s indemnity protections for federal contractors only when such manufacture or use is “for the Government.” 35 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Thus, § 1498(a) applies only to the portion of the C-100 contract by which the government paid for the manufacture of vaccine doses “for the United States Government,” (id.), such as for “use” by U.S. military personnel and federal employees. For the other portion of the C-100 contract providing for payment of vaccine doses for “the US population,” § 1498(a) is inapplicable as a matter of law. For the nationwide access to its vaccine doses by the US population generally, Moderna’s contract with the federal government was for use by private patients in the U.S. healthcare market.

This Court previously and correctly denied Moderna’s motion to dismiss by recognizing that § 1498(a) applies only when a contractor makes or uses a patented invention “for the Government.” Arbutus Biopharma Corp., 2022 WL 16635341, at *7. The federal government may have derived an incidental benefit from resolution of the COVID-19 public health emergency through the private distribution and use of vaccines by private patients, but this Court rightly recognized that “[i]ncidental benefit to the government is insufficient” to trigger § 1498(a) as an affirmative defense in a patent infringement lawsuit. Id. at *5 (quoting IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

II. Judicial Interpretation of § 1498(a) Confirms it is an Eminent Domain Statute Inapposite to Private Transactions in the Marketplace

This Court, in its prior decision denying Moderna’s motion to dismiss the complaint by Arbutus, recognized and applied binding precedents that have construed § 1498(a) as an eminent domain statute. This explains why the federal government must use a patented invention, or at least be a direct beneficiary of a contractor making or using a patented invention for the government, to trigger its requirement of payment of “reasonable and entire compensation” by the government. § 1498(a). In addition to the cases discussed by this Court, see Arbutus Biopharma Corp., 2022 WL 16635341, at *4-*7, federal courts have consistently recognized for well over half a century that § 1498 is an eminent domain statute. See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (“It is [the government’s] taking of a license, without compensation, that is, under an eminent domain theory, the basis for a suit under § 1498.”); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (Nichols, J., concurring) (stating that § 1498(a) authorizes a claim in court “to recover just compensation for a taking under the power of Eminent Domain”); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (stating that § 1498(a) is “an eminent domain statute”).

This Court acknowledged in its earlier decision that courts have recognized that the federal government need not be a primary or sole beneficiary, as first stated in Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 1371, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In Advanced Software, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a regional Federal Reserve bank acted “for the government” when it used a process for detecting fraudulent Treasury checks that infringed a patent on this process. The Federal Circuit concluded that “the benefits to the government of using the [infringing fraud-detection] technology on Treasury checks are not incidental effects of private interests.” Id. at 1379. Thus, the Advanced Software court concluded that the patent owner had to proceed in a lawsuit against the federal government under § 1498(a), and not in a lawsuit against the specific Federal Reserve bank that infringed its patent. Given the formal relationship between the federal government and the Federal Reserve System in managing the official currency printed by the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing in the U.S. Department of Treasury, this decision makes sense, both legally and commonsensically.

The Federal Reserve System is not the same legal or commercial entity as a private company that manufactures and sells a drug or vaccine dose. The Federal Reserve System is also not the same legal or commercial entity as a private company that distributes this drug or vaccine dose for use by private patients in the marketplace. Notably, the Advanced Software court expressly distinguished the Federal Reserve System as an entity “for the Government” from a private company that was paid by Medicare in providing a medical device to a private patient in Larson v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 365, 369 (1992).

Larson is more similar in its facts to the C-100 contract between Moderna and the federal government than the facts of Advanced Software, as previously recognized by this Court. Arbutus Biopharma Corp., 2022 WL 16635341, at *7 (“I find this case more akin to Larson than Advanced Software Design”). In Larson, a patent owner sued a private medical company for infringing its patent on a medical device (a splint), and the splints were paid through government programs such as Medicaid or Medicare. Id. at 367-68. Given that “the government reimbursed the cost [of the infringing splint] through Medicare and other federal programs,” id., the defendant argued that the patent owner’s lawsuit must proceed against the government under § 1498(a). The Larson court rejected this argument, stating that “government reimbursement of medical care expenses did not constitute a use of a medical patent for government purposes,” as required by the text of § 1498(a) in authorizing lawsuits against the federal government for compensation. Id. at 369. Similarly in this case, the federal government’s payment to Moderna for its vaccine doses to be distributed “for the . . . US population” in the healthcare market for “nationwide access” by private individuals, (D.I. 520-1 § C.1.1.1), is not a use of a patent “for the Government.” 23 U.S.C. § 1498(a).

In the Federal Circuit’s decision in Advanced Software seventeen years later, the appellate court reaffirmed the key holding of Larson that “[t]he fact that the government has an interest in the [healthcare] program generally, or funds or reimburses all or part of its costs, is too remote to make the government the program’s beneficiary for the purposes underlying § 1498.” Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1379 quoting Larson, 26 Ct. Cl. at 369) (emphasis added). This has long been recognized by scholars as well. One monograph acknowledges that § 1498(a) must be “modified” if it is “to apply to governmental payment for drugs prescribed for beneficiaries of such federal health programs as Medicare and Medicaid.” Milton Silverman & Philip R. Lee, Pills, Profits, and Politics 187 (1974).[2]

Applying both Advanced Software and Larson, this Court rightly recognized in its order denying Moderna’s motion to dismiss, “Moderna’s argument . . . could mean that every government-funded product used to advance any policy goal articulated by the U.S. Government—such as IV needles to fight HIV to cancer drugs to fight the war on cancer—would be subject to a § 1498(a) defense.” Arbutus Biopharma Corp., 2022 WL 16635341, at *7. Given widespread federal funding of healthcare services today, Moderna’s argument would convert every patent infringement lawsuit arising from patents covering drugs or other healthcare treatments into a suit for compensation against the federal government for the exercise of its eminent domain power. The absence of any limiting principle in Moderna’s argument reveals how divorced this argument is from the text, congressional intent, and judicial interpretation of § 1498(a) as an eminent domain statute.

Conclusion

This Court should hold again as a matter of law that § 1498(a) is applicable only to the unauthorized manufacture or use of patents by or for the United States, and thus deny Moderna’s motion for summary judgment as applied to the vaccine doses manufactured by Moderna under the C-100 contract “for the . . . US population.”

[1] Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), amici state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person other than amici, their members, or their counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.

[2] For more recent scholarship analyzing the text and judicial construction of § 1498(a) and reaching the same conclusion, see Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of Breaking Patents to Lower Drug Prices, 98 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 287, 292-310 (2024); Susan G. Braden & Joshua A. Kresh, Section 1498(a) is Not a Rx to Reduce Drug Prices, 77 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 274 (2022).

Brief of Former Antitrust Officials and Scholars to the 9th Circuit in CoStar v CREXi

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE[1] Amici Curiae are former antitrust officials and scholars who have spent decades enforcing and studying the Nation’s antitrust laws. Amici believe . . .

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE[1]

Amici Curiae are former antitrust officials and scholars who have spent decades enforcing and studying the Nation’s antitrust laws. Amici believe the decision reached by the panel, if upheld, would upend foundational antitrust principles and open the floodgates to baseless antitrust suits.

Amici are the following:[2]

Timothy J. Muris, J.D., is a George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, and a Senior Counsel at Sidley Austin LLP. He served as Chairman of the FTC from 2000-2004. Before being elevated to Chairman, Tim served as Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection and Director of the Bureau of Competition. He is the only person ever to head both of the agency’s enforcement bureaus.

Alden Abbott, J.D., is a Senior Research Fellow focusing on antitrust issues at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. He served as General Counsel of the FTC from 2018-2021, where he represented the Commission in court and provided legal advice to its representatives.

Daniel J. Gilman, J.D., Ph.D., is a Senior Scholar of Competition Policy at the International Center for Law & Economics. He previously served as an attorney advisor in the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning and as the Victor H. Kramer Foundation Fellow in antitrust law and economics at Harvard Law School.

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, J.D., is the Director of Law & Economics Programs at the International Center for Law & Economics and a Senior Fellow and Academic Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation, and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. He previously served as a trial attorney with the U.S. Justice Department Antitrust Division in the Telecommunications and Media Enforcement section.

Geoffrey A. Manne, J.D., is the President and Founder of the International Center for Law & Economics and serves as distinguished fellow at Northwestern University’s Center on Law, Business, and Economics, and as visiting professor of law at IE University (Madrid). Before founding ICLE in 2009, he served as a law professor at Lewis & Clark Law School and as a Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law at the University of Chicago Law School.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Sherman Act is the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004). It directs itself “not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). And it does so not to protect corporate or private interests, but from concern for consumer welfare and the public interest. Id. The antitrust laws are thus “not designed to equip [a] competitor with [its rival’s] legitimate competitive advantage.” Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997).

For almost four decades, CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (“CoStar”) have provided commercial real estate (“CRE”) services. Commercial Real Estate Exchange Inc. (“CREXi”), launched roughly a decade ago, is attempting to build its own CRE platform. CoStar filed suit against CREXi in September 2020, alleging that CREXi “harvests content … from CoStar’s subscription database without authorization by using passwords issued to other companies.” SER-12; 124–34. In response, CREXi filed eight counterclaims for violations of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The district court twice dismissed them all. 1-ER-2–44.

A panel of this court reversed. In doing so, it made two critical errors warranting en banc review. First, the panel created an intra-circuit conflict and put this Court on the wrong side of a circuit split by concluding that CREXi plausibly alleged that CoStar’s contractual provisions with brokers are “de facto” exclusivity provisions that violate the Sherman Act. Op. 24–26. This Court had never before “explicitly recognized a ‘de facto’ exclusive dealing theory.” Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016). And for good reason: A careful examination of this theory reveals that it lacks a sound doctrinal foundation, and that precedent, historical context, and administrability concerns all counsel strongly against recognizing this theory.

Second, the panel misapplied out-of-circuit precedent and created another intra-circuit conflict on an issue of exceptional importance in concluding that CoStar “substantially foreclosed” brokers from dealing with CREXi. Op. 12–20. Despite the fact that no party briefed the issue, the panel held sua sponte that “even though monopoly power is not a necessary element of a Section 1 claim, it is sufficient to allege the substantial foreclosure element of exclusive dealing.” Id. at 13. But this Court has rejected exclusive dealing claims brought against monopolists for lack of substantial foreclosure. See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 1004 (9th Cir. 2020). Further, although substantial foreclosure applies with equal force to Section 1 and Section 2 claims, the panel analyzed substantial foreclosure only with respect to CREXi’s claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Op. 12–13.

The panel’s opinion contravenes binding authority and bedrock antitrust principles. This Court should grant en banc review to secure uniformity of this Court’s decisions and get the Court back on the right side of a circuit split.

ARGUMENT

I. The De Facto Exclusive Dealing Theory Cannot Be Used To Transform Non-Exclusive Contractual Provisions Into Exclusivity Provisions.

Despite acknowledging that this Court had “yet to recognize a de facto exclusive dealing theory,” Op. 23, the panel did so here. That was error. Several circuits have declined to apply this theory, and a close examination of its underpinnings reveals that it lacks any sound doctrinal foundation. The Court should not recognize it.

A.     The De Facto Exclusive Dealing Theory Lacks Any Doctrinal Foundation.

The notion of de facto exclusive dealing can be traced back to a century-old case involving Section 3 of the Clayton Act, United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). In United Shoe, the Supreme Court held that a contract falls within the Clayton Act’s section as to exclusivity, even though the contract does “not contain specific agreements not to use the [goods] of a competitor,” if “the practical effect … is to prevent such use.” Id. at 457. The Court noted that the provisions at issue there amounted to “tying agreements” and that, due to the “dominating position in supply shoe machinery” occupied by United Shoe, they “effectually prevent[ed] [the lessee] from acquiring the machinery of a competitor,” except “at the risk of forfeiting the right to use the machines furnished by” United Shoe. Id. at 457–58.

Though this theory first emerged in United Shoe, the few modern cases recognizing de facto exclusive dealing as a valid theory have relied on language from yet another case involving Section 3 of the Clayton Act—Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). In Tampa Electric, the Court surveyed its cases “pass[ing] upon questions arising under [Section] 3” of the Clayton Act, including its holding in United Shoe, and concluded that a contract “found to be an exclusive dealing arrangement” does not violate “[S]ection [3] unless the court believes it probable that performance of the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.” Id. at 325, 327. Notably, the Court “assume[d], but d[id] not decide” that the requirements contract at issue in fact was “an exclusive-dealing arrangement within the compass of [Section] 3,” and ultimately held that the contract did not violate Section 3. Id. at 330, 335. So too, because the contract did not “fall within the broader proscription” of the Clayton Act, the court concluded that “it is not forbidden by” Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 335.

As the panel recognized, from these humble beginnings in Section 3 cases, two of this court’s sister circuits have recognized a de facto exclusive dealing theory. See Op. 24 (citing ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 282 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) & McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 819–20, 833–35 (11th Cir. 2015)).[3] Under this theory, though a contract does not contain an agreement to deal exclusively, courts will “look ‘past the terms of’” the non-exclusive contract “to ascertain the relationship between the parties and the effect of the agreement in the real world.” Aerotec, 836 F.3d at 1182 (quoting ZF Meritor, LLC, 696 F.3d at 270). But the Third Circuit and Eleventh Circuit’s precedent is a slender reed. It should not guide this Court.

The Third Circuit became the first circuit since the turn of the century to bless this theory in LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). Though the court did not mention the theory by name, the court rejected 3M’s argument that an arrangement “that contained no express exclusivity requirement” could not support an exclusive dealing claim under Section 2, and held that the arrangement—bundled rebates and discounts offered to major suppliers—were designed to and did operate as exclusive dealing arrangements. Id. at 157. Not long after, in another Section 2 case, the court similarly reasoned that “a series of independent sales” could be an “exclusive dealing arrangement” if accompanied by certain “economic elements”—i.e., sufficiently large market share and exclusionary conduct. United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2005).

In ZF Meritor, the Third Circuit offered its most thorough discussion of this theory. There, the court held that “an exclusive dealing claim does not require a contract that imposes an express exclusivity obligation” or “a contract that covers 100% of the buyer’s needs” because “de facto exclusive dealing may be unlawful.” ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 282 & n.14. The legality of such a contract, the court reasoned, turns on “whether the agreement foreclosed a substantial share of the relevant market such that competition was harmed.” Id. at 283. But even in crediting such a claim, the court acknowledged that “‘partial’ exclusive dealing is rarely a valid antitrust theory” because contracts that are not “100% exclusive” are “generally lawful because market foreclosure is only partial, and competing sellers are not prevented from selling to the buyer.” Id. at 283 (collecting cases rejecting such claims).

Finally, in McWane, the Eleventh Circuit became only the second circuit court to recognize this theory. McWane—a major player in the iron pipe fittings market—announced that, with limited exceptions, “unless [their distributors] bought all of their domestic fittings from McWane, they would lose their rebates and be cut off from purchases for 12 weeks.” McWane, 783 F.3d at 819. The FTC brought an enforcement action under Section 5 of the FTC Act and ultimately found that McWane’s actions “constituted an illegal exclusive dealing policy.” Id. Critically, the Commission and the ALJ found that distributors were “essential to the domestic fittings market” because there were no “viable alternate distribution channels, including direct sales to end users.” Id. at 834.

Before the Eleventh Circuit, McWane argued that its exclusivity program was “presumptively legal” because it was “short-term and voluntary.” Id. at 833. The Court noted that neither its precedent nor precedent from the Supreme Court spoke “specifically to this issue,” but it ultimately agreed with the FTC that the de facto exclusive dealing approach from Dentsply and ZF Meritor was “consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction to look at the ‘practical effect’ of exclusive dealing arrangements.” Id. at 834 (citing Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 326–28). Grafting this framework from the Section 3 context onto its analysis, the court considered “market realities” rather than “formalistic distinctions” and rejected “McWane’s argument that the specific form of its exclusivity mandate” made it “presumptively legal” and thus “insulated … from antitrust scrutiny.” Id. at 835.

Though this Court in Aerotec described McWane as a de facto exclusive dealing case akin to the Third Circuit’s decision in ZF Meritor, McWane did not involve the sort of de facto exclusive dealing theory that CREXi pressed below. Like in ZF Meritor, CREXi urged the district court to “look past the terms of the contract” to its “effect … ‘in the real world,’” and conclude that—even though CoStar’s agreements lack an ‘express exclusivity requirement—they amount to de facto exclusive dealing. 2-ER-51. In McWane, however, everyone agreed that McWane’s exclusivity program constituted exclusive dealing. 783 F.3d at 834–35. The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the “practical effect” of the program thus concerned only whether the program substantially foreclosed competition. McWane, 783 F.3d at 833–35.

As all this makes clear, the theoretical underpinnings of the de facto exclusive dealing theory are threadbare. Prior to the panel’s ruling, the Third Circuit was the only circuit court that has imported this doctrine into Section 2 cases. Only one opinion—ZF Meritor—had ever extended this doctrine to an exclusive dealing claim under Section 1, and it offered nothing more than ipse dixit and its own Section 3 Clayton Act precedent to do so. As noted, Tampa Electric declined to consider whether such a contract could violate Section 1 or Section 2, see 365 U.S. at 335, so its analysis offers no support for this doctrinal move.

B.     This Court’s Cases, Historical Context, and Administrability Concerns Counsel Strongly Against Recognizing The De Facto Exclusive Dealing Theory.

1. This Court’s prior cases cut sharply against the de facto exclusive dealing theory. As this Court held in Aerotec, “[a] prerequisite to any exclusive dealing claim is an agreement to deal exclusively.” 836 F.3d at 1181. And in evaluating these claims, this Court has made clear that courts must focus on “the actual terms of the agreements,” including “whether there are requirements terms” or “volume of market share targets.” Id. The de facto exclusive dealing theory the panel adopted is incompatible with this approach. Indeed, this Court has already recognized as much. In Aerotec, this Court canvassed the aforementioned de facto exclusive dealing cases. Id. at 1182–83. In doing so, the Court explained, that in “any exclusive dealing claim”—actual or de facto—“the court first [must] be satisfied that specific features of the agreement required exclusivity.” Id. at 1183.

Here, however, the panel strained to find de facto exclusivity in the relevant agreements. See Op. 24–26. To start, the panel conceded that the contracts at issue did not “contain [the] rebate or discount terms that create[d] de facto exclusivity” in ZF Meritor and McWane. Id. at 24. Without a sufficient textual basis in the agreements, the panel instead credited CREXi’s threadbare allegation that three brokers had supposedly “declined to work with CREXi” based on CoStar’s terms. See Op. 26; 4-ER-578–79 (¶¶ 66-68); Pet. for Reh’g En Banc at 4. The panel overstepped its bounds. Notwithstanding CREXi’s meager allegations concerning CoStar’s exclusionary practices, CREXi conceded that it has hundreds of customers who use CoStar’s web tools. 4-ER-633 (¶ 257); see 2-ER-182–183; 4-ER-634 (¶ 260). And given that the Supreme Court has held that courts are “ill suited” to identify proper “terms of dealing,” they are even more inadequately stationed to police “terms of dealing” based on third parties’ reactions to non-exclusive contract terms. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc, 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009). Indeed, no court has entertained such a broad conception of de facto exclusive dealing divorced from express contractual terms.

Tellingly, no court that has adopted the de facto exclusive dealing theory has offered any rationale—let alone a convincing one—for uncritically grafting United Shoe’s and Tampa Electric’s “practical effect” test for Clayton Act Section 3 cases onto Sherman Act cases. And the panel here did not try to either. While this test arguably flows from the Clayton Act, United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 457, it is not clear that the same can be said for the Sherman Act. See Aerotec, 836 F.3d at 1181. Indeed, given that both United Shoe and Tampa Electric employ an ”approach [that] is a relic from a bygone era of statutory construction,” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 437 (2019), courts should be skeptical that such an approach accords with the Sherman Act.

To that end, the panel made little effort to ground the de facto exclusive dealing theory in foundational antitrust principles. Rather, it simply reasoned that not recognizing the theory would produce an “overly formalistic rule.” Op. 24. Far from rote formalism, however, tethering de facto exclusive dealing claims to the contractual text provides guardrails against limitless antitrust liability for parties’ ordinary, procompetitive practices. If this Court breaks from Aerotec and recognizes a de facto exclusive dealing theory for the first time, it should—as a full court— explain how the theory accords with traditional antitrust principles, including the core principle that courts are “ill suited” to determine terms of dealing for parties. Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452.

2. Historical context likewise cautions against jettisoning the bright-line rule applied by other circuits. As the leading treatise has noted, the historical record shows that before the Clayton Act, exclusive dealing arrangements were analyzed under the Sherman Act and the vast majority were found lawful, “just as they had always been at common law.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1800c (Aug. 2023).

Moreover, institutional and administrability concerns counsel restraint. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear rules in antitrust law.” Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452. Aerotec provided a clear rule: “A prerequisite to any exclusive dealing claim is an agreement to deal exclusively.” 836 F.3d at 1181. And in evaluating exclusive dealing claims, courts must look only to the agreement’s text. Id. The panel broke sharply with this rule, rejecting it as “overly formalistic.” Op. 24. This Court must choose between Aerotec’s rule and the panel’s ill-defined approach. It should grant en banc review to do so.

* * *

In sum, the panel discarded Aerotec’s clear, administrable rule—that “[a] prerequisite to any exclusive dealing claim is an agreement to deal exclusively,” 836 F.3d at 1181—in favor of the amorphous de facto exclusive dealing theory. While amici urge the Court to resolve this intra- circuit conflict by making clear that any exclusive dealing claim must fail unless the terms and features of the agreement require exclusivity, the Court could instead do here what it did in Aerotec and “not reach the issue” of whether to “explicitly recogniz[e]” the de facto exclusive dealing theory as a viable theory, 836 F.3d at 1182, and instead grant en banc review and reverse the panel’s error on substantial foreclosure.

II. Monopoly Power Alone Is Insufficient To Allege The Substantial Foreclosure Element of Sherman Act Claims.

Relying on a misreading of out-of-circuit precedent rather than the record, the panel separately erred by finding that CoStar’s allegedly exclusive dealing substantially foreclosed the market. This error was premised on the panel’s conclusion that “monopoly power … is [alone] sufficient to allege the substantial foreclosure element of exclusive dealing.” Op. 13. That is wrong. Two flaws undermine the panel’s substantial foreclosure holding. First, as both parties agreed, substantial foreclosure is an independent element of every exclusive dealing claim. Second, without any justification, the panel’s ruling addressed the substantial foreclosure requirement only for claims arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This requirement, however, applies with equal force to Section 2 monopolization claims.

A. Substantial Foreclosure Is An Independent Element of Exclusive Dealing Claims.

Without the benefit of briefing on the issue, the panel crafted its substantial-foreclosure rule from dicta in ZF Meritor. Op. 12–13. There, the Third Circuit noted that “[i]f the defendant occupies a dominant position in the market, its exclusive dealing arrangements invariably have the power to exclude rivals.” 696 F.3d at 284. Reasoning from this statement, the panel concluded that “even though monopoly power is not a necessary element of a § 1 claim, it is sufficient to allege the substantial foreclosure element of exclusive dealing.” Op. 13. That misreading creates an intra-circuit conflict with this Court’s holding in Qualcomm that exclusive dealing claims require an independent finding of substantial foreclosure. The panel’s sua sponte distortion is precisely the sort of error that merits rehearing en banc. Cf. Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing panel majority for “[r]elying on a ground not raised by either party [] or in the district court”), superseded sub nom. by Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (opinion of Kozinski, J.).

In Qualcomm, this Court made clear that even monopolists must substantially foreclose competition to be subject to exclusive dealing claims. There, unlike here, Qualcomm indisputably enjoyed a dominant position in the cellular modem chip markets. Throughout an extended period prior to the litigation, for example, it controlled “over 90% of market share” in one of the relevant markets. See Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 983 (emphasis added). Despite Qualcomm “possess[ing] monopoly power,” however, the Court held that the contracts at issue did not substantially foreclose competition. Id. at 1004. Accordingly, it reversed the district court’s finding of exclusive dealing, which constituted “an improper excursion beyond the outer limits of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 982.

Other circuits are in accord. See Pet. for Reh’g En Banc at 12–13 (collecting cases). These cases, many of which the panel relies upon, have long followed the Supreme Court’s directive in Tampa Electric: To prevail on an exclusive dealing claim, “the competition foreclosed . . . must be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant market.” 365 U.S. at 326–28. This requirement is not perfunctory. As the panel’s citation to United States v. Microsoft made clear, a court must find actual anticompetitive effect; it may not simply assert it: “[I]t is clear that in all cases the plaintiff must . . . prove the degree of foreclosure.” 253 F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).

Likewise, the Third Circuit’s opinion in ZF Meritor plainly stated that “modern antitrust law generally requires a showing of [both] significant market power by the defendant [and] substantial foreclosure.” 696 F.3d at 271. The panel brushed past this, instead focusing on the ZF Meritor court’s assertion that monopolists’ “exclusive dealing arrangements invariably have the power to exclude rivals.” Id. at 284; Op. 12–13. Reasoning from this assertion, the panel correctly observed that a monopolist’s agreements “can substantially foreclose competition,” Op. 12. But it did not meaningfully analyze whether CoStar’s agreements actually do so. Because the panel failed to credit any allegations that the agreements truly “foreclosed competition in a substantial share of the market,” it could not find that CREXi plausibly alleged an exclusive dealing claim. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

At bottom, courts have consistently required parties to provide evidence demonstrating that the challenged conduct has actually foreclosed a substantial share of the relevant market. And CREXi has plainly failed to do so. By allowing monopoly power to stand in for this evidentiary showing, the panel departs from precedent and undermines the rigor of the substantial foreclosure inquiry.

C.    The Substantial Foreclosure Element Likewise Applies to Sherman Act Section 2 Claims.

The panel likewise misconstrued the Sherman Act by concluding that, because “exclusive agreements are an example of anticompetitive conduct[,] if CREXi plausibly alleges that CoStar entered into exclusive agreements that foreclose competition under § 1, it has also plausibly alleged that CoStar engaged in anticompetitive conduct under § 2.” Op. 13. That is wrong. The panel ignored that substantial foreclosure is an independent requirement for both Section 1 and Section 2 claims. Although the panel opinion is technically correct insofar as it can be read to say that a plausible allegation of substantial foreclosure under Section 1 would translate to a plausible allegation of substantial foreclosure under Section 2, its holding risks allowing future litigants to bypass the Section 2 requirement entirely. And by brushing past the Section 2 requirement, the panel again ignored this Court’s precedent. In Qualcomm, for instance,

this Court reversed the district court’s “specific finding” that “Qualcomm violated both sections of the Sherman Act” by signing exclusive deals that foreclosed a substantial share of the chip market. 969 F.3d at 1003.

In short, the panel’s treatment of substantial foreclosure risks opening the floodgates to all manner of meritless Sherman Act claims.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant en banc review and reverse the panel’s decision.

[1] No party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or part. No party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. No person other than amici or their counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.

[2] Amici submit this brief in their personal capacities and, accordingly, speak only for themselves personally and not for any entity or other person.

[3] At least two of this Court’s sister circuits have briefly examined this theory before rejecting such claims outright. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1989); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1058–60 (8th Cir. 2000); Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 612–13 (8th Cir. 2011).

ICLE Brief to the Ninth Circuit on Stay of Permanent Injunction in Epic Games v Google

STATEMENT OF INTEREST The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual . . .

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. ICLE promotes the use of law and economics methodologies and economic learning to inform policy debates and has longstanding expertise evaluating antitrust law and policy.

ICLE has an interest in ensuring that antitrust law promotes the public interest by remaining grounded in sensible rules informed by sound economic analysis. That includes advising against improperly excessive antitrust remedies that could deteriorate the quality of mobile ecosystems, thereby harming the welfare of consumers and app developers.[1]

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court should grant Google’s motion to stay the district court’s injunction, given several significant problems with the district court’s order.

First, the injunction imposes a duty to deal with competitors, a measure rejected by the Supreme Court in all but the most extreme circumstances. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). In affirming, the panel brushed Trinko aside, saying that it addressed the question of “liability” for a refusal to deal, not the question of an appropriate “remedy” given a finding of liability. But the Supreme Court has made clear that its concerns in Trinko—deterring investment, inviting regulatory supervision, and enlisting courts as “central planners”—apply equally to remedies. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 102 (2021) (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415). Trinko’s skepticism about forced sharing is rooted in both the difficulty of crafting and supervising such remedies and the market distortions they are likely to entail. 540 U.S. at 408, 411, 415.

Second, the district court’s injunction mandates that Google stop lawful conduct without establishing the requisite causal relationship between that relief and the conduct that was found unlawful. But courts have rightly tended to reject remedies untethered from the conduct they are supposed to remedy. Thus, Optronic Techs., Inc. v. Ningbo Sunny Elec. Co., 20 F.4th 466 (9th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) require a clear indication of a significant causal connection between the particular remedy and the particular violation. See Optronic, 20 F.4th at 486 (quoting Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 105). The district court’s opinion establishes no such connection: Its rationale for the app-store distribution provision is a single paragraph focused on a single witness; its catalog-access provision is justified largely by loose and highly generalized network-effects rhetoric—an economic wave of the hand, not proof that the mandate will remedy the violation, least of all for developers not party to the suit. Based on a finding of harm to a single plaintiff, the injunction would require a universal redesign of Google Play. While this may benefit some developers, it would manifestly harm many others. Yet the court did not establish that this intervention was either proportionate or necessary to remedy the adjudicated injury. It is thus inconsistent with established authority.

Third, the injunction runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s view of universal injunctions in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. __ (2025). That decision makes clear the general impropriety of sweeping, system?wide relief affecting non-parties with heterogeneous interests and that courts should not use universal injunctive “relief” to achieve de facto regulation. CASA’s logic—the relationship between who is injured and the scope of an injunction—applies with particular force in private antitrust suits governed by procedural limits (antitrust injury) aimed at ensuring that courts address only direct injuries to specific plaintiffs. Here the injunction would not only force Google to aid its direct competitors by granting them a privileged position in its Android operating system, it would also redesign Android for over 100 million non-party U.S. users and more than 500,000 non-party app developers, potentially exposing them to lax data security, ecosystem fragmentation, increased risks of fraud and piracy, and the degradation of platform value these entail.

The harms threatened by the injunction are certain, immediate, and irreversible: a fundamental restructuring of the Android ecosystem, an erosion of user trust, and a permanent alteration of relationships with developers and device manufacturers. By imposing novel, quasi-regulatory duties on Google that are not borne by its chief competitor, the order threatens to distort the competitive landscape, chill incentives for platform innovation, and, ultimately, harm consumers by degrading a major product in the market. A stay would not merely protect one party from irreparable harm but would help ensure that a contested remedy does not itself become a source of anti-competitive instability before its legal and economic implications are fully reviewed.

ARGUMENT

I. THE PANEL’S AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S DUTY-TO-DEAL INJUNCTION MISCONSTRUES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

The district court’s injunction mandates that Google deal with rivals. Trinko strongly cautions against such mandates. The panel addressed Trinko by suggesting that it does not apply because the Trinko Court was concerned solely about liability, not remedies. Op., 45–46, Dkt. No. 200.1. That is simply wrong. Rather, as the Supreme Court plainly held in Alston—quoting Trinko’s concerns about chilling investment, facilitating collusion, and forcing courts to act as “central planners”—“[s]imilar considerations apply” when crafting remedies. 594 U.S. at 102 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415). Trinko places mandates to deal “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability” precisely because such forced sharing is a remedial morass: it blunts incentives (for the platform and for rivals), invites ongoing judicial oversight, and risks suppressing procompetitive innovation. 540 U.S. at 409, 411, 415; see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, Circuit Justice).

Indeed, compelling a firm to deal with rivals on court?supervised terms implies the very anticompetitive harm that refusal?to?deal doctrine hedges against, effectively short?circuiting the rule?of?reason analysis. A remedy that mandates the distribution of app stores is tantamount to a determination that the failure to distribute constitutes a violation of the law; and imposing a duty to deal without a showing of anticompetitive effect imposes liability by inference. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Unilateral Refusals to Deal, Vertical Integration, and the Essential Facility Doctrine, U. Iowa Leg. Stud. Rsrch. Paper No. 08-31, 28 (Jul. 14, 2008), http://bit.ly/33Q5fIM (“[Unilateral refusal to deal under §2] comes dangerously close to being a form of ‘no?fault’ monopolization.”). This risks mistakenly condemning legitimate business arrangements, which, the Supreme Court has held, is “‘especially costly, because [it] chill[s] the very’ procompetitive conduct ‘the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’” Alston, 594 U.S. at 99 (quoting Tinko, 540 U.S. at 414). This risk of mistaken condemnation fairly compels a stay here.

II. THE PANEL WRONGLY UPHELD THE SCOPE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S INJUNCTION, WHICH IS NOT TAILORED TO THE HARM FOUND AT TRIAL

The panel relied on Optronic to justify the scope of the district court’s injunction. Op., 42-43 (quoting Optronic, 20 F.4th at 486 (“the available injunctive relief is broad[.]”). But not all available remedies are proper ones. To the contrary, Optronic emphasizes that injunctive remedies must rest on a “clear indication of a significant causal connection between the conduct enjoined or mandated and the violation found,” and must be a reasonable method of remedying the proven harm. 20 F.4th at 486 (quoting Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 105). The district court’s injunction fails both the causal nexus and proportionality requirements.

A. The injunction fails to demonstrate a causal nexus with the harm adjudicated

In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s remedy because the district court failed to explain how the ordered relief would “unfetter [the] market from anticompetitive conduct,” and because structural relief “designed to eliminate the monopoly altogether” required a clearer indication of causation than the inferences the district court had relied upon. 253 F.3d at 103, 106–07 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577 (1972)). Here, the district court’s remedy should have fared no better. The district court’s justification for the app-store-distribution mandate is a single paragraph, anchored in one witness’ testimony about sideloading friction and the number of steps some users encountered. Order re UCL Claim and Injunctive Relief, 12, In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., 3:20-cv-05671-JD, Dkt. No. 701. That does not demonstrate that forcing Google to carry rival stores (as opposed to less intrusive alternatives) is causally tied to any proven violation.

The “catalog access” provision fares no better. The district court leaned on network effects, but those are a feature of platform markets, not anticompetitive conduct to be rectified. Id. Treating network effects as a license for compelled access improperly converts a mundane market feature with no inherent anticompetitive significance into a causal nexus. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 106–07 (requiring specific, demonstrated causal connection at the remedy stage, not conjecture); Catherine Tucker, Network Effects and Market Power: What Have We Learned in the Last Decade? ANTITRUST, Spring 2018, 72–79) (“[N]ew findings suggest that network effects are not the guarantor of market dominance.”).

More fundamentally, the district court did not establish how either remedy is causally related to the supposed problem. Users can and do obtain particular apps through multiple channels, and rivals can compete for distribution of specific apps without mirroring the entire catalog. In fact, the connection between the conduct to be remedied and the alleged harm was specifically disclaimed by Jury Instruction No. 24: “It is not unlawful for Google to prohibit the distribution of other app stores through the Google Play Store, and you should not infer or conclude that doing so is unlawful in any way.” Final Jury Instrs., 33, In re Google, 3:20-cv-05671-JD, Dkt. No. 592. The district court’s injunction therefore has no demonstrated causal nexus with the Epic’s anticompetitive harm, and this applies a fortiori to third parties.

B. The injunction is disproportionate to the harm adjudicated

An antitrust injunction must reflect a “proportionality between the severity of the remedy and the strength of the evidence of the causal connection,” and the “[m]ere existence of an exclusionary act does not itself justify full feasible relief….” United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 164 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶650a, 67).

The district court’s injunction here goes far beyond “stopping” the allegedly exclusionary act; it mandates that Google create and maintain new modes of business—hosting rival stores and exposing Play’s catalog—under continuing judicial supervision. But ordering a firm to expand or reconfigure facilities puts courts “nearly in the shoes of the regulator.” Hovenkamp, supra, at 25. Such a remedy could be proportionate only to the most severe, widespread, and pervasive anticompetitive conduct—nowhere near what was presented on the facts here.

A critical distinction also separates this case from Microsoft (and from classic precedents like Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)): those cases addressed discriminatory restrictions that prevented others—intermediaries or members—from dealing with rivals. The appropriate remedy was to prohibit the discrimination and require equal terms for similarly situated actors. See also Optronic, 20 F.4th at 486 (injunction curing discriminatory terms). Here, by contrast, the district court mandates that Google provide a brand-new form of access it has never offered: distribution of rival app stores in Play and wholesale access to its curated catalog. Cf. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining difference between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions and noting that mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored”). As this Court’s decision in MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp. holds, Trinko does not require a defendant to provide access to a competitor if it isn’t already providing access elsewhere. 383 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004). Even Associated Press refused to embrace a “public utility concept” obliging a firm to deal with all newcomers; its remedy simply forbade discriminatory denial of admission. See Hovenkamp, supra, at 10–11.

III. THE PANEL’S HOLDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE LIMITING THE COURT’S AUTHORITY TO REMEDY PURPORTED SYSTEM-WIDE HARM TO NON-PARTIES

Supreme Court precedent establishes that there must be a relationship between the harm found and the remedy imposed and the remedy must relate to the plaintiff’s injuries, not those of non-parties. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111–13 (1986) (requiring antitrust injury “‘that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful’” for injunctive relief under Section 16) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).

The district court’s remedial order that Google must (i) host rival app stores inside Play and (ii) open Play’s catalog to rival stores necessarily regulates the entire Android mobile?distribution ecosystem. It gives potential benefits to some non-parties and imposes costs and risks on other non-parties, many of whom may be harmed by reduced security or by fragmentation they did not seek and do not want. The injunction is contrary to the rule that relief in private antitrust enforcement actions must be tailored to plaintiffs’ injury.

Antitrust injunctions can incidentally affect non-parties. But the classic examples involve nondiscrimination obligations—in which equal treatment requires an order running across similarly situated customers or suppliers. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483–86 (1992); Optronic, 20 F.4th at 486 (approving relief that eliminated discriminatory terms and ensured access on comparable terms). What was ordered here is categorically different: a new duty to provide across-the-board access where no such access was previously ever offered.

Trump v. CASA confirms that injunctive relief must be tailored to the parties before the court and may not be used to deliver de facto, class?wide remedies to non-parties. In CASA, the Court drew a sharp line between (i) injunctions that give plaintiffs “complete relief between the parties” even if they incidentally advantage others, and (ii) injunctions designed to confer direct relief on absent persons. Trump v. CASA, slip op. 17 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” (emphasis added by CASA Court)). See also CASA, slip op. 15–19 (explaining that party?specific orders may have “incidental” spillover benefits, but “complete relief” is not “universal relief”).

That logic applies here. Indeed, Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes injunctions to prevent “threatened loss or damage” to the plaintiff, not to redesign an industry for the benefit of non-parties. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1960) (“[Section] 16 of the Clayton Act, which was enacted by the Congress to make available equitable remedies previously denied private parties, invokes traditional principles of equity and authorizes injunctive relief upon the demonstration of ‘threatened’ injury.”).

CASA requires that any injunction should be limited to eliminating the challenged restraints as to the named plaintiff’s proven antitrust injury. Market?wide relief for all app developers or all app store providers is improper. See CASA, slip op. 12–15 (rejecting attempts to use universal injunctions as a shortcut around class procedures).

While an Epic?specific order here may properly yield incidental marketplace effects, equity forbids crafting an order for the purpose of conferring direct benefits on non-parties. Yet that is what the injunction does in mandating platform?wide entitlements for “all developers.”

In that respect, the panel’s reliance on Zenith is misplaced. Zenith does not confer carte blanche to impose any remedy that promotes competition. Rather, while the antitrust remedy in that case went beyond the specific source of harm identified, it was applied to the same locus of harm—i.e., against likely conduct by the same defendant against the same plaintiff. Zenith, 395 U.S. at 131; id. at 132 (quoting NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, (1941)). But a broad injunction to prevent an end-run around the court’s ruling with respect to the specific plaintiff whose injury had been adjudicated is a world apart from a market-wide injunction based on the claim of a single market participant.

Likewise, the claim that “district courts are ‘clothed with “large discretion” to . . . pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints’” is misapplied. Op., 42 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573, 577–78 (1972)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished between the government’s role in obtaining broad, structural relief (as in Ford Motor) and the constraints on private plaintiffs who must show antitrust injury, and whose relief must be tethered to their threatened loss. And even the government faces limits. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 103, 106–07 (vacating remedy obtained by the U.S. Department of Justice).

The district court’s non?class injunction that effectively regulates a national platform and imposes costs on non-parties with divergent interests is outside traditional equitable principles and thus at odds with Supreme Court precedent.

[1] The amici represent that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, no party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief, and no person—other than amici and their counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. Amici file this brief with the consent of Google LLC.

ICLE Amicus to California Supreme Court in Ortiz v Daimler Trucks

In accordance with California Rule of Court 8.500(g), we are writing to urge the Court to grant the Petition for Review filed by Petitioner Daimler . . .

In accordance with California Rule of Court 8.500(g), we are writing to urge the Court to grant the Petition for Review filed by Petitioner Daimler Truck North America LLC (“Petitioner” or “Daimler”) in the above-captioned matter.

At root, products liability doctrine and public policy concerning innovative technologies share a common aim: to manage tradeoffs in the face of uncertainty. No product can be made perfectly safe, and attempting to do so often reduces welfare—including safety—on other margins. This is especially true when evaluating emerging technologies, such as advanced driver assistance systems, where the benefits of innovation must be weighed against the risk of chilling progress. Public policy decisions that impose additional safety requirements inevitably entail opportunity costs. For instance, dramatically increasing the mandated safety equipment on commercial trucks may reduce certain categories of accidents, but it can also lead to higher vehicle costs, reduced freight capacity, and greater barriers to market entry. These effects may cascade into higher consumer prices, fewer available goods, and reduced access to essential services—particularly in underserved areas. Even well-intentioned efforts to maximize safety in one domain can inadvertently diminish it in others.

To this end, we believe the Petitioner is correct in pointing out that:

By requiring, through judicial fiat, that DTNA and all commercial truck manufacturers… now have a duty to equip vehicles with technology that is still under study by NHTSA, the Court of Appeal effectively bypassed NHTSA and the rulemaking process for setting safety standards governing the design of heavy-duty trucks.  (Pet. 11.)

The fact that collision-avoidance systems like automatic emergency braking (“AEB”) remain under study by the federal agency principally responsible for national vehicle safety standards—NHTSA—speaks volumes. This is not to suggest that NHTSA’s process is infallible, but rather to underscore that even the expert body tasked with evaluating these technologies and their tradeoffs is proceeding with caution. Contrary to the assumptions made by the court below, the introduction of advanced automation technologies into commercial vehicles is neither a self-evident good nor a regulatory afterthought. These systems are still being scrutinized precisely because they involve difficult tradeoffs. Overreliance on automation, for example, may lead to increased driver complacency—a behavioral response long studied in the economic literature as the Peltzman effect (See, e.g., Decision Lab, The Peltzman Effect, https://thedecisionlab.com/reference-guide/psychology/the-peltzman-effect, last visited Aug. 7, 2025)—where gains in technological safety are offset, in whole or in part, by riskier human behavior. That the federal government has not yet mandated these systems, despite years of research and public pressure, reflects a policy judgment that their benefits are not yet unequivocal or costless.

The Court of Appeal’s recognition of a novel duty of care—effectively requiring truck manufacturers to preemptively install optional safety technologies like AEB—raises serious concerns for the future of innovation and public safety. By shifting highly technical design decisions from engineers and regulators into the hands of juries and judges evaluating events in hindsight, the decision introduces legal uncertainty into what had been a carefully calibrated area of commercial activity.

The likely result of this expanded tort duty is to deter manufacturers from pursuing or introducing new safety technologies unless and until they are mandated by regulation—creating a paradox, as regulators typically base mandates on technologies that have already been developed, tested, and brought to market. If manufacturers are discouraged from innovating in the first place, regulators will have little upon which to base future safety requirements. In effect, the California court’s approach risks turning automotive safety into a speculative exercise in “science fiction,” where the only technologies regulators could mandate would be those imagined, rather than those proven in the real world. The larger risk is that judicially-imposed duties of this kind will distort innovation incentives across industries, undermining the incremental and iterative processes that typically drive meaningful progress.

These concerns are especially acute in the context of emerging artificial intelligence systems, such as driver-assistance technologies and semi-autonomous features, where the optimal mix of capabilities on the road remains unsettled. Regulators, researchers, and industry participants continue to assess how human drivers interact with increasingly automated systems, and how those systems perform under real-world conditions. Prematurely imposing tort duties that treat optional, evolving technologies as baseline safety requirements risks locking in early design choices and penalizing the very experimentation that is necessary to improve outcomes over time. In such a dynamic environment, the path to safer roads is not to mandate specific configurations through litigation, but to allow a flexible, data-driven process of evaluation and refinement led by experts and guided by evidence.

We respectfully urge the Court to grant review and clarify that manufacturers do not owe a legal duty to accelerate the development or deployment of alternative products, nor should they be held liable for commercialization decisions made in good faith under conditions of regulatory and technical uncertainty. Further, this case raises the same core question now pending before the Court in Gilead: whether a company may be sued for failing to bring to market a product that, in hindsight, might have been safer or more desirable than the one actually sold. (Case No. S283862, Review granted May 1, 2024.) These identical concerns make Ortiz an ideal candidate for a “grant and hold” order pending resolution of Gilead, which will directly bear on the viability of the duty recognized below. Until this threshold issue is resolved, imposing tort liability based on the timing or scope of innovation decisions risks undermining California’s longstanding commitment to balanced, innovation-friendly product liability law.

Interest of Amicus Curiae

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to advancing policy grounded in sound economic principles. Our work focuses on applying the tools of law and economics to contemporary legal and regulatory issues, particularly those involving innovation and the institutional frameworks that support dynamic markets. We study both artificial intelligence (“AI”) and the principles of liability—particularly products liability—that are directly implicated in the present matter.  In submitting this letter, we seek to outline several key concerns regarding the potential chilling effects on innovation that could result from the Court of Appeal’s ruling in this matter.[1]

The Court of Appeal’s Duty Theory Would Expand Liability Without an Actual Defect

The Court of Appeal’s recognition of a duty to equip commercial trucks with emerging safety technologies like AEB represents a substantial and unwarranted departure from traditional California products liability law. Historically, plaintiffs have been required to show that the product that actually injured them was defective. (Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 21, 30, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 424 P.3d 290; Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co. (1934) 1 Cal.2d 229, 233.) By contrast, the theory accepted below imposes liability not for any defect in the truck as manufactured or sold, but for the manufacturer’s decision not to include a still-evolving, non-mandated technology at the time of production. That shift in doctrine opens the door to a much broader form of liability—one that could apply to any product, at any time, simply because a plaintiff can argue that a better version might have been possible sooner.

Indeed, the history of regulatory examination and market adoption of these sorts of AEB systems suggests that Petitioner was moving at a reasonable pace in integrating them. Indeed, NHTSA’s measured approach to adopting these systems as a standard was vindicated by its 2023 investigation into false AEB activations in Freightliner trucks—the very manufacturer in this case—where 18 complaints documented trucks braking inappropriately ‘with no actual roadway obstacle present.’ (Tyson Fisher, NHTSA Investigates Automatic Emergency Braking on Daimler Trucks, Landline.MEDIA, May 31, 2023, https://landline.media/nhtsa-investigates-automatic-emergency-braking-on-daimler-trucks/).  Thus NHTSA’s cautious timeline reflected genuine technical concerns which, undoubtedly, the manufacturers were also considering. Moreover, the market has already been responding effectively: by 2023 a majority of the manufacturers who were part of the Truck and Engine Manufacturer’s Association (which includes Daimler (see Truck & Engine Manufacturer’s Association, Member Companies, https://www.truckandenginemanufacturers.org/companies/ last visited Aug. 7, 2025) were installing AEB technology on a “majority of new highway tractors.” In recent comments to NHTSA, however, the Association voiced a concern which echoes well the sentiment of this letter:

(Engine and Truck Manufacturer’s Association) member companies and their system suppliers constantly improve AEB technologies to more accurately detect objects in the road ahead so the systems can better differentiate between a potential collision and other situations, thereby more effectively mitigating potential crashes.

Simultaneously, manufacturers and designers improve AEB systems to minimize the false activations that cause drivers and fleets to lose confidence in the technology and can cause other unintended adverse safety consequences. (Comments Of The Truck And Engine Manufacturers Association, Heavy Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking; AEB Test Device, NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0023, https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2023-0023-0667.)

The risk of the expansive liability that the decision below would encourage is particularly acute when the harm at issue is speculative and untethered from any defect. The truck in this case complied with all applicable federal and state safety standards. The plaintiffs do not allege a failure to warn or a malfunction. Instead, they assert that Petitioner should have opted to include a particular advanced driver assistance system—despite its optional status and the lack of any regulatory mandate at the time. That kind of hindsight-based duty theory transforms a lawful, fully regulated product into a source of liability simply because the manufacturer did not predict, and preemptively act on, evolving preferences and technologies.

As with the pharmaceutical development at issue in Gilead, decisions about product design—particularly with respect to emerging technologies—are complex and layered. Introducing a new safety system is not costless, nor is it automatically net beneficial. Engineering constraints, interoperability, reliability, consumer training, and the risk of overreliance all factor into whether and when to incorporate such tools. The Court of Appeal’s suggestion that manufacturers knew the system was better, and should therefore have included it, elides those difficult tradeoffs. The reality is that even regulators such as NHTSA have taken years to evaluate these technologies—precisely because the costs and benefits are not obvious, and the wrong configuration may undermine safety.

The plaintiffs’ duty theory also rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of how manufacturers operate in the face of technological uncertainty and market complexity. The question here is not whether the collision-avoidance system could ultimately prove beneficial—many innovations are—but whether Petitioner was under a legal obligation to adopt it at a time when neither federal regulators had mandated it nor the relevant customer base had widely embraced it. In reality, Petitioner was actively working to integrate the system into its product offerings and understand where it would provide the greatest value.

Adoption decisions during this period reflected a range of considerations—technical readiness, compatibility with existing fleet operations, driver preferences, and empirical performance data—not simply cost of adoption. Drivers accustomed to traditional braking systems may have resisted the perceived intrusiveness or unpredictability of early-generation AEB, especially where reports of false activations raised safety concerns. When an optional system is offered at nominal cost and still not widely adopted by sophisticated fleet operators, that fact should carry important evidentiary weight. To retroactively impose a tort duty to include the system in all vehicles, despite the absence of a regulatory requirement and clear market demand, would run counter to the very conditions of uncertainty in which these design decisions were made.

California law has never recognized a duty to preemptively innovate, nor a duty to equip products with technologies that remain optional and unmandated by expert regulatory agencies. To adopt such a duty now would undermine the stability of product design decisions across industries and invite courts to act as de facto technology regulators—without the tools, expertise, or perspective to balance long-run innovation incentives with short-term litigation pressures.

The Court’s Foreseeability Analysis Overlooks Uncertainty, Tradeoffs, and Regulatory Context

Implicit in its application of the Rowland foreseeability factor, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the general proposition that rear-end truck collisions are foreseeable. But this flattens a much more complex analysis. As this Court has emphasized, Rowland requires courts to assess foreseeability at a general level—asking not whether this specific injury was predictable, but whether the category of conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm alleged to justify imposing a duty. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 51 Cal.4th 764, 772 (2011).) But even at that level of abstraction, the foreseeability inquiry cannot ignore the context in which a manufacturer is making design and commercialization decisions about an emerging technology.

Petitioner, like other manufacturers, was engaged in developing and refining advanced safety technologies—technologies whose deployment involved meaningful tradeoffs in cost, usability, and driver acceptance. The foreseeability question cannot be reduced to “was a rear-end collision foreseeable?”—of course it was—but must instead be framed around the foreseeability of preventable harms given the real-world constraints of product development, incomplete information, and market readiness.

The Court of Appeal’s foreseeability framework effectively punishes manufacturers for the very uncertainty that defines emerging technology development. NHTSA itself characterized AEB technology as emerging and requiring further validation through the 2010s—precisely because the optimal deployment, potential false activation risks, and behavioral adaptation effects remained unresolved. (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Automatic Emergency Braking, 49 CFR Part 571 (2015), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-10-16/pdf/2015-26294.pdf) By treating the ex post occurrence of an accident as evidence that the manufacturer should have ex ante anticipated the need for a specific technological response, the court inverts the proper temporal orientation of the foreseeability inquiry. Under this logic, every safety innovation becomes retrospective proof that its absence was unreasonable—a standard that would render product development decisions essentially strict liability determinations dressed in negligence doctrine. This approach is particularly problematic when, as here, expert regulatory bodies were themselves still evaluating the technology’s optimal deployment.

Manufacturers were navigating a landscape of emerging technology, uncertain adoption, and evolving standards. In this context, the foreseeability analysis should have considered not every potential downstream injury, but whether it was reasonably feasible—ex ante—for Petitioner to treat non-adoption of an optional system as categorically unreasonable. By treating optional AEB systems as presumptively required, the court below flattened the analysis and imposed a duty without regard for the careful, iterative process by which both regulators and manufacturers evaluate emerging technologies.

Moreover, this narrow view of foreseeability ignores the tradeoffs inherent in requiring the early adoption of new technologies. The tort system must not overlook the downstream harms that arise when well-intentioned mandates distort complex systems. AEB systems, like all safety technologies, entail costs—not just financial, but operational and behavioral. Driver discomfort or resistance, incompatibility with fleet logistics, and the risk of false activations  all shape whether and how these systems are integrated. Requiring their inclusion in all trucks, regardless of use case, driver training, or real-world performance, risks unintended consequences—such as increased costs for goods movement, reduced fleet turnover, or even degraded safety if drivers over-rely on automation.

These are precisely the kinds of tradeoffs regulators are best positioned to evaluate. Tort law is not well-suited to substitute its own hindsight judgments for this kind of prospective, system-level analysis.

Public Policy Factors Undermine the Court of Appeal’s Holding

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s concern that recognizing a duty here would unreasonably require manufacturers to adopt novel technologies as they become available. (Op. at 19-20). It framed the duty as a narrow one, triggered only where a manufacturer declines to include a safety feature that is allegedly effective, feasible, and already available at the time of sale. (Id.) But this dismissal of Petitioner’s concerns did not give due attention to the downstream innovation effects. In practice, recognizing a duty based on availability alone collapses the line between emerging and established technologies and invites courts to impose liability whenever a newer, potentially better safety system could have been included but wasn’t. That is not a narrow duty—it is a deeply expansive one, and it risks distorting the careful, case-by-case tradeoffs that innovation requires.

This internal contradiction in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning deserves closer scrutiny. Petitioner did not ignore or suppress the technology at issue—it invested in developing Detroit Assurance 4.0, brought it to market, and on multiple occasions sought to persuade its customers to adopt it. The company provided marketing materials and training that emphasized the system’s safety benefits, highlighting its potential to reduce collisions and save lives. These efforts were aimed at encouraging adoption by a customer base that was, at the time, still acclimating to the presence of automated driver-assistance features in commercial vehicles. The problem, as the court sees it, is not that Petitioner failed to innovate or withheld a safety system, but that it respected its customers’ decision not to include the system as standard. In effect, the Court has treated Petitioner’s refusal to mandate the technology—despite its affirmative efforts to encourage its use—as a basis for liability. That is not a failure of reasonable care; it is a reflection of market realities and regulatory discretion during a period of technological transition. Thus, in essence, the Court of Appeal would allow legal liability against Petitioner for not forcing wide-spread market adoption fast enough.

The concerns that this case creates are not hypothetical. In the table saw industry, for example, this dynamic played out in the table-saw safety technology surrounding SawStop. (See Tanner B. Samples, Protecting “Learned Hands”: Table Saw Injuries, the Sawstop Saga, and How Our Design Defect Doctrine Is Disincentivizing Safety, 69 Geo. L. Rev. 671, 676-79). There, the inventor of a breakthrough safety system alleged that leading manufacturers actively avoided adopting or even acknowledging the technology—not because it was ineffective, but because they feared that its inclusion in some products could be used against them in design defect litigation. (Id.) Rather than take the legal risk of being the “first mover,” manufacturers kept the innovation out of their product lines altogether. The chilling effect was so strong that the industry’s apparent position became circular: no one adopted the safety feature because it was “not industry standard,” and it wasn’t industry standard because no one adopted it.

Ortiz risks replicating—and metastasizing—that pathology. Here, Daimler did exactly what the saw manufacturers feared: it developed an advanced safety system, marketed its benefits, and tried to convince a hesitant customer base to adopt it. Rather than being rewarded for this leadership, it now faces liability for failing to make adoption mandatory. The Court of Appeal’s decision effectively converts the manufacturer’s own innovation into a litigation trigger. That sends the wrong message. It tells manufacturers that if they try to introduce a new safety feature, they may not just fail to persuade the market—they may expose themselves to legal claims for not imposing it unilaterally. This is precisely the incentive structure that drove the SawStop standoff and potentially stifled adoption of a technology now widely understood to reduce harm. If this Court does not correct the Ortiz rule, that same perverse logic will take hold in industries like trucking, where technological improvement depends on iterative development, fleet-level adoption, and gradual normalization—not on one-size-fits-all mandates imposed through litigation.  And whether a manufacturer’s failure to include a given technology is characterized as a “design defect” or a “negligent omission,” the deeper risk is the same: that liability will attach not just for a known hazard, but for failing to predict the optimal timing and scope of adoption of still-evolving systems.

This concern is magnified in a field like commercial vehicle design, where innovation is iterative, operational constraints vary widely, and driver acceptance is critical. Even if a technology like AEB holds promise—and is ultimately proven beneficial—it does not follow that its earlier, discretionary adoption is the proper basis for a tort duty. At the time Petitioner built the truck in question, Detroit Assurance 4.0 was offered as an option, not required by federal regulation, and still undergoing field evaluation. Some customers declined to include it. Drivers were still adapting to its functionality. And regulators, including NHTSA, had not yet finalized a standard. That is not an environment of legal clarity; it is one of ongoing policy calibration. Tort law should not short-circuit that process.

Indeed, the cost of recognizing a duty in this context is the risk that manufacturers will either delay innovation to avoid creating retroactive liabilities or commercialize only the most defensible, conservative solutions—those least likely to attract litigation, not those most likely to advance safety. Economic incentives operate at the margin, and even a modest shift in legal exposure can reconfigure product development pipelines. The Court of Appeal’s decision gives insufficient weight to this systemic risk. The tort system, when overextended, can suppress exactly the kind of progress it purports to promote.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision threatens to transform California tort law from a system that encourages reasonable care into one that imposes retroactive liability for failing to predict technological futures. By imposing a duty to install non-mandated safety systems during their developmental phase—when even a relevant regulator was proceeding cautiously—the decision inverts the proper relationship between regulatory expertise and judicial oversight, substitutes hindsight bias for ex ante reasonableness, and risks chilling the very innovation it purports to promote. We respectfully urge the Court to grant review to preserve California’s balanced approach to products liability and prevent the emergence of a “duty to innovate” that would ultimately harm both innovation and safety.

[1] No party or counsel for a party authored or paid for this amicus letter in whole or in part.

COMMENTS & STATEMENTS

ICLE Scholars Available to Discuss United States v Google Decision

PORTLAND, Ore. (Sept. 2, 2025) – Antitrust scholars from the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) are available to discuss the U.S. District Court . . .

PORTLAND, Ore. (Sept. 2, 2025) – Antitrust scholars from the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) are available to discuss the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s just-released decision in the remedies phase of the United States v. Google case.

The court had earlier ruled in the liability phase of the trial that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act and illegally maintained a monopoly by entering into exclusive agreements to secure default distribution for its general search engine.

Relevant Resources From ICLE Scholars

To schedule an interview with ICLE President Geoffrey A. Manne or other ICLE scholars, contact R.J. Lehmann at [email protected].

About ICLE

The International Center for Law & Economics is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center working with a roster of more than one-hundred academic affiliates and research centers from around the globe. ICLE scholars promote the use of law and economics methodologies to inform public policy debates.

ICLE Comments to the FCC on the Copper Retirement NPRM

Introduction The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) commends the Federal Communications Commission for this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),[1] which represents a critical . . .

Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) commends the Federal Communications Commission for this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),[1] which represents a critical opportunity to modernize a regulatory framework that lags behind market and technological realities. Dynamic competition has resulted in “creative destruction”: newer, superior technology has replaced older, inferior technology in the provision of voice services. The Commission’s current rules governing network changes and service discontinuances impose significant transaction costs and create a deadweight loss on the U.S. economy by artificially inflating the cost of migrating from inefficient, deteriorating copper networks to superior, next-generation IP-based infrastructure. Consumer welfare would be best served by eliminating impediments to this transition.

ICLE urges the Commission to adopt its most ambitious deregulatory proposals. Specifically, the Commission should use its Section 10 authority to forbear from the network-change notice requirements of Section 251(c)(5) and the service-discontinuance requirements of Section 214 where competitive alternatives exist. The modern communications marketplace, characterized by robust intermodal competition, provides a more dynamic and effective discipline than prescriptive, monopoly-era oversight. By aligning its rules with the economic reality of a competitive marketplace, the Commission can reduce unnecessary costs, unleash private capital for infrastructure deployment, and accelerate the delivery of advanced services to all Americans.

I. Dynamic Competition Has Led to Creative Destruction in Voice Services

The market for voice services has drastically changed since the adoption of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. This market, much like the broadband market,[2] is best understood through dynamic-competition analysis.

Unlike static-competition analysis—which assumes all firms compete in a defined market of the same commodities, using the same processes—dynamic-competition analysis recognizes that innovation often results in “creative destruction,”[3] whereby a new product or service replaces an old one. For example, the automobile replaced the horse and carriage, and telephone replaced the telegraph. Under a dynamic-competition model, the focus is not just on current players in the marketplace for a known product or service, but how market process often give rise to brand new products or services that may replace older ones altogether. As economist David Teece has put it:

With dynamic competition, new entrants and incumbents alike engage in research and development (R&D) and the development of new products, processes, and new business models. Firms seek to create entirely new markets and product categories. Businesses are not just looking everywhere for rivals seen and unseen, but to the future to try to satisfy user/customer needs and unlock latent demand. New product introductions followed by price declines are common. Competition is usually either for the market or sometimes to create entirely new markets as much as it is within markets.[4]

Voice markets are a compelling example of how technological changes and disruption by rapid modal shifts have completely changed the game, and are leading to creative destruction. Where most households were once served by copper networks, mobile and VoIP have largely replaced those traditional switched-access lines. As the FCC’s data shows:

  • As of December 2023, there are “386.1 million mobile subscriptions in the United States, representing an increase in mobile voice subscriptions at a compound annual growth rate of 3.1% over the prior three years.”[5] On the other hand, “there are approximately 20.6 million end-user switched-access lines, including approximately 8.5 million residential lines. In addition, there are approximately 64.2 million interconnected VoIP subscriptions, including approximately 24.1 million residential subscriptions. Of the 85 million fixed retail voice telephone service subscriptions, approximately 38% were residential connections and approximately 62% were business connections. The relative growth trends show that fixed switched-access continues to decline while interconnected VoIP services plateaued then had a slight decrease. The number of fixed retail switched-access lines declined over the past three years at a compound annual rate of 15.7%, while interconnected VoIP subscriptions decreased at a compound annual growth rate of 1.6%.”[6]
  • This is a continuation of long-term trends that have seen mobile overtake almost completely the previously dominant traditional switched access, while interconnected VoIP has largely replaced copper lines as the technology of choice for fixed voice. At year-end 1999, there were 189.6 million switched-access lines and 79.7 million mobile subscribers in the United States.[7] By year-end 2008, there were 141 million switched-access lines and 21.7 million VoIP subscriptions, compared to 261.2 million mobile subscriptions.[8] Whereas “as of December 2023, residential fixed voice connections were approximately 26% switched-access and approximately 74% interconnected VoIP, with residential switched-access connections comprising approximately only 10% of all fixed retail voice connections.”[9]
  • Moreover, “[a]ccording to preliminary data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as of December 2023, approximately 76% of adults lived in a wireless-only household in late 2023, with adults in lower age groups more likely to live in wireless-only households. For children, the CDC found that an even greater number, approximately 87%, live in wireless-only households In the 25 to 29 age group, approximately 87% of adults lived in wireless-only households, approximately 90% of those aged 30 to 34 lived in wireless-only households, approximately 87% of those aged 35 to 44 lived in wireless-only households, approximately 74% of those aged 45 to 64 lived in wireless-only households, and approximately 55% of those 65 and older lived in wireless-only households. About 0.5% of households had neither wireless nor fixed voice subscriptions, as of late 2023.”[10]
  • These trends don’t even take into consideration the plethora of “apps running solely on data networks that are nearly indistinguishable to the consumer from the core communications functionality of the public switched telephone network, and nearly indistinguishable to providers from other network data traffic. Many of these apps combine the benefits of voice, video, and text communications into one data-based service.”[11]
  • In sum, “[a]lthough the public switched telephone network was once the only means to connect, there now exists a multitude of other voice service options for consumers in the United States.”[12]

These incredible changes in the voice marketplace over the past 30 years make sense if one views the market through the lens of dynamic competition. One of the features of dynamic competition is that:

With dynamic competition, new entrants and incumbents alike engage in new product and process development and other adjustments to change. Frequent new product introductions followed by rapid price declines are commonplace. Innovations stem from investment in R&D or from the improvement and combination of older technologies. Firms continuously introduce product innovations, and from time to time, dominant designs emerge. With innovation, the number of new entrants explodes, but once dominant designs emerge, implosions are likely, and markets become more concentrated. With dynamic competition, innovation and competition are tightly linked.[13]

In other words, both incumbents and new entrants invested in new ways to provide voice service, with mobile and VoIP largely overtaking the old copper networks. Competition came from outside the traditional switched-access market, and then largely replaced it. The FCC should facilitate these market changes by removing barriers to this dynamic competition.

II. Maintaining Legacy Copper Networks Is Cost-Prohibitive

As markets have moved toward mobile and VoIP, maintaining legacy copper lines has become increasingly expensive. With fewer subscribers, the per-subscriber cost for copper lines has increased. Prices have also gone up for standalone voice service over copper lines, leading to even more switching by consumers. This negative feedback loop is unsustainable over the long term, which is why many providers are looking to retire their copper networks.

For instance, AT&T has reported that it spends more than $1 billion annually just to maintain copper lines in California.[14] Nationwide, these annual costs run to around $6 billion for AT&T alone.[15]

The reasons for these high maintenance costs include:

  • Legacy copper lines are expensive because regional wire centers must be operated to serve the few who still use them.
  • Copper lines also take a long time to repair relative to fiber lines. Fiber-optic lines can be restored within four to five hours, while copper lines can take days. That’s because copper wires are encased in paper (or sometimes lead), which takes time to dry.[16]
  • Another maintenance challenge is finding qualified technicians to repair these copper wires. Only a handful of technicians are still trained in copper-wire maintenance, making it a skill in short supply.[17]
  • Copper is sufficiently valuable that it is often stolen by thieves.[18]
  • Copper is hard to replace because such lines “frequently use hardware and cables that are no longer in production or supported by manufacturers.”[19]

In sum, the economic case for transitioning from copper to fiber-optic and other IP-based networks is overwhelming. Maintaining legacy copper networks imposes a significant deadweight loss on the economy. These networks are increasingly expensive to operate, consume substantial amounts of power, and are prone to weather-related damage and frequent outages. Moreover, copper’s limited bandwidth capacity constrains innovation and prevents providers from offering the advanced services consumers demand.

Conversely, next-generation networks offer superior speed, lower latency, enhanced reliability, and massive scalability, which are foundational to economic growth, productivity gains, and consumer welfare in the digital age. The Commission’s rules should actively encourage, not hinder, this value-creating technological migration.

III. The FCC Should Make Retiring Copper Networks Easier

In addition to the substantial costs carriers face from maintaining legacy copper networks, they also face transaction costs in the form of various notification requirements, as well as the requirement that they receive FCC approval before discontinuing the service. The time, expense, and uncertainty associated with such notifications and applications all further increase carriers’ costs and divert resources away from competing in a dynamic marketplace by better serving consumers and deploying next-generation infrastructure.

While the NPRM has been characterized as a “copper retirement” initiative, it reflects a much broader objective: to facilitate the efficient allocation of capital toward next-generation infrastructure. The proposals in this NPRM offer a historic opportunity to remove regulatory impediments that have artificially inflated the costs and slowed the pace of the nation’s transition to an all-IP network.

From a law & economics perspective, the Commission’s rules governing network changes and service discontinuances should be evaluated based on their ability to reduce the transaction costs associated with this transition, thereby unlocking private investment and maximizing consumer welfare. The current regulatory regime, which was designed for the AT&T monopoly of a century ago, actively impedes this transition by creating artificial barriers to exiting costly legacy services and facilities.

A. Section 251(c)(5) Network-Change Disclosure Forbearance

The network-change disclosure regime imposed by Section 251(c)(5) of the Communications Act establishes specific obligations for incumbent local-exchange carriers (ILECs) to provide reasonable public notice of changes to their network that might affect competing telecommunications carriers, or the interoperability of networks. Section 251(c)(5) requires ILECs to provide “reasonable public notice of changes in the information necessary for the transmission and routing of services using that local exchange carrier’s facilities or networks, as well as of any other changes that would affect the interoperability of those facilities and networks.”[20]

Section 251(c)(5)’s network-change disclosure regime is a relic of an era when competitive LECs (CLECs) were wholly dependent on the ILEC’s physical network to reach customers. In today’s competitive market, where facilities-based cable and wireless providers are the primary source of competition, these requirements have become a pure transaction cost, with no corresponding public benefit. The Commission should exercise its authority under Section 10 of the Act and forbear entirely from these anachronistic rules.

The NPRM proposes to codify the Wireline Competition Bureau’s recent waiver of the filing requirements associated with network-change disclosures.[21] The Bureau’s action was based on dispositive evidence: over a two-year period, the Commission processed more than 400 such filings and received no comments in opposition.[22] This record demonstrates that the filing requirement itself provides zero public-interest value. It is purely an administrative burden that forces carriers to expend resources on a procedural step that doesn’t inform consumers and influences no outcome.

Codifying the waiver is a logical and necessary step to eliminate this deadweight cost from the regulations permanently. The NPRM proposes the next logical step: to forbear from all public-notice requirements imposed by section 251(c)(5), thereby eliminating all network-change disclosure filing and associated requirements.[23]

Section 10 of the Communications Act requires the Commission to forbear from enforcing regulations on telecom carriers or services in certain geographic markets if it determines that all three of the following criteria are met:[24]

  1. Fair pricing assurance: Enforcement isn’t needed to ensure carriers maintain “just and reasonable rates” and practices without discrimination;
  2. Consumer protection: Enforcement isn’t necessary to protect consumers; and
  3. Public interest: Waiving the regulation serves the public interest.

In other words, Section 10 gives the FCC discretionary power to reduce carriers’ regulatory burdens when market conditions indicate that formal oversight may be unnecessary.

Using forbearance to eliminate all network-change disclosure filing and associated requirements imposed by section 251(c)(5) makes sense in this dynamic marketplace and satisfies Section 10’s three-prong test.

  1. Pricing: The rule was premised on an ILEC having monopoly power over the local loop, which could theoretically be leveraged to harm dependent CLECs through unannounced network changes. That premise is now obsolete. The precipitous decline in ILEC market share to just 25% of the fixed-voice market demonstrates the profound erosion of this legacy market power.[25] In the modern market, inter-carrier relationships are governed by commercial interconnection agreements and the discipline of competition, not by prescriptive FCC notice rules. A facilities-based cable or wireless provider is not dependent on ILEC copper-network changes for its operations.
  2. Consumer protection: The notice required by Section 251(c)(5) is directed to interconnecting carriers, not end-user consumers. Direct consumer protection from service discontinuance is governed by Section 214, not Section 251. Indirectly, consumer welfare is best protected by the availability of competitive alternatives. In the unlikely event that an ILEC’s network change were to disrupt a competitor’s service, that competitor’s customers can and do switch to other providers—a far more potent and immediate form of discipline than a regulatory notice filing.
  3. Public interest: The public interest is served by promoting competitive market conditions and encouraging investment in advanced networks. Forbearance achieves both. It frees ILEC resources from regulatory compliance, allowing that capital to be redeployed for network modernization. It also promotes regulatory parity by relieving ILECs of a burdensome requirement that their primary competitors—cable, wireless, and satellite operators—do not bear. This regulatory neutrality levels the competitive playing field and allows market forces, rather than regulatory asymmetries, to determine outcomes.

The Commission’s concern about potential 911 service disruption can and should be addressed through targeted, technology-neutral requirements on any carrier that interconnects with 911 call paths, rather than by preserving a broad, inefficient, and obsolete rule that applies to all network changes. The Section 251(c)(5) notice requirement is a form of regulatory inertia, protecting a business model of copper-loop leasing that has largely been replaced through the creative destruction of the market process. Forbearance is the economically rational path forward.

B. Section 214 Discontinuance Forbearance

The NPRM reports that the Section 214 discontinuance process was enacted in 1943 to protect communities from the loss of essential communications services in a monopoly environment, particularly during wartime.[26] In today’s dynamically competitive marketplace, which is characterized by a proliferation of technologically superior alternatives, this process functions as a primary impediment to network modernization. By making it costly and time-consuming for carriers to exit obsolete and inefficient copper-based services, the Section 214 regime slows the flow of capital toward the deployment of next-generation networks.[27] The Commission’s goal should be to eliminate these requirements wherever the market itself provides a sufficient backstop for consumers.

The NPRM’s invitation to forbear from Section 214 discontinuance requirements in specific, competitively supplied circumstances is the most economically sound approach. Applying the Section 10 forbearance test demonstrates that forbearance is appropriate where consumers have access to alternative services.

  1. Pricing: When a competitive replacement service is available—whether from a facilities-based VoIP provider, a mobile-wireless carrier, or a low-earth-orbit satellite operator—market forces, not a regulatory process, are the best guarantor of just and reasonable rates and practices. A carrier cannot discontinue a legacy service and offer an unreasonable or inadequate replacement without ceding customers to its rivals.
  2. Consumer protection: The ultimate consumer protection in a dynamic market is the availability of choice. Forbearance is warranted where the record demonstrates that consumers have access to alternative providers. The fact that nearly 95% of Americans have at least three mobile-wireless choices,[28] as well as the rapid growth of competitive VoIP,[29] is dispositive evidence of a dynamic and competitive market. As the Commission contemplates, a simple consumer-notice requirement—a potential condition of forbearance—is a far more targeted and efficient protection mechanism than a full, costly, and time-consuming Section 214 review.
  3. Public interest: Forbearance directly serves the public interest by promoting competitive conditions. It eliminates the deadweight costs of maintaining deteriorating legacy networks and the transaction costs inherent in the discontinuance process. This frees up scarce capital for investment in next-generation networks, accelerating the realization of massive consumer welfare gains—including higher productivity, greater innovation, and new services—that IP-based communications make possible.

Even if the Commission declines to forbear, it should, at a minimum, adopt its proposal to replace the complex and burdensome adequate-replacement and alternative-options tests with a single, streamlined certification rule.[30] The existing tests have failed to achieve their purpose of facilitating technology transitions. As the NPRM notes, the first discontinuance application using the adequate replacement test without relying on a third-party cable provider was filed in July 2024—a full eight years after the Commission adopted the test.[31] This is a clear signal that the test is unworkable and imposes excessive information and compliance costs that deter its use.

A simplified rule that allows a carrier to certify the availability of a competitive alternative—such as facilities-based VoIP, mobile-wireless service, or a service funded by a high-cost support mechanism—would correctly shift the regulatory focus. Instead of micromanaging the technical features of a replacement service, it rightly focuses on the macro-level condition of market competition, recognizing innovation in a dynamic marketplace. This approach aligns with ICLE’s comments in the “Delete, Delete, Delete” proceeding, urging the Commission to simplify the procedural requirements and cost-benefit framework of § 63.71:

Line discontinuance. Under “Delete, Delete, Delete,” the FCC initiative should streamline 47 C.F.R. § 63.71 by simplifying the procedural requirements for carriers seeking to discontinue legacy copper lines. For example, the FCC might reduce the mandatory customer-notification period for nondominant carriers (currently 15 days) or eliminate redundant filing steps for automated approvals, particularly in markets with competitive alternatives. Additionally, the FCC could revise § 63.71’s cost-benefit framework by aligning timelines for dominant carriers (60 days) with current market realities like widespread fiber or the availability of wireless, in order to accelerate infrastructure transitions. Merging overlapping provisions in § 63.71 and § 63.90 into a unified process for technology transitions could further reduce administrative burdens, while maintaining consumer safeguards through alternative-service requirements.[32]

The FCC’s “technology transitions discontinuance” framework has been built on the flawed premise of “replacement,” rather than “upgrade.”[33] The rules implicitly treat legacy TDM service as the gold standard to be replicated, leading to backward-looking static tests for “substantially similar” quality.[34]

A dynamic approach would recognize that the market is transitioning to a superior technological paradigm. IP-based services are not mere replacements; they are fundamentally different products that offer immense value that TDM cannot, including mobility, data integration, and scalability. The proper regulatory question is not “Is the new service an adequate technological replacement for the old one?” but rather “Is the market for the new, superior service sufficiently competitive to ensure consumers benefit from the upgrade?” The NPRM’s proposals to forbear or simplify the rules correctly move the Commission toward asking this more economically relevant question.

Conclusion

This NPRM is an incredibly important undertaking. The Commission should move forward with new rules that recognize the current marketplace realities, including the incredible creative destruction taking place in the provision of voice services. The FCC should use its forbearance authority to adapt the regulatory framework governing this space to the 21st century.

[1] Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of Reducing Barriers to Network Improvements and Service Changes and Accelerating Network Modernization, Fed. Com. Comm’n (WC Docket No. 25-209, 25-208, Jul. 25, 2025), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-37A1.pdf.

[2] See Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout, & Ben Sperry, A Dynamic Analysis of Broadband Competition: What Concentration Numbers Fail to Capture, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (Jun. 2021), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/A-Dynamic-Analysis-of-Broadband-Competition.pdf; Eric Fruits et al., Dynamic Competition in Broadband Markets: A 2024 Update, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (Jun. 4, 2024), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Broadband-Competition-2024-Update.pdf.

[3] See Richard Alm & W. Michael Cox, Creative Destruction, Econlib, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html (last accessed Aug. 19, 2025).

[4] David J. Teece, Understanding Dynamic Competition: New Perspectives on Potential Competition, “Monopoly,” and Market Power, 86 Antitrust L. J. 735, 741 (2025).

[5] 2024 Communications Marketplace Report, Fed. Com. Comm’n (GN Docket No. 24-11, Dec. 31, 2024), at para. 158, available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-136A1.pdf.

[6] Id. at para. 158.

[7] Cf. Local Telephone Competition at the New Millenium, Fed. Com. Comm’n (Aug. 2020), at Table 4, 5, available at https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0800.pdf.

[8] Cf. Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2010, Fed. Com. Comm’n (Oct. 2011), Fig. 1, Table 17, available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-310264A1.pdf.

[9] 2024 Communications Marketplace Report, supra note 5, at para. 156.

[10] Id. at para. 158.

[11] Id. at para. 154.

[12] Id.

[13] J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. Competition L. & Econ. 581, 604 (2009).

[14] Isabelle Salgado, Maureen R. Jeffreys, & C. Frederick Beckner, Application of Pacific Bell Telephone Company D/B/A AT&T California (U 1001 C) For Targeted Relief From Its Carrier of Last Resort Obligation and Certain Associated Tariff Obligations, CPUC (Mar. 3, 2023), available at https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publisheddocs/efile/g000/m502/k977/502977267.pdf.

[15] Acielle Gucela, AT&T Copper Network Retirement, Ifax, https://www.ifaxapp.com/analog-to-digital-fax/att-copper-network-retirement (last accessed Aug. 19, 2025).

[16] Id.

[17] Id.; see also Mike Robuck, AT&T Makes Case Against Keeping Copper, Mobile World Live (May 22, 2024), https://www.mobileworldlive.com/att/att-makes-case-against-keeping-copper (“Sambar noted some of the copper lines are 100 years old. Each copper line sheathed in paper is susceptible to moisture issues. Whereas it takes AT&T six to eight hours to fix a fibre-related issue, it can take several weeks to dry out the copper lines. In addition to paper, some of the copper lines are encased in lead.”).

[18] Masha Abarinova, Copper Theft Is a Colossal Problem for Telcos. Here’s Why, Fierce Network (Nov. 5, 2024), https://www.fierce-network.com/broadband/copper-theft-colossal-problem-telcos-heres-why.

[19] Id.

[20] 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(5).

[21] NPRM, supra note 1, at paras. 10-11.

[22] Id. at para. 11.

[23] Id. at para. 14.

[24] 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).

[25] NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 8.

[26]  Id. at para. 106.

[27] See, e.g., Comments of AT&T and Opposition to Petitions for Reconsideration, In the Matter of Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, Restoring Internet Freedom, Bridging the Digital Divide for Low-Income Consumers, and Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization (WC Docket 23-320, Dec. 14, 2023), 17-108, 17-287, 11-42, at 28, available at  https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/12140407728115/1 (“For example, in many areas, AT&T originally offered DSL internet access services over legacy copper networks, which still cost billions of dollars annually to maintain. Subjecting those services to Section 214 discontinuance obligations could indefinitely force AT&T to continue allocating capital to these outdated networks rather than investing in modern fiber networks. Further, the Commission’s current Section 214 rules were developed for legacy telephone service, not internet service—and certainly not for outdated DSL-based internet access services.”).

[28] 2024 Communications Marketplace Report, supra note 5, at para. 56 (“[T]hree service providers have networks that they report cover a substantial majority of the country—each reports covering at least 95% of the U.S. population”).

[29] NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 8.

[30] Id. at paras. 26-27.

[31] NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 27.

[32] Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics, RE: Delete, Delete, Delete, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (GN Docket No. 25-13352, Apr. 11, 2025), at 18, available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Delete-Delete-Delete-Comments-r3.pdf.

[33] NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 23 n. 64.

[34] Id. at para. 23 n. 66.

ICLE Comment on FTC/DOJ Listening Session on Anticompetitive Conduct by Pharmaceutical Companies Impeding Generic or Biosimilar Competition

Please find attached my article, “First Impressions from the DOJ/FTC Listening Session on Drug-Price Competition.” In it, I analyze the competing reform proposals discussed during the . . .

Please find attached my article, “First Impressions from the DOJ/FTC Listening Session on Drug-Price Competition.” In it, I analyze the competing reform proposals discussed during the session, with particular attention to their implications for innovation incentives, patient access, and the balance between patent protections and generic entry. My aim is to contribute a law & economics perspective that emphasizes targeted enforcement over systemic disruption, and to highlight how preserving the U.S. model of pharmaceutical competition can best serve patients and innovation alike.

ICLE Comments to FCC RE: MB Docket No. 17-318 – National Television Multiple Ownership Rule

On behalf of the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), I respectfully submit the attached article by Eric Fruits, “Media-Ownership Regulations in a Streaming . . .

On behalf of the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), I respectfully submit the attached article by Eric Fruits, “Media-Ownership Regulations in a Streaming World: Time to Change the Channel” (Mar. 5, 2025), for inclusion in the record of the above-captioned proceeding.

As the Commission considers refreshing the record in the National Television Multiple Ownership Rule proceeding, Fruits’ analysis highlights the significant changes that have occurred in the video marketplace since the prior comment cycle closed. The article explains how the rise of streaming services, shifts in consumer behavior, and technological convergence render legacy ownership rules increasingly mismatched with competitive realities.

By comparing the regulatory treatment of broadcast, cable, and streaming platforms, Fruits underscores the distortions created by disparate ownership restrictions and suggests that a technology-neutral framework grounded in competition principles would better serve consumers and the public interest. We believe this perspective provides valuable insight to the Commission’s consideration of whether to retain, modify, or eliminate the national audience-reach cap and the related UHF discount.

Please include the attached article in the record of MB Docket No. 17-318.

ICLE Comments to UK CMA on SMS Designations for Mobile Ecosystems

I. Introduction The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) proposed Strategic . . .

I. Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) proposed Strategic Market Status (SMS) decisions relating to Apple’s and Google’s mobile ecosystems.[1] These decisions represent the inaugural and most significant application of the new regulatory regime established by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Act 2024. As such, the CMA’s final decisions will set a crucial precedent for how this new legislative framework will be interpreted and applied for years to come.

The stated purpose of the DMCC is to create a “balanced and proportionate approach to driving greater competition in digital markets, unlocking opportunities for innovation and economic growth across the UK tech sector”.[2] This objective aligns squarely with the UK government’s broader economic vision, which prioritises boosting private-sector investment in research and development (R&D), creating the right conditions for all businesses to innovate, and establishing the UK as a global “science and technology superpower”.[3] The CMA itself has acknowledged this strategic steer, noting its responsibility to prioritise pro-growth and pro-investment interventions.[4]

It is within this context that the CMA’s provisional decisions to designate both Apple and Google as having SMS must be scrutinised. A flawed application of this new regime—one based on a static and incomplete understanding of competition—risks creating regulatory uncertainty that could chill investment and stifle the very innovation that the DMCC and the UK’s national industrial strategy are designed to foster. Given this, it is crucial the DMCC is applied in a manner consistent with these pro-growth goals, grounded in robust economic evidence and a clear-eyed appreciation for the dynamic nature of competition in digital platform markets.

A. Mistaking Dynamic Rivalry for Static Duopoly

The central premise of the CMA’s proposed decisions is that Apple and Google operate as an “effective duopoly”, characterised by “limited competitive constraint”.[5] This conclusion appears to be derived from an inherently static analysis of the market—one that focuses heavily on the stability of market shares over time and the differentiation between the two primary competing ecosystems. But while iOS and Android have indeed maintained significant shares of the UK market, interpreting this stability as evidence of weak competition is a profound analytical error. It mistakes the temporary outcome of successful past innovation for a permanent state of insulated market power.

The mobile-ecosystem industry features significant competition for the market, not merely in it. The primary competitive pressure is, therefore, not so much the fear of losing a small percentage of market share to a price cut, but the existential threat of being displaced entirely by a superior technology or business model. This constant threat compels firms to engage in relentless large-scale investment in R&D and innovation simply to remain viable.

The evidence of this dynamic rivalry is overwhelming and can be found precisely where the CMA sees a lack of competition: in the nonprice vectors that matter most to consumers. The fierce competition between Apple and Google is waged through continuous improvements in camera technology, the race for superior processing power (with Apple’s A-series chips and Google’s Tensor chips forming the basis of their respective performance claims), and divergent—yet intensely competitive—approaches to user security and privacy, which have become central pillars of each company’s marketing and value proposition.[6]

Most recently, this rivalry has shifted to the next frontier of innovation: the deep integration of artificial intelligence into the core user experience, with the corollary that both firms have invested massively invested in AI technology (and continue to do so). To observe this landscape of ceaseless innovation and declare it a market with “limited competition” is to misunderstand its fundamental nature.

B. User Satisfaction Is Not ‘Lock-In’

The CMA’s narrative of entrenched market power in the mobile-ecosystem industry hinges on the assertion that consumers are “locked into” their respective ecosystems by high switching costs and other barriers, leading to limited churn between platforms.[7] This perspective, however, misinterprets the nature of consumer choice. The CMA’s own data, which showing a large majority of users do not consider switching when purchasing a new device, is not necessarily evidence of insurmountable barriers. Rather, in a market with highly differentiated products, it is powerful evidence of high consumer satisfaction. When a consumer chooses to buy a new iPhone or a new Pixel, it is typically an affirmative choice to remain within the ecosystem they value and with which they are satisfied, not a market failure.

Moreover, the claim of prohibitive switching costs is inconsistent with both the available evidence and the firms’ observed behaviour. Various studies, including the CMA’s own data, demonstrate that significant user churn (potentially exceeding 20%) does occur.[8] Contrary to the CMA’s assertion, these numbers suggest there is a permanently contestable segment of the market that disciplines both platforms’ behaviour. To wit, this level of swtiching is signficantly higher than in industries like telecoms, insurance services, utilities, and banking services.[9]

Tellingly, both Apple and Google invest significant resources to develop and promote sophisticated data-portability tools (Apple’s “Move to iOS” app and Google’s “Data Transfer Tool”) that are designed for the express purpose of lowering switching costs for their rival’s customers. The existence of these tools is a clear signal of competition. A monopolist has limited incentive to build a bridge to makes it easier for customers to leave a rival’s territory and enter its own; a competitor does. While the user experience of these tools may be imperfect, their strategic purpose is undeniable. They are instruments of competition, designed to persuade potential customers and facilitate switching.

The CMA’s framework treats brand loyalty earned through years of investment and product improvement as synonymous with anticompetitive lock-in, overlooking the fact that the decision to remain with a platform is, for most consumers, an active and rational one.

C. The Economic Value of Differentiation and the Dangers of Mandated Homogeneity

The CMA’s proposed decisions appear to treat the distinct business models of Apple and Google not as a dimension of competition, but as a source of competitive harm. This approach fails to appreciate that these structural differences are the very source of the differentiated value propositions that give consumers meaningful choice.

Consumers choose between two fundamentally different philosophies. Apple offers a highly curated, secure, and integrated experience, where the tradeoff for less customisation is a higher degree of privacy and safety—a proposition many consumers clearly value. Google, through Android, offers openness, customisation, and a wide variety of hardware at multiple price points, supported by an advertising-based model. These are not subtle variations; they are distinct and competing visions for the mobile experience.

The interventions that the CMA’s findings imply—such as mandating sideloading on iOS or restricting Google’s licensing agreements—would force a convergence toward a single, homogenised model. Forcing Apple to open its ecosystem to unvetted third-party app stores would fundamentally undermine the security and privacy proposition that is a primary reason consumers choose its products, exposing them to significant new risks of malware, fraud, and data theft. Such a remedy would not “increase” competition; it would eliminate a distinct competitive offering from the market, thereby reducing consumer choice and welfare. A regulatory framework that cannot distinguish between a competitive business model and an anticompetitive barrier is one that is likely to do more harm than good.

D. Differentiation and Unintended Consequences

These comments proceed in two parts. In Section II, we explain why the CMA’s premise of “limited effective competition” understates the rivalry between iOS and Android. Modest but meaningful churn—on the order of 15–20%—together with the steady inflow of new users, widespread switching tools, and continual feature-by-feature leapfrogging, are all consistent with large contestable market shares and vigorous competition. In short, differentiation and some brand loyalties do not imply a lack of competitive pressure; they reflect distinct business models that compete along dimensions of quality, security, price point, and experience.

In Section III, we assess the unintended consequences of heavy-handed interventions that would likely ensue under the DMCC. Mandates around interoperability, choice screens, and app-store access all risk degrading privacy, security, reliability, and the monetization models that fund innovation—while, as the overseas experience suggests, yielding little demonstrable benefit. Overly broad remedies could also slow the integration of AI and erode valuable platform differentiation that lets consumers choose between distinct approaches (Apple’s integrated model and Android’s open model). Accordingly, given the competitive dynamics we document, any SMS designation should be paired with narrow, evidence-based measures, if any, and a presumption in favor of lighter-touch oversight.

II. Strong Competition in Mobile Ecosystems

The CMA’s July 2025 proposed decisions for Apple and Google reiterate the authority’s view that competition between iOS and Android is limited. On that basis, they provisionally find “substantial and entrenched market power” for each firm in a bundled “mobile platform” (OS, native app distribution, and browser/engine) market.[10]

For Apple, the CMA says the platform “faces limited competitive constraint from rival Mobile Ecosystems”, noting a “stable duopoly with Google”, and that “user switching … poses a limited competitive constraint … [with] large sticky customer bases” where “with the vast majority of end-users not even considering the alternatives available to them when they last replaced their smartphone”.[11]

For Google, the CMA likewise “provisionally conclude[s] that Google’s Mobile Platform faces limited constraint from other Mobile Platforms”, again describing a “stable duopoly with Apple” and further asserting there are “no expected or foreseeable developments” likely to eliminate Google’s market power over the next five years.[12]

These inferences, however, still overlook critical competitive dynamics. “Low” switching rates are not synonymous with weak competitive pressure: modest but material churn—often in the mid-teens—together with a steady inflow of first-time and replacement buyers can support large contestable shares and intense rivalry. Switching tools and cross-platform services further reduce frictions, while developers’ widespread multi-homing, and ongoing feature competition between iOS and Android, constrain both ecosystems.

Antitrust scholarship likewise cautions that observed switching rates, standing alone, are a poor proxy for market power. In short, the CMA’s updated record does not establish that competition between mobile ecosystems is ineffective, nor that the statutory tests for DMCC designation are satisfied merely because many users do not switch.

A. High Levels of User Churn

One of the most compelling indicators of competition between iOS and Android is the high rate of user churn between the platforms. Contrary to widely held belief, consumers frequently switch between iOS and Android, undermining the notion of ecosystem lock-in.

The CMA’s assertion that there is limited effective competition between iOS and Android rests on an assumption that brand loyalty prevents meaningful switching. The numbers, however, tell a different story. According to the latest data, only 24% of iOS users cite brand as the most important factor in their smartphone choice, compared to 12% for Android users.[13] While this suggests a higher brand attachment for iOS users, it does not imply the absence of competition. Instead, it highlights how consumer preferences are shaped by perceived quality and features. These are factors that both Apple and Android manufacturers actively refine in their efforts to attract users.

Another critical aspect of competition is the ability to transfer data and apps across platforms. The CMA acknowledges that modern switching tools exist but notes that 35% of switchers experienced some difficulty with at least one aspect of the switching journey.[14] While some barriers to switching may persist, these are not the only factors that consumers consider.

The CMA’s data indicates that 33% of iOS users and 38% of Android users see no significant benefits in switching operating systems.[15] This may not, however, reflect direct unwillingness to switch, but rather user satisfaction with their current device. In fact, 11% of iOS users and 10% of Android users considered switching when purchasing a new smartphone but ultimately did not, demonstrating that competition remains a significant factor in consumer decisionmaking.[16]

The CMA’s figures also show that iOS primarily targets the premium segment, accounting for 71% of smartphones sold for more than £300 in 2024, while Android holds 100% of the lower-end market (devices sold for £300 or less).[17] Further, 51% of new Android smartphones were sold for £300 or less in 2024.[18] While the CMA suggests that iOS and Android largely operate in separate market segments, evidence suggests that competition extends beyond direct price comparisons.

Looking beyond the CMA’s market study, some of the best available data stems from the European Commission’s Google Android decision.[19] This data is now several years old and must therefore be taken with a pinch of salt, but it nonetheless paints a compelling picture of smartphone competition, which happens to run counter to the Commission’s ultimate conclusions.

According to the Commission’s own numbers, roughly 39% of all smartphone sales are contestable. This comprises both new users without prior brand loyalty (roughly 25% of purchases at the time, although this number is likely lower today), and the roughly 20% of existing users who switch brands when they purchase new devices.[20] For context, these churn rates are in the same ballpark as other industries that cannot remotely be called anticompetitive, such as general retail, travel, and financial/credit services.[21]

This churn is facilitated by the constant evolution of features and pricing strategies. For instance, Apple’s introduction of more affordable iPhone models—such as the iPhone SE—has attracted price-sensitive Android users. Conversely, the proliferation of high-end Android devices with cutting-edge technology—like Samsung’s Galaxy series and Google’s Pixel phones—has drawn iOS users who seek enhanced features. This fluidity underscores a vibrant competitive environment in which neither platform can afford complacency.[22] It also contradicts any assumption that operating system is irrelevant to consumer choices. Instead, it reflects an environment in which firms compete aggressively to enhance user experience and retain customers.

In short, it is important to remember that there is some degree of brand loyalty in nearly all markets, and that this rarely constitutes an obstacle to interbrand competition. The CMA’s study provides no benchmark against which to assess its claims. In other words, its market study merely shows that smartphone users exhibit some brand loyalty, not that they exhibit too much of it for competition to thrive.

B. Ease of Data Portability

The CMA’s study of mobile ecosystems cites several factors that might prevent users from switching to new platforms. As the CMA puts it:

(i) We have found substantial evidence from our consumer survey, internal documents (from both Google and Apple) and third-party responses of material perceived barriers to switching related to: (i) learning costs associated with switching;300 (ii) transferring data and apps across mobile devices;301 and (iii) losing access to other devices (including connected devices) and having a worse experience of interacting with friends’ and family’s devices.[23]

What the proposed decisions do not reveal, however, is whether these minor inconveniences have a significant effect on user switching, or whether they merely represent a minor and competitively irrelevant departure from perfect competition. In other words, all markets present some minor frictions that may marginally reduce the intensity of competition—switching from one supermarket to another, for instance, implies learning costs to absorb the layout of the new store—but this does not mean such markets aren’t intensely competitive.

In that respect, there are important reasons to believe that competition between the two platforms is stronger than is typically recognized in competition-policy circles. Ever since the first iPhone was introduced in 2007, each iteration of both companies’ operating systems has included features that could be found in previous versions of the other:

Features like picture-in-picture, live voicemail, lock screen customization and live translation were all found on the Android operating system before eventually making their way to iOS. And though the use of widgets to customize your home screen was long held as a differentiator for Android, that feature too eventually found its way to iOS.

On the other hand, Android’s Nearby Share feature is remarkably similar to Apple’s AirDrop, and Android phones didn’t get features like “do not disturb” or the ability to take screenshots until some time after the iPhone had them.

Apple removed the 3.5mm headphone jack from the iPhone in September 2016, and I distinctly remember that at Google’s launch event for the Pixel the following month, chuckles went round the room when the exec on stage proclaimed, “Yes, it has a headphone jack.” Google itself went on to also ditch the headphone jack, with the Pixel 2.

…Rumors that Apple would remove the physical home button on the iPhone X were circling long before the phone was officially unveiled in September 2017. Are they the same rumors Samsung responded to when it “beat Apple to the punch” and removed the home button from its Galaxy S8 earlier that same year? Or did both sides simply arrive at such a big design decision independently?[24]

Another critical factor enhancing competition in mobile ecosystems is the ease of data portability. Both Apple and Google have made substantial efforts to simplify the process to transfer data between their platforms, thereby lowering switching costs for consumers.

FIGURE 1: Apple’s ‘Move from Android to iPhone’ Tutorial

SOURCE: Apple

Apple’s “Move to iOS” app allows Android users to seamlessly transfer contacts, message history, photos, and even app data to their new iPhone.[25] Similarly, Google’s “Data Transfer Tool” facilitates the migration of data from iOS devices to Android smartphones with minimal friction.[26] Moreover, both Apple and Google have webpages that help users to switch from one platform to the other (see Figure 1).

This isn’t the only evidence that Apple and Google are engaged in fierce competition for potential users. Online comparisons of Android and iPhone abound.[27] Likewise, the business press often describes the fierce rivalry between Apple and Google.[28] And numerous academic studies have reached similar conclusions about the nature of their competition. Nicolas Petit refers to Apple and Google as “moligopolists”,[29] while David Evans has described their rivalry as “dynamic competition”.[30] Marshall Van Alstyne and his coauthors have analyzed the strategies that both Google and Apple have deployed to outcompete one another.[31]

Finally, both Apple and Google regularly file reports with securities regulators that cite the other firm as an important competitor (if not by name). For example, Apple has noted in its 10-K filing that:

The Company believes the availability of third-party software applications and services for its products depends in part on the developers’ perception and analysis of the relative benefits of developing, maintaining and upgrading such software and services for the Company’s products compared to competitors’ platforms, such as Android for smartphones and tablets and Windows for personal computers.[32]

While Google has noted in its 10-K:

We face competition from: Companies that design, manufacture, and market consumer electronics products, including businesses that have developed proprietary platforms.[33]

The upshot is that the competitive battle in which iOS and Android are engaged is marked by continuous advancements across multiple dimensions, including user-interface design, hardware integration, app-ecosystem quality, and security features. Apple’s iOS is known for its seamless integration with hardware, delivering a tightly controlled and optimized user experience. Conversely, Google’s Android offers a more open ecosystem, allowing for greater customization and a wider variety of device choices from multiple manufacturers.

These differing approaches and business models do not mean that Apple and Google fail to compete. To the contrary, those differences are a function of competition. As Randal Picker has explained in the context of the case initiated by the European Commission against Google Android:

Google undoubtedly wanted to support Android through its advertising business as that was its great competitive advantage. Embedding Google Search in Android is the natural way to do that. It meant that Android would come with a third-party payment mechanism built in and it meant that the price of Android handsets would presumably be lower given that the Android software itself would be free.

This is really the point of business model competition. Apple was being Apple: vertically integrated hardware and software. Did that with the Macintosh, did that with the iPhone. Microsoft was being Microsoft: it had dominated the OS market for the open IBM PC architecture and it hoped to do exactly that for mobile phones. There would be lots of handset makers, just as there were PC makers and Microsoft would make money off of phone OSs. Google was offering a different business model: lots of handset makers and advertising-supported software. The competition between Microsoft and Google was precisely over which way of paying for phone OS software would win.[34] [Emphasis added.]

These tools reflect the companies’ acknowledgment of consumer demand for flexibility and choice. By reducing barriers to switching, Apple and Google have created an environment in which users can make platform decisions based on current preferences and needs, rather than be locked into a single ecosystem. This ease of mobility is a testament to the competitive pressures both platforms face, driving them to enhance their user experience and value propositions continuously.

This combination of vigorous platform rivalry, significant user churn, and robust data-portability mechanisms paints a clear picture of a highly competitive mobile ecosystem. This competition not only fuels innovation but also ensures that consumers retain the ultimate power to choose the platform that best meets their evolving needs. Not only does this cut against arguments for designating iOS and Android as SMS players, but perhaps more importantly, it significantly tilts the cost-benefit analysis of regulatory intervention (which we discuss in the following section) toward a lighter-touch approach, as competition can be expected to discipline market players’ behaviour.

III. The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Mobile Ecosystems

The regulation of mobile ecosystems presents a complex set of tradeoffs. While regulatory interventions, such as enforcement of the DMCC, aim to promote competition and consumer choice, they also risk unintended consequences that could hinder innovation, reduce incentives to invest, and alter the fundamental dynamics of platform competition. Given this, it is important for the CMA to ensure that conduct requirements do not inadvertently and unnecessarily penalize consumers.

As we explain below, there are at least three important ways in which heavy-handed enforcement of the DMCC may do more harm than good. To start, some of the conduct requirements the CMA is contemplating have been tried in other jurisdictions and failed to deliver benefits. Second, enforcement may delay or prevent the deployment and integration of artificial-intelligence (AI) technologies into existing platforms. Finally, it may nullify valuable product differentiation that currently enables consumers with diverse preferences to choose the platform they prefer, rather than having to settle for a one-size-fits-all design.

In recognizing these tradeoffs, the CMA can adopt a more nuanced approach that preserves the benefits of competition, while addressing legitimate concerns in the digital marketplace. This is particularly true given the important competition between Android and iOS. Indeed, even if the CMA decides to designate these activities as SMS, the fierce competition between the platforms means any anticompetitive harms to consumers are likely to be small, and the benefits of regulatory intervention are thus less likely to outweigh the costs discussed below. In short, the risk of regulatory errors is great in markets where there is significant competition.

A. Interoperability, Choice Screens, and App-Store Fees

Regulatory interventions, even when well-intentioned, can lead to unintended consequences that may harm consumers and the broader market. The CMA should be vigilant in identifying and mitigating such risks. For example, regulations aimed at increasing competition by mandating interoperability or data-sharing requirements could inadvertently compromise user privacy and security. Similarly, policies designed to curb perceived anticompetitive behaviour might reduce platforms’ incentives to invest in innovative technologies and features.

Lessons from international jurisdictions, particularly the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), offer valuable insights into the potential pitfalls of overregulation. The DMA’s stringent requirements have led to significant compliance costs for companies and have sometimes resulted in reduced functionality and a diminished user experience. For instance, mandated changes in platform operations to ensure fairness have, in some cases, led to decreased efficiency and increased complexity for both developers and users.

At least three of the potential interventions contemplated by the CMA appear to raise significant risks of unintended consequences. In a previous invitation to comment, the CMA suggested it would consider mandated interoperability to increase mobile competition, as well as the use of choice screens:

Potential measures could include: i. Requirements for Apple and Google not to restrict interoperability as required by third-party products and services (such as rival browsers, digital wallets and connected devices) to function effectively and compete with Apple’s and Google’s own products and services…

iii. Requirements for Apple and Google to make changes to choice architecture in factory settings or subsequent device settings; in order to enable users of mobile devices to make active and informed choices about the product or services they use and/or set as a ‘default’ service.[35]

As ICLE scholars have discussed in more detail elsewhere, such interventions are unlikely to deliver net benefits to UK consumers.[36] In comments submitted to the European Commission, we concluded that:

The forced interoperability proposed under Article 6(7) introduces significant risks to user security. Many of the features targeted for interoperability—such as devices’ NFC capabilities and wireless-file transfer functionalities like AirDrop—are integral to the iOS ecosystem’s security infrastructure. These features were designed with stringent safeguards to prevent unauthorized access and to ensure that users’ sensitive information remains protected. By mandating that third-party developers gain access to these APIs and functionalities, the Commission’s approach would create opportunities for exploitation by malicious actors.[37]

This is not just theoretical speculation. The Microsoft/CrowdStrike outage that kept airlines, hospitals, banks, and other businesses down for hours in July 2024, generating great disruption for thousands, appears to have been caused—at least in part—by an interoperability mandate.[38] Likewise, mandated interoperability may have a detrimental impact on device reliability and performance:

For example, allowing third-party applications to run in the background without adequate controls can significantly reduce battery life, as has been observed on competing platforms like Android. As one journalist put it: “Got the case of a quickly dying phone? It might be your background apps!” The issue arises because background activity consumes system resources, often without users’ awareness. And because users may be unable to attribute battery degradation to a specific application, developers may have weak incentives to minimize the energy their apps consume.[39]

The upshot is that mandated interoperability threatens to degrade aspects of the iOS and Android experiences that consumers value deeply.

Along similar lines, the choice screens the CMA is contemplating have been tried and tested in other jurisdictions, where they have systematically failed to deliver regulators’ desired outcomes. For example, the implementation of browser and search-engine choice screens for Android in Europe does not appear to have meaningfully affected competition or market shares for those services.

More fundamentally, there are serious doubts that default placement has the competitive significance typically ascribed to it. As Geoffrey Manne writes, commenting on the U.S. Google Search case and the European Commission’s Google Search proceedings:

With respect to the conclusion that the cost to users of choosing the non-default option is higher, that is inherently true, of course. But it is arguably trivially so…

Among other things (more of which are discussed below), it must be noted that, even when users are presented with a neutral option (e.g., a “choice screen”), they appear to make essentially the same choices as when presented with a default. In Europe, where Google has since 2020 implemented a search engine choice screen on Android following the EU’s 2018 antitrust decision against it, Google’s share of the search engine market has barely budged.

By the same token (at least when Google is the non-default) users are apparently quick to switch from a less-preferred default in order to get access to Google Search:

“In a 2016 experiment, Mozilla switched the default GSE on both new and existing users from Google to Bing. By the twelfth day, Bing had kept only 42% of the search volume. After some additional time, those numbers dropped to 20– 35%….”

It is exceedingly difficult to square these facts with the court’s conclusions on the functional irrelevance of non-default options.[40]

Finally, the CMA’s previous invitation to comment also contemplated interventions to boost app-store competition, either by forcing Apple to allow third-party app stores or by preventing Google from deploying revenue-sharing agreements that prevent fragmentation of the Android ecosystem:

Potential measures that may be appropriate to promote competition in relation to native app distribution could include:

  1. A requirement for Apple to allow alternative app stores to operate on iOS.

  2. A requirement that prevents Google from making revenue share payments in return for certain additional requirements in relation to the Play Store, e.g. setting the Play Store as the default app store and not preloading alternative app stores on devices.[41]

Beyond the security and reliability concerns discussed above, these measures have the added harm that they target the monetization of today’s most successful mobile platforms, with two major consequences. The first is that these platforms can be expected to respond by resorting to inferior monetization strategies that penalize consumers and small developers. The second is that, even with these changes, weaker monetization will have a knock-on effect on the platforms’ incentives to innovate, leading to a worse mobile experience for users in the long term.

B. Integration of AI Services

A further concern is that the CMA should avoid policies that could hinder the integration of AI technologies. Indeed, overregulation could stifle the development and deployment of AI innovations, depriving consumers of the benefits of more intelligent, responsive, and personalized mobile experiences. Encouraging a regulatory environment that supports AI integration is essential to foster continued growth and innovation in the mobile ecosystem.

The CMA’s proposed decisions, however, implicitly suggest the authority may pursue policies that prevent incumbent tech firms from competing in this space, thereby preventing the product integrations discussed above and reducing competition in this highly dynamic space. This is nowhere clearer than in the following paragraphs of the Apple proposed decision (largely replicated in the Google proposed decision):

6.135 Furthermore, evidence suggests that Apple may be able to use AI to strengthen its position in respect of its Mobile Platform and wider Mobile Ecosystem:

(a) The trend towards increased integration of AI into mobile devices is likely to reinforce barriers to entry and expansion in Mobile Platforms (discussed above in the section titled ‘Barriers to entry and expansion in Mobile Platforms’). Creating a highly integrated platform that facilitates smooth interactions between different products and services across the operating system to compete effectively with Apple’s Mobile Platform offering can be costly.

(b) Many third parties submitted that Apple may be able to use AI to strengthen its position in respect of its Mobile Platform and wider Mobile Ecosystem. For example, Apple’s position as the operating system provider may enable it to gain a competitive advantage relative to third-party providers of FM services and wider content, particularly if Apple can use AI to disintermediate between end-users and third-party content and service providers.

(c) Finally, evidence we reviewed from third-party investor reports is consistent with the view that AI is more likely to strengthen rather than weaken Apple’s position in respect of its Mobile Platform. We reviewed a selection of third-party investor reports published between September 2024 and March 2025. Out of 14 reports that commented on Apple’s expected financial performance, six mentioned AI. Five out of six of these reports indicated they expected future growth in Apple’s financial performance as a result of Apple releasing new AI features in updates to the iPhone.[42]

AI is currently in the process of being integrated into various aspects of mobile ecosystems, from predictive text and photo categorization to health monitoring and augmented-reality applications. Google’s AI-driven features, such as real-time language translation and adaptive battery management, highlight AI’s potential to improve usability and efficiency. Apple’s focus on on-device AI processing ensures user privacy, while delivering powerful features like facial recognition and intelligent photo sorting. Heavy-handed intervention threatens these valuable product integrations.

Another important fear is that, paradoxically, efforts to prevent incumbent platforms from competing freely in generative-AI markets may backfire and lead to less, not more, competition. Indeed, upstarts like OpenAI are currently acquiring a sizeable lead in generative AI.[43] While competition authorities might like to think that other startups will emerge and thrive in this space, it is important not to confuse those desires with reality.

While there currently exists a vibrant AI-startup ecosystem, there is at least a case to be made that significant competition for today’s AI leaders will come from incumbent Web 2.0 platforms—although nothing is certain at this stage. The CMA should beware not to stifle that competition on the misguided assumption that competitive pressure from large incumbents is somehow less valuable to consumers than that which originates from smaller firms. This is particularly relevant in the context of merger control.

C. The Importance of Differentiation

Differentiation between iOS and Android is a cornerstone of healthy competition in the mobile ecosystem. Each platform offers a distinct user experience, catering to diverse consumer preferences and fostering innovation through unique approaches to design and functionality. Apple’s iOS is renowned for its seamless integration with hardware, stringent privacy controls, and a curated app ecosystem that prioritizes quality and security. In contrast, Android’s open-source nature allows for extensive customization, a wide variety of device options, and greater flexibility for developers.

This differentiation not only enhances consumer choice but also drives each platform to innovate continuously. For example, Apple’s emphasis on privacy has pushed Android to introduce more robust privacy features, while Android’s customization capabilities have influenced iOS to offer more flexible user-interface options in recent updates. The unique strengths of each platform contribute to a dynamic competitive landscape that benefits consumers.

Regulatory interventions that aim to homogenize these platforms could undermine the very competition they seek to promote. The CMA’s policies should respect the distinct characteristics of both iOS and Android, ensuring that regulatory measures do not inadvertently force one platform to emulate the other. Preserving the diversity of approaches within the mobile ecosystem is essential to foster innovation and meet the varied needs of consumers. Indeed, as ICLE scholars put it in an amicus brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in the Epic v Apple proceedings:

Centralized app distribution and Apple’s “walled garden” model (including IAP) increase interbrand competition because they are at the core of what differentiates Apple from Android, the other major competing platform. They play into Apple’s historical business model, which focuses on being user-friendly, reliable, safe, private, and secure. Even Epic recognized that Apple would lose its competitive advantage if it were to compromise its safety and security features. For Apple and its users, the touchstone of a good platform is not “openness,” but carefully curated selection and security, understood broadly as encompassing the removal of objectionable content, protection of privacy, and protection from “social engineering,” and the like. By contrast, Android’s bet is on the open platform model, which sacrifices some degree of security for the greater variety and customization associated with more open distribution. These are legitimate differences in product design and business philosophy.[44]

IV. Conclusion

The CMA’s investigations of Apple and Google’s mobile ecosystems raise important questions about competition and innovation in the digital economy. As our comments explain, however, the assumption that these ecosystems function as an entrenched duopoly with limited competition is misguided. The mobile industry is characterized by dynamic competition, with continuous innovation, significant user choice, and considerable investment in platform development.

Rather than pursue heavy-handed regulatory interventions that could distort incentives and hinder innovation, the CMA should adopt a cautious and evidence-based approach. Apple and Google compete vigorously, not just with each other but also with a broader landscape of technology firms that includes manufacturers, service providers, and developers who operate across various segments of the mobile ecosystem. User churn rates and the contestability of key market segments indicate that competition remains robust.

Interventions that force interoperability, restrict preinstalled applications, or mandate alternative app stores all carry significant risks. Lessons from similar regulatory actions in other jurisdictions suggest that such measures often lead to unintended consequences, including a degraded user experience, increased security risks, and reduced incentives for investment and innovation. In contrast, market-driven differentiation, where consumers can choose between Apple’s integrated approach and Google’s open ecosystem, provides a natural check on anticompetitive behaviour, while maximizing consumer choice.

Given the rapid pace of technological change and the evolving nature of digital markets, a prescriptive regulatory approach could stifle innovation and reduce the competitive benefits that users currently enjoy. Instead, the CMA should focus on clear and proportionate policy measures that address demonstrable harms without undermining the fundamental drivers of competition. The objective should not be to reengineer these ecosystems, but to ensure that competition remains vibrant and that consumers continue to benefit from technological advancements and product differentiation.

In this context, we urge the CMA to approach its investigations with a view toward fostering innovation, preserving incentives for investment, and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens that could harm consumers, developers, and the broader digital economy. A well-calibrated approach—grounded in empirical evidence and mindful of the risks of intervention—will ensure that the UK’s digital markets remain competitive and dynamic in the years to come.

[1] [1] Strategic Market Status Investigations into Apple’s Mobile Platform – Proposed Decision, Compet. Mark. Auth. (23 July 2025), available at https://connect.cma.gov.uk/43419/widgets/129636/documents/88332, hereinafter ‘Apple proposed decision’); Strategic Market Status Investigations into Google’s Mobile Platform – Proposed Decision, Compet. Mark. Auth. (23 July 2025), available at https://connect.cma.gov.uk/43414/widgets/129618/documents/88217 hereinafter ‘Google proposed decision’).

[2] Apple & Google proposed decisions, at 1.1.

[3] Plan to Forge a Better Britain Through Science and Technology Unveiled, GOV.CO.UK (6 March 2023), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/plan-to-forge-a-better-britain-through-science-and-technology-unveiled.

[4] Draft Strategic Steer to the Competition and Markets Authority, GOV.CO.UK (6 March 2025), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority/strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority; see also Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Speech at the International Investment Summit (14 October 2024), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-international-investment-summit-speech-14-october-2024; Joe Pike, Starmer Asks UK Regulators for Ideas to Boost Growth, BBC (28 December 2024), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0n14ywzqpo.

[5] Apple proposed decision, at 6.11; Google proposed decision at 6.23. See also Apple proposed decision, at 1.20.

[6] See, e.g., Sarah Lord, Apple iPhone 16 vs. Google Pixel 9: The Ultimate iOS vs. Android Showdown, PCMag (10 September 2024), https://www.pcmag.com/comparisons/apple-iphone-16-vs-google-pixel-9-the-ultimate-ios-vs-android-showdown.

[7] Apple proposed decision, at 6.30; Google proposed decision, at 6.35.

[8] See, e.g., Google proposed decision, at 6.33 (“Google’s internal data indicates that in 2024 around: (i) [%] [10 – 20%] of Android smartphone users switch to iOS at each purchase decision; and (ii) [%] [10 – 20%] of iOS users switch to Android at each purchase decision. 212 It further noted that switching rates from Android to iOS are greater for higher-priced mobile devices with Android losing around [%] [20 – 30%] of users to iOS for devices priced at $700.213 Further, Google submitted that it is harder for users to switch from iOS to Android, [%].214 6.34 We note that it is difficult to draw direct comparisons between the switching rates from our consumer survey and the switching rates from Google’s internal data (as set out above), as these are based on different methodologies.215 Nevertheless, we note that Google’s submitted switching rates from Android smartphones to iOS are of a similar order of magnitude to those we find in our consumer survey”.)

[9] See, e.g., Consumer Markets Scoreboard: Making Markets Work for Consumers, Eur. Comm’n (2018), at 67, available at https://mpo.gov.cz/assets/cz/ochrana-spotrebitele/eu-a-spotrebitel/aktuality-z-eu/2018/10/2018-Consumer_Markets_Scoreboard.pdf.

[10] Apple and Google proposed decisions, at 1.2.

[11] Apple proposed decision, at 1.20, 6.37, 6.46, and 6.66.

[12] Google proposed decision, at 1.20, 6.23, and 1.26.

[13] Apple proposed decision, at 7.21 (c); Google proposed decision, at 6.16 (c).

[14] Apple proposed decision, at 6.36 (d) (iii); Google proposed decision, at 6.47 (d) (iv).

[15] Apple proposed decision, at 6.36 (a); Google proposed decision, at 6.47 (a).

[16] Apple proposed decision, at 6.27; Google proposed decision, at 6.31.

[17] Apple and Google proposed decisions, at 1.20.

[18] Google proposed decision, at 6.25 (a).

[19] See Commission Decision AT.40099 (Google Android), slip op. (18 July 2018).

[20] Dirk Auer, Making Sense of the Google Android Decision, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (25 February 2020), at 20, available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Auer-Making-Sense-of-the-Google-Android-Decision-White-Paper.pdf.

[21] See, e.g., Raphael Bohne, Customer Churn Rate in the United States, by Industry, Statista (9 November 2024), https://www.statista.com/statistics/816735/customer-churn-rate-by-industry-us.

[22] Id.

[23] Apple proposed decision, at 6.36 (d); Google proposed decision, at 6.47 (d).

[24] Andrew Lanxon, Android vs. iPhone: 15 Years of Innovation Through Rivalry, CNET (24 April 2024),  https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/smartphone-showdown-15-years-of-android-vs-iphone.

[25] Move from Android to iPhone or iPad, Apple, https://support.apple.com/en-au/118670 (last visited 7 February 2025).

[26] Switch Is Easier than Ever, Android, https://www.android.com/switch-to-android (last visited 7 February 2025).

[27] See, e.g., Michael Muchmore & Gabriel Zamora, Android vs. iOS: Which Phone OS Really Is the Best?, PCMag (13 November 2024), https://www.pcmag.com/comparisons/android-vs-ios-which-mobile-os-is-best; Prakhar Khanna, iPhone Vs. Android – Which One Should You Get?, Forbes (16 February 2024), https://www.forbes.com/sites/technology/article/iphone-vs-android; Bartosz Szczygie?, iPhone vs Android Users: Key Differences in 2024, NetGuru (8 January 2025),  https://www.netguru.com/blog/iphone-vs-android-users-differences.

[28] See, e.g., Rhiannon Williams, Why Competition Between Apple and Google Is More Brutal than Ever, The Telegraph (29 September 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/11127694/Why-competition-betweenApple-and-Google-is-more-brutal-than-ever.html; Bianca DiSanto, Google vs. Apple: Why Their Competition Is Good for You, The Hoya (21 October 2016), https://thehoya.com/google-vs-apple-why-their-competition-is-good-for-you; Can Google or Huawei Stymie Apple’s March Towards $4trn?, The Economist (24 October 2024), https://www.economist.com/business/2024/10/24/can-google-or-huawei-stymie-apples-march-towards-4trn.

[29] Nicolas Petit, Big Tech & the Digital Economy: The Moligopoly Scenario (2020).

[30] David S. Evans, Why the Dynamics of Competition for Online Platforms Leads to Sleepless Nights But Not Sleepy Monopolies, SSRN (25 July 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009438.

[31] Marshall W. Van Alstyne et al., Pipelines, Platforms, and the New Rules of Strategy, Harv. Bus. Rev. (April 2016), at 1-9.

[32] Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (29 September 2018).

[33] Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (31 December 2017).

[34] Randal Picker, The European Commission Picks a Fight with Google Android over Business Models, ProMarket (23 July 2018), https://www.promarket.org/2018/07/23/european-commission-picks-fight-google-android-business-models.

[35] Strategic Market Status Investigations into Apple’s and Google’s Mobile Ecosystems – Invitation to Comment, Compet. Mark. Auth. (23 January 23, 2025), at 27, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67911997cf977e4bf9a2f1aa/Invitation_to_comment.pdf (hereinafter ‘Invitation to Comment’).

[36] Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer, & Mario A. Zúñiga, Comments of ICLE to Commission Consultation on Proposed Measures for Interoperability Between Apple’s iOS Operating System and Connected Devices, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (8 January 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/comments-of-icle-to-commission-consultation-on-proposed-measures-for-interoperability-between-apples-ios-operating-system-and-connected-devices-dma-100203.

[37] Id. at 7

[38] Id. at 8

[39] Id. at 9

[40] Geoffrey A. Manne, A Critical Analysis of the Google Search Antitrust Decision, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (14 August 2014), at 16-17, available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Manne-Google-Search-Decision-Analysis-2024-08-14.pdf.

[41] Invitation to Comment, supra note 35 at 24.

[42] Apple proposed decision at 6.135; Google proposed decision at 6.143.

[43] See, e.g., Paul Baier, Estimated Market Share of Closed-Source LLM Models in 2024, GenAI Insights (24 August 2024), https://gaiinsights.substack.com/p/estimated-market-share-of-closed.

[44] Geoffrey A. Manne & Daniel G. Gilman, ICLE Amicus to US Supreme Court in Apple v Epic, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (27 October 2023), at 15-16, available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ICLE-Amicus-Apple-v-Epic-SCt-10.27.23-FINAL.pdf.

ICLE Comments to U.S. Departments of State and Commerce on the EU Space Act

I. Executive Summary The purpose of this submission is to provide a law and economics assessment of the EU Space Act and its implications for . . .

I. Executive Summary

The purpose of this submission is to provide a law and economics assessment of the EU Space Act and its implications for U.S. competitiveness, innovation, and trade policy. As telecommunications experts with a particular interest in the next generation of satellite connectivity, we approach this issue with both technical and economic expertise. Our work focuses on the economic structure of regulation, and we are particularly attentive to the ways in which poorly integrated economic reasoning in regulatory decision-making can produce distortions that undermine both market efficiency and long-term innovation.

Our analysis concludes that the EU Space Act functions as a nontariff barrier (NTB) under World Trade Organization principles. In design and effect, it selectively targets U.S. large-constellation operators, imposing compliance burdens that are not proportionate to any demonstrated safety or sustainability benefits. The regulation’s structure and procedural mechanisms—most notably its size-based “giga-constellation” threshold, dual-track registration process, and extraterritorial inspection provisions—create discriminatory market-access barriers. These provisions are likely to harm both U.S. and EU economic welfare, slow the pace of innovation in the sector, and shift market share toward geopolitical competitors whose strategic objectives may run counter to transatlantic security interests.

In light of these findings, we recommend that the U.S. government treat the EU Space Act’s discriminatory provisions as nontariff barriers in trade negotiations with the European Union and, where appropriate, pursue remedies through the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade framework. At a minimum, U.S. policy should press for alignment of the EU Space Act with established international orbital safety standards, including those developed by the International Standards Organization, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, NASA, and the Federal Communications Commission. Such alignment would reduce the risk of market fragmentation, provide regulatory certainty, and ensure that safety objectives are met without imposing unnecessary and discriminatory costs on foreign operators.

II. High Level Concerns with the EU Space Act

The EU Space Act’s central structural feature is the introduction of a “giga-constellation” category, defined as any satellite constellation comprising more than 1,000 operational satellites.[1] This size threshold is not grounded in an evidence-based assessment of orbital risk or debris mitigation; rather, it is seemingly tailored to capture only the largest U.S. operators, while exempting all foreseeable EU systems. For example, the EU’s own IRIS² program is projected to contain around 264 satellites,[2] well below the threshold, ensuring that its operators will be spared the most onerous requirements.

The Act also creates a dual-track registration process that imposes additional procedural and substantive burdens on non-EU operators. EU-based firms register through the competent authority of an individual member state, subject to harmonized but nationally administered requirements.[3] Non-EU operators, however, must undergo review by a Compliance Board housed within the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) before their registration can proceed to the European Commission for a final decision.[4] This is not a neutral administrative arrangement: EUSPA is itself slated to operate EU constellations that will directly compete with U.S. operators,[5] raising a significant conflict of interest.[6] The combination of heightened procedural burdens and review by a market participant creates both delay and the potential for discriminatory outcomes.

Curiously, the EU Space Act also authorizes the European Commission to request inspections of non-EU operators’ facilities located outside the Union as a condition of market access.[7] Such inspections could conflict directly with U.S. export control laws, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which restricts the sharing of certain technical data and access to controlled facilities.[8] Even if nominally voluntary, these inspection powers create the risk that denial of access would be used as grounds to withhold licensing, thereby coercing compliance in ways incompatible with U.S. law and security policy. Thus, in effect, these inspection provisions could operate as a poison pill—a built-in condition that makes lawful compliance by U.S. firms impossible under existing U.S. export control laws, thereby excluding them from the EU market.

In addition, the Act defers numerous substantive technical requirements to future Implementing Acts (IAs).[9] This legislative structure deprives non-EU operators of regulatory certainty, leaving critical compliance obligations—including debris-mitigation criteria, reflectivity standards, and operational procedures—undefined until potentially just months before the rules take effect. Such open-ended delegation allows for selective imposition of burdens that can be crafted to fit emerging EU industrial-policy goals, rather than neutral safety objectives.

III. The EU Space Act as a Nontariff Barrier

Critically, in both design and effect, the EU Space Act meets the definition of a nontariff barrier (NTB) under World Trade Organization principles and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.[10] The TBT Agreement recognizes that technical regulations can constitute trade barriers when they create unnecessary obstacles to international commerce, particularly if they deviate from relevant international standards without a clear scientific basis.[11] The EU Space Act’s size-based obligations, dual-track registration process, and extraterritorial inspection regime are not calibrated to achieve demonstrably superior safety outcomes. Instead, they disproportionately restrict market access for foreign — specifically U.S. — operators while insulating EU competitors. This combination of discriminatory scope, procedurally burdensome market-entry requirements, and absence of proportional justification is the hallmark of an NTB.

From a static economic perspective, the EU Space Act’s compliance structure will raise costs, distort allocation of resources, and limit consumer options within the EU. Additional compliance costs imposed on non-EU operators are likely to be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices or slower service rollout, thereby reducing output and leaving mutually beneficial transactions unrealized. By deterring or excluding the largest foreign providers, the Act diminishes the diversity of service offerings available to EU consumers and governments, constraining competition on quality, price, and coverage. Shielding less efficient EU operators from the full force of competition further misallocates capital, talent, and spectrum, allowing these resources to remain in less productive uses rather than being deployed where they would generate the greatest value. These effects replicate the inefficiencies observed in other regulated sectors where NTBs have been used to protect domestic incumbents.

The longer-term, dynamic harms are likely to be even more significant. In innovation-driven markets such as satellite constellations, regulatory design has an outsized influence on investment incentives and the rate of technological diffusion. By deferring critical technical requirements to IAs that may not be issued until 2028 or 2029, the EU Space Act injects substantial regulatory uncertainty into capital-intensive, multi-year constellation projects. Standard “real options” reasoning predicts that firms will delay or scale back irreversible investments until regulatory obligations are clear, slowing the introduction of new capacity and capabilities. Moreover, the EU Space Act’s departure from established global debris-mitigation and operational-safety standards undermines the benefits of international convergence on proven best practices. Rather than reinforcing interoperability and enabling the widespread adoption of technical improvements, the Act risks creating a parallel compliance regime that fragments markets, discourages interoperability, and limits the spillover of innovation across jurisdictions.

A. The Economic Structure of Regulatory Barriers

Economics identifies several mechanisms through which regulations can function as trade barriers. In particular, compliance costs function as fixed entry barriers that disproportionately affect firms seeking to enter a new market. Research by Baldwin and Krugman on strategic trade policy demonstrates how regulations requiring market-specific investments can deter entry by raising the minimum efficient scale needed to profitably serve that market.[12]

An examination of the EU Space Act’s chosen legal basis—Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)—reveals that its primary objective is the “establishment and functioning of the internal market.”[13] The Act explicitly avoids using Article 189 TFEU, the legal basis for space policy, because that article prohibits the harmonization of national laws.[14] The stated rationale is to prevent “fragmentation of the internal market” and enhance the “competitiveness of the Union space industry.”[15] This legal framing is telling—it demonstrates that the principal driver of the legislation is industrial policy and market integration, not a response to an external safety imperative that requires a novel, EU-specific regime. The safety, resilience, and sustainability objectives, while laudable, are thus positioned as instruments to achieve the primary goal of constructing and protecting the EU’s internal market. This context is crucial for understanding the EU Space Act’s protectionist character under the TBT Agreement, which is centrally concerned with preventing legitimate policy objectives from being used as a pretext for distorting trade.[16] In contrast, the EU Space Act’s bespoke technical requirements force non-EU operators to make EU-specific investments in engineering, legal compliance, and administrative systems that provide no value in other markets.

Moreover, the regulation creates fragmentation costs. When different jurisdictions adopt incompatible technical standards, firms face higher costs to serve multiple markets and lose economies of scale from standardization. Mattoo and Subramanian’s work on regulatory barriers shows how divergent standards can be as trade-restrictive as traditional tariffs, particularly in technology-intensive sectors where interoperability is crucial.[17]

The EU Space Act’s deviation from established international standards exemplifies this problem. By requiring compliance with EU-specific debris mitigation rules, collision avoidance protocols, and reporting requirements that differ from those developed by international bodies like the IADC and ISO, the regulation forces operators to maintain parallel compliance systems. This fragmentation reduces the economic benefits of global standardization and creates ongoing operational complexity.

B. Market Structure Effects and Competitive Distortions

The discriminatory impact of the EU Space Act’s size-based thresholds becomes particularly clear when analyzed through the lens of market structure economics. The 1,000-satellite threshold for “giga-constellation” obligations creates selective burden that targets only the most capable competitors in the satellite communications market. In contrast, IADC, UN, and ISO standards do not contain specific, tiered requirements based on arbitrary satellite counts. Instead, risk is assessed based on operational parameters and orbital environment, not a numerical threshold.

Current market data shows that this threshold applies almost exclusively to U.S. operators. SpaceX’s Starlink system currently operates nearly 8,100 satellites,[18] while Amazon’s Project Kuiper plans a constellation of over 3,000 satellites.[19] Most EU-based satellite operators, by contrast, operate much smaller systems that fall below the threshold. This creates a regulatory structure that systematically advantages smaller, primarily European operators while imposing additional costs on their must larger—and possibly more efficient—competitors.

From an industrial organization perspective, this represents a classic case of using regulation to alter competitive dynamics. The economic literature on strategic trade policy shows how governments can use selective regulations to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. For example, Brander and Spencer demonstrated that governments could raise their national incomes at other countries’ expense by supporting national firms in international competition.[20] The EU Space Act’s structure follows this pattern by imposing higher costs on the most successful foreign competitors while leaving domestic firms largely unaffected.

In short, the EU Space Act’s “giga-constellation” category is a unilateral EU invention with no basis in international technical standards. Its creation is prima facie evidence of a regulation designed to target specific operators, rather than to address a scientifically defined risk category recognized by the international community.

C. The Economics of Regulatory Uncertainty

A significant—and largely unacknowledged—economic harm from the EU Space Act stems from the regulatory uncertainty it creates. Modern finance theory, particularly real options analysis pioneered by Dixit and Pindyck, provides a framework for understanding how regulatory uncertainty affects investment decisions in capital-intensive industries.[21]

Real options theory shows that when firms face irreversible investments under uncertainty, they have strong incentives to delay commitment until uncertainty is resolved. This is particularly relevant for satellite constellations, which require massive upfront capital expenditures with long payback periods. The value of the “option to wait” increases with the level of uncertainty, meaning that high regulatory uncertainty can significantly reduce or eliminate the incentive to invest.

Privately-owned operators launch satellites because they anticipate that it would be profitable to do so. By increasing regulatory uncertainty, the EU Space Act increases the uncertainty of profit projections and reduces operators’ confidence in their reliability. Because of the well-known and widely accepted risk-return tradeoff, firms facing increased uncertainty in investment returns (i.e., risk) will demand higher expected returns.[22] To achieve higher returns operators may launch fewer satellites or increase prices to generate higher revenues. The result would be some combination of reduced service quality and higher prices for consumers.

The EU Space Act creates several layers of regulatory uncertainty for non-EU operators. Critical technical requirements are deferred to future IAs that may not be issued until 2028 or 2029. These include fundamental operational parameters like orbital lifetime limits, specific debris mitigation procedures, and detailed collision avoidance requirements. For firms planning multi-year constellation deployments, this uncertainty makes it nearly impossible to calculate expected compliance costs or assess the viability of serving the EU market.

Academic research on regulatory uncertainty supports this concern. Studies by Baker, Bloom, and Davis demonstrate that policy uncertainty significantly reduces private investment, particularly in sectors requiring long-term capital commitments.[23] Their findings show that uncertainty about future regulatory requirements can be as damaging to investment as actual regulatory burdens, because firms postpone irreversible decisions until the regulatory environment stabilizes. Earlier this year the OECD identified “reducing policy uncertainty” as a “key” factor to “reinvigorate investment.”[24]

D. Structural Conflict of Interest and Regulatory Capture

The competitive harms of the EU Space Act are compounded by a structural conflict of interest that creates a clear pathway for regulatory capture. The EU Space Act tasks EUSPA with significant regulatory and technical assessment functions, including the critical role of assessing third-country operators for registration. Simultaneously, Article 64 mandates that all operators subscribe to the collision avoidance (CA) service provided by the Union’s designated entity, the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU-SST) partnership, which EUSPA oversees and integrates.

This arrangement places EUSPA in a dual role as both a regulator and a de facto market participant (or the overseer of a mandated participant). This lays the groundwork for regulatory capture, where the regulator has an inherent incentive to shape technical rules and registration requirements in a way that favors its own operational systems and disadvantages competitors.[25] For instance, EUSPA could advise the Commission to adopt IAs that define data formats or interoperability standards for collision avoidance that are native to the EU-SST system but are technically complex and costly for U.S. operators to adopt.

The CA service provisions of the EU Space Act raise several fundamental questions regarding competition and conflict of interest. First, the provision create a mandatory relationship between competitors and an EU-controlled entity, potentially allowing that entity to gather competitively sensitive information about foreign operators’ plans and capabilities. Second, it eliminates competition in collision avoidance services within the EU market, reducing innovation incentives and potentially leading to higher costs and lower service quality.

The combination of regulatory uncertainty and structural conflict of interest creates a powerful barrier. U.S. firms are not just facing unknown future rules; they are facing unknown future rules that will be developed with input from an entity that has an interest in disadvantaging them. From an investor’s perspective, this transforms the problem from one of managing technical uncertainty to one of managing strategic, political, and competitive risk. There is no guarantee that the range of possible outcomes for the implementing acts will be neutral longer neutral. In contrast, regulators will be under enormous pressure to favor EU systems. This amplified uncertainty dramatically increases the option value of waiting discussed above, creating a uniquely hostile investment environment that will strongly deter non-EU firms from committing the capital necessary to serve the EU market.

IV. Recommendations & Conclusion

By selectively excluding or burdening the largest U.S. satellite operators, the EU Space Act risks creating a vacuum in the European market that could be readily filled by Chinese providers. Such a shift would not only erode U.S. market share but also undermine transatlantic security interests by expanding the footprint of PRC-controlled infrastructure in critical space-based communications and observation systems. The Act also sets a troubling regulatory precedent: if the EU succeeds in deploying a discriminatory framework without facing trade or diplomatic pushback, other jurisdictions may adopt similar nontariff barriers, producing a fragmented global regulatory environment that increases compliance costs and further constrains market access for U.S. firms. Finally, these measures jeopardize existing and future U.S.–EU industrial cooperation. In this way, the EU Space Act not only harms U.S. competitiveness but also diminishes the economic gains Europe itself would otherwise realize from open transatlantic participation in the space economy.

To address these risks, the U.S. government should presumptively treat the discriminatory provisions of the EU Space Act as nontariff barriers in relevant trade negotiations. A core objective should be regulatory alignment: the United States should press for incorporation of established orbital safety standards—such as those developed by the International Standards Organization, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, NASA, and the FCC—directly into the EUSA text to ensure consistency and predictability. At the same time, market-access safeguards are essential. Reciprocity in registration and inspection processes must be secured, and the EU Agency for the Space Programme should not be permitted to regulate direct competitors in ways that create conflicts of interest.

In parallel, U.S. agencies should monitor the potential spillover of this regulatory model to other jurisdictions, coordinating with allies and industry to develop responses that prevent the proliferation of similarly protectionist frameworks. The EU Space Act is not simply a space safety initiative; it is a clear example of a nontariff barrier with significant economic and strategic costs. For these reasons, the Departments of State and Commerce should treat it not only as a technical regulation, but as a combined trade and competitiveness challenge that warrants coordinated diplomatic, legal, and economic action.

[1] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Safety, Resilience and Sustainability of Space Activities in the Union, 2025/0335 (COD) (Jun. 25, 2025) at Art. 5 [hereinafter “EU Space Act”].

[2]

Jean-Pierre Diris, IRIS2: Everything You Need to Know About This New European Constellation, Polytechnique Insights (Mar. 11, 2025), https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/industry/iris2-everything-you-need-to-know-about-this-new-european-constellation.

[3] EU Space Act at Arts. 6,7, and 9.

[4] Id., at Art. 17.

[5] See IRIS²: The New EU Secure Satellite Constellation, Eur. Commission Defence Industry & Space, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/iris2-secure-connectivity_en (last visited Aug. 12, 2025).

[6] For an analogous regulatory structure and its attendant problems see, e.g., Julian Morris, Central Banks and Real-Time Payments: Lessons from Brazil’s Pix, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (2022), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/central-banks-and-real-time-payments-lessons-from-brazils-pix (discussing how Brazil’s state-owned real-time-payment system both directly competes with private-sector financial companies and also directly regulates them, leading to a host of conflicts of interest).

[7] EU Space Act at Arts. 48(4) & 52.

[8] See, e.g., Parts 120(10), 121 Cat. IV(h)(3), 124.1, 127.1.

[9] See EU Space Act Ch. IV(5).

[10] Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, World Trade Org. (1995), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tbt_e.htm [hereinafter “TBT”].

[11] Id. at Art. 2.

[12] Paul R. Krugman, Import Protection as Export Promotion: International Competition in the Presence of Oligopoly and Economies of Scale, in Imperfect Competition and International Trade (Gene E. Grossman ed., 1992) (demonstrating that, in an oligopolistic market with economies of scale, “giving a domestic firm a privileged position in one market, a country gives it an advantage in scale over foreign rivals.”). Richard Baldwin & Paul Krugman, Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories, in Empirical Research in Industrial Trade (Robert C. Feenstra ed., 1987) (demonstrating that a protected home market was a crucial advantage to domestic firms, “which would otherwise have been uncompetitive both at home and abroad.”)

[13] EU Space Act at 3.

[14] Id.

[15] Id. at 2, 5, 8, 16, 118.

[16] TBT Agreement, supra note 10 (“measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices” should “not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.”).

[17] See, e.g., Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 303 (1998).

[18] Tereza Pultarova, Starlink Satellites: Facts, Tracking and Impact on Astronomy, Space.com (Aug. 1, 2025), https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html.

[19] Clara Easterday, Amazon Sets April 9 Launch Date for First Operational Kuiper Satellites, Broadband Breakfast (Apr. 3, 2025), https://broadbandbreakfast.com/amazon-sets-april-9-launch-date-for-first-operational-kuiper-satellites.

[20] James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, 18 J. Int’l. Econ. 83 (1985); James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, 50 R. Econ. Stud. 707 (1983).

[21] Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Expandability, Reversibility, and Optimal Capacity Choice (NBER Working Paper No. 6373, Jan. 1998), available at https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w6373/w6373.pdf.

[22] See, Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis (4th ed, 1991).

[23] Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, & Steven J. Davis, Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty (NBER Working Paper No. 21633, Oct. 2015), available at https://www.policyuncertainty.com/media/BakerBloomDavis.pdf (“policy uncertainty raises stock price volatility and reduces investment and employment in policy-sensitive sectors like defense, healthcare, and infrastructure construction”).

[24] OECD Economic Outlook: Tackling Uncertainty, Reviving Growth, OECD (Jun. 2025), available at https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/06/oecd-economic-outlook-volume-2025-issue-1_1fd979a8/83363382-en.pdf.

[25] See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short Inglorious History, in Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., Jun. 2014).

ICLE Comments to the Canadian Competition Bureau on Algorithmic Pricing and Competition

Introduction We thank the Government of Canada and the Canadian Competition Bureau for the opportunity to comment on the discussion paper “Algorithmic Pricing and Competition.”[1] . . .

Introduction

We thank the Government of Canada and the Canadian Competition Bureau for the opportunity to comment on the discussion paper “Algorithmic Pricing and Competition.”[1] The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan global research and policy centre founded with the goal of building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. ICLE promotes the use of law & economics methodologies to inform public policy debates and has longstanding expertise in the evaluation of competition law and policy. ICLE’s interest is to ensure that competition law remains grounded in clear rules, established precedent, a record of evidence, and sound economic analysis.

In its ongoing efforts to ensure that competition law remains tethered to sound principles of economics, law, and due process, ICLE has engaged extensively with algorithmic-pricing issues across jurisdictions. We have filed amicus briefs in leading U.S. cases, including Gibson v. Cendyn[2] and Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesars,[3] arguing against overly broad theories of algorithmic collusion.

The consultation’s focus on algorithmic pricing raises important questions about how competition policy should adapt to technological change. In our view, the fundamental challenge is not the technology itself but ensuring that enforcement remains grounded in economic effects, rather than formalistic assumptions about how pricing algorithms operate. As former aptly noted by Maureen Ohlhausen, former chair of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), we should evaluate automated business practices by asking whether they would be legal if performed manually. Ohlhausen’s “guy named Bob” test provides a useful heuristic that Canadian authorities should embrace.[4]

Our comments focus primarily on the following aspects of algorithmic pricing:

  1. The economic effects of algorithmic pricing, including both efficiencies and potential harms;
  2. The application of existing legal frameworks to concerns about algorithmic collusion;
  3. The distinction between conscious parallelism and actual agreement in algorithm-mediated markets;
  4. The role of market structure in determining competitive effects; and
  5. The importance of preserving incentives for innovation while addressing legitimate competition concerns.

The competitive effects of algorithmic pricing depend on three key factors: market structure, software design, and implementation methods. Algorithmic adoption can facilitate coordinated outcomes, but it also offers consumer benefits through improved capacity utilization and dynamic pricing. The same technology that intensifies price competition in some contexts can dampen it in others. These findings underscore that technology amplifies existing market characteristics, rather than fundamentally altering competitive dynamics. Those markets that are susceptible to tacit coordination with human decisionmakers remain problematic with algorithms; competitive markets remain competitive.

In addition to what we know from economic research, various legal cases have brought forward other factors relevant to understanding algorithmic pricing. Crucially, the modern pricing algorithms examined usually operate within careful boundaries regarding information use. As we’ve pointed out, in actual cases, reputable vendors design their systems to avoid any inter-firm sharing of sensitive information.[5] Firms typically feed their own internal data (sales volumes, inventory levels, cost data) into algorithms that combine these with publicly available market data, such as competitors’ posted prices. This one-way flow of processed market intelligence differs fundamentally from scenarios in which competitors exchange confidential strategic information. A hotel using pricing software sees market analyses (demand trends, average rates scraped from travel sites) but not rivals’ proprietary booking data or recommendations based on such data.

These empirical and legal findings converge on a crucial insight: algorithms seem to amplify existing market characteristics rather than fundamentally transforming competitive dynamics. In concentrated markets with high barriers to entry and homogeneous products, algorithmic pricing may facilitate coordination. These same markets were, however, already susceptible to tacit collusion with human decisionmakers. Conversely, in competitive markets with differentiated products and low entry barriers, algorithms typically intensify competition by enabling faster price responses, better capacity management, and more targeted offerings. The technology serves as an accelerant, not a catalyst. It serves to make existing competitive or anticompetitive tendencies more pronounced, without creating entirely new market dynamics.

The key distinction lies not in the use of algorithms, per se, but in whether firms move beyond legitimate monitoring of public information to actual coordination of competitive decisions. Using common analytical tools or receiving similar market intelligence does not establish unlawful coordination. In short, algorithmic pricing should be seen as an evolution of older forms of pricing, and not some revolution that requires throwing out everything we know about competition policy.

I. Algorithmic Pricing in Modern Markets

Algorithmic pricing refers to the practice of using computer algorithms to set or recommend prices for goods or services. Rather than relying solely on manual pricing decisions or simple rules of thumb, firms input data into software that can automatically recommend or determine prices based on predefined criteria or learned patterns. These tools range from relatively simple algorithms (e.g., dynamic rules that raise prices as inventory drops) to advanced artificial-intelligence (AI) systems that continuously learn from market data.

The Competition Bureau notes that algorithmic pricing is “is gaining momentum across sectors and industries worldwide,” employed in industries from hospitality to concert tickets to ridesharing.[6] Indeed, algorithmic pricing is, in many ways, an extension of techniques that have existed for decades. Airlines and hotels, for example, have long engaged in dynamic pricing and yield management by systematically adjusting fares or room rates according to demand fluctuations, the timing of bookings, and capacity constraints. And they have, for decades, employed software—algorithmic tools—to do so.

What has changed is the scale and sophistication made possible by modern computing and data availability. Today, even mid-sized and small firms can access cloud-based pricing software or revenue-management systems that analyze large datasets—including sales history, competitor prices, or consumer behaviour—to adjust prices.

Pricing algorithms may analyze data to monitor market conditions, predict optimal pricing, or both. Common inputs include a firm’s own sales and inventory data, publicly available information (such as competitors’ prices scraped from websites), and broader factors like seasonality or local events. Depending on the complexity, an algorithmic tool might use simple rules (e.g., “if inventory < X, raise price by Y%”) or more complex machine-learning models that recognize patterns (e.g., an AI that learns demand elasticity at different price points). Some algorithms use dynamic rules that adjust prices continuously in response to real-time data, while others use personalized rules that tailor prices to individual customer segments, or even to specific individuals, based on their characteristics or past behaviour. Other algorithms can do both.

It is important to demystify how these algorithms function in practice. Most pricing algorithms do not set prices in a vacuum or in a conspiratorial manner; rather, they replicate and enhance traditional pricing tasks that human managers have always done. The software simply automates these tasks, often with the aid of computational resources: observe competitor prices, analyze market conditions, and make pricing recommendations. In other words, algorithms are tools that follow the instructions or goals set by their human programmers (e.g., maximize occupancy, or achieve a target revenue per-product).

In some cases, such as the case of Rainmaker’s pricing software used by hotels, the algorithm presents recommendations to a human decisionmaker, who can choose to accept or override the suggested price.[7] Even in fully automated settings like e-commerce platforms, the algorithms are tuned to known business objectives, like clearing stock by a season’s end or undercutting a competitor’s price by a small margin. This operational reality is crucial to bear in mind: using an algorithm is not a magical means to collude or to exploit consumers, but a way to process information more efficiently.

A. Data Sources

The consultation inquires about the sources of algorithmic-pricing data and suggests that “pooling data among competitors may raise issues under the Competition Act.”[8] This would only occur in the case of third-party software, not in the case of, e.g., an airline using its own data to construct a pricing algorithm. In the case of external software, firms typically feed their own internal data (sales volumes, inventory levels, cost data) into the algorithm, often combined with publicly available market data, such as competitors’ posted prices.

Modern pricing tools do not usually involve exchanging confidential data among competitors. In fact, reputable vendors design their systems to avoid any inter-firm sharing of sensitive information, precisely to steer clear of risk to competition.[9] For example, a hotel using a pricing algorithm will see analyses of its market (demand trends, average competitor rates scraped from online-travel sites), but it will not be given a direct feed of a rival hotel’s proprietary booking data or recommendations based on such proprietary competitor data.

Competition law draws important distinctions between distinct types of information use. Monitoring publicly available competitor prices has always been legitimate competitive conduct, whether done manually by human analysts or automated through algorithms. The automation of this process does not transform lawful activity into unlawful coordination.

The Competition Bureau’s own guidance provides helpful context for evaluating information sharing in algorithmic contexts. In its Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, the bureau analyzed a scenario in which trade-association members agreed to share aggregated sales and cost data through an independent third party.[10] The bureau recognizes that information exchanges among competitors can “impair competition by reducing uncertainties regarding competitors’ strategies and diminishing each firm’s commercial independence,” but notes that most such exchanges “do not raise concerns under the Act because competitors generally avoid sharing information that is competitively sensitive.”[11]

The bureau’s analysis of when information sharing becomes problematic offers useful guidance by analogy. The bureau focuses on whether information is “competitively sensitive,” with “publicly available information” generally not raising concerns.[12] The bureau also distinguishes between “information exchanged directly between competitors” (more concerning) and “information that is supplied to an independent third party” in aggregated form (less concerning).[13]

The key legal test focuses on whether firms have moved beyond information gathering to actual coordination of competitive decisions—e.g., by sharing non-public, competitively sensitive information. Using common analytical tools or receiving similar market intelligence does not establish such coordination. Rather, enforcers must prove that competitors have agreed to act in concert, using shared information as a facilitating mechanism for price-fixing, rather than independent competitive decision-making.

Using one’s own and public data to set prices has always been a legitimate business practice, as we will explain later. Doing it faster with an algorithm does not change that fundamental point. Indeed, competition law draws a line between public price monitoring (generally lawful) and sharing confidential pricing plans (potentially unlawful). Algorithms that stick to the former are tools that promote efficiency, not collusion.

B. Types of Algorithmic Pricing

Two key concepts highlighted in this consultation are dynamic pricing and personalized pricing (or algorithmic price discrimination). We briefly define each:

1. Personalized pricing

Personalized pricing refers to setting different prices for different customers (or segments or groups of customers) based on their individual characteristics or willingness to pay. This could mean offering targeted discounts or higher prices depending on a customer’s profile, purchase history, location, or device. For instance, an e-commerce site might algorithmically offer a coupon to price-sensitive shoppers (those who haven’t purchased in a while) while charging full price to frequent purchasers who have shown low price sensitivity. Personalized pricing is enabled by data analytics that can estimate a consumer’s willingness to pay.

While the idea sometimes raises fairness questions, it is important to note that personalized pricing can be broadly procompetitive. It often means that more consumers can be served, as price-sensitive consumers get access to lower prices, rather than being priced out entirely under a one-price-for-all strategy. We discuss the consumer-welfare implications of personalized pricing below.[14]

The FTC recently introduced the term “surveillance pricing” to describe certain personalized-pricing practices.[15] But while this terminology comes from the academic literature, it has gained little traction. With no clear application or applicable research, it adds nothing to our understanding of the economic effects that are of interest in competition policy. The phrase appears designed more for rhetorical impact than analytical clarity; personalized or algorithmic price discrimination already captures the relevant economic phenomena without the pejorative connotations.[16] As a general rule, Canadian authorities should focus on the actual economic effects of these practices, rather than adopting loaded terminology that may prejudge outcomes.

2. Dynamic pricing

Dynamic pricing refers to adjusting prices over time in response to changing market conditions. The same phenomenon is also sometimes dubbed “surge pricing” or “real-time pricing.” The strategy can involve temporal price discrimination: the price for the same item may be higher at times of peak demand and lower at times of slack demand.

There are, at least, four distinct types of dynamic pricing. While all involve updating prices over time, the underlying economics and policy implications of each could differ.

The first form is pure intertemporal price discrimination, where firms exploit predictable differences across consumer types. Examples include “early-bird” concert tickets that are offered at lower prices months in advance, or last-minute business-class airline fares that skyrocket even when plenty of seats remain. The price path is pre-programmed and does not respond to new demand information; it is instead designed to sort diverse types of consumers based on their planning horizons or willingness to pay. A busy executive who books a flight the night before travel reveals something about their time value that the airline can exploit. This pricing strategy uses time of purchase as an imperfect proxy for consumer type, and is a form of price discrimination.

But not all dynamic pricing is pure price discrimination. The second form responds to predictable demand cycles, rather than consumer heterogeneity. Electricity companies charge more during peak hours (4 to 9 p.m.), because that’s when aggregate demand systematically spikes. Ski resorts charge less in April than February for the same reason. Here, the pricing algorithm does not try to discriminate among customer types. It is instead aligning prices with known fluctuations in market-wide demand to keep marginal revenue roughly equal to marginal cost.

The third form is real-time market balancing under flexible capacity constraints. This is where Uber’s surge pricing really shines: when demand unexpectedly spikes (say, when a concert lets out), prices jump to ration limited driver capacity and signal additional drivers to enter the market. The key feature here is that higher prices can serve to expand total supply; more drivers get on the road when surge multipliers kick in. Unlike the first two forms, the price path responds to real-time demand shocks, and the “capacity constraint” is soft, rather than hard. There is no doubt that consumers prefer lower prices, all else being equal. But consumers also prefer adequate supply (in the case of ridesharing, the ability to secure a ride), which is not likely to meet surges in demand in circumstances of constrained pricing.

The fourth form may be described as “capacity-based pricing,” which is a practice of yield management under fixed capacity constraints. Airlines exemplify this mechanism: a plane has exactly 200 seats, and no price increase can create more. As the flight date approaches, the algorithm learns about demand by observing booking pace. If business travelers are snapping up seats faster than expected, prices on the remaining seats rise to maximize revenue from that fixed inventory. If bookings lag, prices might drop to avoid empty seats. Here, unlike in Uber’s pricing model, supply cannot respond to price signals. The algorithm is purely optimizing allocation of a fixed (in the short run) capacity.

3. How common is algorithmic pricing?

While it is difficult to quantify with precision the prevalence of algorithmic pricing in Canada, surveys in other jurisdictions suggest that a significant minority of firms have adopted some form of automated pricing, especially in online markets. This may be illustrative of the adoption of such tools in Canada.

Survey evidence from multiple jurisdictions demonstrates that algorithmic pricing has moved from a niche practice to a mainstream business tool. In 2017, the European Commission found that 49% of European retailers tracked competitor prices, with 66.6% of those using price-monitoring software; that is, roughly one-third of all retailers employed some form of algorithmic price monitoring.[17] More tellingly, among those who use monitoring software, 78% actively changed prices in response to competitor moves, and 35% used specialized pricing algorithms for automatic adjustments.[18] Similar patterns have been observed across jurisdictions in the EU.[19]

The observed adoption patterns reveal important sectoral differences. Airlines and hotels have long been pioneers in dynamic pricing and yield management, extending decades-old practices with more sophisticated computational tools. Retail sectors—especially e-commerce—show high adoption rates, with academic research identifying algorithmic pricing among at least 500 sellers (2.4% of roughly 30,000 sellers) on Amazon alone.[20]

Implementation approaches vary significantly across firms and sectors. A 2021 study by the This spectrum—from human-assisted to fully automated pricing—reflects different levels of algorithmic sophistication and organizational comfort with automated decisionmaking.

Importantly, algorithmic pricing isn’t confined to online markets. The Danish survey revealed that, while 80% of algorithmic pricing occurred in online sales, approximately 33% of firms also used algorithms to set prices in physical stores.[22] This convergence reflects the broader digitization of retail operations and the integration of online and offline pricing strategies. The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) documented evidence of growing adoption of algorithmic pricing in traditionally offline sectors, including large supermarkets and retail gasoline stations.[23] This trend suggests that the competitive effects of algorithmic pricing will extend well beyond digital-native industries.

Despite concerns about algorithmic price discrimination, survey evidence suggests that personalized pricing remains relatively uncommon. The European Commission’s mystery shopping exercise found that only 6% of tests recorded personalized pricing, with a median price difference of less than 1.6%.[24] Most price variations were found in the airline and hotel sectors, where price discrimination has long been standard practice. The limited adoption of personalized pricing may reflect both technical challenges and consumer resistance. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) puts it:

…firms may either refrain from adopting personalised pricing to protect their reputation or be less forthcoming and open when they do use personalised pricing. This may explain why there is not much evidence of firms using personalised pricing.[25]

A significant portion of algorithmic-pricing adoption occurs through third-party software providers, rather than in-house development. A 2020 survey by the Netherlands competition authority found that 80% of firms using pricing algorithms had developed them internally, while 20% worked with third-party providers.[26] But the availability of cloud-based pricing software has democratized access to sophisticated pricing tools, allowing smaller firms to compete with larger rivals’ pricing capabilities.

This trend toward third-party solutions has important competitive implications. When multiple competitors use the same pricing software, it can create the conditions for coordinated pricing outcomes even without explicit agreements—a concern that has emerged in academic research on German gasoline markets[27] and in recent litigation involving hotel and rental-housing software.[28] We discuss both cases below.[29]

II. Economic Effects of Algorithmic Pricing

In this section, we focus on the competitive effects of algorithmic pricing, drawing on both economic theory and empirical studies. The bureau’s consultation rightly notes that algorithmic pricing “could improve resource allocation and lower production costs,”[30] even as it also carries some risks. We strongly emphasize these economic efficiencies, as they often are overlooked in public debates. While demonstrable risks shouldn’t be ignored, nor should they be overstated or overgeneralized. Sound competition policy depends on due consideration of economic efficiencies and other consumer benefits, not simply potential risks to competition.

In particular, we highlight how dynamic pricing can improve allocative efficiency and consumer welfare; how personalized pricing and price discrimination can benefit consumers by expanding market output; and how algorithmic tools generally tend to intensify competition (especially by empowering smaller firms and new entrants).

A. Personalized Pricing and Algorithmic Price Discrimination: Competitive Benefits

Personalized pricing—that is, charging different prices to different customers for the same product based on data-driven predictions of their willingness to pay—is among the more controversial aspects of algorithmic pricing. But it can be highly procompetitive, or at least neutral, in its competitive effects. It is not generally considered an antitrust violation, absent some exclusionary or collusive purpose, and it often reflects healthy competition to win over different segments of customers.

The fundamental rationale for price discrimination is to expand output and serve more consumers. In a classic single-price scenario, a firm sets a price too high for those consumers who value the product below that price, but above cost. Those potential customers are left unserved, which is a deadweight loss. By offering a lower price (a discount) to price-sensitive consumers, while still charging higher prices to those willing to pay more, a firm can sell to both groups. That increases total sales, potentially making both the firm and the price-sensitive consumers better off.

Basic economic theory shows that, under many conditions, price discrimination can bring output closer to the socially efficient level (where each consumer who values the product at or above marginal cost gets to buy it). This is why airlines, for instance, use various differentiation tools (advance-purchase requirements, Saturday-night-stay rules, frequent-flyer segmentation) to effectively charge lower fares to leisure travelers and higher fares to business travelers.

But even when price discrimination does not increase output, it can still benefit consumers under competition where multiple firms have access to the requisite. data. Brian Albrecht offers a simple model to illustrate this effect.[31] He finds a stark result: unlike under monopoly, under competition, consumer prices are minimized when firms have complete information and can perfectly price discriminate. Firms can identify when consumers view their products as perfect substitutes, triggering the kind of intense competition that the French economist Joseph Bertrand demonstrated in the 19th century would drive prices toward marginal cost for those consumers.[32] The mechanism works by eliminating firms’ ability to charge high prices to consumers who would switch to competitors; perfect information reveals exactly which consumers are price-sensitive, forcing aggressive competition for their business.

Recent empirical evidence from ride-hailing markets provides a more cautionary perspective on personalized pricing. Nicholas Buchholz et al. (2025) studied the European platform Liftago, which features a unique auction-based mechanism that allows consumers to choose among drivers offering different combinations of price and wait time.[33] Using this rich variation, the authors estimate individual-level preferences for time and money, and simulate several counterfactual pricing regimes.

They found that, if the platform were to move from its current fee-based model—in which prices are determined by competitive bidding and the platform takes a 10% cut—to a personalized-pricing scheme, consumer surplus would decline by 2.5%, platform profits would increase threefold, and 20% fewer trips would be completed, due to higher prices.[34] Most consumers (62.5%), however, would actually benefit from personalized pricing, with losses concentrated among the least price-sensitive riders.[35]

Importantly, the study demonstrated that most of the reduction in consumer surplus arose not from personalization itself, but from the platform’s ability to exercise market power by setting prices on both sides of the market. This suggests that the welfare consequences of personalized pricing depend critically on the underlying market structure and the degree of platform control, not merely on the use of consumer data.

B. Dynamic Pricing: Matching Prices to Demand for Greater Efficiency

Dynamic pricing may be the most common form of algorithmic pricing, and its procompetitive benefits are well-documented. By adjusting prices in line with real-time demand and supply conditions, dynamic pricing serves to allocate resources to their highest-valued uses and avoids the inefficiencies of static pricing.

In a static-pricing regime (where a firm sets one price for all times), the price is often too high during low-demand periods (resulting in unsold products and unsatisfied consumers—those who would have bought at a lower price) and too low during peak periods (resulting in shortages or long wait times when more consumers want more of the product than there are units available). Dynamic pricing corrects this inefficiency by lowering prices during off-peak times to encourage additional consumption and raising them in peak times to ration limited supply to those who value it most.

Consider a simplified example of Uber rides: if Uber charged the same flat price all week, many willing riders and drivers would fail to transact during weekday lulls (because the price floor of a flat rate is too high). Meanwhile, on a busy weekend night, a flat price would leave many riders stranded, because excess demand would overwhelm supply.[36] In contrast, surge pricing at busy times raises the fare to entice more drivers onto the road and to allocate rides to those who urgently need them, while off-peak price cuts get more people riding when cars are sitting idle. The net effect is more efficiently matching supply and demand across time.

The best research on dynamic pricing, due to the abundance of available data, is from the airline industry. An influential study by?Kevin R. Williams estimated a structural model on U.S. monopoly routes and shows that allowing airlines to update fares in real time raises output by about?3%, boosts revenues by?8%, and reallocates seats toward early?booking leisure passengers.[37] Because late?arriving business travelers pay much higher prices, aggregate consumer surplus falls by roughly?6%. But the revenue gain more than offsets this loss, such that total welfare rises by about?1% overall. Roughly two?thirds of the revenue improvement comes from third?degree intertemporal price discrimination, while the remaining third reflects capacity?based responses to demand shocks.

One unique feature of the Williams dataset is that it focuses exclusively on monopoly routes. By using novel flight?level seat?map data for markets served by a single carrier, the paper can abstract from strategic interaction and cleanly isolate the welfare effects of dynamic pricing itself.

The net effects on consumers will depend crucially on the level of competition, just like in the static case. For example, Nan Chen and Przemyslaw Jeziorski found that introducing dynamic pricing in a competitive airline network led to a Pareto improvement: both consumers and producers benefited overall.[38] The airlines could increase load factors and revenues through better yield management, while consumers benefited from more opportunities to find cheaper fares or available seats when they needed them. The study attributes this welfare gain to two aspects of dynamic pricing: intertemporal price discrimination (e.g., charging different prices to leisure vs. business travelers) and capacity-based pricing (adjusting fares as seats fill up).

Interestingly, Chen and Jeziorski note that, while price discrimination can soften head-to-head competition (since airlines focus on their own customer segmentation), the capacity-responsive pricing aspect actually intensifies competition by making firms react more aggressively to fill remaining seats. On net, consumers saw increased surplus on average in dynamic-pricing regimes relative to static pricing.

Dynamic pricing in competitive settings can, however, also create new inefficiencies. Jose M. Betancourt et al. introduce a theoretical framework for studying dynamic price competition in perishable-goods markets and identify what they term the “Bertrand scarcity trap.”[39] Using novel data from competing U.S. airlines, they show that intense algorithmic price competition can lead to inefficiently low prices early in the booking period, resulting in overprovision of seats far from departure and under-provision close to departure. Their empirical analysis of 50 routes reveals that, when airlines use pricing heuristics instead of fully competitive algorithmic pricing, revenues increase (by 4-5%) and consumer surplus improves (by 3%).

This finding suggests that, while algorithmic pricing can enhance efficiency in monopolistic settings, competitive dynamics may sometimes warrant more restrained pricing strategies. The study demonstrates that the welfare effects of algorithmic pricing depend critically on market structure and the degree of competitive interaction between pricing algorithms.

One common misconception is that, if dynamic pricing raises some prices (e.g., during peak demand), it must harm consumers. This ignores the other side of the coin: dynamic pricing lowers prices during off-peak times, directly benefiting consumers who have flexible timing or lower willingness to pay. Moreover, even during peak times, dynamic pricing ensures that those who most urgently need the product can get it (albeit at a higher price), rather than finding it unavailable.

For example, airlines often charge much more for a ticket bought the day before departure than one bought months in advance. While the last-minute buyer pays more, the higher price also provides seat availability for travelers with urgent needs (business or emergency travelers) instead of the flight being fully booked weeks earlier by tourists paying a cheap fare. In a world of static pricing, that business traveler might simply have no seat available at any price, because the airline—not being able to raise the price—has no mechanism or incentive to hold inventory for high-value last-minute customers.

With dynamic pricing, the market is better segmented: high-value, time-pressed consumers can buy what they need (at a premium), while low-value consumers can enjoy lower prices if they buy early or when demand slackens. Overall consumer welfare can increase because more consumers get what they value most: the ones who highly value immediacy get the product and the ones who highly value low prices get discounts if they plan accordingly. Dynamic pricing moves the allocation of goods from a random or first-come-first-served basis (which can be inefficient) to allocating by willingness to pay, which tends to be more efficient and welfare-enhancing.

Importantly, even those who face higher prices at peak times are not necessarily worse off relative to static pricing, and not just because they might not obtain the product at all under a static-pricing policy. They might, for example, endure nonmonetary costs like waiting in line or rationing. Dynamic pricing often reduces nonmonetary costs (like wait times, stockouts, missed opportunities) by clearing markets. If you can reliably get a ride during a storm because the price rose to attract drivers, that might be preferable to not being able to find a ride at all at the old price. In economic terms, the higher price compensates drivers to supply more service, which can alleviate the shortage and lower the total cost to the consumer, when also considering time saved or utility gained. Meanwhile, consumers who are price-sensitive have the option to wait for lower prices at a later time or choose off-peak consumption. This dynamic adjustment is often more efficient than, say, leaving a marketplace chronically undersupplied at an artificially low price.

There is empirical work outside of airlines that finds this. Juan Camilo Castillo provides detailed insights into surge pricing’s welfare effects using data from Houston’s Uber market.[40] The study finds that surge pricing increased total welfare by 2.15% of gross revenue relative to uniform pricing, but with asymmetric effects across market participants. Rider surplus increased by 3.57% of gross revenue, while driver surplus decreased by 0.98% of gross revenue.

The asymmetry in welfare effects arises from three key mechanisms: surge pricing saves time by mitigating supply-demand imbalances (benefiting riders more due to their higher value of time); allocates trips more efficiently to high willingness-to-pay riders when drivers are scarce; and results in lower average prices relative to uniform pricing. Importantly, the study finds that surge pricing benefits riders at all income levels, with low-income riders benefiting most from lower prices, shorter pickup times, and more reliable trips, while high-income riders also benefit, but would prefer even higher prices for further reduced wait times.

Far from always softening competition, dynamic pricing can intensify competitive rivalry under many circumstances. Because firms using algorithms monitor market conditions constantly, they are quick to react to competitors’ price changes. If one firm tries to cut prices to gain market share, rivals’ algorithms may detect the move and match or beat the price drop, nearly in real time. This rapid matching can lead to vigorous price competition that benefits consumers. Traditional static pricing might involve a slower, more tacit form of coordination (competitors adjusting prices infrequently and cautiously). In contrast, dynamic algorithms can create a fast-paced environment in which prices are always under pressure from current demand and competitor actions.[41]

Another vivid demonstration of dynamic pricing’s intricate effects comes from the rental-housing sector. Sophie Calder-Wang and Gi Heung Kim compared property owners who used algorithmic-pricing software to set apartment rents, versus those who priced manually.[42] During the Great Recession (when demand plummeted), landlords using algorithms lowered rents more quickly and significantly. As a result, they achieved higher occupancy rates than those who kept rents steadier. In other words, tenants of algorithm-using landlords saw rent decreases that they might not have gotten otherwise, and more units stayed filled (fewer empty apartments). By contrast, during the post-recession expansion, algorithmic landlords raised rents more aggressively and tolerated lower occupancy, which helped sustain higher average market rents.

Most notably, Calder-Wang and Kim’s structural model finds that algorithmic adopters priced as if they were maximizing joint profits, not individual profits. This led to rent increases of roughly $25 per-unit per-month on average, affecting millions of apartments. These findings underscore a key point: algorithmic pricing can improve efficiency in weak markets but may also facilitate coordinated outcomes in tight markets. The same mechanism that enables faster rent cuts when demand falls can also support supracompetitive pricing when demand recovers.

The fundamental policy implication is that automated pricing is not, in and of itself, either procompetitive or anticompetitive. Rather, the specific type or function of algorithmic pricing needs to be assessed in the context of specific market conditions, lest competition enforcement be overly lax or overly stringent, to be detriment of both competition and Canadian consumers.

Even in industries like airlines or hotels, the fear that dynamic pricing leads to uniformly higher prices is not borne out when multiple firms compete. Instead, each firm’s algorithm is trying to optimize its own performance, often by stealing demand from rivals when advantageous (e.g., lowering a fare to fill seats if a competitor’s flight is going empty). The Chen & Jeziorski study mentioned earlier explicitly found that one element of dynamic pricing (optimizing on remaining capacity) tends to intensify competition, as firms have strong incentives to undercut each other to avoid being the one left with unsold inventory.[43] This competitive dynamic again favours consumers through lower prices or more choices.

C. Algorithmic Price Competition

Zach Y. Brown and Alexander MacKay study algorithmic-pricing competition using high-frequency price data from online retailers.[44] They find that retailers using high-frequency pricing algorithms (updating prices within hours) systematically charge lower prices than competitors that rely on slower technology (daily or weekly price updates), even for identical products. They further document that consumer surplus declined 4.1% and firm profits increased 9.6% due to asymmetric algorithmic competition, translating to an estimated $300 million annual cost to online consumers in the personal-care category alone. Brown and MacKay’s theoretical framework demonstrates that simple pricing algorithms can support supracompetitive prices, even in competitive equilibrium, without explicit collusion.

Stephanie Assad et al. (2024) provide empirical evidence from the retail-gasoline market in Germany, where algorithmic-pricing software became widely available in 2017.[45] They identify adopting stations through structural breaks in pricing behaviour (frequency of price changes, response times to competitors) and use brand-level adoption as an instrument. The study found that algorithmic adoption increases margins by roughly 9%, but the effects vary dramatically with market structure. In monopoly markets, adopting stations see no meaningful change in margins. But in duopoly markets where both stations adopt, margins increased by 38% relative to markets where neither adopts. Importantly, these margin increases emerged gradually over about a year, suggesting the algorithms learn to avoid price competition. The study documents that algorithmic adopters become more likely to match competitors’ price decreases but less likely to undercut rivals, consistent with learned coordination without explicit agreement.

D. Algorithmic Tools, Market Entry, and Small Firm Competitiveness

An often-underappreciated benefit of algorithmic pricing is that it can lower barriers to entry and improve small firms’ ability to compete. While not part of the empirical studies described in the preceding paragraphs, this has important implications for dynamic competition and innovation in markets.

Historically, implementing sophisticated pricing strategies required substantial resources (data collection; analytics expertise, whether contracted or in-house; and continuous monitoring), which only large incumbents could afford. This gave larger firms an advantage in pricing acumen over smaller rivals. Today, however, third-party algorithmic-pricing services have become widely available, effectively outsourcing a data-analytics department to any firm that wants one. As a result, new entrants and smaller companies can quickly adopt state-of-the-art pricing techniques without developing them in-house.

This levels the competitive playing field. A startup can use the same revenue-management software that industry leaders use, ensuring that it does not leave money on the table or misprice its product out of ignorance. In economic terms, algorithms can reduce economies of scale in pricing, because even a small firm can get scale-like insights by pooling data via a vendor’s platform. The OECD has explicitly recognized this benefit: algorithms can “reduce barriers to entry by allowing smaller entrants to gain market insights or develop new disruptive products at lower cost.”[46]

Another dynamic procompetitive aspect is that algorithms can spur entry by new business models. Consider how Uber and other platform-based services have leveraged dynamic-pricing algorithms as an integral part of their model. Surge pricing allowed ride-hailing platforms to ensure supply met demand in real time, which was a key innovation over traditional taxis (which often faced shortages at peak times). This innovation created a whole new market for on-demand rides, clearly benefiting consumers who now find it easier to get a ride at nearly any time.

If surge pricing had been banned from the outset as “price gouging,” the platform model might not have proven viable or attractive to drivers (who rely on earning more in peak times to make the service worthwhile). Algorithms also enable entirely new products like real-time price-comparison services, personalized shopping assistants, and dynamic-discounts apps—all of which increase competition by making markets more transparent and giving consumers more power to find deals. The competitive pressure that these innovations bring (often to the dismay of incumbents) should not be underestimated.

Based on the literature review and economic analysis presented, several key takeaways emerge. Perhaps most importantly, algorithmic pricing represents an evolutionary step in established business practices, rather than a fundamental departure from traditional market dynamics. Airlines have engaged in yield management for decades; hotels have long adjusted rates based on occupancy and demand patterns; and retailers have always monitored competitor prices to inform their own pricing decisions. There is nothing inherently magical about algorithms that transforms legitimate pricing strategies into anticompetitive conduct. When a hotel manager manually checks competitor rates each morning and adjusts prices accordingly, this is recognized as normal competitive behaviour. When the same process is automated through an algorithm that monitors competitor websites and updates prices in real time, the fundamental economic activity remains unchanged—only the efficiency of pricing has improved.

The empirical evidence demonstrates that the competitive effects of algorithmic pricing depend heavily on market structure and competitive dynamics, rather than the technology itself. In competitive markets, algorithms can intensify price competition. In oligopolistic markets, on the other hand, they may facilitate coordination—although this requires careful case-by-case analysis to distinguish between conscious parallelism (which is generally legal) and actual agreement (which is not). Because the effects of algorithmic pricing are generally ambiguous, competition authorities should resist developing categorical rules for it. Instead, authorities should apply established legal principles and the best available evidence.

Enforcers should, among other things, focus on evidence of actual agreements to coordinate pricing, rather than the mere use of common algorithms or software platforms. Given the substantial efficiency benefits and competitive potential of algorithmic pricing, policymakers should be cautious about premature regulatory interventions, as these are likely to fit actual practices and their effects poorly. Instead, they should continue to monitor markets, technical developments, and the developing literature, while pursuing enforcement actions only where evidence of actual anticompetitive agreements and actual or likely harm to competition and consumers emerges.

To synthesize the empirical literature: algorithmic pricing can lead to higher prices in oligopolistic settings where firms use similar tools, supporting concerns about tacit collusion. At the same time, in competitive or dynamic settings, algorithms tend to improve efficiency and can benefit consumers (through lower prices for some, better allocation, and expanded output). The presence of both effects even within one market (as in housing) means regulators’ inquiries should be case-specific. It would be misguided to be always skeptical of algorithmic pricing, let alone to ban algorithmic pricing outright (we would lose substantial efficiencies and innovation), or to ignore the potential need for enforcement when clear coordinated effects emerge.

The bureau should continue to gather data and monitor outcomes in algorithm-heavy markets (fuel retail, airlines, ridesharing, e-commerce, housing). If patterns of sustained unexplained price elevation coincide with the adoption of algorithms, it may warrant investigation (looking for facilitating practices or agreements). Conversely, evidence of consumer benefits should make the bureau cautious about intervening unless absolutely necessary.

III. Addressing Competition-Law Concerns

To this point, we have focused primarily on the economic effects of pricing algorithms. We turn now to the potential competition concerns associated with algorithmic pricing, as highlighted in the discussion paper. In particular, we discuss: (A) the legal framework for distinguishing legitimate parallel conduct from unlawful agreements in algorithmic contexts; (B) concerns about unilateral anticompetitive conduct by dominant firms; and (C) issues of deceptive or manipulative practices.

Throughout, we argue that existing competition-law principles (if properly applied) are capable of handling truly anticompetitive behaviour, but that we must be careful to distinguish such behaviour from superficially similar but benign conduct. A recurring theme is that parallel or similar pricing outcomes should not be presumed illegally collusive without evidence of an agreement, and that the automation of a practice does not change its legality. If a strategy is legal for a human, it is legal when done by or with an algorithm, and vice versa.

A. Algorithmic-Collusion Theories: Legal Framework and Evidentiary Standards

Perhaps the foremost concern in this area is that competitors could use pricing algorithms to facilitate collusion, either explicitly (through a common intermediary coordinating prices) or tacitly (if self-learning algorithms learn to avoid price competition). The bureau’s paper warns that sharing algorithms “may facilitate coordinated behaviour, such as price-fixing.”[47] They may, under certain facts and circumstances, but that does not mean that they are likely to do so as a general matter.

Moreover, and critically, algorithmic pricing introduces novel mechanisms for price setting, but it does not change the fundamental structure of competition law. Under Canadian law, competition enforcement remains grounded in clear statutory elements, most notably Section 45 of the Competition Act.[48] Section 45(1) prohibits conspiracies, agreements, or arrangements between competitors to fix prices, allocate markets, or restrict output.[49] It does not, however, render parallel conduct or shared practices unlawful absent a meeting of the minds. There is a straightforward rationale for the distinction: a range of factors—not just anticompetitive intent, much less likely anticompetitive effects—can lead to parallel conduct. Crucially, this provision requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an agreement or arrangement.

As clarified in Section 45(3), the court may infer such an agreement from circumstantial evidence, but there must still be sufficient facts to support the conclusion that competitors consciously coordinated their conduct.[50] While it does not require a smoking gun, it does require evidence of an agreement. The provision allows courts to infer conspiracy from circumstantial evidence, but it leaves the substantive elements of Section 45(1) untouched.

This statutory structure mirrors the analytical framework laid out in U.S. cases like Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesars and Gibson v. Cendyn.[51] In those cases, plaintiffs alleged a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy because hotels used the same pricing software. But as ICLE explained in amicus briefs, simply subscribing to the same vendor—without evidence of a “rim” (i.e., a horizontal agreement among competitors)—does not suffice to establish an unlawful conspiracy under U.S. or Canadian law.[52]

The Competition Bureau’s own guidance makes clear that conscious parallelism is not a crime: rivals may lawfully mimic each other’s prices, even when they do so with full awareness of their interdependence, so long as each firm decides pricing for itself.[53] Thus, a price trajectory produced by identical algorithms used by competing firms does not, without more, establish a cartel. To convert lawful rivalry into a criminal conspiracy, the Crown must still point to plus factors—e.g., evidence showing that competitors:

  1. coordinated the adoption or parameter-setting of their software;
  2. exchanged competitively sensitive information; or
  3. agreed not to deviate from the algorithm’s recommendations.

Absent such proof, identical or highly correlated prices remain the product of legitimate competition—not an unlawful “meeting of the minds.” The evidentiary flexibility makes agreements easier to prove, but it does not render the agreement unnecessary as an element of the offense. Any enforcement action aimed at algorithmic pricing must respect that line. The provision was drafted to catch clandestine cartels, not to criminalize modern pricing tools or the parallel outcomes they can generate.

1. Hub-and-spoke theories in algorithmic pricing

Internationally, authorities are grappling with cases like the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) RealPage case, which alleges that landlords who used a common pricing software effectively formed a cartel, or similar class-action suits brought by private plaintiffs in the hospitality sector (e.g., Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesars and Gibson v. Cendyn in the United States) that have made hub-and-spoke conspiracy claims.

ICLE has been active in these discussions, filing amicus briefs that urged the courts to carefully apply collusion doctrine to the specific facts and circumstances presented by algorithmic-pricing cases. Our core argument is this: using the same pricing algorithm as one’s competitors is not itself evidence of an unlawful agreement. There must be proof of a “meeting of minds,” an agreement to fix prices or otherwise restrain competition, separate from the mere use of a common tool. Indeed, case-specific facts about the customization of pricing platforms have suggested it is misleading even to say that the software licensees all used the same data and algorithms.

In traditional hub-and-spoke cases, a central party (the “hub”) coordinates anticompetitive conduct among multiple competitors (the “spokes”). Crucially, liability requires demonstration of a “rim”: horizontal agreements that connect the spokes to one other. As the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Howard Hess Dental Labs v. Dentsply (2010), “the rim of the wheel is the connecting agreements among the horizontal competitors (distributors) that form the spokes.”[54] Without this rim, there would be merely a series of vertical relationships between the hub and each spoke, which typically does not violate competition law.

This distinction becomes critical when evaluating algorithmic-pricing platforms. When multiple hotels use Rainmaker software or multiple landlords use RealPage, each has a vertical relationship with the software provider. To transform these vertical relationships into a horizontal conspiracy requires evidence that the competitors agreed among themselves to coordinate through the platform. The mere fact that they all chose the same software vendor cannot establish this horizontal agreement.

Thus, even if an algorithmic platform enables competitors to be more aware of each other’s pricing intentions (say, via aggregated market forecasts), that is not illegal unless it crosses into an actual concerted plan to fix prices. And it is not illegal, in no small part, because the forecasts might foster competition, rather than collusion.

The appropriate enforcement approach is thus to look for “plus factors” that indicate an agreement. Was there some communication or conduct ensuring that firms would not undercut each other beyond what the algorithm suggested? Did they agree not to override the algorithm or to follow certain rules collectively? In that regard, U.S. courts have mirrored Canada’s statutory requirements, which permit circumstantial evidence of an agreement but nonetheless require an agreement as an element of the offense. That evidence need not comprise an express written (or otherwise recorded) agreement to fix prices. But in the absence of such evidence, parallel pricing facilitated by a common tool should be seen as “conscious parallelism,” which competition law generally permits so long as each firm retains independent control.

The economic reality of how these platforms operate further undermines hub-and-spoke theories. In the Gibson v. Cendyn litigation, evidence showed that hotels retained full discretion to accept or reject Rainmaker’s pricing recommendations. As ICLE noted in its amicus brief, hotels “frequently override Rainmaker’s pricing recommendations,” with the software presenting recommendations to “a human decision-maker, who can choose to accept or override the suggested price.”[55] This retention of independent pricing authority is fundamentally inconsistent with the horizontal agreement required for hub-and-spoke liability.

Furthermore, the timing and circumstances of adoption matter. In the casino hotel cases, defendants adopted the software over a span of 14 years, making it “quite implausible that they tacitly agreed to anything, much less to fix the prices of their hotel rooms.”[56] Each firm’s decision to adopt pricing software at various times, for different properties, and with different customizations suggests independent business judgment, rather than coordinated action.

The data flow in these systems also distinguishes them from traditional hub-and-spoke conspiracies. Modern pricing algorithms typically aggregate market data and provide market intelligence without facilitating direct competitor-to-competitor communication. A hotel using Rainmaker sees analyses of its market (demand trends, average competitor rates scraped from online-travel sites) but does not receive a direct feed of a rival hotel’s proprietary booking data. This one-way flow of processed market intelligence differs qualitatively from scenarios where competitors use an intermediary to exchange confidential strategic information.

Again, we stress that the automation of pricing does not transform legal conduct into illegal conduct. Maureen Ohlhausen’s “guy named Bob” test is instructive here: if it is legal for Bob the pricing manager to review competitors’ public prices and adjust his company’s prices accordingly (which it is, as a form of savvy competition), then Bob doing the same via a computer program is also legal.[57]

2. Autonomous algorithmic coordination

A more novel concern is that self-learning AI algorithms might independently reach tacitly collusive outcomes without any agreement or human facilitation. Essentially, the algorithms could learn that competing on price is counterproductive and settle into a supracompetitive pricing pattern. This theoretical possibility has been explored in models and simulations (e.g., work by Emilio Calvano et al. showing Q-learning algorithms in a simple duopoly sometimes converged to high-price equilibria).[58] It is crucial to note, however, that there is no conclusive evidence that such autonomous tacit collusion is occurring in real markets or is currently a significant issue, much less that it is a necessary result of automated-pricing software generally. The OECD’s recent analysis in 2023 underscores this point, while advising vigilance as AI systems develop.[59]

This theoretical concern about autonomous algorithmic coordination differs importantly from, for example, the empirical findings in Assad et al.’s gasoline study.[60] While Assad and colleagues documented that algorithmic adoption led to higher margins and reduced price competition (with stations becoming more likely to match price decreases but less likely to undercut rivals), this represented a softening of competition, rather than explicit collusion. The gasoline algorithms learned to avoid aggressive price competition over time, but there was no evidence of an actual agreement among competitors to fix prices or coordinate conduct. Instead, the algorithms appeared to independently converge on less competitive behaviour as a profit-maximizing strategy.

This distinction is crucial for legal analysis: softened competition through parallel algorithmic learning, while potentially concerning from a welfare perspective, does not necessarily constitute the “agreement” required under Section 45 of the Competition Act.[61] The theoretical autonomous coordination concern, by contrast, envisions algorithms that might effectively replicate the outcomes of explicit price-fixing agreements without any human agreement or coordination—a scenario that would present novel challenges for competition law’s focus on proving concerted action.

The economic literature reviewed above demonstrates that algorithmic-pricing effects are fundamentally dependent on context. The same technology that enables coordination intensifies competition. Dynamic pricing can enhance efficiency in competitive markets, while potentially softening competition in oligopolistic ones. This context dependence provides strong economic justification for maintaining high legal burdens of proof. Because parallel-pricing outcomes can emerge from either coordination or competition, and because the welfare effects vary dramatically with market structure and implementation, legal standards cannot presume harm from algorithmic adoption alone. The economic evidence shows that distinguishing beneficial competition from harmful coordination requires careful analysis of facts and circumstances: the pricing software at-issue, its application, specific market conditions, information flows, timing patterns, and competitive responses and effects.

Canadian authorities evaluating potential algorithmic coordination should therefore focus on evidence of horizontal agreements, rather than vertical adoption patterns. Key indicators would include: evidence that competitors communicated about their mutual adoption of the software; agreements among competitors not to deviate from algorithmic recommendations; coordinated customization of algorithms to achieve common pricing outcomes; or use of the platform to exchange competitively sensitive information beyond what is publicly available. Without such evidence, the use of common pricing software remains a series of independent vertical relationships, regardless of how many competitors happen to use the same vendor.

In other words, while researchers have shown algorithms could collude under certain idealized conditions, competition authorities worldwide have yet to encounter a proven instance where an algorithm, on its own, created and sustained a collusive outcome that would not have happened with human operators. In Canada’s context, one might imagine concern in oligopolistic industries (say, retail gasoline or airlines) that pricing AIs could make tacit coordination “easier.” But even here, absent communication, it’s worth remembering that tacit collusion is not illegal under the Competition Act. The law instead targets “conspiracies, agreements or arrangements” (Section 45), which implies a meeting of minds, not mere conscious parallelism or intelligent adaptation to market conditions.[62]

If algorithms simply mirror what rational oligopolists would do anyway (recognize their interdependence and avoid price wars), that may be frustrating for regulators, but it is not caught by the letter of the law. The focus should remain on detecting any evidence of agreement or explicit facilitating practices. If companies deliberately design algorithms to reach collusive outcomes and have an understanding that they will do so, regulators could treat that as an agreement by proxy. Short of that, agencies should be cautious about stretching theories of liability too far. Doing so could chill the development of procompetitive algorithms. As former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General Roger Alford remarked:

…in the absence of evidence of concerted action, we cannot presume the simple use of pricing algorithms is an antitrust violation. Any approach that bypasses proof of concerted action risks false prosecution of potentially pro-competitive pricing decisions. Misplaced enforcement efforts have the potential to discourage innovation and deter efficiency-enhancing pricing.[63]

B. Unilateral Anticompetitive Conduct

Pricing algorithms may also raise concerns about unilateral conduct, such as predatory pricing, tying, or self-preferencing. These concerns are valid in principle but must be assessed under the proper legal standards. In Canada, unilateral conduct by a dominant firm is governed by abuse-of-dominance provisions (Sections 78 & 79), which require that conduct have an exclusionary, predatory, or disciplinary negative effect on a competitor, or that it is likely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition.

Algorithmic pricing can facilitate targeted price cuts, but this alone is not predatory. As the bureau recognizes, firms have long used targeted discounts to retain customers or respond to entry.[64] Algorithms simply make such responses more precise. It would be paradoxical to suggest that enforcers should, in the service of Canadian consumers, be generally suspicious of discounting or price cutting. Enforcement should focus on whether below-cost pricing is sustained long enough to eliminate rivals, and whether there is a realistic prospect of recoupment—standards that remain appropriate even in algorithmic contexts.

IV. Conclusion

Algorithmic pricing represents an evolutionary step in established business practices, rather than a fundamental transformation of competitive dynamics. The empirical evidence demonstrates that these tools can both intensify and soften competition, depending on market structure, implementation details, and competitive context. In concentrated markets with barriers to entry, algorithmic pricing may facilitate coordination, but the same markets were already susceptible to tacit collusion with human decisionmakers. Conversely, in competitive markets, algorithms typically enhance efficiency through improved capacity utilization, dynamic pricing, and more precise demand forecasting. The technology serves as an accelerant of existing market characteristics, not a catalyst for entirely new competitive dynamics.

Canadian competition authorities should resist the temptation to develop categorical rules for algorithmic pricing. The substantial efficiency benefits documented across airlines, ride-hailing, hospitality, and other sectors warrant protection, while legitimate competition concerns require careful case-by-case analysis grounded in established legal principles. Enforcement should focus on evidence of actual agreements to coordinate pricing, rather than the mere use of common algorithms or software platforms.

Ohlhausen’s “guy named Bob” test provides a useful heuristic: automated business practices should be evaluated by asking whether they would be legal if performed manually.[65] Using algorithmic tools to monitor public competitor prices and adjust accordingly remains legitimate competitive conduct, just as it was when done by human analysts.

As algorithmic pricing continues to evolve, the Competition Bureau should maintain its commitment to evidence-based enforcement, while monitoring developments in algorithm-heavy markets. The bureau’s existing analytical frameworks—particularly its guidance on information sharing and conscious parallelism—provide sufficient tools to address genuinely anticompetitive conduct without chilling innovation.[66] By focusing on economic effects rather than technological form, Canadian competition policy can preserve the substantial consumer benefits of algorithmic pricing while guarding against the genuine risks of coordination. The goal should be to ensure that competition law remains grounded in sound economic principles and clear legal standards, allowing Canadian businesses to harness the efficiency gains of modern pricing technology, while maintaining vigorous competitive markets.

[1] Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Discussion Paper, Competition Bureau Canada (Jun. 10, 2025), https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/en/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/publications/algorithmic-pricing-and-competition-discussion-paper.

[2] Brief of the International Center for Law & Economics as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesars Ent., Inc., No. 24-3006 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2025)

[3] Brief of the International Center for Law & Economics as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Gibson v. Cendyn Grp., LLC, No. 1:23-cv-02536 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2024)

[4] Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Should We Fear the Things That Go Beep in the Night? Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust Laws and Algorithmic Pricing, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 23, 2017), at 10, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/122 0893/ohlhausen_-_concurrences_5-23-17.pdf.

[5] See ICLE Amicus Briefs, supra notes 2-3.

[6] Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 1.

[7] ICLE Amicus Brief, supra note 2.

[8] Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 1.

[9] ICLE Amicus Brief, supra note 3 (“there is no allegation here that Rainmaker’s pricing recommendations to one subscriber are based on the confidential information of another subscriber.”)

[10] Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, Competition Bureau Canada (May?6, 2021), https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/en/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/competitor-collaboration-guidelines#sec04-7.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Infra Section II.

[15] FTC Surveillance Pricing 6(b) Study: Research Summaries A Staff Perspective, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Jan. 2025), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files?file=ftc_gov/pdf/p246202_surveillancepricing6bstudy_researchsummaries_redacted.pdf.

[16] Moreover, the term “surveillance” suggests that consumer behaviour and/or choices are observed in spaces with a reasonable expectation of privacy, not in the context of a consumer-provider relationship where the data collector is a party to the transaction.

[17] Final Report on the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry, Eur. Comm’n (May. 10, 2017), at 17, 22, 24, 29-32, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1261

[18] Id.

[19] See Algorithmic Competition, OECD Competition Policy Roundtable Background Note, OECD (2023), at 12, available at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/algorithmic-competition-2023.pdf. In 2020, the Norwegian Competition Authority found that 55% of surveyed firms used monitoring algorithms, while 20% employed pricing algorithms. In Denmark, 17% of e-commerce companies used pricing algorithms, with varying degrees of automation—from simple information provision to full algorithmic control. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets reported that 36% of firms used competitor-pricing data, with 16% (6% of all firms) employing pricing algorithms.

[20] Le Chen, Alan Mislove, & Christo Wilson, An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace, in Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web 1339-1349 (Apr. 2016), available at https://mislove.org/publications/Amazon-WWW.pdf.

[21] Prisalgoritmer og Deres Betydning for Konkurrencen, Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (2021), available at https://kfst.dk/media/yecpmmxu/prisalgoritmer.pdf.

[22] Id.

[23] Pricing Algorithms – Economic Working Paper on the Use of Algorithms to Facilitate Collusion and Personalised Pricing, CMA (Oct.18, 2018), at 19, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5bbb2384ed915d238f9cc2e7/Algorithms_econ_report.pdf

[24] Consumer Market Study on Online Market Segmentation Through Personalised Pricing/Offers in the European Union, Eur. Comm’n (Jul. 19, 2018), at 171, 219-220, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/consumer-market-study-online-market-segmentation-through-personalised-pricingoffers-european-union_en.

[25] OECD, supra note 19.

[26] Position Paper: Oversight of Algorithms, ACM (2020), available at https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/position-paper-oversight-of-algorithms.pdf.

[27] OECD, supra note 19.

[28] Id.

[29] Infra Section 4.C & III.1.

[30] Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 1.

[31] Brian C. Albrecht, Price Competition and the Use of Consumer Data (Aug. 11, 2020), available at https://briancalbrecht.github.io/albrecht_price_competition_consumer_data.pdf.

[32] Joseph Bertrand, Book Review of Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale and of Recherches Sur les Principles Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses, 67 Journal de Savants 499–508 (1883).

[33] Nicholas Buchholz et al., Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides, 93 Econometrica 930,  https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18838

[34] Id. at 931.

[35] Id. at 932.

[36] See Cody Taylor, The Case for Algorithmic Pricing: Consumer Welfare, Market Efficiency, and Policy Missteps, Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason Univ. (May 14, 2025), https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/case-algorithmic-pricing-consumer-welfare-market-efficiency-and-policy.

[37] Kevin R. Williams, The Welfare Effects of Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from Airline Markets, 90 Econometrica 831 (2022).

[38] Nan Chen & Przemyslaw Jeziorski, Consequences of Dynamic Pricing in Competitive Airline Markets (Jan. 26, 2023), at 3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4285718.

[39] Jose M. Betancourt et al., Dynamic Price Competition: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 30347 (Aug. 2022; rev. Apr. 2023), https://doi.org/10.3386/w30347.

[40] Juan Camilo Castillo, Who Benefits from Surge Pricing, Econometrica (forthcoming 2025), available at https://www.econometricsociety.org/publications/econometrica/0000/00/00/Who-Benefits-from-Surge-Pricing/file/19106-4.pdf.

[41] See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964). For a modern treatment, see Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production, 97 Am. Econ. Rev. 1794 (2007).

[42] Sophie Calder-Wang & Gi Heung Kim, Algorithmic Pricing in Multifamily Rentals: Efficiency Gains or Price Coordination? (2024), available at https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4403058.

[43] Chen & Jeziorski, supra note 36.

[44] Zach Y. Brown & Alexander MacKay, Competition in Pricing Algorithms, 15 Am. Econ. J. Microecon. (May 2023), https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210158.

[45] Stephanie Assad et al., Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market, 132 J. Pol. Econ. 763 (Mar. 2024), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/726906.

[46] OECD, supra note 19.

[47] Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 1.

[48] Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34.

[49] Id., s 45(1).

[50] Id., s 45(3).

[51] See ICLE Amicus Briefs, supra notes 2-3.

[52] Id.

[53] Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, Competition Bureau Canada (May 6, 2021), https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/en/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/competitor-collaboration-guidelines. (“The Bureau does not consider that the mere act of independently adopting a course of conduct with awareness of the likely response of competitors or in response to the conduct of competitors, commonly referred to as “conscious parallelism”, is sufficient to establish an agreement for the purpose of subsection 45(1). However, parallel conduct coupled with facilitating practices, such as sharing competitively sensitive information or activities that assist competitors in monitoring one another’s prices, may be sufficient to prove that an agreement was concluded between the parties.”)

[54] Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2010). (“The rim of the wheel is the connecting agreements among the horizontal competitors … that form the spokes.”)

[55] ICLE Amicus Brief, supra note 3.

[56] Id.

[57] Ohlhausen, supra note 4.

[58] Emilio Calvano et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 3267–97 (Oct. 2020), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26966472.pdf.

[59] OECD, supra note 19 at 14.

[60] Assad et al., supra note 40.

[61] Competition Act, supra note 43.

[62] Id.

[63] Roger Alford, Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., The Role of Antitrust in Promoting Innovation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 23, 2018), at 8.

[64] Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 1.

[65] Ohlhausen, supra note 4.

[66] Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 48.

LONG FORM WRITING

Do Ecosystems Exist in EU Competition Law?

At first glance, questioning the existence of ecosystems in competition law may seem merely provocative. After all, the term is pervasive in the antitrust . . .

Abstract

At first glance, questioning the existence of ecosystems in competition law may seem merely provocative. After all, the term is pervasive in the antitrust debate, where competition in today’s digital world is routinely described as a race between and within ecosystems. Accordingly, new theories of harm and substantial adjustments to traditional antitrust analysis are frequently invoked. However, upon closer examination, doubts arise about the actual novelty of the concept. While the term ‘ecosystem’ evocatively captures the seemingly irrepressible expansion of digital conglomerates, the paper investigates whether it is also grounded in a genuinely distinctive analytical framework and legal theory.

Read at SSRN.

AI Partnerships and Competition: Damned if You Buy, Damned if You Don’t

In this paper, we examine the rise of strategic partnerships between large technology firms and AI startups, arguing that these arrangements—often structured to avoid . . .

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the rise of strategic partnerships between large technology firms and AI startups, arguing that these arrangements—often structured to avoid traditional merger-control thresholds—have sparked undue antitrust concern despite limited evidence of competitive harm. Situating these “AI partnerships” within the broader framework of competition policy, we contend that such collaborations are frequently procompetitive, enabling startups to access capital, infrastructure, and distribution channels necessary to scale innovation in a rapidly evolving market. While regulators have raised theoretical concerns about foreclosure, switching costs, and concentration, empirical evidence to date suggests that AI markets remain dynamic, with robust entry, falling prices, and intensifying rivalry across the ecosystem. We further argue that expanding merger-control rules to capture non-controlling partnerships risks undermining legal certainty and deterring efficiency-enhancing collaborations. Ultimately, we conclude that AI partnerships are more likely to promote, rather than hinder, competition and innovation, cautioning against regulatory overreach that could stifle the development of emerging AI markets.

Site Blocking and Incentive-Compatible Solutions to Illicit Online Activity

Executive Summary Online file sharing has been a double-edged sword for the creative arts, enabling unprecedented access to content even as it has also introduced . . .

Executive Summary

Online file sharing has been a double-edged sword for the creative arts, enabling unprecedented access to content even as it has also introduced significant challenges for copyright enforcement. Napster revolutionized peer-to-peer file sharing, but courts ruled that its centralized servers facilitated copyright infringement. In its place came decentralized networks like Kazaa and BitTorrent, which complicated enforcement efforts and enabled users to evade liability. Meanwhile, The Pirate Bay continues to operate outside reach of U.S. authorities, navigating legal and diplomatic hurdles that persist despite intermittent crackdowns.

These developments highlight the limitations of traditional enforcement strategies, such as the notice-and-takedown provisions introduced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Such reactive provisions have proven ineffective in combatting mass reuploads and decentralized platforms domiciled in foreign jurisdictions. The “whack-a-mole” nature of enforcement underscores the need for a more sustainable approach.

Legal streaming services like Netflix and Spotify offer a market-based alternative to the pirates, providing consumers with accessible and affordable content and significantly reducing the incentives to seek illegal alternatives. These platforms demonstrate the power of addressing consumer demand directly, fostering a more cooperative environment between rightsholders and legitimate providers. Alas, a significant amount of piracy persists.

Evidence shows that well-crafted site-blocking regimes can dramatically reduce the amount of pirated content consumed. Implemented in more than 50 countries,[1] mechanisms to block offending domain-name systems (DNS) or internet-protocol (IP) addresses or to filter troublesome uniform-resource-locator (URL) addresses have reduced piracy by up to 80% when they are paired with complementary measures like search-engine delisting. Challenges remain, however, as tech-savvy users can circumvent these blocks through virtual private networks (VPNs) and alternative DNS providers.

Viewed through a law & economics lens, site blocking can represent a socially efficient solution, if implemented with sufficient legal-liability protections for intermediaries. Cost sharing among intermediaries—such as internet service providers (ISPs), content delivery networks (CDN), search engines, and rightsholders—can align incentives, making it a more cost-effective way to reduce piracy while preserving market efficiencies. Toward this end, appropriately narrow and transparent implementation of no-fault site-blocking frameworks can effectively deter piracy while minimizing the risk of overreach.

Crucially, such site-blocking orders should operate on a no-fault basis, so that intermediaries like ISPs and CDNs are not held responsible for the underlying infringement. Instead, intermediaries’ roles should be limited to technical compliance with clearly defined judicial directives, ensuring minimal disruption and cost. Moreover, any new site-blocking regime should also immunize intermediaries from legal suit with respect to how they comply—i.e., the regime should introduce no new liability, and instead represent an absolute liability shield so long as the intermediary makes some effort to comply with a court order.

Rather than viewing intermediaries as bearing new burdens, no-fault site blocking represents a pragmatic recognition that addressing large-scale copyright infringement requires coordinated action across the digital ecosystem. Just as property owners, security companies, and law enforcement all play roles in preventing theft, effective copyright protection benefits from contributions by different stakeholders according to their capabilities. This approach acknowledges that, while rightsholders bear primary responsibility for protecting their content, the technical architecture of the internet means that intermediaries are often well-positioned to implement certain protective measures efficiently.

The ongoing interplay among innovation, law, and market forces suggests that effective copyright enforcement requires a nuanced approach that aligns incentives and embraces technological progress. The limitations of traditional U.S. enforcement, when contrasted with the global success of site blocking, suggest the need for reform in the United States. Adopting incentive-compatible site-blocking laws, inspired by models from abroad, could address enforcement gaps while respecting constitutional rights. Such measures would balance enforcement with the protection of free expression; foster better coordination among stakeholders; and create a sustainable framework to address piracy in the digital age.

I. Introduction

The advent of the commercial internet brought about unprecedented opportunities for the dissemination of information and culture. It also, however, contributed significant new challenges to the legal frameworks designed to protect intellectual property. The history of illegal online file sharing is a testament to the ongoing dance between technological innovation and the law’s attempts to keep pace.

The consequences have been extensive. Recent estimates suggest that, in the United States alone, there are more than 26 billion illicit viewings of U.S.-produced movies and 127 billion illicit viewings of U.S.-produced television episodes each year, costing U.S. rightsholders between $30 and $70 billion annually.[2] This digital upheaval set the stage for the emergence of groundbreaking peer-to-peer platforms like Napster, which not only revolutionized how content was consumed but also magnified the tension between technological advancement and copyright enforcement.

A. The Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Revolution

In 1999, Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker unveiled Napster, a peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing service that fundamentally changed how users could access music.[3] Napster’s technology allowed users to share MP3 files directly, bypassing traditional distribution channels. The simplicity and efficiency of Napster’s platform led to a rapid surge in users eager to explore this new frontier of free music access.[4]

But when people obtained an MP3 via Napster, copyright holders were not compensated.[5] If left unchecked, such illicit file sharing would have a devastating impact on copyright holders’ revenues, thereby undermining artists’ incentives to produce new music.[6] The ensuing legal battle culminated in a 2001 decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the copyright holders’ claim that Napster’s centralized servers were facilitating theft.[7] As a result, Napster was forced to shut down.

B. Beyond Section 512

A central question in Napster was the applicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), particularly the law’s Section 512. The text of that section provides a “safe harbor” protecting service providers from liability for their users’ actions, provided they met certain conditions, such as promptly removing infringing content upon notification.[8] Napster’s centralized indexing system meant it could exercise control over the shared content, which the courts interpreted as disqualifying it from safe-harbor protections. This legal interpretation set a precedent for how P2P services would be treated under the DMCA.

1. Gnutella, Kazaa, and the shift to decentralization

Napster’s shutdown did not quash the public’s appetite for digital content. Instead, it spurred the development of more sophisticated P2P networks like Gnutella and Kazaa. These platforms embraced decentralization, eliminating centralized servers and making it more challenging for legal authorities to target a single point of failure. Kazaa, in particular, became a global phenomenon, as it enabled users to share not just music, but also videos and software. The platform’s decentralized nature complicated the application of Section 512, as there was no central authority controlling the network.

Without the ability to issue notice-and-takedown requests to network operators, the entertainment industry shifted its strategy, focusing on litigation against individual users and the developers of the P2P software.[9] These approaches, however, often spurred public-relations backlashes, as well as questions about the proportionality of such legal actions.[10]

2. The BitTorrent protocol and international jurisdictional challenges

In 2001, Bram Cohen introduced the BitTorrent protocol, which revolutionized file sharing by allowing users to download pieces of a file from multiple sources simultaneously.[11] This innovation significantly increased download speeds for large files, such as movies and software. Websites like The Pirate Bay—founded in Sweden in 2003—became central hubs for torrent files linked to copyrighted content.[12] The Pirate Bay’s operators were unabashed in their defiance of copyright laws, arguing for the “free exchange” of information—with the focus on “free.”

The international nature of BitTorrent sites posed and continues to pose significant challenges for enforcement. The Pirate Bay, domiciled outside the U.S., was beyond the immediate reach of American legal authorities. Attempts to apply U.S. copyright law extraterritorially were met with legal and diplomatic hurdles. Even when Swedish authorities took action—such as the 2006 raid on The Pirate Bay’s servers and the 2009 conviction of its founders—the site proved resilient, reappearing through mirror sites and shifting domain names.[13]

3. Cyberlockers and the Megaupload shutdown

As P2P networks faced increased scrutiny, file sharing evolved once again with the rise of cyberlockers such as Megaupload, founded by Kim Dotcom in 2005.[14] These services allowed users to upload files to centralized servers and share links for direct downloads, blending legitimate uses with widespread piracy. The U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) shutdown of Megaupload in 2012 and the arrest of Kim Dotcom in New Zealand marked a significant escalation in enforcement efforts, including international cooperation.[15]

C. Streaming: Licit and Illicit

The development of streaming services was an important part of the response to the threat of illegal file sharing. Initially limited to the delivery of relatively low-quality music, increases in bandwidth, improved compression, and other innovations (such as content-delivery networks, which have reduced latency) have made streaming a highly effective way to consume media content of all kinds.[16] These innovations dramatically reduced both the average and marginal cost to distribute digital content, enabling economies of scale that have benefitted both providers and consumers.

Perhaps most importantly, legal streaming services significantly reduce transaction costs associated with accessing content. Consumers no longer need to purchase individual songs or movies; instead, they pay a subscription fee for access to extensive libraries. By enabling consumers to access a wide array of content for a relatively low monthly subscription fee, streaming services also reduced the incentive for consumers to seek out illegal content. This has enhanced overall market efficiency and consumer welfare.

Legal streaming services also protect consumers from the significant security risks associated with illegal content sources. Users of peer-to-peer networks and illicit streaming sites frequently encounter malware, phishing schemes, and other cybersecurity threats that can compromise personal data, damage devices, and lead to identity theft or financial fraud.[17] These hidden costs introduce substantial additional transaction costs for users of pirated content, further strengthening the value proposition of legitimate streaming platforms that provide safe, reliable access without exposing consumers to these dangers.

Streaming platforms have also introduced innovative business models, including free streaming services supported by artists seeking to promote their content.[18] Other content streamers offer “freemium” services, where basic services are free with advertisements, and premium services are available via subscription. Finally, other steaming services utilize a tiered subscription model, which may include a lower-priced tier partly supported by advertising. Competition in this space creates incentives to continually improve service quality and content offerings, which benefits consumers. By offering products at differentiated price points, these services have further reduced the incentives for consumers to seek out illegal content.

From a legal perspective, the development of these services hinges on the negotiation and enforcement of intellectual-property (IP) rights. Music-streaming services like Spotify and video-streaming services like Netflix operate under licensing agreements with content creators and rightsholders, ensuring that creators are compensated. This arrangement aligns with the economic incentive structures intended by IP laws—to encourage creativity by granting exclusive rights that can be economically exploited. The rise of streaming services demonstrates how improving convenience, and accessibility enables content distribution to defeat piracy by drawing consumers to legitimate content.[19]

One way that copyright owners maximize revenue is by licensing content on a geographical basis, thereby benefitting from geographical price differentiation due to differences in willingness to pay between markets. Paradoxically, however, geographical limits on content licensing have contributed to the emergence and proliferation of illegal streaming services. Websites and platforms like Putlocker, Popcorn Time, and unauthorized IPTV services provide access to copyrighted content without proper licensing.

Illegal streaming undermines the economic incentives for content creation by depriving rightsholders of revenue. This loss can lead to reduced investment in new content, harming both creators and consumers in the long run. Additionally, it creates unfair competition for legal providers, who incur the costs of licensing and compliance.

D. Incentive-Compatible Regulation

Traditional approaches to digital regulation in the copyright space have relied primarily on prohibitory measures and punitive enforcement mechanisms—regulatory “sticks” designed to deter illegal behavior.[20] For the most severe infringing conduct, there are criminal sanctions that target online criminals.[21] These criminal frameworks are supplemented by civil liability regimes that enable rightsholders to pursue damages against infringers or allow regulators to impose fines on illegal operators.[22]

The predominance of these measures reflects an enforcement-first mindset that may overlook opportunities for more efficient and effective solutions.[23] As is evidenced in the case of illicit file sharing, these traditional enforcement approaches face significant limitations. Jurisdictional constraints present the primary challenge, as illegal operators deliberately locate in jurisdictions with weak enforcement regimes.[24] Even when jurisdiction can be established, sophisticated actors regularly develop new methods to evade blocking and monitoring efforts, creating a perpetual technological arms race between regulators and illegal operators.[25] The resource-intensive nature of investigating and prosecuting illegal operators, combined with the anonymous nature of many digital transactions, further complicates enforcement efforts.[26]

Market dynamics pose additional challenges to prohibition-focused approaches. Pure prohibition does not address the underlying consumer demand that drives illegal markets, while rigid regulatory frameworks often struggle to keep pace with rapidly evolving digital technologies.[27] Perhaps most significantly, the compliance costs that legitimate operators face can create pricing and convenience advantages for illegal alternatives, inadvertently strengthening the competitive position of illegal operators.[28]

These enforcement challenges contribute to several regulatory inefficiencies. The heavy reliance on enforcement diverts public resources from other potential approaches, often with diminishing returns beyond a certain point of effort.[29] Multiple enforcement agencies and jurisdictions frequently struggle to coordinate effectively, while success metrics can focus on enforcement actions, rather than actual market outcomes.

Stringent prohibitions may also inadvertently segment markets, making illegal alternatives more attractive to certain consumer segments.[30] Compliance requirements can impede legitimate operators from developing new products or services, while driving activity underground may expose consumers to greater risks from unregulated illegal operators.[31] Over time, the limited success of prohibition efforts can gradually erode public and institutional support for enforcement.

These limitations suggest the need to complement traditional enforcement with strategies that leverage market forces and address consumer incentives. Such approaches would create conditions under which legitimate operators can effectively compete with illegal alternatives, while also providing businesses with the tools and frameworks to protect their interests. The optimal regulatory framework would balance enforcement efforts with other approaches, based on their relative effectiveness. These “carrot” approaches recognize that sustainable regulation in digital markets requires ensuring legitimate businesses can effectively compete against illegal operators.[32]

Market-based regulatory strategies can complement enforcement efforts in several crucial ways. First, they acknowledge the reality that consumer choice in digital markets is heavily influenced by convenience, price, and accessibility.[33] When regulatory frameworks inadvertently disadvantage legitimate businesses along these dimensions, they may unintentionally drive consumers toward illegal alternatives, regardless of enforcement efforts.[34]

A market-oriented regulatory approach also recognizes the importance of private ordering. Rather than relying solely on government enforcement, this framework empowers legitimate businesses to protect their interests through market mechanisms and technological tools.[35] The potential effectiveness of content-delivery networks in preventing certain forms of piracy, for instance, illustrates how private-sector innovation can complement traditional enforcement approaches.[36]

The effectiveness of such “carrot” approaches depends on careful attention to market dynamics and consumer behavior. Regulatory interventions must be designed with a sophisticated understanding of how they will affect competitive conditions in digital markets. This requires moving beyond simple prohibitions to consider how regulatory frameworks influence the relative attractiveness of legal and illegal options. In broad terms, such incentive-compatible regulation can take two forms: purely market-based solutions and techno-legal solutions.

1. Market solutions and market-compatible solutions

To the extent that illicit streaming services exist due to unmet demand in jurisdictions where copyright holders have not licensed content to a legal streaming service, the solution may seem relatively straightforward: provide licenses that are less geographically limited.[37] Unfortunately, this assumes away not only copyright holders’ incentives to maximize revenue through differential pricing but also the complex and highly varied nature of copyright law across jurisdictions. While it could certainly make sense to encourage the development of broader geographical licenses, they are unlikely to produce a panacea any time soon.

Another option is to enforce copyright law against illegal streaming services. This, however, presents challenges similar to those discussed in relation to P2P services. The global and decentralized nature of the internet allows these services to operate across jurisdictions that lack stringent IP enforcement. Unlike downloads, streaming usually does not leave users with a copy of the file, thus creating ambiguities in the applicability of existing laws in some jurisdictions. Even where feasible, legal actions are reactive, costly and typically of limited effectiveness, due to the ease with which these services can rebrand or relocate.

In response, rightsholders and governments have explored technological measures—such as digital rights management (DRM) and network-level interventions such as site blocking. These measures are, however, subject to criticism regarding their effectiveness, potential overreach, and unintended consequences on internet freedom and privacy. This paper seeks to propose a measured approach that would properly align incentives, acknowledging the potential advantages of interventions like site blocking while emphasizing the importance of ensuring that such interventions do not over-reach.

E. Summary

From a law & economics perspective, the development of legal streaming services represents a market adaptation to consumer demand facilitated by technological innovation and supported by the frameworks of intellectual-property law. These services enhance welfare by reducing transaction costs and providing value through legal access to content. Conversely, illegal streaming services highlight the challenges creators face in an age when perfect digital copies can be distributed from jurisdictions where they are not easily protected.

Addressing the issue of illegal streaming requires a multifaceted approach, which this brief seeks to explore in more detail. The next section begins with a discussion of techno-legal solutions, including the implementation of site-blocking regimes, designed to disrupt access to illicit streaming platforms. The brief will then evaluate market-driven strategies, emphasizing the role of legal streaming services in reducing consumer demand for pirated content. By combining technological enforcement mechanisms with incentive-compatible regulations, policymakers can craft a comprehensive framework that mitigates the harms of piracy, while fostering innovation and protecting fundamental rights.

II. Stopping the Illegal Streamers: From Notice-and-Takedown to Site Blocking

Nearly three decades after the passage of DMCA, online piracy of copyrighted works still causes immense losses to creators. As noted in the introduction, U.S. consumers watch tens of billions of illegal video streams each year, valued upward of $30 billion.[38] The traditional notice-and-takedown approach embodied in Section 512 of the DMCA seems incapable of addressing this scale of infringement. Faced with similar threats, many other countries have instead adopted website blocking as an enforcement tool.

This section considers ways that the law might be improved domestically and internationally to address the threat of illegal streaming services. It begins with a deeper dive into the status quo, looking in particular at the role played by Section 512 of the DMCA. This is followed by a description of site blocking and its application and effect in other jurisdictions.

A. Section 512 of the DMCA

Section 512 has been central in shaping the legal landscape of online content sharing in the United States. As noted above, it provides ISPs with immunity from copyright-infringement claims so long as they comply with the law’s specific requirements, such as implementing a notice-and-takedown system. The provision has proven to be both a shield for legitimate platforms and a sword wielded against infringing sites. For platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and X.com, compliance with Section 512 has been critical in managing user-generated content while avoiding liability. These platforms have therefore invested heavily in systems to detect and remove infringing material.

But whether by design or by court interpretation, Section 512’s notice-and-takedown requirement is reactive and often fails to prevent rapid reuploads of infringing content. Enacted in 1998, the DMCA was designed for an internet dominated by static web pages and slow, centralized file-sharing systems. It has struggled to address the rise of decentralized piracy networks, illegal streaming platforms, and automated content-reupload tools.

Moreover, for sites domiciled outside the United States, Section 512 offers little leverage. Without U.S. jurisdiction, foreign sites have little incentive to comply with DMCA takedown notices, rendering the provision ineffective in those contexts. This has led rightsholders and governments to explore alternative strategies, such as site blocking.

B. Site Blocking

“Site blocking” refers to the practice of imposing technological restrictions on access to websites and apps that exclusively or predominantly host infringing content. It represents a shift in legal strategy from trying to remove individual instances of infringing content to prevent users from accessing sites dedicated to infringement. This approach recognizes that the “whack-a-mole” problem of endless takedown notices cannot effectively combat determined bad actors who simply repost content or shift to new domains. Unlike static takedown notices, dynamic site blocking offers a more agile approach, capable of evolving with the tactics of infringers.

As we discuss below, of particular interest is “no-fault” site blocking. Such regimes rely on judicial orders compelling intermediaries to disable access to infringing websites without attributing liability to the intermediaries themselves and, crucially, with important immunities provided to intermediaries who comply. To effectuate site blocking, rightsholders must demonstrate clear infringement as a predominant function of a site, after which intermediaries can implement technical blocks at minimal cost.

More than 50 countries—including Denmark, Finland, France, India, and the United Kingdom—have enacted site-blocking provisions that direct ISPs to disable access to websites that predominantly promote copyright infringement.[39] The following sections examine how different blocking mechanisms create and rely upon aligned incentives among various stakeholders; the evidence from international implementations; and considerations for potential adoption in the U.S. legal framework.

1. Mechanisms

Site blocking’s effectiveness depends heavily on both the technical mechanisms employed and how those mechanisms align various stakeholders’ incentives. Differing blocking approaches create distinct costs, benefits, and circumvention risks that affect both implementation decisions and stakeholder cooperation.

DNS blocking represents the most widely implemented form of site blocking, due to its relatively low cost and straightforward implementation. When a court orders DNS blocking, ISPs must configure their DNS servers to stop resolving the domain names of infringing websites to their corresponding IP addresses.[40] For example, if a user attempts to visit “illegalcontent.com,” the ISP’s DNS server will refuse to translate that domain name into the numerical IP address that would allow the user’s browser to connect to the website.

The key advantage of DNS blocking is its low implementation cost for ISPs, requiring only simple modifications to existing DNS infrastructure. DNS blocking can, however, be circumvented relatively easily by users who switch to alternative DNS providers or use VPNs.[41] Despite this limitation, DNS blocking remains effective at reducing casual piracy.[42] IP blocking operates in a similar manner by preventing users from connecting to specific IP addresses associated with infringing websites.

URL blocking and deep packet inspection (DPI) represent more sophisticated approaches to site blocking. URL blocking operates at a granular level by examining the specific web addresses that users attempt to access, allowing targeted blocking of individual pages, while leaving legitimate content accessible.[43] DPI goes further by examining the actual content of internet traffic, enabling highly precise blocking based on the material being transmitted.[44] Both methods require ISPs to make substantial infrastructure investments, with DPI being particularly expensive due to the need for specialized equipment. The precision these methods offers does, however, offer better incentives for compliance from both ISPs and legitimate web platforms by minimizing collateral damage to innocent content. On the other hand, DPI raises additional privacy concerns that must be balanced against its effectiveness.

Combining multiple blocking mechanisms produces the strongest results. For example, where site blocking has been combined with search-engine delisting, traffic to piracy sites dropped by 1.5 times more than with ISP-level blocking alone.[45] This suggests that a layered approach that aligns incentives across multiple stakeholders—ISPs, search engines, and hosting providers—is most effective at sustainably reducing piracy.

The choice of blocking mechanism fundamentally shapes the incentives for compliance and enforcement. Less expensive mechanisms like DNS blocking face minimal resistance from ISPs, but require frequent updates as infringers adapt. More sophisticated approaches like URL blocking and DPI create stronger incentives for careful targeting by rightsholders but face greater opposition from ISPs, who have expressed concerns about implementation costs, as well as from civil-rights advocates concerned with privacy and freedom of expression.

A growing number of courts worldwide have adopted “dynamic” site-blocking approaches that allow for rapid adaptation of blocking orders using different techniques without requiring entirely new legal proceedings. These dynamic injunctions enable “the prompt addition of new domain names, IP addresses, and/or URLs to an existing site-blocking order – and without filing a new lawsuit or appearing again before a court.”[46] This approach recognizes the reality that pirate sites frequently shift domains and IP addresses to evade enforcement.

For example, in Singapore’s influential Disney Enterprises v. M1 Limited decision, the High Court approved dynamic injunctions after noting how infringing online locations had already changed domain names and established mirror sites, concluding that “without a continuing obligation to block additional domain names, URLs and/or IP addresses upon being informed of such sites, it is unlikely that there would be effective disabling of access.”[47] Similar precedents have been established in the UK and, very recently, in Canada.[48]

Courts have generally left technical implementation details to ISPs, while establishing clear procedural frameworks—such as requiring written notice identifying new domains to be blocked, allowing ISPs opportunities to object, and mandating good-faith declarations that new sites are actually providing access to previously blocked content.[49] This balanced approach enables rapid response to evasion attempts while maintaining appropriate oversight and safeguards.

2. Implementation

The development of site-blocking regimes across jurisdictions demonstrates both the growing acceptance of this enforcement tool and the emergence of increasingly sophisticated frameworks for its implementation. As of 2024, more than 35 jurisdictions had implemented site blocking through either judicial or administrative mechanisms.[50]

The European Union laid much of the groundwork for modern site blocking through Article 8(3) of the 2001 Information Society Directive (InfoSoc Directive), which required member states to ensure rightsholders can obtain injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used for infringement.[51]

The UK incorporated the InfoSoc Directive requirement in a 2003 amendment to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act.[52] In the 2012 case Twentieth Century Fox v. British Telecommunications, the High Court compelled British Telecommunications (BT), one of the UK’s largest ISPs, to block access to Newzbin2, a site infamous for distributing pirated movies and television shows.[53] This was followed in 2013 by Football Association Premier League Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd., which required the six primary UK ISPs to block streaming sites offering unauthorized access to live sports.[54] Together, these cases have effectively imposed dynamic site blocking on all UK ISPs, meaning that rightsholders are not required “to return to court for an order in respect of every single IP address or URL” used by an infringing party.[55]

In Germany, courts initially developed site-blocking jurisprudence without specific statutory authorization, relying instead on German civil law’s secondary-liability doctrine.[56] Germany’s site-blocking system, managed by the Clearing House for Copyright on the Internet (CUII), subsequently developed a carefully structured legislative approach to combat online harms through industry cooperation, subject to the purview of a federal regulator.[57] Rather than rely on court-ordered blocks, the CUII facilitates a partnership between rightsholders and ISPs, streamlining the blocking process while maintaining checks and balances.[58]

In the German system, a three-tiered structure—comprising a steering committee, an administrative office, and a review committee—seeks to ensure accountability and consistency.[59] Every blocking recommendation undergoes a thorough review process and requires unanimous approval by the review committee and compliance verification by the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA).[60] This model combines speed with procedural safeguards. It also includes deliberate delays to prevent domain recycling, ensuring previously infringing domains are not prematurely unblocked.[61] While the system appears to be effective, it is one that is very much rooted in Germany’s constitutional framework and may not be readily transposed to common-law or even other civil-law systems.

Australia has developed one of the most comprehensive statutory frameworks for site blocking. The country’s Copyright Act empowers courts to require ISPs to take “reasonable steps” to disable access to online locations whose primary purpose or effect is infringing copyright.[62] The Australian system has evolved significantly since its 2015 implementation, with a 2018 amendment explicitly allowing for dynamic blocking orders.[63]

India has developed a dynamic site-blocking regime through both legislative frameworks and judicial decisions. The Delhi High Court has been particularly active in crafting site-blocking jurisprudence, as evidenced in cases like UTV Software Communication Ltd. v. 1337X.TO. Indian courts have established a qualitative multifactor analysis to determine whether a given site is a “rogue website” that should be subject to blocking orders.[64] Indian courts have ordered ISPs to block pirate websites to protect new releases of Indian films, with the Delhi High Court routinely granting blocking orders against dozens of websites. For example, in 2019 alone, the Delhi High Court ordered the blocking of 30 torrent sites.[65]

3. Effectiveness

Empirical evaluations of the international experience with site blocking suggests that it can be effective. Studies show that court-ordered site blocking can reduce traffic to piracy sites by 70% on average, and by as much as 80-90% in some jurisdictions.[66] In Denmark, DNS blocking orders led to an average 44% decrease in Danish IP traffic to piracy sites.[67] When combined with search-engine delisting, the Motion Picture Association reports that site blocking results in a “1.5 times larger traffic decline” compared to ISP-level blocking alone.[68]

The effectiveness of site blocking, however, varies significantly across countries, due to a combination of legal frameworks, technological capabilities, and the level of cooperation among stakeholders. In jurisdictions where site blocking has been more successful, several factors stand out. They are often countries with clear and comprehensive legislative frameworks that empower courts or regulatory agencies to issue site-blocking orders with minimal procedural delays. For instance, dynamic injunctions in countries like the UK and Australia allow for rapid updates to blocking orders, enabling rightsholders and ISPs to respond effectively to infringing sites’ evasion tactics.

Also, effective site-blocking regimes often rely on a collaborative approach among governments, rightsholders, and intermediaries like ISPs and search engines. Germany’s CUII exemplifies this approach, with its structured partnership ensuring accountability and swift implementation of blocking measures, while maintaining safeguards against overreach.

Effective technological infrastructure and strong enforcement capacity are also crucial to the success of site-blocking efforts. For example, using layered enforcement strategies—such as integrating DNS blocking, URL filtering, CDN blocks, and search-engine delisting—likely yields more substantial reductions in piracy, as the combination of these techniques significantly raises the difficulty of circumvention. Conversely, fragmented legal frameworks, inadequate technological capabilities, or poor coordination among stakeholders all likely create enforcement gaps that are easily exploited by infringers.

It also matters how site-blocking technologies are implemented, as overly broad blocking regimes may infringe users’ rights. These variations underscore the need to align the legal, technological, and collaborative elements effectively. Drawing insights from these experiences can help policymakers to craft a balanced framework that effectively reduces piracy while promoting innovation and safeguarding user rights.

C. The Law & Economics of Site Blocking

Viewed through the lens of law & economics, the introduction of site-blocking injunctions and other intermediary obligations can be understood as reallocating property rights (in the loose sense of “entitlements”) away from infringers and toward copyright owners—ultimately by changing which party (or parties) must bear the cost of preventing or remedying copyright infringement.

1. Coase, social costs, and the allocation of rights

The Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase noted that, where property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are zero, parties will bargain to an efficient outcome, regardless of how rights are initially allocated.[69] But as Coase also noted (indeed, it was the main point of his article), in the real world, transaction costs are never zero and are often significant. In the case of copyrighted material, transactions costs would include the cost and difficulty of identifying infringers, the costs of negotiating with potential infringers, and the costs of enforcing any legal agreement. As a result, the initial allocation of rights and the mechanisms available for enforcement are highly material.

One way to view the massive scale of online digital piracy is as a nonconsensual transfer to infringing users of a significant proportion of the de-facto rights to content. In other words, infringers enjoy the benefit (use of copyrighted material) without bearing the associated costs (royalties or permission). This is due to a combination of factors.

The first is high enforcement costs, where copyright owners have to police individual infringers (or individual pirate sites) directly, which is extremely costly and logistically cumbersome. The problem of diffuse infringers is a second factor, where infringers are numerous and often anonymous or scattered across various jurisdictions. Finally, the limited leverage over intermediaries like ISPs, search engines, and web hosts—as well as the high costs of case-by-case litigation—make it difficult for content owners to enforce their rights. Intermediaries typically remove content upon notice (e.g., DMCA takedowns in the United States), but there is no broad obligation proactively and dynamically to block infringing sites.

2. Removing legal friction through no-fault injunctions

No-fault site-blocking injunctions offer a solution to this problem by creating a framework that removes the friction that placing liability on intermediaries would otherwise introduce. Under this approach, upon receiving a court order, intermediaries would take steps to prevent their users from accessing infringing content. These no-fault injunctions fundamentally differ from traditional liability-based models, as they:

  • Leverage efficient implementation capabilities: Intermediaries can often implement blocking measures at the lowest total social cost.[70] Because intermediaries have the technical infrastructure to block access to infringing sites or remove them from search results and other relevant lists (such as DNS), they can help reduce infringement with greater efficiency than if each copyright owner had to pursue individual end-users through separate legal actions.
  • Restore rightsholder control without creating new liability: This framework effectively places the right to exclude back in the copyright owners’ hands without making intermediaries liable for the infringing content itself. When a court determines that content is infringing, rightsholders gain a practical enforcement mechanism through the intermediaries, who serve as technical facilitators rather than liable parties.
  • Create technical barriers for infringers: Under the current system, infringers can harm copyright holders with little practical consequence. Site blocking raises the technical hurdles infringers must overcome, as they need to invest in circumvention tools and find ways to operate despite being blocked by ISPs and delisted by search engines.

Further, under no-fault injunction frameworks, intermediaries’ technical compliance costs are minimal, often limited to standard network management (e.g., DNS or IP filtering). Jurisdictions like Australia have explicitly required rightsholders to cover reasonable implementation costs, alleviating ISPs from bearing disproportionate expenses. Additionally, because these injunctions narrowly target clearly infringing sites, ISPs incur negligible operational burdens and retain legal certainty.

In short, no-fault injunctions serve as a form of incentive-compatible regulation that better aligns stakeholders’ interests and activities without imposing new proactive policing responsibilities on intermediaries. They leverage intermediaries’ existing capabilities efficiently, thus reducing piracy without imposing significant new costs. Unlike liability-based approaches that create adversarial relationships, no-fault injunctions provide intermediaries with legal clarity and immunity, while furnishing rightsholders with effective enforcement tools.

3. Risks from overly broad liability rules

As noted, site blocking can be a useful tool to realign incentives and, in the right circumstances, facilitate efficient enforcement through those parties best positioned to implement technical measures, without requiring them to bear legal responsibility for the underlying infringement. But site blocking does also have the potential to result in harmful consequences. These can include high private costs, if intermediaries are held liable for infringing content and feel obliged to use costly and invasive technologies to identify and block such content; and high social costs, if site blocking is applied too broadly and impinges the sharing of noninfringing material. The latter would have a chilling effect on the creation of such material, perversely harming some of the creators the law is intended to benefit.

The challenge lies in properly calibrating the rules—in particular, through the use of no-fault injunctions that obviate many of these concerns—so as to preserve the incentives to create and share legitimate content. Based on the international experience, successful site-blocking frameworks must carefully define the circumstances warranting such orders; establish clear procedural requirements that make compliance straightforward for intermediaries; and provide transparency around the blocking process.

D. US Legal Framework and Reform Proposals

The international experience with site blocking suggests that the United States has an opportunity to implement incentive-compatible regulation that could reshape online copyright enforcement. As noted, the current U.S. framework fails to create proper incentives for cooperation between rightsholders and intermediaries. But for the status quo to change, it is first important to understand the barriers to such change.

1. Constitutional and procedural barriers

Section 512 of the DMCA offers a useful historical parallel for understanding the limitations of static regulatory frameworks in addressing rapidly evolving technological challenges. Section 512(j) appears to provide explicit statutory authority for site blocking, requiring service providers to “take reasonable steps specified in the order to block access, to a specific, identified, online location outside the United States.”[71] This tool has, however, largely gone unused. This gap reveals not just a legal anomaly, but a missed opportunity to align various stakeholders’ incentives in the fight against online piracy.

Why hasn’t § 512(j) been used more effectively? One reason may be that Section 512(j) requires bringing direct legal action against ISPs, necessitating a full lawsuit to determine liability for providing access to infringing content. This makes the tool fundamentally unscalable—the time, expense, and adversarial nature of litigation required to achieve even a single site block would be immense, ultimately rendering the provision impractical for addressing widespread piracy in a timely manner.

Another reason for the hesitation to pursue site blocking may stem from limitations imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), which restricts preliminary injunctions to parties “in active concert” with defendants.[72] This procedural hurdle exemplifies how poorly designed regulations can impede the development of least-cost-avoider solutions.

2. Carefully crafted legislation

The experience of other jurisdictions suggests that constitutional concerns about site blocking can be addressed through careful attention to incentive structures. When blocking frameworks properly identify bad actors through clear criteria, and provide streamlined procedures for legitimate sites to challenge mistakes, they create aligned incentives that protect both intellectual property and free expression. Critically, the overwhelming experience with site blocking around the world is that it has produced little if any evidence that legitimate discourse or access to legal information has been interrupted by site-blocking measures.[73]

Reform proposals for the U.S. system should focus on creating proper incentives for all stakeholders. Such proposals could explicitly embrace no-fault injunctions modeled after international best practices, clearly delineating that intermediaries bear no additional liability beyond complying with narrowly tailored court orders. Statutory clarity on cost allocation and ISP responsibilities could ensure these measures are both effective and constitutionally sound. This would mean providing ISPs with flexibility in implementing blocking measures, while ensuring rightsholders have efficient mechanisms to identify and target truly bad actors. Drawing from successful frameworks in the UK, Germany, and Australia, reforms should establish clear criteria to identify appropriate blocking targets while maintaining procedural safeguards that give all parties confidence in the system’s fairness and effectiveness.

The framework should particularly emphasize dynamic blocking authority, which creates ongoing incentives for cooperation between rightsholders and intermediaries to address evolving evasion tactics. By allowing efficient modification of orders while maintaining appropriate oversight, dynamic blocking aligns the interests of courts, rightsholders, and intermediaries in maintaining effective enforcement over time.

Rep. Zoe Lofgren’s (D-Calif.) Foreign Anti-Digital Piracy Act (FADPA)[74] offers a legislative framework that exemplifies the principles of no-fault site blocking. The bill creates a balanced approach that respects the interests of all stakeholders, while targeting foreign piracy sites. FADPA would establish a judicial process whereby, after a court has issued an initial order, copyright owners could move for an additional order directing service providers to “take reasonable and technically feasible measures” to prevent users from accessing infringing foreign websites.[75]

Crucially, the bill contains important safeguards before such orders can be granted. Courts first have to determine that implementation would not interfere with access to noninfringing content, would not significantly burden service providers, and would not disservice the public interest.[76] Further, ISPs could be reimbursed for reasonable compliance costs (excluding items like capital expenditures).[77]

FADPA’s cornerstone is its robust immunity provisions for intermediaries. Section 8 explicitly shields compliant intermediaries from liability for any injuries alleged by foreign websites or their users resulting from good-faith implementation of blocking orders.[78] This immunity extends even if a website is later determined to have been incorrectly identified.[79] The bill also preserves existing Section 512(a) safe-harbor protections, ensuring that intermediaries don’t lose their current liability shields when implementing blocking orders.[80] Moreover, as long as intermediaries undertake minimal good-faith compliance when implementing an order, courts and rightsholders would not be able to require extensive levels of compliance, and rightsholders would not be able to pursue any direct litigation.[81]

Crucially, FADPA-style legislation should explicitly provide that an intermediary’s compliance with blocking orders cannot be used as evidence of technical capability in other proceedings. This protection would prevent the perverse outcome where cooperation with court orders becomes evidence against intermediaries in subsequent litigation. The framework should establish that blocking compliance represents a discrete judicial remedy, not an admission of broader monitoring capabilities or duties.

By providing strong liability protections, while still enabling effective enforcement against bad actors, FADPA creates a framework where intermediaries’ normal operation work in concert with the needs of rightsholders without fear of unexpected legal exposure. The bill’s emphasis on reasonable and technically feasible measures[82] acknowledges the practical limitations of blocking technologies, while still empowering courts to order effective action against piracy sites.

Some critics have raised concerns that site-blocking legislation like FADPA could lead to increased liability for intermediaries.[83] Such criticisms appear to miss the bill’s rather robust statutory immunity, which ensures that intermediaries face no additional civil or criminal exposure from complying with court-ordered blocking measures. These critics may be conflating compliance-based actions (fully protected under these frameworks) with entirely separate forms of secondary liability, such as inducement liability articulated in cases like Columbia Pictures v. Fung,[84] which leaves the door open for secondary liability under the DMCA. Inducement liability specifically addresses active promotion or intentional encouragement of infringement—conduct that is distinctly different from merely implementing technical measures ordered by a court.[85]

But the critics do have a point that’s worth bearing in mind: the immunity framework must be truly comprehensive to address the unique litigation environment in the United States. The success of site blocking in other jurisdictions provides valuable insights, but any U.S. implementation must account for the distinctive features of American legal practice. The robust plaintiffs’ bar and expansive discovery processes that characterize U.S. litigation create risks that do not exist in other systems.

For example, intermediaries face potential exposure not just from direct copyright claims, but from secondary-liability theories, class actions, and state-law claims that foreign frameworks may not address. Consequently, the immunity framework must be truly comprehensive to address this unique litigation environment. Intermediaries should, for example, be protected from negligence claims based on how they chose to implement blocking orders, provided they made good-faith efforts to comply. Without these broader protections, the adversarial nature of U.S. litigation could deter intermediary cooperation even under a no-fault framework. This is not a weakness of the American system, but rather a recognition that effective policy must be tailored to the legal environment in which it will operate.

Ultimately, regardless of the bill, reforming the U.S. approach to site blocking presents an opportunity to demonstrate how incentive-compatible regulation can effectively address online piracy, while respecting both constitutional rights and practical market realities. The success of such measures in comparable legal systems suggests that, with proper attention to incentive structures, the United States could implement an effective regime that encourages meaningful cooperation among all stakeholders in the digital ecosystem. A phased approach with clear guidelines, oversight, and a commitment to iterative improvement can bridge enforcement gaps without sacrificing fundamental freedoms.

By crafting site-blocking legislation in such a way that it encourages cooperation among stakeholders and supports legitimate markets without unduly impeding free speech, policymakers can align enforcement with broader regulatory goals.

3. Rightsholders responsibilities

Critically, effective site blocking cannot be a wholesale substitute for rightsholders’ own anti-piracy efforts. Courts should require evidence that rightsholders have invested reasonable resources in direct enforcement and technical-protection measures before granting site-blocking orders. This might include demonstrating attempts at licensing negotiations, implementation of digital-rights management where appropriate, and pursuit of direct action against clear bad actors. Site blocking works best as part of a comprehensive strategy, not as a first resort that shifts enforcement costs to intermediaries, while rightsholders remain passive.

III. Conclusions

The co-evolution of file-sharing technologies and legal responses highlight the complex interplay between innovation, law, and economics. On one hand, technological advancements have empowered consumers and challenged traditional business models. On the other, they have threatened content creators and distributors’ revenue streams, prompting such actors to take legal actions to protect their economic interests.

In the United States, Section 512 of the DMCA has been the dominant tool used to balance the interests of creators and others in the internet ecosystem, but its limitations have become increasingly evident—both domestically and in the global context. The challenges posed by infringers domiciled in jurisdictions with weak copyright protection suggest that, while international cooperation is necessary, it is likely to be insufficient.

International experience further suggests that a well-crafted site-blocking regime for other intermediaries, such as search engines, can be an effective incentive-compatible tool to reduce the social costs associated with online copyright infringement. In the current geopolitical environment, a specific focus on improved domestic mechanisms to block infringing content may represent the most constructive way forward.

This analysis focuses primarily on ISP-level blocking, but comprehensive copyright protection in the digital age requires engagement across the broader internet-infrastructure ecosystem. Future policy development should consider the roles of content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting providers, and domain registrars in supporting both legitimate content distribution and piracy operations. While ISP-level blocking represents an important first step—one that builds on existing international experience—policymakers should view it as part of a longer-term strategy that may eventually encompass other infrastructure providers as appropriate frameworks develop.

Ultimately, adopting no-fault site-blocking injunctions in the United States would represent a promising and balanced solution to online piracy. If properly implemented, these injunctions can significantly reduce infringement, provide certainty for rightsholders and intermediaries, and avoid imposing undue new liabilities or enforcement burdens on intermediaries.

It is, however, essential from both a constitutional and pragmatic perspective that such an approach is compatible with incentives, strikes the right balance toward content creators’ rights, fosters technological innovation, and protects freedom of speech, while prohibiting—as far as feasible—access to infringing content.

[1] See Contribution of Karyn A. Temple, Sharing Experiences and Best Practices on Site Blocking/No-Fault Injunctions (World Intellectual Property Organization Advisory Committee on Enforcement, WIPO/ACE/17/14, 17th Sess., Jan. 30, 2025), available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_17/wipo_ace_17_14_prov.pdf.

[2] See Kristian Stout & Geoffrey A. Manne, A Roadmap to Reform Section 512 of the Copyright Act, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Oct. 13, 2022), at 7, https://laweconcenter.org/resources/a-roadmap-to-reform-section-512-of-the-copyright-act.

[3] See Tom Lamont, Napster: The Day the Music Was Set Free, The Guardian (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/feb/24/napster-music-free-file-sharing.

[4] See Stephen Dowling, Napster Turns 20: How It Changed the Music Industry (May 31, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20190531-napster-turns-20-how-it-changed-the-music-industry.

[5] See Gimme Some Music: The Place of Napster in Copyright History, Cowan Liebowitz Latman (Nov. 2000), https://www.cll.com/newsroom-publications-Gimme_Some_Music_The_Place_of_Napster_in_Copyright_History.

[6] See Norbert J. Michel, The Impact of Digital File Sharing on the Music Industry: An Empirical Analysis, 6(1) Berkeley Elec. Press, Art. 18 (2006), available at https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2004/01/art-the-impact-of-digital-file-sharing-on-the-music-industry-michel-2006.pdf.

[7] A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

[8] 17 U.S.C. § 512.

[9] See Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 981 (2007), available at https://btlj.org/data/articles2015/vol22/22_3_S/22-berkeley-tech-l-j-0981-1060.pdf; Michael P. Murtagh, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices are Not Enough, 61(1) Hastings L. J. 259 (2009), https://repository.uclawsf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3761&context=hastings_law_journal.

[10] See Ryan T. Holt, The Effects of Recording Industry Lawsuits on the Market for Recorded Music, 1(1) Vand. Undergraduate Rsch.  J. (2005), https://vurj.vanderbilt.edu/index.php/vurj/article/view/2713/1148.

[11] See Jahn Arne Johnsen et al., Peer-to-Peer Networking with BitTorrent, UCLA Comput. Sci. (2005), available at https://web.cs.ucla.edu/classes/cs217/05BitTorrent.pdf.

[12] Alex Hern, European Court of Justice Rules Pirate Bay Is Infringing Copyright, The Guardian (Jun. 15, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/15/pirate-bay-european-court-of-justice-rules-infringing-copyright-torrent-sites.

[13] See Vlad Savov, The Pirate Bay Resurfaces at a New Domain Following Seizure, The Verge (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5195374/the-pirate-bay-resurfaces-on-new-domain; Eliot Van Buskirk, The Pirate Bay: Copied, Shared, and Resurrected, Wired (Aug. 20, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/08/the-pirate-bay-copied-shared-and-resurrected.

[14] See Ali V. Mirsaidi, Mega, Digital Storage Lockers, and the DMCA: Will Innovation Be Stifled by Fears of Piracy?, Duke U. Sch. of L. (2014), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1263&context=dltr.

[15] Id.

[16] Less than two decades ago, one of the authors was told by the CEO of a large media conglomerate that it would “never” be possible to livestream content, due to inadequate speed and server capacity.

[17] See, e.g., Luke Bouma, Microsoft Uncovers Massive Malware Campaign Targeting Nearly One Million Devices via Pirated Streaming Sites, Cord Cutters News (Mar. 10, 2025), https://cordcuttersnews.com/microsoft-uncovers-massive-malware-campaign-targeting-nearly-one-million-devices-via-pirated-streaming-sites; Luke Noonan, The Cyber Security Risks of Online Streaming, MetaCompliance MetaBlog (2025), https://www.metacompliance.com/blog/cyber-security-awareness/cyber-risks-of-online-streaming; Digital Piracy, INTERPOL (2025), https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Illicit-goods/Shop-safely/Digital-piracy.

[18] About RadioAirplay, Jango, https://www.jango.com/faq (last visited Jun. 26, 2025).

[19] Joel Waldfogel, How Digitization has Created a Golden Age of Music, Movies, Books, and Television, 31(3) J. of Econ. Persp. 195 (2017), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.3.195.

[20] See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Enforcement Leadership and the World Police Paradox, 64 Va. J. Int’l L. 239, 257 (2024), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4755507.

[21] See Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Oct. 15, 2014), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/97-1025; Internet Gambling: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Jan. 24, 2012); Cyber Harassment Laws and AI-Generated Images Like Deepfakes, Nat’l Sec. L. Firm, https://www.nationalsecuritylawfirm.com/cyber-harassment-laws-and-ai-generated-images-like-deepfakes (last visited Jun. 26, 2025); Protecting Lawful Streaming Act of 2020, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/enforcement-policy/protecting-lawful-streaming-act-2020 (last visited Jun. 26, 2025).

[22] See 17 U.S.C. § 411.

[23] These include widely prescribed “remedies” for net-neutrality violations when applying Title II common-carrier regulations to internet service providers (ISPs).

[24] Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 (3) Vand. L. Rev. 795 (2009), https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=vlr; Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 (4) U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1600262.

[25] See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 (5) U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1011 (2014), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9439&context=penn_law_review.

[26] Verdier, supra note 18 at 264, 66; Anupam Chander, The Electronic Silk Road: How the Web Binds the World in Commerce, Geo. U. L. Ctr. (2013), available at https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3315&context=facpub.

[27] See Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism, Oxford Acad. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://academic.oup.com/book/37371.

[28] Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 (5) U. Chi. L. Sch. (1980), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2551&context=journal_articles; see also Kristian Stout, Julian Morris, & Subiksha Ramakrishnan, Incentive-Compatible Solutions to Illicit Online Activity: Part 1 — Illegal Online Gambling, Intl. Ctr. for Law & Econ. (2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/incentive-compatible-solutions-to-illicit-online-activity-part-1-illegal-online-gambling.

[29] See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 (2) J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830482 (analyzing the tradeoffs entailed in differing legal approaches to deterring illegal behavior).

[30] See, e.g., the discussion at supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties of geography-based copyright enforcement).

[31] See, e.g., Stout, Morris, & Ramakrishnan, supra note 28 (Discussing the growth of illegal offshore gambling with respect to domestic tax policies).

[32] See David J. Teece, Profiting from Innovation in the Digital Economy: Standards, Complementary Assets, and Business Models in the Wireless World, 47 (8) Inst. Bus. Innovation 1367 (2017), https://escholarship.org/content/qt58h69717/qt58h69717_noSplash_259dfc0380dba7d7ee3405c2f4830014.pdf?t=pjak0z (David Teece describes the complex business environments needed to ensure that innovative businesses can thrive. This highlights the need for law and regulation to take seriously the idea that modern dynamic firms are not mere “widget” sellers but are part of highly complicated industries with dynamic cost structures. Even apparently marginal changes in a legal environment can have big effects on legitimate operators).

[33] See Hal R. Varian, Computer Mediated Transactions, 100 (2) Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/27804953 (noting how the “bits” strung together to form the internet constitute solutions to emergent demand based on user/consumer preferences).

[34] Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies and Corruption all Over the World: What do we Really Know?, IZA (Sep. 2006), available at https://docs.iza.org/dp2315.pdf.

[35] Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three “Golden Oldies” Property Rights, Contracts, and Markets, Cato Inst. (2004), available at https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa508.pdf (discussing the development of market solutions and collective-rights organizations as obviating the need for crude legislative approaches to content distribution, such as compulsory licenses).

[36] See Chris Cooke, Cloudflare Must Block Piracy Site, German Court Confirms, CMU (Nov. 29, 2023), https://completemusicupdate.com/cloudflare-must-block-piracy-site-german-court-confirms; Leveraging CDNs to Combat Content Piracy in Music Streaming, CacheFly (Mar. 7, 2024), https://www.cachefly.com/news/leveraging-cdns-to-combat-content-piracy-in-music-streaming.

[37] Notably, this is not true in reality. Legal access to virtually all content is ubiquitous in the United States, but the nation remains the top piracy consumer in the world. See, e.g., Michael Kan, Internet Piracy Grows Amid Glut of Streaming Services, PCMag (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.pcmag.com/news/internet-piracy-grows-amid-glut-of-streaming-services.

[38] Stout, supra note 1 at 7 (the actual losses related to these streams are difficult to calculate, as it is unlikely that those who choose to stream these videos would pay the full price—which, of course, is one of the reasons they stream illegally).

[39] See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 8 (3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/29/oj/eng; Ellen Marja Wesselingh, Website Blocking: Evolution or Revolution? 10 Years of Copyright Enforcement by Private Third Parties, The Hague U. Applied Sci. (2014), at 38-39, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464969; Neil Turkewitz, Why the Canadian Supreme Court’s Equustek Decision Is a Good Thing for Freedom — Even on the Internet, Truth on the Mkt. (Jul. 8, 2017), https://truthonthemarket.com/2017/07/08/why-the-canadian-supreme-courts-equustek-decision-is-a-good-thing-for-freedom-even-on-the-internet.

[40] See What is DNS Filtering?, CloudFlare, https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering (last visited Jun. 26, 2025).

[41] Although, in practice, the overwhelming majority of users don’t employ VPNs to evade blocks. Brett Danaher, Jonathan Hersh, Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang, The Effect of Piracy Website Blocking on Consumer Behavior, 44 MIS Q. 631 (Jun. 2020), available at https://www.cmu.edu/entertainment-analytics/documents/effectiveness-of-anti-piracy-efforts/uk-blocking-misq.pdf.

[42] See, e.g., RettighedsAlliancen, Annual Report 2023 (2024), at 15, available at https://rettighedsalliancen.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Annual-report-2023.pdf.

[43] See What is URL Filtering, Fortinet, https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/what-is-url-filtering (last visited Jun. 26, 2025).

[44] Andrada Coos, What is Deep Packet Inspection? How It Works and Why It Is Important, Endpoint Protector (Sep. 25, 2020), https://www.endpointprotector.com/blog/what-is-deep-packet-inspection-how-it-works-and-why-it-is-important.

[45] Charles H. Rivkin, Working Toward a Safer, Stronger Internet, Motion Picture Ass’n (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.motionpictures.org/press/working-toward-a-safer-stronger-internet.

[46] Justin Hughes, Comparative Online Bad Guys, 38 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1, 21 (2024), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4948487.

[47] Id. at 23.

[48] See High Court of Justice, [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications PLC (Jul. 28, 2011), and more recently, Federal Court of Canada, Bell Media Inc. et al. v. John Doe et al. (Dec. 16, 2024).

[49] Hughes, supra note 43 at 41-42

[50] Hughes, supra note 43 at 10-11.

[51] Hughes, supra note 43 at 12; see also Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko, Website Blocking Injunctions in Flux: Static, Dynamic, and Live, 16 J. Of Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 1127 (2021); EUIPO Study on Dynamic Blocking Injunctions, Eur. Union Intellectual Property Off. (2021), available at https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/2021_Dynamic_Blocking_Injuctions/2021_Study_on_Dynamic_Blocking_Injuctions_in_the_European_Union_FullR_en.pdf.

[52] Hughes, supra note 43 at 12-13.

[53] See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications PLC, Leob & Leob LLP (Jul. 28, 2011), https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2011/08/twentieth-century-fox-film-corp-v-british-teleco__.

[54] See Landmark Decision: The Football Association Premier League Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited and Others [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), Squire Patton Boggs (Aug. 2013), available at https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2013/08/landmark-decision-ithe-football-association-prem__/files/sportsipfocus/fileattachment/sportsipfocus.pdf.

[55] Mark Sweney, BT Ordered to Block Newzbin2 Filesharing Site Within 14 Days, The Guardian (Oct. 26, 2011), available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/oct/26/bt-block-newzbin2-filesharing-site.

[56] Hughes, supra note 42 at 15.

[57] See Jochen Homann, Online Copyright Clearance System Arranges Block of Streaming Site, Bnetza.de (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/20210311_Clearingstelle.html; Freedom on the Net 2023, Freedom H. (2023), https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-net/2023; Mirjam Kaiser, Online Copyright Clearance System is Launched and Arranges Blocks of Streaming Site, IRIS Merlin (2021), https://merlin.obs.coe.int/article/9171.

[58] See Nigel Cory, A Decade After SOPA/PIPA, It’s Time to Revisit Website Blocking, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. (2022), available at https://www2.itif.org/2022-revisiting-website-blocking.pdf.

[59] See Code of Conduct, Clearing Body for Copyright on the Internet (Jan. 18, 2021), available at https://cuii.info/fileadmin/files/CUII_CodeofConduct_23.pdf; Recommendation, Clearing Body for Copyright on the Internet, https://cuii.info/en/recommendations (last visited Jun. 26, 2025); Questions and Answers about the CUII, Clearing Body for Copyright on the Internet, https://cuii.info/faq (last visited Jun. 26, 2025).

[60] See Nathalia Sautchuk-Patricio, Content Blocking at the DNS Level in Germany, CircleID (Nov. 18, 2021), https://circleid.com/posts/20211108-content-blocking-at-the-dns-level-in-germany.

[61] See Matthew Rimmer, Australia’s Stop Online Piracy Act: Copyright Law, Site-Blocking, and Search Filters in an Age of Internet Censorship, 16 (1) Canberra L. Rev. (2019), available at https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/CanLawRw/2019/4.pdf; Nigel Cory, Adaptive Antipiracy Tools: An Update on Dynamic and Live Blocking Injunctions, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://itif.org/publications/2020/10/22/adaptive-antipiracy-tools-update-dynamic-and-live-blocking-injunctions; Federal Court of Australia Orders First Site-Blocking Injunctions to Reduce Online Copyright Infringement, Jones Day (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/01/federal-court-of-australia-orders-first-site-blocking-injunctions-to-reduce-online-copyright-infringement; Lori Flekser, Site Blocking Laws in Australia, Content Café (2016), https://contentcafe.org.au/articles-stories-everything/site-blocking-laws-in-australia.

[62] See Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s115A, https://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115a.html; Malcolm Burrows, s115A Copyright Act- Infringement Outside Australia, Dundas Laws. (Jul. 9, 2020), https://www.dundaslawyers.com.au/s115a-copyright-act-infringement-outside-australia/; Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Act 2015 (Cth) (Austl.), https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2015A00080/latest/text.

[63] Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115A (2B) (a) (ii), https://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115a.html.

[64] UTV Software Commc’ns Ltd. v. 1337X.TO, ¶¶ 60-68, (2019), available at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Utv_Software_Communication_Ltd._…_vs_1337X.To_And_Ors_on_10_April_2019-1.pdf.

[65] See Bhumika Khatri, Delhi HC Bans 30 Torrent Websites for Infringing Copyrights, Inc42Plus (Apr. 16, 2019), https://inc42.com/buzz/delhi-hc-bans-torrent-websites-infringing-copyrights.

[66]See Copyright Law in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 10, 2020), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McCoy%20Responses%20to%20QFRs.pdf; Copyright Piracy: Assessment of National Legislative Approaches and Court Practices Regarding Online Copyright Piracy, Eurojust IPC Project (Dec. 2023), available at https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/assets/eurojust-copyright-piracy-report.pdf.

[67] See Annual Report 2023: The Danish Rights Alliance, Rettigheds Alliancen (2023), at 15, available at https://rettighedsalliancen.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Annual-report-2023.pdf.

[68] See Charles H. Rivkin, Working Towards a Safer, Stronger Internet, Motion Picture Ass’n (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.motionpictures.org/press/working-toward-a-safer-stronger-internet.

[69] See Lana Friesen et al., Initially Contestable Property Rights and Coase: Evidence from the Lab, 120 J. Env’t Econ. & Mgmt. 1 (2023), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069623000608.

[70] See Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale Univ. Press, 1970); Paul Rosenzweig, Content Moderation and the Least Cost Avoider, Am. U. Wash. Coll. L. (2024), https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=research; Geoffrey A. Manne et al., Who Moderates the Moderators?: A Law & Economics Approach to Holding Online Platforms Accountable Without Destroying the Internet, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Nov. 9, 2021), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Manne-Stout-Sperry-Who-Moderates-the-Moderators-2021-11-09-DRAFT.pdf; Stout, supra note 1.

[71] See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (j).

[72] See, e.g., Maayan Perel, Enjoining Non-Liable Platforms, 34 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2020), at 31-32, available at https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v34/1.-Perel.pdf.

[73] Adam Mossoff, Congress Should Protect the Rights of American Creators with Site- Blocking Legislation, Heritage Found. (Feb. 14, 2024), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/congress-should-protect-the-rights-american-creators-site-blocking.

[74] Foreign Anti-Digital Piracy Act, H.R. 791, 119th Cong. (2025), available at https://lofgren.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/lofgren.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/1.29.25%20-%20Foreign%20Anti-Digital%20Piracy%20Act_Full%20Text_0.pdf.

[75] Id. at 6.

[76] Id. at 6-7.

[77] Id. at 11.

[78] Id. at 13.

[79] Id.

[80] Id. at 14.

[81] Id. at 12-14.

[82] Id. at 7.

[83] See, e.g., Michael O’Rielly, Hollywood’s Site Blocking Proposal: Time for a Reshoot, TMT and Me (Feb. 4, 2025), https://mporinc.blogspot.com/2025/02/hollywoods-site-blocking-proposal-time.html; Jeffrey Westling, Primer: Site Blocking and Online Piracy, Am. Action Forum Insight (Jul. 17, 2024), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/primer-site-blocking-and-online-piracy.

[84] Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).

[85] MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).

The Governance of Digital Public Infrastructure: Case Studies

I. Introduction The concept of digital public infrastructure (DPI) has gained cultural currency in recent years as a key component in strategies to reduce poverty . . .

I. Introduction

The concept of digital public infrastructure (DPI) has gained cultural currency in recent years as a key component in strategies to reduce poverty and promote sustainable economic development. The concept appears to have been inspired by the so-called “India Stack,” the set of systems and rules developed by the Indian government that comprises:

  • A digital identity system;
  • An interoperable real-time digital-payment system; and
  • A set of mandatory standards for data sharing.

The Gates Foundation, which committed in 2022 to spend $200 million to promote DPI,[1] describes it as “a set of digital systems that enables countries to safely and efficiently provide economic opportunities and deliver social services.”[2] The hope is that “[s]afe and inclusive DPI can ultimately help advance progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals and ensure that everyone can prosper, especially women and people with the lowest incomes.”[3]

The Gates Foundation notes that “DPI spans the entire economy, connecting people, data, and money in much the same way that roads and railways connect people and goods.”[4] In many respects, this is a useful analogy: just as roads and railways are supplied and regulated in different ways in different jurisdictions, the optimum delivery of DPI will also likely vary from place to place and from time to time.

This study considers some of the main ways that DPI is currently supplied and regulated, with the aim of adducing lessons for improving DPI implementation, with a particular focus on the role of government. Broadly speaking, while we find that government can play a constructive role, it is important to ensure that state involvement avoids crowding out the private sector, impeding competition and innovation, or improperly sharing sensitive information.

A. Ownership, Operation and Regulation

The Gates Foundation warns that:

Countries that allow a laissez-faire market approach to digital services risk becoming dominated by monopolies that charge high fees or having multiple systems that don’t interact. People, businesses, and the government itself will be exposed to risks that include fraud, cyberattacks, and illicit financial flows if well-governed, high-quality safeguards are not put in place.[5]

While these are legitimate concerns, it is important to consider them within the context of broader governance challenges, as there is also clearly a risk that government-run and/or controlled DPI systems may suffer from the same problems. Indeed, public-choice theory suggests that government-run systems will generally be less responsive to consumers, less dynamic, and more susceptible to political interference.[6] Moreover, they will likely reflect the priorities of whichever government is in power.[7]

The governance of DPI can be categorized according to who owns and operates the core systems, the internal operational rules, and the external regulatory framework.

1. The structure of ownership and operation

There are three models of ownership and operation: private, governmental, and hybrid or public-private-partnership (PPP). Considering each in turn:

  • Privately owned and operated: In this model, private firms or industry consortia develop and operate the infrastructure, with the state’s role limited to regulatory oversight and setting the legal framework. Examples include mobile-money networks led by the telecommunications industry, such as M-Pesa; independent payment networks, such as Mastercard and Visa; and bank consortia, such as The Clearing House’s real-time-payments (RTP) system in the United States and EBA Clearing’s RT1 in Europe.
  • Government-owned and operated: Under this model, a state or a state agency (such as the central bank) builds and runs the infrastructure and sets the rules directly. Examples include national digital-ID systems, such as India’s Aadhaar and Estonia’s e-ID; and central-bank-operated payment systems, such as Brazil’s Pix and the U.S. Federal Reserve’s FedNow.
  • Public-private partnerships (hybrids): Hybrid (PPPs) comprise a wide range of mixed systems. In general, the government sets requirements, while the infrastructure is built and operated by private entities. Examples include Thailand’s PromptPay system, developed by the Thai Bankers Association and ITMX with backing from the central bank;[8] and India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI), developed by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), a not-for-profit company owned by a consortium of banks and the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).[9]

2. Internal rules and external regulation

While DPI systems’ ownership and operational structures matter, an arguably more important determinant of their respective performance is the mix of internal governing structures, processes, rules, and relationships, and the nature of external regulation. Together, these factors determine how the DPI is directed, controlled, and held to account. The sections below delve more deeply into the interplay among ownership, control, regulation, and broader governance issues in the context of specific aspects of DPI.

B. Overview

The study proceeds as follows. Section II considers ID systems in more detail, comparing and contrasting two of the leading government-created ID systems, India’s Aadhaar and Estonia’s e-ID, as well as private alternatives. Section III looks at real-time digital payment systems, comparing systems in India, Brazil, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States. Section IV considers which DPI models lead to more rapid adoption of bank accounts and digital payments, but cautions against drawing conclusions. Finally, Section V offers policy conclusions—arguing that, while digital infrastructure can clearly be transformative, its governance should minimize direct government involvement in competitive markets. We recommend that governments focus instead on enabling frameworks, and caution against viewing India’s UPI or Brazil’s Pix as one-size-fits-all models for other countries.

II. Digital-Identity Systems

One of the major costs that banks and other financial-services firms face when onboarding new clients relates to know-your-customer (KYC) requirements. Specifically, firms must verify the identity of customers to avoid impersonation (identity theft), fraud, and money laundering.[10]

But identity verification—proving that a person is who they say they are—can be challenging. In the United States, banks typically use multifactor authentication, requiring customers furnish some combination of their:

  • Social Security Number (SSN);
  • Driver’s license or passport; or
  • Credit or debit card and/or a credit check.

Each of these factors can be checked against a set of separate registries, some run by the federal government (SSN, passports); others by state governments (driver’s licenses); and others still by private companies (banks, credit agencies). In principle, this combination of factors provides a powerful system for confirming identity. It is, however, still quite easy to spoof the system or create synthetic identities,[11] and the advent of generative artificial intelligence (AI) may potentially make the problem significantly worse.[12]

Over the past two decades, many jurisdictions have introduced digital IDs that rely on centralized registries—typically accessed via public-key infrastructure (PKI)—to verify the identity of citizens and other residents. In principle, such digital-identity systems offer a secure and effective means to verify a customer’s identity for KYC purposes, while requiring fewer pieces of information than multifactor authentication.

A. Estonia’s e-ID

Estonia pioneered a national digital ID in the early 2000s as part of its e-government strategy. Each citizen is allocated a unique identifier (UID) and receives a digital ID card (and now, a mobile-ID), which embeds the UID and connects securely to the government registry. The e-ID can be used for online authentication and legally binding digital signatures. While the system relies on a government-issued UID, it is implemented through cooperation with private technology firms and Estonia’s banking association. This governance model emphasizes security (each ID has certificates and uses PKI encryption) and universal acceptance: one ID to access virtually all services, from banking to voting.

The success of Estonia’s model is evident in the fact that 98% of citizens have the ID and use it frequently to interact with both public and private services.[13] Because the government provided a secure and trusted backbone, private companies don’t each need to develop their own login or KYC solutions; they rely instead on the national-ID infrastructure. This has saved costs and contributed to a thriving digital ecosystem. Concerns about independence are mitigated by the fact that, while the state runs the identity system, its use is nondiscriminatory and open to all providers equally.

Moreover, development and maintenance of the interoperable system used to access the registry, the X-Road, has been devolved to the Nordic Institute for Interoperability Solutions (NIIS), a joint initiative originally established by Estonia and Finland and now involving many partner governments. Meanwhile, the X-Road software itself is open source, and many private companies and individuals contribute to its ongoing development.

B. India’s Aadhaar

Aadhaar is a government-run universal-digital-ID program launched in 2009, through which each resident is issued a unique 12-digit identity number linked to their biometrics (fingerprint and/or face ID).[14] It is the world’s largest biometric-ID system, covering more than 1.4 billion people, or roughly 96% of India’s population.[15] Developed by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), Aadhaar was designed with an open API (application programming interface) that allows both government agencies and private companies to authenticate identities online (with user consent).[16]

A recent survey found that Aadhaar has reduced the cost of undertaking KYC from around $12 per-person to just $0.06 per-person.[17] As such, Aadhaar has been one of the primary drivers of the recent dramatic increase in the proportion of Indian adults who hold bank accounts.

But Aadhaar has also faced notable privacy concerns stemming from reported security breaches and seeming abuse. One state government is alleged to have used the system to “clean up” voter-registration rolls, and while misuse by a political party has been alleged in another state.[18] Aadhaar has also faced challenges relating to biometric-identification failure. This, somewhat ironically, has most adversely affected the elderly and the poor, many of whom have been unable to receive food and other benefits when the system failed to recognize their fingerprint.[19] The closed-source nature of Aadhaar’s data-sharing layer also mean that it is not open to public scrutiny or improvement in the ways that X-Road.

C. Privacy-Preserving Systems for Verifying Identity

Most government-run digital-ID systems proceed from the premise that verification requires direct sharing of personally identifiable information (PII). By contrast, many private systems rely on proof points that do not necessarily entail sharing such information. For example, when connecting to a website using transfer-layer security (TLS), a web browser will share information about “you” (such as your IP address and a temporary public key generated during the “handshake”) that enables it to verify various relevant characteristics; these do not, however, usually include a user’s name or much of anything in the way of PII.[20]

A new generation of digital IDs developed in the past decade enable identity information to be confirmed via verifiable credentials without directly sharing PII (e.g., using zero-knowledge proofs to confirm, rather than share information).[21] This is likely to improve the speed and efficiency with which people are able to open and update their accounts with new, verified information, thereby reducing friction in the system.

Systems with an open-source data-sharing layer, such as X-Road, could easily be adapted to facilitate identify verification though zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs)—i.e., with the registry acting as an oracle.[22] By contrast, the data-sharing layer of closed-source government-run systems like Aadhaar—currently built around sharing PII and/or confirming a user’s biometric identity—would have to be completely rebuilt to facilitate ZKP-based identity verification.[23]

D. Comparing ID Systems

The experience with Aadhaar and Estonia’s eID suggest that centralized digital-ID systems can be rolled out quickly, facilitating rapid expansion of access to financial and other services that necessitate identity verification, especially when the systems are mandatory and/or the incentives to adopt them (such as the availability of government benefits) are strong. But when such systems rely on sharing PII, and where the infrastructure employs inadequate security measures, they are open to misuse.

Moreover, centralized government-run ID systems with closed-source data-sharing layers are likely to suffer from technological lock-in due to the relatively slow rate at which governments respond to changes. As such, limiting the purpose of any government-ID system to a registry; requiring that registry to facilitate ID checks with the maximum degree of privacy protection; and imposing fines on the registry’s directors for breaches (or otherwise holding those directors liable) is likely to create the best incentives (on the part of the registry’s operators) to ensure the ID system maintains appropriate security protocols and data-minimization frameworks (including, e.g., limiting verification to ZKP systems).

Nonetheless, some critics have raised concerns that relying on a single authority for identity (underpinned by a UID), even if shared or “wrapped” using a ZKP, poses security risks and could weaken speech protections by undermining pseudonymity. For instance, even with a ZKP wrapper, a person’s unique identity will be traceable. [24] Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin has suggested that pluralistic identities, requiring verification via multiple unrelated certificate authorities, offer a better solution. Such a system would effectively combine the multifactor authentication used in jurisdictions like the United States with the security of digital IDs and the privacy-preserving features of ZKPs.[25]

III. The Governance of Real-Time Payments

For consumers, perhaps the most visible aspect of DPI is the ability to send and receive money instantly by electronic means. In recent years, many countries have implemented real-time payment (RTP) systems that allow immediate credit-push fund transfers 24 hours a day. Broadly speaking, governance of RTP systems can be classified into three buckets: privately owned and operated, central-bank owned and operated, and hybrid public-private-partnerships (PPPs). But as with any taxonomy, bright lines can be challenging: some systems, such as the UK’s Faster Payments, are privately owned and operated but so heavily regulated that we have put them in the PPP category.

A. Private RTPs

Privately owned and operated systems emerge through a process of dynamic competition in response to perceived market demand. This is reflected in their internal governance structures; while these vary considerably, those that succeed typically adopt private-sector best practices.

In 2017, The Clearing House (TCH), the oldest banking association and payments company in the United States, launched its RTP network.[26] TCH is owned by about two dozen of the largest U.S. banks, meaning that RTP is a privately owned and operated network, although the Federal Reserve does play a supervisory role (and now, also, serves a competitor via FedNow). Despite having no government mandate or subsidy, RTP directly reaches about 70% of demand-deposit accounts (DDAs) and can reach up to 90% of DDAs via third parties.[27] RTP charges a flat $0.045 per-transaction fee for usage “with no volume discounts, no volume commitments and no monthly minimums to ensure that all financial institutions participate on the same terms.”[28] It also charges $0.01 for “request for payment” (rfp) messages, and a success fee of $0.10 if the rfp results in a credit transfer.

That same year, EBA Clearing (which is owned by major European banks) established RT1, a privately owned and operated pan-European RTP system. RT1 was launched Nov. 21, 2017—the same date the European Payments Council (EPC) introduced the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer (SCT Inst) scheme. RT1 is funded by a combination of joining fees (€30,000 per-participant); annual fees (€30,000 per-participant); and transaction fees (including a minimum quarterly fee of €2,500 for up to 5,000 daily transactions, and €0.002 per-transaction thereafter).[29]

These open and transparent systems are undergirded by rigorously established governance systems. TCH describes the governance of its RTP as follows:

Day-to-day management and operation of the network falls to The Clearing House’s management. Management’s performance is overseen, in turn, by The Clearing House’s two boards of directors, which are responsible for managing and overseeing the company’s business and affairs. To assist them in these responsibilities, the boards have established a number of committees, including an RTP Business Committee that advises management on many facets of the network, an Enterprise Risk Committee that exercises companywide oversight over risk management, and an Audit Committee that helps the boards ensure, among other things, reviewing the company’s financial statements and system of internal controls, the qualifications and independence of the company’s external auditor, and the company’s internal audit function.

The RTP Business Committee includes representatives from both financial institutions that have an ownership interest in The Clearing House and those that do not.

The Clearing House’s managing board of directors or the RTP Business Committee is responsible for approving changes to the network’s participation and operating rules.

In addition to the RTP Business Committee, The Clearing House has established a number of other bodies to ensure relevant stakeholder interests are considered in the governance of the RTP network. To that same end, it also participates in the Faster Payments Council, periodically solicits input on the RTP rules, and actively engages with regulatory agencies charged with responsibility for consumer protection and the safety and soundness of the financial sector.[30]

Such robust and inclusive governance structures, with clear accountability, enable private DPI systems to be innovative, as well as responsive to changes in market conditions. In addition, TCH’s RTP is subject to substantial oversight from U.S. government agencies, as it notes:

The Clearing House is highly-regulated, falling under the FFIEC’s Significant Service Provider (SSP) program with respect to its operation of the RTP System, as well as the EPN and Image Exchange Network services. Under the FFIEC framework, TCH is examined each year by a multi-agency team. SSP exams include a broad range of activities including governance, risk management, internal controls, information security, and financial condition. Additionally, TCH, as the operator of CHIPS, has been designated under Title VIII of the Dodd Frank Act as a systemically important financial market utility (SIFMU). Under this designation TCH is subject to continuous supervision by full-time, dedicated Federal Reserve examiners and CHIPS must meet Regulation HH’s enhanced requirements for SIFMUs. As all TCH payment services utilize a common infrastructure and fall under a common governance structure, TCH’s Title VIII supervision and standards benefit all TCH services.[31]

B. Government Owned-and-Operated RTPs

In government-owned and operated RTP systems, the broad governance framework is typically set via legislation, but the ministry or agency tasked with oversight and/or implementation often has considerable discretion to determine details. This may pose concerns when the agency responsible for implementation also regulates other payment systems. In such cases, conflicts of interest can result in regulations that inhibit competition and innovation.

Pix and FedNow are both run by the same entity that regulates payments. But there are important differences between them, both at a macro governance level and in the way that the potential conflicts of interest affect governance in practice. At the macro level, Pix was developed and is run by the same department of the Central Bank of Brazil (Bacen) that sets the regulatory framework for payment networks. By contrast, FedNow is run by the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks under the oversight of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The board is tasked with ensuring the FedNow service operates in accordance with the Federal Reserve’s public-policy objectives and monitors FedNow for compliance with federal regulations and the Fed’s own internal standards. The implications of these differences for operational independence are explored below.

1. Pix

In the case of Pix, Bacen:

  • mandated that all major banks and e-money providers must connect to Pix;
  • set the fees for person-to-person transactions at zero; and
  • set the fee for merchants at a minimal level.

Bacen’s stated rationale for these actions is that banks faced a collective-action problem and had little incentive to jointly build an inexpensive, interoperable RTP system, as Bacen claiming that they profited from card fees and proprietary transfers.[32] Such claims are difficult to reconcile with the U.S. experience with TCH’s RTP, which was built entirely voluntarily by a consortium of America’s largest banks (which are also the largest four-party payment-card issuers).

It also seems contrary to Pix’s primary intended purpose, which was to replace cash and increase financial inclusion.[33] Moreover, Pix’s success in achieving that objective has actually increased the use of other electronic-payment systems, such as credit cards.[34] If Brazilian banks actually opposed creating an interoperable faster payments system in order to maintain profits on existing revenue streams, they were being short-sighted.

Another possible explanation is that, in 2018, Bacen capped interchange fees on debit cards, setting a maximum rate of 0.8% and an average rate of 0.5%.[35] Since average rates had previously been approximately 1.4%, this reduced revenue to issuers by between $400 million and $1 billion.[36] It also created uncertainty: if Bacen was willing to impose price controls on debit-card payments, how would it respond to a new private RTP network? Would it also impose price controls on RTP transactions, thereby making it more difficult for the banks to recoup their investment?

The likely answer to that question materialized shortly before Pix’s rollout. In June 2020, Facebook announced a pilot version of WhatsApp Pay, which would enable anyone with a WhatsApp account and an account with one of four partner banks (Cielo, Banco do Brasil, Sicredi, Nubank) to make instant free account-to-account transfers using their debit card. Instead of embracing this interoperable solution, Bacen shut it down. It did so by issuing a new rule requiring any new payment scheme that “poses risk to the normal operation of retail payment transactions” to be approved by Bacen before it could be marketed.[37] Bacen issued that rule just a week after the new WhatsApp payment service was announced, and then immediately used it to suspend the new service, claiming that it was necessary to “preserve an adequate competitive environment” for mobile payments and to ensure the “functioning of a payment system that’s interchangeable [presumably this means interoperable], fast, secure, transparent, open and cheap.”[38]

Forcibly removing a competitor would appear an odd way to preserve “an adequate competitive environment.” Moreover, it is not clear that the WhatsApp system violated the obligations created by the new rule. While the service initially would have been available only to users with accounts at the four banking partners, it would almost certainly have been expanded; indeed, by the time it was permitted to launch in 2021, the partnership had already grown to nine banks.[39] It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Bacen created the new rule specifically to prevent WhatsApp from launching its payments system prior to the launch of Pix—at the expense of competition, innovation, and financial inclusion.

In sum, while Pix has expanded financial inclusion in Brazil and gained widespread adoption, it has done so, in part, by mandating participation and impeding competition. As such, it is likely less accountable and responsive than might otherwise be the case. One way to reduce these problems would be to transfer Pix’s ownership, control, and direct oversight to a separate operating entity that is not run by the same division of Bacen that regulates payment networks.

2. FedNow

Like other Federal Reserve services (e.g., Fedwire, FedACH), the FedNow service is priced according to the Monetary Control Act (MCA), which requires the Federal Reserve to recover the costs of providing payment services over the long run, rather than operating at a profit. FedNow charges the following fees (except for so-called “on-us” transactions, which are free because they are made within the same bank):[40]

  • A monthly participation fee (currently $25) charged to each routing number (or endpoint) that participates in the service;
  • Per-transaction fees (currently $0.045 per-credit-push transaction);
  • Request for payment fees (currently $0.01); and
  • Return ($1).

As a result, FedNow operates more like a private-sector competitor to TCH, identifying and seeking to fill niches, such as the long tail of financial institutions and the (potentially enormous) opportunity for business-to-business (B2B) payments.[41]

Nonetheless, FedNow’s $540 million development costs and $245 million annual operational costs are both probably higher than they would have been had the system been contracted out to the private sector.[42] In contrast, Bacen claims the cost of developing Pix was only $4 million, and that it costs about $8 million annually to run—both of which are surprisingly low.[43]

C. Hybrid (PPP) Systems

Governance frameworks vary considerably among hybrid PPPs. For example, Thailand’s PromptPay system—developed by the Thai Bankers’ Association and ITMX with backing from the central bank—has been granted considerable independence. While the Bank of Thailand sets default fees, individual participant banks are permitted to vary these.[44] One advantage of having the central bank as a sponsor is that PromptPay has been able to leverage both the Bank of Thailand’s international connections and the private sector’s international network to achieve unprecedented international interoperability.[45]

At the other end of the scale, state actors may be granted a seat on the PPP’s board and such expansive regulatory authority that it has effective control. For example, India’s UPI was developed by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), a not-for-profit company owned by a consortium of banks, but the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)—which was not only the driving force behind UPI—has de-facto control.[46]

1. Thailand’s PromptPay

Thailand’s PromptPay is a PPP initiated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as part of its National e-Payment Master Plan. In part, the MOF’s objective was to digitize government-to-person (G2P) transactions—such as tax returns and social-welfare payments—in order to increase transparency and reduce costs. The key partners in PromptPay’s implementation were:

  • Bank of Thailand (BOT), Thailand’s central bank and primary regulator for payment systems, which set the policy framework, regulatory standards, and guidelines for PromptPay. BOT also oversees the broader national payment landscape and ensures alignment with monetary-policy and financial-stability objectives.
  • The Thai Bankers’ Association (commercial banks) and the Government Financial Institutions’ Council (government-owned banks) provided the infrastructure to link millions of customer accounts to PromptPay and manage real-time transaction volumes.
  • National ITMX (Interbank Transaction Management and Exchange) developed and maintains the core technology that enables real-time transfers between different banks, acting as the central switching and clearing infrastructure for PromptPay.

Practically all Thai commercial banks and several non-bank payment-service providers now offer PromptPay services to their customers. They build user-facing apps and services (e.g., mobile banking) that integrate the PromptPay “proxy” feature, allowing individuals to link a mobile number or national ID to their bank account.

Banks pay National ITMX a setup fee to integrate with PromptPay, plus ongoing maintenance fees that vary by usage.[47] Transactions between accountholders at different banks also entail an interchange fee that is set by a committee comprising representatives of member banks.[48] Banks initially charged users a small per-transaction fee for person-to-person and small-business transfers, but most have now eliminated those fees (recovering the wholesale fees from other charges), while high-volume merchants pay a modest fee, such as 15 Baht/transaction.[49]

2. UK Faster Payments Service

The UK’s Faster Payments Service (FPS) was developed through collaboration among several key players in the banking and payments industry, with government playing a facilitating role. The primary organizations involved in establishing and launching Faster Payments include:

  • The Payment Systems Task Force (PSTF)—led by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), a government body—recognized the need to speed electronic payments in the UK and played a central role in pushing the banking industry to develop a faster, more efficient clearing system.
  • A consortium of the largest UK retail banks provided the funding and governance to implement Faster Payments, including Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and several others.
  • VocaLink was tasked with designing and building the technical infrastructure for Faster Payments.
  • The Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) was the industry body that oversaw UK payment systems in the early stages.

Today, FPS is essentially private: it is overseen by Pay.UK, a private (non-profit) organization with board representation from banks, fintechs, and other payment-service providers.[50] Pay.UK owns and manages FPS’ rulebook, standards, and governance. The FPS is regulated by both the Payment System Regulator, which has a mandate to ensure fair access and promote competition and innovation, and by the Bank of England, which has a mandate to maintain financial stability.

Meanwhile, VocaLink (now owned by Mastercard) continues to operate the core platform that processes real-time transactions. Major banks continue to have direct access to the system, while smaller banks and fintechs can connect indirectly via sponsors.

The advantage of this governance structure is that the operator is not the regulator; banks and third-party payment firms have access if they meet objective criteria, and no single provider is forced to use the services (although in practical terms, any bank not offering Faster Payments would be uncompetitive). The UK regulators have also mandated interoperability—e.g., requiring that fintech payment firms be permitted access to FPS via sponsor banks, and promoting “open banking” APIs that let third-party apps initiate FPS transfers on their customers’ behalf.

3. India’s UPI

India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) is operated by NPCI, a non-profit company established in 2008 by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Indian Bankers Association (IBA).[51] In addition to UPI, the NPCI also operates the country’s two other major retail-payment systems: IMPS and Rupay.[52] Despite being notionally independent, NPCI is substantially controlled by the RBI, which maintains special oversight and has “last word” authority under India’s Payment &?Settlement Systems Act of?2007.[53] As a result, RBI effectively has veto authority over any NPCI decision, leading observers to describe its governance power as a “golden share.”[54]

Launched in 2016, UPI provides an interoperability framework that allows any bank or approved third-party app to plug in, and allows users to send money instantly to any other bank or app. UPI was strongly promoted by the government and the RBI as a public-good infrastructure—part of the so-called “India Stack.” As such, UPI is treated as a public utility subject to aggressive regulation regarding pricing and participation.

In fact, the RBI and government have treated UPI as a free public service. In 2020, they directed that UPI must have zero charges to users and merchants, effectively banning merchant-discount fees (MDR) for the service?.[55] This decision represents a gratuitous regulatory distortion that favors those participants that are able to monetize UPI without relying on MDR, while penalizing other payment systems—such as international payment cards—that use interchange fees to cover the costs and balance the two-sided market (e.g., enabling card issuers to offer fraud protection, rewards, and other benefits to cardholders, thereby encouraging participation).

The consequences have been profound. Google Pay and PhonePe (owned by Walmart) have thrived in the zero-MDR environment, as they are able to monetize the service via other means (such as the sale of data, advertising, and e-commerce). This has enabled the two services to acquire roughly 85% of both the volume and value of transactions on UPI?.[56] By contrast, banks and smaller fintechs that do not have the scale to generate revenue from alternative streams have struggled to gain market share. Even Paytm, the early market leader in mobile wallets pre-UPI, has only 6.8% of the UPI market share by volume and 5.4% by value.[57]

More generally, zero MDR on UPI has inhibited more diverse and innovative payment solutions from flourishing in India?.[58] While many entrepreneurial payment options exist, they are unable to gain traction as pure payment apps and must find additional sources of revenue, such as interest on loans, spreads on stock trading, and insurance.

RBI also imposed a series of restrictions on WhatsApp Pay. In 2018, NPCI permitted WhatsApp to undertake a trial of its payment service, with participation limited to 1 million users.[59] While that may appear superficially reasonable, given that WhatsApp had around 200 million users in India at the time, it meant the company could only offer the service to 0.5% of its users. To make matters worse, RBI imposed data-localization rules on UPI participants, requiring them to store customer data locally in India as of Oct. 18, 2018.[60] Because Facebook/WhatsApp’s technical infrastructure was then still partially reliant on servers outside the country, it was prohibited from expanding its payment services beyond the initial trial.[61]

WhatsApp sought to address RBI’s concerns, and NPCI issued a letter in June 2020 declaring the company to be in compliance.[62] Alas, a nonprofit group then brought a public-interest litigation (PIL) case seeking to block WhatsApp from providing payments, claiming that it remained in violation of the data-localization rules. Whether in response to this PIL or otherwise, NPCI did not increase WhatsApp Pay’s permitted number of users until 2022, when it was allowed to rise to 100 million. By that time, however, WhatsApp had squandered four years of market development and was well behind the market leaders. Indeed, WhatsApp ranked between 10th and 20th in monthly volume and value of transactions in 2022 among apps on UPI.

By 2024, WhatsApp had gradually improved its position, but still ranked only 11th, with just 0.34% of total volume and 0.18% of total value on UPI. RBI finally removed the participant restriction in December 2024, enabling WhatsApp to make payments available to all of its members in India, who now numbering over 600 million—about half of all adults in the country.[63] Nonetheless, as of March 2025, WhatsApp remained 11th among UPI apps, with volume of 0.37% and value of 0.2%.

D. RTP Governance Lessons

A key issue with RTP systems is how their governance structures manage conflicts of interest and ensure regulators’ neutrality and impartiality. When the central bank or government is a direct participant in the market, there is a risk that regulations will be designed in that system’s favor. In Brazil, for example, the central bank’s decision to mandate Pix connectivity and make it free for most uses gave Pix a built-in advantage over competing private networks. Meanwhile, in India, RBI’s golden share in NPCI enabled it to prohibit MDR on UPI, resulting in losses for banking partners and effectively subsidizing the two fintechs able to leverage their ecosystems to dominate UPI payments.

By contrast, the European Union, United Kingdom, and Thailand—and, until recently, the United States—avoided conflicts by separating ownership from regulation. Regulators then set standards (e.g., requiring that payments be interoperable, or that incumbents open up access), while leaving product development and implementation to private entities. For example, the EU’s PSD2 (Revised Payment Services Directive) mandates that banks open their APIs for third-party payment initiation (an interoperability rule). The EU, however, did not build its own payment app—it relies on industry to create services on top of that framework. Similarly, the UK’s Payment Systems Regulator does not run a payment network; it is charged with ensuring that networks operate fairly and that new players can enter. This separation avoids self-preferencing. The regulator isn’t tempted to steer transactions to “its” network, since it has none.

The United States followed that model for years: the Fed provided backbone settlement services (FedWire, ACH) but allowed private networks (Visa, Mastercard, PayPal, Zelle) to flourish on top of that backbone. Only recently, with FedNow, has the U.S. central bank extended into retail instant payments. For its part, the Fed has been careful to promise an “even playing field” between FedNow and the private TCH RTP network. Time will tell how that dual-operator situation plays out in the United States, but the Fed is at least required to recoup costs and has set pricing for FedNow at a level similar to TCH’s RTP, thereby avoiding undercutting the private sector unfairly.

IV. DPI Adoption and Financial Inclusion

Proponents of government-run DPI systems often boldly assert that such systems achieve near-miraculous levels of financial inclusion. This typically involves unsophisticated before/after comparisons, along with the implicit assumption that post hoc ergo propter hoc. Understanding the actual role of DPIs, and determining which DPI model is most effective at delivering expanded access to finance, requires us to disentangle many other factors and consider counterfactuals.

A. Adoption

In the case of India, the digital-identity layer (Aadhaar) appears to have facilitated a dramatic increase in the proportion of adults with bank accounts (see Figure 1). While digital IDs have lowered banks’ onboarding costs, and interoperable RTPs have facilitated low-cost person-to-person transfers, other factors have also contributed to the rise in RTP use. Specifically, wider smartphone adoption and cheaper mobile data has facilitated the adoption and use of digital services in general. For instance, the cost of mobile data in India plummeted by more than 95% from 2014 to 2021, from Rs 269 (about $5) per GB to Rs 9.5 (about $0.20).[64] The number of smartphone users also soared to 659 million in 2022, and is expected to reach about 1 billion by 2026?.[65] Such factors have dramatically lowered barriers for consumers to use payment apps.

FIGURE 1: Indian Population with Aadhaar Number and Indian Adults with Bank Account, 2011-2024

SOURCE: UIDAI, World Bank Findex Report[66]

Government subsidy programs have also played a role in both India and Brazil. In India, a financial-inclusion program called Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana created incentives to banks to open accounts for previously unbanked individuals by paying a small transaction fee when direct benefit transfers (DBTs) are made into the account, and by subsidizing insurance offered to “Jan Dhan” account holders.[67] As a result, between 2014 and 2022, banks onboarded 462 million “Jan Dhan” accounts using Aadhaar-based e-KYC.[68] Meanwhile, Brazil’s COVID-relief program Auxílio Emergencial delivered payments to between 30 and 38 million Brazilians via newly created “Poupança Social Digital” (digital savings) accounts at government-run CAIXA?.[69] These initiatives leveraged DPI to channel transfers, giving recipients a reason to open and use accounts. Also important has been the adoption of smartphones, without which most P2P digital transactions would not be possible using the technologies implemented during the past decade.[70] Relatedly, the falling cost of mobile data has almost certainly been a factor driving adoption.

B. Payments

Meanwhile, UPI has seen explosive growth since its launch in 2016, leading some to ascribe to it almost magical powers. But Thailand’s PromptPay and Brazil’s Pix have grown faster both on a per-capita transactions basis (Figure 2) and on a value-of-transactions per-capita basis (Figure 3).

FIGURE 2: Annual Transactions Per-Capita on Various RTPs

SOURCE: BCB, UPI, PromptPay[71]

Indeed, going merely by the increase in the rate of adoption, one might be tempted to think that, of the three systems, Pix is clearly superior. That would be a mistake. As noted in Section IV, Pix has grown in no small part because of self-preferencing by Bacen. Looking only at the numbers for the RTP is misleading, as it ignores other types of payments, each of which have their own characteristics. For example, as noted in the introduction, RTPs lack an embedded credit function. Consumers would therefore be expected to spend less at stores if they only use an RTP-based P2P payment system, as they will be limited to the funds they have in their bank accounts (and any overdraft facilities). By contrast, if consumers also had access to credit cards, they would likely spend more, benefiting merchants.[72]

FIGURE 3: Annual Per-Capita Value of Transactions on Various RTPs (US$)

SOURCE: BCB, UPI, PromptPay[73]

V. Conclusions

The series of case studies presented here demonstrate that, while centralized, state-led DPI governance can rapidly achieve extremely broad reach, it also results in politicized choices and sidelines competitive forces—ultimately impeding innovation. By contrast, decentralized governance harnesses competition and innovation, which may result in somewhat slower expansion of financial-services access, but leads to greater responsiveness and dynamism—and, crucially, reduces the risk of technological lock-in.

The presumption that governments should provide digital public infrastructure is belied by the evidence, which shows that the private sector is perfectly capable of providing most such infrastructure. Identity verification may be an exception, due to decades—and, in some cases, centuries—of state involvement in registries, passports, and other forms of ID, as well as rules relating to KYC and AML that states have deemed to be their purview. But even digital identity benefits from decentralization and competition, as evidenced by the evolution of Estonia’s e-ID and acknowledged by the EU in its recent eID regulation.

The case studies presented here highlight several concerns with DPI initiatives in general, and government-led RTP systems in particular.

A. Governance Concerns

DPI initiatives have raised concerns about governance and security. On the one hand, private-sector initiatives that have benefited from government licenses have raised concerns about inadequate competition.[74] On the other hand, government-led systems that are not subject to appropriate controls can end up dominating markets and restricting competition, especially if regulators favor them over private alternatives.

1. Self-preferencing

Indeed, self-preferencing is a major problem with many government-run payment systems. As we have documented, Brazil’s Bacen initially prohibited the operation of WhatsApp Pay, which had partnered with banks and private-payment networks Visa and Mastercard, and was due to launch five months before the launch of Bacen’s own RTP system, Pix. WhatsApp Pay was eventually permitted nine months later, four months after Pix’s launch of Pix, but Bacen continued to prohibit the use of credit cards on WhatsApp Pay until April 2023.[75]

The Reserve Bank of India has also engaged in widespread and blatant self-preferencing by creating rules that favor its own payment card, RuPay, and its RTP system, UPI.[76]

2. Market distortions

Central banks also typically impose rules that distort markets. RBI effectively blocked WhatsApp Pay’s development by capping the number of users who could send and receive funds.[77] RBI also imposes price controls on the fees that merchants can be charged for accepting a payment on UPI, with the fee capped at zero for most transactions. This means that payment-service providers cannot generate revenue directly from transactions and thus must find it elsewhere, such as through product sponsorship, advertising, and ancillary services. This has so distorted the system that UPI is now almost completely dominated by two companies, Google (through Google Pay) and Walmart (through its Phone Pe subsidiary), which are able to monetize their app-based payment systems without charging merchant-transaction fees. Ironically, a system founded on the premise that it would enable wide interoperability has instead ended up creating a duopoly.

3. Security and fraud

Government-controlled digital IDs can pose major security and fraud risks, especially if appropriate checks are not in place. For example, a bank manager in Bihar, India, was able to access Aadhaar records to open fake accounts in the names of various bank customers, subsequently using those accounts to defraud the government.[78] These and other concerns have led some critics to question the value of Aadhaar.[79]

New fraud and security risks are also emerging as RTPs gain mass adoption. The UK’s Faster Payment network, for instance, has seen a sharp rise in authorized push payment (APP) fraud, in which scammers tricking users into sending money. Losses from APP scams reached £485 million in 2022, but have since fallen following the implementation of additional security measures.[80]

In Brazil, large banks’ mandatory adoption of Pix gave rise to “Pix gangs,” who exploit instant, irrevocable transfers through such tactics as phone scams, phishing, and even on-the-spot kidnappings (so-called “lightning kidnappings”) to coerce victims into sending money?.[81]

These various concerns highlight the importance of ensuring that DPI is well-governed and that it is owned, controlled and regulated in ways that facilitate competition, inclusion, and innovation, while limiting and mitigating new risks.

B. Other Concerns

The push for government-created DPI has also raised a host of related concerns, including replicability, the ability to incorporate external innovations, and the implications for both consumers and merchants.

1. Contingent replicability

While the governance of a DPI system is critical, the circumstances under which it is implemented will have a considerable bearing on its success. In Mexico, the central bank’s Cobro Digital (CoDi) payments system, launched in 2019, achieved only about 8% adoption in its first 1.5 years.[82] Banco de Mexico (Banxico) launched a second payment system in 2023 called Dinero Movil (DiMo), a mobile wallet that can settle on either CoDi or on the older (but better connected) interbank settlement system (SPEI).[83] While DiMo perhaps stands a better chance of achieving widespread adoption than CoDi, it is not clear why it was needed, given the popularity and widespread use of wallets built by private banks and fintechs.[84] Such challenges call into question the presumption that an India Stack-style DPI or a Pix-style RTP should or even could be replicated.

2. Ability to incorporate external innovations

Fintech innovations, such as stablecoins, present competitive alternatives to RTPs. Stablecoins can be used with an increasingly wide range of wallets and can settle quickly and with finality, just like RTPs, but do not require any centra;-bank infrastructure and are very low cost without any subsidy.[85] Moreover, private payment-service providers, such as PayPal and global payment networks Visa and Mastercard, are already building stablecoin solutions in collaboration with banks and fintechs to facilitate global interoperability.[86] Some DPI initiatives could potentially impede the development and rollout of these innovative solutions.

3. Absence of credit function

RTP systems lack an embedded credit function: they move money that people already have but, unlike credit cards, they don’t offer credit lines to buyers. This absence of built-in credit limits the utility of systems like UPI and Pix for consumers and merchants. Since the ability to utilize short-term credit for purchases demonstrably increases ticket sizes, with benefits to merchants, the lack of a credit function is a distinct disadvantage for merchants and the economy as a whole.[87] Unless banks or fintechs are able to add such features on top of the RTP rails in a cost-effective manner, the push by governments to shift payments away from cards and toward RTP-based systems will have net-negative economic effects.

4. Limited protection for consumers

The finality of RTP-based payments means that, once a payment has been initiated, it cannot be stopped or, in most cases, reversed. This is advantageous for sellers, since it reduces counterparty risk, but it has the opposite effect for buyers. If the goods or services purchased using an RTP system are not supplied or do not meet the payor’s expectations, the payor cannot easily initiate a reversal or chargeback, as they could if they paid with a credit card. The payor could send a request-for-payment to the recipient, but the recipient has no obligation to comply. (Pix has introduced procedures designed to recover funds in the case of fraud, but these will seem to work only if the fraudster keeps fraudulently obtained funds in the account into which it was received or perhaps a connected account at the same bank.[88])

C. Avoiding Governance Failure

Underpinning the most serious concerns are governance issues. For example, as demonstrated in the cases of UPI and Pix, where conflicts of interest are not adequately addressed, central banks typically favor their own payment systems over private alternatives. This has the effect of increasing adoption of their system, which may make it seem effective. If banks and fintechs have little alternative but to use the government system, then they will do so regardless of its merits. But high levels of adoption do not necessarily translate into sustainable financial inclusion; such mandates instead end up locking out competitors and undermining innovation.

One way to reduce these conflicts of interest is by implementing rules that require separation between the departments that operate payment systems and the departments that regulate them. Another is to mandate full cost recovery for government-run payments systems. Pix, for example, is implemented and overseen by the same team responsible for regulating payments. It has used that power to create and enforce rules, including arbitrary prices, which give preferential treatment to its own payment system. In contract, FedNow, which is implemented by the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks and overseen by the Federal Reserve Board, has instituted transparent pricing based on cost recovery.

Such protections are important, not least because systems run by central banks that lack private competitors generally have little incentive to respond to competitive pressures through innovation and the adoption of new technologies. As a result, countries with such systems will become locked into outmoded technologies that are less efficient and more costly (although such costs are often hidden from the public).

An analogy may be helpful. Private competition was generally prohibited in communist countries, with dire consequences. For example, the main passenger car produced in East Germany from 1964 onwards was the Trabant 601, which was based on a pre-war design that changed little from the day it was first produced until the last car rolled off the production line in 1990.[89] Trabants rapidly declined in popularity after the fall of the Berlin Wall because people could purchase modern vehicles that were faster, cleaner, and safer. Many of those vehicles came from West Germany, where companies such as BMW, Mercedes, Audi, VW, and Porsche had engaged in fierce competition—not only with each other, but also with overseas companies such as Ford, General Motors, Saab, Volvo, Toyota, and Honda. The result was that they had strong incentives to identify and implement improvements. In other words, countries that permitted competition benefitted from innovation; those that didn’t, didn’t.[90]

Likewise, centralized government-run DPI systems are likely to become expensive, lumbering monopolists—the very thing that the Gates Foundation ascribes to “laissez faire” systems. By contrast, as the case studies in this paper show, when governance is decentralized and the systems are provided by market actors, they tend to be responsive to competitive pressures, developing and adopting innovative solutions.

While governments can help to set the broad legal framework for digital infrastructure, they should not get involved in such questions as which protocol to use for sharing data, where data is stored, how much payment-service providers may charge merchants, how much may be retained by payment-service providers acting for consumers, and many other features best determined by the private sector. Moreover, to the extent that governments do provide digital infrastructure, they should ensure that they do not create rules that favor their system over others or that favor one or more players over other players.

D. Lessons Learned

RTPs clearly contribute to financial inclusion. In many cases, they facilitate a dramatic shift from cash to electronic payments. But where government regulators are also involved in the RTP’s operation, it is important to limit the potential for conflicts of interest. If not properly managed, such conflicts can lead to distorted prices and the crowding out of private competitors, forcing users onto the central banks’ preferred rails (as happened in India and Brazil with UPI and Pix, respectively) and forcing banks to subsidize those rails (for example, by limiting banks’ ability to charge fees that cover their costs). Restrictions on MDR and/or interchange fees also impede competition among both merchant- and consumer-oriented payment facilitators (apps), resulting in distortions to that downstream market. In the case of UPI, this has created something close to a duopoly, crowding out innovative local competitors.

By contrast, the central banks in Thailand, UK, Europe, and the United States have been more neutral and impartial, enabling the RTPs (regardless of the notional governance model) to implement more sustainable market-based pricing, thereby avoiding the distortions created by UPI and Pix.

The effects on innovation are likely significant, but difficult to quantify in the short term, as counterfactuals cannot be known. As new payment technologies like stablecoins gain importance, the lock-in to government-favored RTPs could become increasingly problematic in countries where potential conflicts of interest have not been addressed through appropriate governance structures.

The key lesson from all of this is that, while there is no “one size fits all” solution to the ownership, control, and regulation of digital payments infrastructure, it is important for the governance of whichever entity is in control to be structured in ways that limit opportunities for conflicts of interest and, where they might arise, to have clear procedures to address them.

[1] See Press Release, Gates Foundations Announces $1.27 B in Health and Development Commitments to Advance Progress Toward the Global Goals, Gates Found., (Sep. 21, 2022), https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ideas/media-center/press-releases/2022/09/gates-foundation-unga-global-fund-replenishment-commitment.

[2] Digital Public Infrastructure, Gates Found., https://www.gatesfoundation.org/our-work/programs/global-growth-and-opportunity/digital-public-infrastructure (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] See David J. Teece, Understanding Dynamic Competition: New Perspectives on Potential Competition, “Monopoly,” and Market Power, Competition Lab, Geo. Wash. U. (Jul. 17, 2024), available at https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs6711/files/2024-07/understanding-dynamic-competition.pdf.

[7] James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (U. Mich. Press, 1962), http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3.html.

[8] See Foo Boon Ping, Thailand’s National ITMX-PromptPay Could Have the Most Real-time Cross-border Payment Linkages in the World, The Asian Banker (Jul. 12, 2025), https://www.theasianbanker.com/updates-and-articles/thailands-national-itmx-promptpay-could-have-the-most-real-time-cross-border-linkages-in-the-world.

[9] See Unified Payments Interface (UPI), Nat’l Payments Corps. of India, https://www.npci.org.in/what-we-do/upi/product-overview (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[10] See 5 Essential Steps for KYC/AML Onboarding and Compliance, Thomson Reuters (Jun. 24, 2025), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/5-essential-steps-for-kyc-aml-onboarding-and-compliance.

[11] Identity theft typically involves the acquisition of enough personal details (e.g., Social Security number, date of birth, driver’s license info) to pass automated checks. A criminal might even forge physical ID documents if an in-person branch visit is required. Alternatively, criminals sometimes combine real stolen data (an SSN) with a fictitious name or birthdate to create a “synthetic” identity, which they use to open accounts and cultivate a credit file over time. The use of a synthetic identity avoids direct impersonation of a specific real person but still uses someone else’s SSN—creating problems for the holder of that SSN (and for all the other parties who are defrauded).

[12] Generative Artificial Intelligence Increases Synthetic Identity Fraud Threats, FedPayments Improvement, https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/sif-toolkit-genai.pdf (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[13] Estonia Introduced a New ID Card, e-Estonia (Jan. 23, 2019), https://e-estonia.com/estonia-introduced-a-new-id-card.

[14] See A Unique Identity for the People, Unique Identification Auth. of India, Gov’t of India, available at https://www.uidai.gov.in/images/Aadhaar_Brochure_July_22.pdf (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[15] See Aadhaar Authentication API Specification- Version 2.5 (Revision-1), Unique Identification Auth. of India (2022), https://uidai.gov.in/aadhaar_dashboard/india.php.

[16] Id.

[17] See Ajinkya Kawale, Economic Survey: DPI Brings Down KYC Costs to Rs 6 from about Rs 1,000, Bus. Standard (Jul. 22, 2024), https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/economic-survey-dpi-brings-down-kyc-costs-to-rs-6-from-about-rs-1-000-124072201118_1.html.

[18] Yogesh Sapkale, Aadhaar Data Breach Largest in the World, Says WEF’s Global Risk Report and Avast, MoneyLife Found. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.moneylife.in/article/aadhaar-data-breach-largest-in-the-world-says-wefs-global-risk-report-and-avast/56384.html; Gopi Dara, TDP Govt Mined Personal Data, Tried to Misuse it: Andhra Pradesh Assembly Committee, Times of India (Sep. 21, 2022), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/vijayawada/tdp-govt-mined-personal-data-tried-to-misuse-it-andhra-panel/articleshow/94337425.cms (A 2018 data breach allegedly resulted in the entire database—which then contained about 1 billion names, addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers—being made available for about $8. The same year, the state of Talangana was accused of using Aadhaar to “clean up” voter-registration rolls to remove “undesirable” names. Meanwhile, there have been persistent allegations that the Andra Pradesh political party TDP misused Aadhaar data when it was in power from 2016 to 2019).

[19] See Anumeha Yadav, Digital Exclusive: Poor, Elderly Face the Brunt of Aadhaar-Based Authentication Errors, The Wire (Dec. 22, 2024), https://thewire.in/rights/digital-exclusion-poor-elderly-face-the-brunt-of-aadhaar-based-authentication-errors.

[20] See TLS Basics, Internet Soc’y, https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/tls/basics (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[21] See Lu Zhou et al., Leveraging Zero Knowledge Proofs for Blockchain-based Identity Sharing. A Survey of Advancements, Challenges and Opportunities, 80 J. Info. Sec. Application (Feb. 2024), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212623002624.

[22] X-Road Data Exchange, X-Road, https://x-road.global/data-exchange (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[23] Nojan Sheybani et al., Zero-Knowledge Proof Frameworks: A Survey, Cornell U. (Feb. 10, 2025), https://arxiv.org/html/2502.07063v1.

[24] See Anthony Ha, Vitalik Buterin Has Reservations About Sam Altman’s World Project, TechCrunch (Jun. 28, 2025), https://techcrunch.com/2025/06/28/vitalik-buterin-has-reservations-about-sam-altmans-world-project.

[25] Does Digital ID Have Risks Even if it’s ZK-Wrapped, Vitalik Buterin’s Website (Jun. 28, 2025), https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2025/06/28/zkid.html.

[26] See Frequently Asked Questions, The Clearing House, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/rtp/institution (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[27] Id.

[28] RTP Participant Fee Schedule, The Clearing House, available at https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/New/TCH/Documents/Payment-Systems/RTP/RTP_Pricing_01-01-2025.pdf?rev=7f805ed190e64ca0abe76d7694f1153b&hash=12EC40D45290074281670FD2A9CCE42A (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

[29] See RT1 System Pricing, EBA Clearing, https://www.ebaclearing.eu/services-instant-payments/rt1/pricing (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[30] The Clearing House, supra note 26.

[31] Id.

[32] Pix Management Report, Conception and First Years of Operation, Banco Cent. do Brasil (2022), available at https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/estabilidadefinanceira/pix/relatorio_de_gestao_pix/pix_management_report_2023.pdf.

[33] See Angelo Duarte et al., Central Banks, the Monetary System and Public Payment Infrastructures: Lessons from Brazil’s Pix, BIS Bull. No. 52, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull52.htm.

[34] Matheus Sampaio & Jose Renato Haas Ornelas, Payment Technology Complementarities and their Consequences on the Banking Sector, (May 27, 2025), SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5002235.

[35] See Fumiko Hayashi & Jesse Leigh Maniff, Public Authority Involvement in Payment Card Markets: Various Countries, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Kan. City (2023), available at https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/8287/PublicAuthorityInvolvementPaymentCardMarkets_VariousCountries_August2021Update.pdf.

[36] Id.

[37] See Circular BACEN/DC Nº 4031 DE 23/06/2020, Legisweb (Jun. 24, 2020), https://www.legisweb.com.br/legislacao/?id=397401.

[38] Manish Singh, Brazil Suspends WhatsApp’s Payments Service, TechCrunch (Jun. 23, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/23/brazil-orders-to-suspend-whatsapp-pay-week-after-rollout.

[39] See WhatsApp Payments Launches in Brazil with Nine Partner Banks, Leaders League (May 20, 2021), https://www.leadersleague.com/en/news/whatsapp-payments-launches-in-brazil-with-nine-partner-banks.

[40] FedNow Service 2025 Fee Schedule, Fed. Rsrv., https://www.frbservices.org/resources/fees/fednow-2025 (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[41] Miriam Sheril, FedNow at Two: Building Real-Time Rails That Work for the U.S., Form3 (Jul. 2025), https://www.form3.tech/news/payment-insights/fednow-at-two-building-real-time-rails-that-work-for-the-us (last visited Jul. 24, 2025).

[42] See Frequently Asked Questions, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_faq.htm#:~:text=To%20provide%20new%20services%20for,decide%20to%20adopt%20instant%20payments (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[43] Michael Pooler, Brazil Counts Success with Pix Payments Tool, Fin. Times (Sep. 18, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/e1c7b0e7-4c17-40c4-8e03-16c698674efa; Lynne Marek, FedNow Racks Up Nearly $246M in Annual Expenses, Payments Dive (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.paymentsdive.com/news/federal-reserve-fednow-payments-system-annual-expense-quarterly-statistics/734577 (This number, which appears suspiciously low, has been bandied around by journalists, including in the Financial Times, but I could not find a reliable source. The FT piece simply says “according to the BCB.” See Michael Pooler, Brazil Counts Success with Pix Payments Tool, Financial Times (Sep. 17, 2023)).

[44] See World Bank Fast Payments Toolkit Case Study: Thailand, World Bank (2016), available at https://fastpayments.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/World_Bank_FPS_Thailand_PromptPay_Case_Study.pdf.

[45] Ping, supra note 8.

[46] See Aditi Routh, The Role of Nonbanks and Fintechs in Boosting India’s UPI Person-to-Merchant Transactions, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Kan. City (2024), https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/payments-system-research-briefings/the-role-of-nonbanks-and-fintechs-in-boosting-indias-upi-person-to-merchant-transactions.

[47] World Bank, supra note 44 at 19.

[48] Id. (This is the Joint Steering Committee of the Payment Systems Office (PSO), constituted under the Thai Bankers Association).

[49] See Convenient and Safe! With PromptPay for Business, KBank, https://www.kasikornbank.com/en/business/promptpay/pages/promptpay-for-business.aspx (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[50] See Board Members, Pay.UK, https://www.wearepay.uk/who-we-are/our-organisation/board (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[51] See NPCI Profile, Nat’l Payments Corp. of India, https://www.npci.org.in/npci-profile (last visited July 14, 2025).

[52] Id.

[53] See The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, India Code, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2082/4/a2007-51.pdf (last visited July 15, 2025).

[54] See PFMI Disclosure Report March 2024, Nat’l Payments Corp. of India, https://www.npci.org.in/who-we-are/risk-management/pfmi-disclosure-report-march-2024 (last visited Jul. 15, 2025); Ashwin Manikandan, RBI to Regulate NPCI, Retail Payment Systems with Increased Oversight, Econ. Times (Jun. 13, 2020), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/rbi-to-regulate-npci-retail-payment-systems-with-increased-oversight/articleshow/76361543.cms?from=mdr.

[55] Discussion Paper on Charges in Payment Systems, Rsrv. Bank of India, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=21082#:~:text=in%20the%20transaction.-,iii.,%2C%20effective%20January%201%2C%202020 (last visited Jul. 16, 2025).

[56] See Julian Morris, Digital Payments and Financial Inclusion, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Sep. 24, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/digital-payments-and-financial-inclusion.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] See PTI, WhatsApp Allowed Beta Test with Limited User base, Low Transaction Limit: NPCI, Indian Express (Feb. 17, 2018), https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/whatsapp-allowed-beta-test-with-limited-user-base-low-transaction-limit-npci-5067368.

[60] See Geetha Nandikotkur, WhatsApp Pay Faces One More Hurdle, BankInfoSecurity (Jun. 21, 2019), https://www.bankinfosecurity.asia/whatsapp-pay-faces-one-more-hurdle-a-12674.

[61] WhatsApp Payments Rollout Delayed in India, PYMNTS (Jul. 20, 2018), https://www.pymnts.com/news/payments-innovation/2018/whatsapp-payments-rollout-delay-india-facebook.

[62] Digbijay Mishra, NPCI Confirms WhatsApp Pay’s Data Localisation, Times of India (Jul. 29, 2020), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/npci-confirms-whatsapp-pays-data-localisation/articleshow/77228456.cms.

[63] See WhatsApp Pay Can Now Extend UPI Services to all Users in India, Nat’l Payments Corps. of India (Dec. 31, 2024), available at https://www.npci.org.in/PDF/npci/press-releases/2024/NPCI-Press-Release-WhatsApp-Pay-Can-Now-Extend-UPI-Services-To-All-Users-in-India.pdf.

[64] See Nidhi Jacob, Fact Check: Internet Has Become Cheaper in India – but Not as Much as the Coal Ministry Claims, Scroll.In (Jul. 7, 2022), https://scroll.in/article/1027718/fact-check-internet-has-become-cheaper-in-india-but-not-as-much-as-the-coal-ministry-claims.

[65] See Sunil Gill, How Many People Own Smartphones in the World?, Priori Data (Jan. 1, 2025), https://prioridata.com/data/smartphone-stats; India Calling: Decoding the Country’s Electronics Manufacturing Journey and the Way Forward, PWC (2023), available at https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/india-calling-decoding-the-countrys-electronics-manufacturing-journey-and-the-way-forward/india-calling-decoding-the-countrys-electronics-manufacturing-journey-and-the-way-forward.pdf.

[66] UIDAI Annual Report 2022-23, available at https://uidai.gov.in/images/UIDAI_Annual_Report-2022-23_English.pdf; Global Findex Database 2025, World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globalfindex/download-data (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[67] See Nidhi Agarwala et al., Efficiency of Indian Banks in Fostering Financial Inclusion: An Emerging Economy Perspective, Nat’l Libr. Med., https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9817463 (last visited Jul. 14, 2025).

[68] Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) – National Mission for Financial Inclusion, Completes Eight Years of Successful Implementation, Press Info. Bureau, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1854909 (last visited Jul. 17, 2025).

[69] Auxilio Emergencial: Lessons from the Brazilian Experience Responding to COVID-19, World Bank (2021), available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099255012142121495/pdf/P1748361b302ee5718913146b11956610692e4faf5bc.pdf; Enrollment and Eligibility Process of Brazil’s Auxilio Emergencial, World Bank (2021), available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099255012142136232/pdf/P1748360d7131402e086730fbce1d687fa1.pdf.

[70] SMS-based transactions, as M-Pesa began implementing in 2005, would have been possible.

[71] Pix Statistics, Banco Cent. Do Brasil, https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/financialstability/pixstatistics (last visited Jul. 17, 2025); PromptPay Statistics, Bank of Thailand, https://app.bot.or.th/BTWS_STAT/statistics/BOTWEBSTAT.aspx?reportID=921&language=ENG (last visited Jul. 18, 20o25); UPI Product Statistics, Nat. Payments Corp. of India, https://www.npci.org.in/what-we-do/upi/product-statistics (last visited Jul. 18, 2025); Population Estimates and Projections, World Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/population-estimates-and-projections (last visited Jul. 18, 2025).

[72] See Julian Morris & Ben Sperry, The Cost of Payments: A Review, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Aug. 28, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-cost-of-payments-a-review.

[73] Id.

[74] Njuguna S. Ndung’u, A Digital Financial Services Revolution in Kenya: The M-Pesa Case Study, Afr. Econ. Rsch. Consortium, available at https://aercafrica.org/old-website/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/AERC-MPesa-Case-Study.pdf  (last visited Jul. 17, 2025).

[75] Marcel Van Oost, The Success Story of WhatsApp Payments in Brazil, Connecting the Dots in FinTech (Aug. 2, 2024), https://www.connectingthedotsinfin.tech/the-success-story-of-whatsapp-payments-in-brazil.

[76] See Saloni Shukla, RBI Allows RuPay Credit Card Transactions on UPI, Econ. Times (Jun. 9, 2022), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/rbi-allows-rupay-credit-card-transactions-on-upi/articleshow/92090548.cms?from=mdr; Adriana Nunez, RuPay and UPI Get Multimillion-Dollar Support from Indian Government, EMarketer (Jan. 12, 2023), https://www.emarketer.com/content/rupay-upi-multimillion-dollar-support-indian-government.

[77] As documented above, the number of permitted users was initially below 1%, meaning that WhatsApp could not benefit from its own scale.

[78] Neelanjit Das, Kotak Mahindra Bank Branch Manager Siphoned Off Rs 31 Crore of Public Money to Gamble; Know How he Misused Customer’s KYC Details, Econ. Times (Jul. 5, 2025), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/legal/will/kotak-mahindra-bank-branch-manager-looted-rs-31-crore-of-public-money-to-gamble-know-how-he-misused-customers-kyc-details/articleshow/122249626.cms.

[79] See Pam Dixon, A Failure to “Do No Harm” – India’s Aadhaar Biometric ID Program and its Inability to Protect Privacy in Relation to Measures in Europe and the U.S., Nat’l Libr. Med. (2017), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5741784; Nicolas Belorgey & Christophe Jaffrelot, Identifying 1.4 Billion Indians Biometrically? Corporate World, State, and Civil Society, Portail HAL Scis. Po (2024), available at https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04845547/file/identifying_1.4_billion_indians_biometrically.pdf.

[80] See Over € 1.2 Billion Stolen Through Fraud in 2022, With Nearly 80 Per Cent of APP Fraud Cases Starting Online, U.K. Fin., https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/news-and-insight/press-release/over-ps12-billion-stolen-through-fraud-in-2022-nearly-80-cent-app (last visited Jul. 17, 2025); Over € 570 Million Stolen by Fraudsters in the First Half of 2024, U.K. Fin., https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/news-and-insight/press-release/over-ps570-million-stolen-fraudsters-in-first-half-2024 (last visited Jul. 17, 2025).

[81] David Feliba, Feature- ‘Pix Gangs’ Cash in on Brazil’s Mobile Payments Boom, Reuters (Jun. 14, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/feature-pix-gangs-cash-in-on-brazils-mobile-payments-boom-idUSL8N37Z4E1.

[82] Behind the Struggle of Mexico’s CoDi, Vixio (Aug. 18, 2022), https://www.vixio.com/insights/pc-behind-struggle-mexicos-codi#:~:text=Launched%20in%202019%2C%20CoDi%20processed,of%20existence%2C%20moving%20around%20BRL5.

[83] Can DiMo Promote Financial Inclusion in Mexico?, PCMI, https://paymentscmi.com/insights/dimo-financial-inclusion-mexico/#:~:text=Launched%20in%20March%202023%20by,only%20a%20recipient’s%20phone%20number (last visited Jul. 17, 2025).

[84] Mexico’s E-Commerce and Digital Payments Growth Era: A Strategic Opportunity for Global Merchants, PPRO (Apr. 11, 2025), https://www.ppro.com/insights/mexicos-e-commerce-and-digital-payments-growth-era.

[85] Average Transaction Fee, Polygon P0L, https://tokenterminal.com/explorer/projects/polygon/metrics/transaction-fee-average (last visited Jul. 17, 2025), (A typical USDT or USDC transaction on a fast layer 1 chain, such as Solana, or an Ethereum layer 2 chain, such as Polygon, costs fractions of a cent).

[86] Visa Expands Stablecoin Settlement Capabilities to Merchant Acquirers, Visa (Sep. 5, 2023), https://investor.visa.com/news/news-details/2023/Visa-Expands-Stablecoin-Settlement-Capabilities-to-Merchant-Acquirers/default.aspx; Marek, supra note 42.

[87] Morris & Sperry, supra note 71.

[88] Pix Frequently Asked Questions, Banco Cent. Do Brasil, https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/financialstability/pixfaqen, at 14 (last visited Jul. 17, 2025).

[89] Trabant, Cult Classics, https://www.howandwhy.com/world/the-trabant-is-why-socialism-failed (last visited Jul. 17, 2025), (This comparison between the Trabant and Subaru is opposite).

[90] See A Drive in the World’s Worst Car, How and Why (Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.howandwhy.com/world/the-trabant-is-why-socialism-failed. (This comparison between the Trabant and Subaru is opposite).

A Europe Fit for the Age of Startups: Rhetoric and Reality in the EU’s Digital Package

I. Introduction Europe is at a crossroads. While the global hegemony that it enjoyed into the 20th century continues to erode, the continent remains an . . .

I. Introduction

Europe is at a crossroads. While the global hegemony that it enjoyed into the 20th century continues to erode, the continent remains an important—albeit diminished—source of economic output, productivity, innovation, and technology.[1] European policymakers have expressed growing alarm in recent years that the continent’s weak economic dynamism and productivity may lead it to fall further behind global leaders like the United States and China.[2] Against this backdrop, the next decade will be of pivotal importance: can Europe reclaim its place at the technological frontier, or will the coming years seal Europe’s fate as a spent force that can no longer compete on the global stage?

These fears were reflected in a recent report on European competitiveness written by former Italian Prime Minister and European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi (“Draghi Report”).[3] The report painted a sobering picture of a competitiveness and innovation gap that, unless promptly addressed, is expected to only compound Europe’s decline over the coming years and decades.[4] According to the report:

Across different metrics, a wide gap in GDP has opened up between the EU and the US, driven mainly by a more pronounced slowdown in productivity growth in Europe. Europe’s households have paid the price in foregone living standards. On a per capita basis, real disposable income has grown almost twice as much in the US as in the EU since 2000.[5]

These challenges likely have multiple causes. The Draghi Report identifies several contributing factors, including high energy costs, fragmented capital markets, unfavourable conditions for venture-capital investment, low startup activity, and overregulation. To date, European policymakers have acknowledged some of these issues and expressed an at least nominal commitment to address them. For instance, fostering home-grown startups is a key goal of the current EU administration and a priority under the recently unveiled Competitiveness Compass (“Compass”).[6] At the same time, the EU has aimed to position itself as a leader in digital rulemaking, enacting a series of pioneering regulations—including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), Digital Services Act (DSA), Data Act (DA), and Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act)—that are known collectively as the “Digital Package”.[7] According to Ursula Von der Leyen, who in July 2024 renewed her mandate as president of the Commission until 2029, these new regulations are needed to create “A Europe fit for the Digital Age”.[8]

Unfortunately, it appears these two pillars of the EU’s industrial policy—expansive digital regulation and startup promotion—may be working at cross purposes or, worse still, reinforcing each other in misguided directions. The Draghi Report suggests a correlation between overregulation and poor economic performance, including EU startups’ limited ability to scale. Moreover, the EU’s focus on promoting startups over fostering innovation itself reflects a misplaced emphasis on who drives innovation, rather than on innovation outcomes. This approach risks stifling progress by neglecting valuable contributions from other sources, including large firms and established incumbents—a misstep that could paradoxically deprive startups of the very innovations upon which they often build.

Indeed, R&D investments and productivity tend to increase with size,[9] and large tech firms are among the most productive and innovative segments of the modern economy.[10] This reality challenges the narrative that policymakers should focus primarily on facilitating innovation from tech startups (“TSUs”).[11] Large firms also often provide vital exit strategies for digital-market startups, many of which are formed with acquisition explicitly in mind.[12] Foreclosing this avenue risks deterring the creation of TSUs in the first place, in addition to forfeiting the benefits  that acquisition by an incumbent may yield, such as access to superior managerial capabilities,[13] greater scale, and the integration of the TSU’s innovative projects into the acquirer’s “ecosystem”.[14]

Some of the EU Digital Package’s regulations aim to hobble large players under the misguided premise that hindering incumbents would automatically elevate TSUs.[15] But in the complex net of competitive and cooperative relations that characterize the digital economy,[16] disruptions to the central digital platforms can harm the many firms that depend on them for cumulative and generative innovation. For example, when a TSU is acquired by a DMA-designated “gatekeeper”, it must automatically comply with the DMA. This means the gatekeeper is required to share certain competitive advantages and is restricted in its ability to expand into additional markets.[17] This, in turn, can affect a TSU’s ability to scale, as well as the investments it can hope to receive from gatekeepers. To the extent that the DMA deprioritizes economic efficiency and consumer welfare, reducing a platform’s attractiveness—such as through a deprecated user experience or diminished convenience[18]—may also harm the business prospects of startups that depend on it.[19]

This approach, and the underlying political and regulatory zeal against “Big Tech” that underpins it, is likely to conflict with key pillars of the Draghi Report. Where the report emphasizes strong support for startups and for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), its primary concern is with removing the obstacles that prevent companies from scaling to compete globally.[20] In other words, size is seen as vital to the EU’s competitiveness strategy. As the report finds:

The lack of a true Single Market also prevents enough companies in the wider economy from reaching sufficient size to accelerate adoption of advanced technologies. There are many barriers that lead to companies in Europe to “stay small” and neglect the opportunities of the Single Market.[21]

Further:

However, there is a close link between the size of companies and technology adoption. Evidence from the US show that adoption rises with firm size for all advanced technologies. Likewise, while in 2023 30% of large businesses in the EU had adopted AI, only 7% of SMEs had done the same. Size enables adoption because larger companies can spread the high fixed costs of AI investment over greater revenues, they can count on more skilled management to make the necessary organisational changes, and they can deploy AI more productively owing to larger data sets.[22]

Against this backdrop, this paper examines whether and to what extent the EU’s goals of fostering startups and regulating digital markets align, as well as the role that promoting digital startup activity and investment has played in the design of the Digital Package. The Draghi Report called for an impact assessment of the effect of regulations on small companies,[23] an area where it finds the Commission has traditionally fallen short.[24] Echoing similar concerns, fellow former Italian Prime Minister Enrico published a similar report mere months before the Draghi Report (“Letta Report”), which found that SMEs and deep-tech startups were disproportionately hampered by regulation, bureaucratic red tape, and overlapping and overly complex rules.[25]

Our analysis reveals mixed degrees of attention paid to TSUs in the design of the Digital Package. In fact, the impact assessments of key legislation like the DMA, Data Act, and AI Act at times appear to overlook the effects these regulations would have on startups. This omission is particularly problematic for several reasons:

  1. European policymakers have widely cited these measures as essential to promote startup activity;
  2. There is growing anecdotal evidence to suggest that these regulations may harm startups; and
  3. A robust body of empirical research demonstrates that digital regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) have contributed to increased market concentration and a decline in startup investment.

Thus, while startup creation was and remains a clear goal for European policymakers (and a key weakness identified in the Draghi Report), the actual consideration that the Digital Package gives to TSUs may not be commeasure with those policy commitments. This could mean two either that the Digital Package was not intended to primarily or significantly benefit tech startups or, alternatively, that EU policymakers incorrectly assumed the Digital Package would make everyone better off, including TSUs. The former highlights a seeming contradiction between EU leaders’ public rhetoric and the real motivations driving the enactment of digital regulations. The latter suggests a faith-based assumption that digital regulations would benefit TSUs that has proven unsupported by the impact assessments.

This lack of focus on TSUs fails to align with either EU policymakers’ strong rhetoric or the priorities outlined in the Compass. It is also unlikely to effectively address the concerns raised in the Draghi Report regarding the relationship between regulation and innovation.

If tech startup growth is a key component of the Digital Age, as EU policymakers have repeatedly claimed, failing to adequately consider how the Digital Package will affect TSUs—as well as innovation from other sources—could ultimately serve to make Europe unfit for the Digital Age, pushing the continent even further from the technological frontier.

II. Why Tech Startups Are Relevant for the Digital Package

Given the absence of a unified EU definition for TSUs, this paper will draw from common understandings of the term employed in the literature. Startups and scaleups are generally understood as recently established entities focused on new technological developments, often relying on collaboration, open systems, and networks. They are characterized by innovative business models, scalable products or services, significant investment needs, equity-based capital structures, rapid growth potential, and ambitions to scale. They also tend to have a high tolerance for risk, rely heavily on intangible assets (such as data and intellectual property), and employ a small but highly skilled workforce.[26] Accordingly, in this paper, “TSU” will be used as a shorthand for small, young, and innovative firms with growth potential in digital markets—commonly referred to as startups or scaleups.

There are three key reasons why the EU’s Digital Package should not overlook TSUs. First, there is a strong policy push to strengthen TSUs in Europe. This is underpinned by a sense that startup activity is a driver of a healthy economy, a sentiment evident in the Draghi report.[27] Second, evidence suggests that regulation can negatively affect investment and startup activity. It would thus be reasonable to expect the Digital Package to be sensitive to the potential chilling effects of regulation on startups and innovation, including TSUs. Third, there have been indications that EU regulations—including the Digital Package—have already hindered startup activity. For instance, there is emerging evidence the DMA may have harmed the online-advertising industry, which often serves as a key source of revenue for tech startups. In short, there are important reasons for the Digital Package to be cognizant of startup activity.

A. The Policy Push for TSUs in Europe

EU leaders have long called for a focus on TSUs and their exceptional needs. According to France Digitale’s Manifesto for the 2024 European Elections (“France Digitale Manifesto”) and the European Parliament’s Joint Motion for a Resolution on the State of the SME Union (“SME Resolution”),[28] these include access to high-quality data; high levels of collaboration; open systems and interoperability; the need to attract significant investment; the ability to manage rapid growth; and minimal regulatory burdens. These needs require specific attention.

Both the France Digitale Manifesto and the SME Resolution call for establishing a coherent European definition of startups distinct from the existing definition of SMEs, as many startups do not fit the definition of an SME. This would not only enable targeted action more responsive to TSUs’ needs (on such topics as compliance burdens, visas, funding, and public procurement) but would also address the exclusion of TSUs with more than 250 employees from certain relevant European programs—notably, the accelerator program.[29]

The EU Recommendation on the Definition of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2003/361/EC) defines SMEs based on headcount and turnover thresholds. [30] While all startups qualify as small or medium-sized businesses, the reverse is not necessarily true: not all SMEs are startups. Indeed, there is a vast difference between a typical family-owned small company and a technology startup. This is not to say that, at the margin, one of these activities necessarily contributes more to economic growth and competitiveness than the other. Rather, the issue is that the type of activity that policymakers typically want to protect and encourage is narrower than what the SME label encompasses.

The lack of a unified legal definition in the EU, or a consensus on which key components should be included or which methodologies should be applies, makes it difficult for European regulations to consider the specific interests of such a distinct group of SMEs; it also constitutes the first hurdle in formulating coherent EU-wide TSU policies.[31] Moreover, it undermines the effectiveness of existing policies intended to foster startup growth.[32]

A charitable explanation for this oversight is that the lack of a unified TSU definition is a byproduct of “tech” vernacular, which is itself rife with opaque terms such as “scaleup”, “unicorn”, “digital entrepreneur”, or “nascent competitor”, which can be vague, overlapping, and sometimes used interchangeably. Conversely, the oversight could also indicate that European policymakers have been less focused on promoting TSUs than their policy pronouncements might suggest, especially given the general proclivity for definitions and categorizations in the EU.

In support of the latter interpretation, France Digitale—the largest startup association in Europe—has argued that European TSUs and their investors “don’t get the same recognition and support of their counterparts in America and Asia, which makes their development more complex and hampers their competitiveness”. France Digitale also contends that “more than a third of the Commission’s impact assessments do not provide enough details on the needs of SMEs” and that, despite dialogue with policymakers, “these discussions are not always translated into efficient measures”. Amid what it characterizes as challenging investment conditions over the past five years, France Digitale claims that “Europe has focused on establishing the regulatory framework for the twin green and digital transition, rather than on promoting innovation”.[33]

A recent Stripe survey of digital startups regarding the key challenges they face[34] found that respondents report “the intended benefits [of the EU’s initiatives to improve the regulatory environment] are not yet being felt on the ground. Eighty-three percent of startups believe policymaking is geared toward incumbents and want policymakers to focus on changes that will save them time and money, so they can make the most of limited resources”.

France Digitale has called for additional measures to address these shortcomings, including regulatory “breathing space” to allow TSUs to comply with new regulations. The group proposes extending protections for TSUs beyond the 12 months found in the DSA and Data Act, and broadening the moratoria on burdens imposed on TSUs to include companies’ efforts to comply with prior regulations.[35] As France Digitale member and software-as-a-service company (SaaS) Mirakl argued, the next European Commission (EC) mandate (2024-2029) should allow TSUs “time to comply with the previous regulations before introducing new constraints that will not ensure a level playing field with the American and Asian tech players”.[36]

France Digitale also highlighted the sharp decline in EU M&A activity in 2023.[37] It emphasized the need to find alternative ways to attract investors and support growth to mitigate potential negative impacts on innovation in Europe. It called for fostering a European exit culture by exploring alternatives to existing market exit strategies; and it identified the recruitment of skilled personnel as the top challenge for most TSUs.[38]

The SME Resolution similarly put forward proposals to foster European startups, including using startups’ innovation to promote EU competitiveness and to achieve climate targets. The Parliament likewise called for a formal legal definition of TSUs. The SME Resolution argued that such EU policy must consider TSU interests in minimizing regulatory compliance burdens, as well as pragmatic suggestions to expand TSUs’ access to public and private capital, public procurement, and the talent pipeline.[39]

While the SME Resolution does not touch on digital market competition, per se, Parliament expressed in its Innovation Resolution that it was “of the view that regulatory mechanisms must adapt to and evolve in sync with technological advancements and market shifts to uphold competitiveness and innovation, especially in relation to European start-ups”.[40] The Innovation Resolution also called on the European Commission and EU member states to foster a European-led ecosystem of marketplaces for non-personal data.[41]

For its part, the Commission has itself vowed to foster the growth of TSUs. New Commissioners, for example, have a mandate to implement the Draghi Report’s recommendations, which highlight TSUs’ importance in reigniting growth and achieving technological leadership.[42] In particular, the report highlights inconsistent and restrictive regulations that have bogged down European startups, especially their ability to scale.[43] The report also details problems EU startups have experienced in attracting capital, noting that 61% of global funding for AI startups goes to U.S. companies, 17% to Chinese companies, and just 6% to those in the EU.[44]

Among the Draghi Report’s proposed remedies is to create an “Innovative European Company” statute that would provide a single digital identity valid throughout the EU.[45] This proposal underscores that the report views inconsistent laws as an impediment to fostering startups in the EU. “Innovative European Companies” would have access to harmonized legislation concerning corporate law and insolvency, as well as a few key aspects of labour law and taxation.[46] But in line with France Digitale’s observations, the report also proposes that:

The EU should carry out a thorough impact assessment of the effect of digital and other regulation on small companies, with the aim of excluding SMEs from regulations that only large companies are able to comply with.[47]

The Draghi Report offers this suggestion is made in the context of helping “inventors to become investors” by supporting the transition from invention to commercialization, which the report identifies as one of the EU’s primary comparative weaknesses. Elsewhere, the Draghi Report is more direct in asserting that digital regulations could hinder TSUs and other innovative companies, finding that “we continue to add regulatory burdens onto European companies, which are especially costly for SMEs and self-defeating for those in the digital sectors”.[48] The report also notes that regulatory barriers “to scaling up are particularly onerous in the tech sector, especially for young companies”.[49] Further, the report finds that:

EU regulation imposes a proportionally higher burden on SMEs and small mid-caps than on larger companies, yet the EU lacks a framework to assess these costs. About 80% of Commission Work Programme items are relevant to SMEs but only around half of impact assessments substantially focused on these companies. The EU also lacks a commonly agreed definition of small mid-caps and readily available statistical data.[50]

In her “Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission”,[51] Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need to allow EU TSUs to scale. The guidelines document asserts that:

European companies and start-ups should not be forced to look at the United States, Asia or other markets to finance their expansion. They should be able find what they need to grow here in Europe too.[52]

A key means to help small companies grow and scale is to simplify relevant regulations and alleviate the TSUs’ bureaucratic burden.[53] Indeed, an overarching theme of the Political Guidelines is making business easier by creating a simpler, more coherent legal framework is an overarching theme of Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines.[54] Accordingly, they recommend that:

Each Commissioner will be tasked with focusing on reducing administrative burdens and simplifying implementation: less red tape and reporting, more trust, better enforcement, faster permitting.[55]

The guidelines frame this as a general principle, rather than one meant to apply solely to TSUs. They do, however, appear to recognize that startups and small firms may be disproportionately harmed by the burden of complying with a heavy and overlapping regulatory load.[56] These themes were carried through to the mission letters issued to the new EU commissioners (Mission Letters)[57] and the more recent Compass document.[58]

The Compass, in particular, identifies innovative, disruptive startups as key to European competitiveness.[59] It also highlights concerns raised in the Draghi Report, such as the difficulties startups face in scaling, overcoming regulatory barriers, and accessing capital. [60] In response, the Compass proposes a series of measures, among which is a dedicated startup and scaleup strategy that proposes to “address the obstacles that are preventing new companies from emerging and scaling up”.[61] The strategy would include innovation support and a “28th legal regime” meant to harmonize and simplify applicable rules.[62]

The principles underlying these recent policy statements can also be found in a wide range of past EU policies related to TSUs. These policies have traditionally focused on access to investment capital, creating innovation networks, and building capacity. Some examples include the Start-Up and Scale-Up Initiative (SSI) from 2016, which sought to provide a supportive ecosystem that would help TSUs access capital;[63] the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), which mobilizes private investment in strategic projects;[64] 2021’s Startup Europe project, which looked to strengthen networking opportunities for “deep tech”;[65] the New European Innovation Agenda (2022), which focused on funding scaleups in order to create regional “innovation valleys”, develop a solid talent base, and improve policymaking tools;[66] the European Innovation Council (EIC), whose 2023 work programme included more than €1 billion in funding for startups with breakthrough ideas to help bring their innovations to market;[67] and the recently created European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) Fund of Funds, which commits more than €3.75 billion to support European high-tech companies with late-stage growth capital.[68]

Despite these efforts, however, there remain concerns among the EU’s TSU community. In response to the Commission’s 2023 New European Innovation Agenda and roadmap for startup growth, for example, Stripe published a report exploring whether proposed changes in European policy and regulation addressed key TSUs challenges. It noted that:

The intended benefits [of the EU’s initiatives to improve the regulatory environment] are not yet being felt on the ground. Eighty-three percent of startups believe policymaking is geared toward incumbents and want policymakers to focus on changes that will save them time and money, so they can make the most of limited resources.[69]

It is not surprising that stakeholders continue to argue for the EU to adopt more coherent startup and scaleup strategies.[70] As the Draghi Report noted, many European entrepreneurs:

Prefer to seek financing from US venture capitalists and scale up in the US market. Between 2008 and 2021, close to 30% of the “unicorns” founded in Europe — startups that went on to be valued at over USD billion — relocated their headquarters abroad, with the vast majority moving to the US.[71]

Consistent with these concerns, the European Parliament’s Innovation Resolution [72] called for a range of capacity-building measures that would focus on more traditional needs. But even as it called for comprehensive strategies to deploy innovation enabled by startups, the report suggested that the EU lacks such strategies. Furthermore, if the Innovation Resolution reflects policies that European startups would wish to see prioritized, it is notable that Parliament did not see the Digital Package as the means to achieve those goals. Possible explanations include either that the package fails to address more fundamental challenges that TSUs face, or that it does not provide TSUs with specific opportunities.

B. Evidence that Regulation Can Harm Startups

Regulating digital markets has been a major focus of the EU’s efforts over the past five years. But the Draghi Report, the Letta Report, the Compass, and several other recent policy statements all suggest that EU regulation can be a hurdle for TSUs. The Draghi Report even called for regulators to exercise “self-restraint” and consider “doing less”.[73] The Letta Report adds that the EU’s heavy, “risk-averse” regulatory framework imposes an “unsustainable” burden on startups (e.g., compliance costs for a typical SME in sectors like business services can reach up to €10,000[74]); which the report in turn identifies as a principal hurdle for the future of the Single Market:

Moreover, the tendency – present at all levels in Europe and among Member States following the economic and financial crisis – towards a risk-averse regulatory approach has led to a surplus of overlapping regulations, creating legal uncertainty and imposing substantial compliance costs. This scenario has adversely affected the business environment and economic activities, hitting SMEs the hardest. Thus, addressing these regulatory challenges is not merely a task of reform but a crucial necessity to unlock the full potential of the Single Market.[75]

Indeed, a mounting body of evidence suggests that these fears are not misplaced, and that regulation can lead to significant inefficiencies and unintended consequences. For example, while the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was designed to strengthen data privacy, empirical studies find that it has had significant unintended effects on competition and startup innovation. [76] A study by Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin, and Liad Wagman finds that, within a year of the GDPR’s enforcement, European tech startups experienced a 26.1% drop in monthly venture-funding deals compared to their U.S. counterparts.[77]

This decline in investment was not just a short-term shock. Follow-up analysis by the same authors shows a persisting reduction in the number of funding deals for nascent European tech ventures relative to U.S. counterparts through at least 2020.[78] This contraction in venture-capital investment appears to have been most acute for data-driven startups, as well as new and early-stage startups (ages zero to three years).[79] Business-to-consumer (B2C) businesses also saw more marked declines in the EU.[80] These findings suggest that the GDPR’s compliance burdens—from costly consent requirements to data-handling obligations—disproportionately deterred investment in young, data-centric firms, which are precisely the sorts of startups that European policymakers elsewhere seek to foster.

There is also evidence that the GDPR has disproportionately favoured incumbent firms, thereby increasing market concentration. A study by Garrett A. Johnson, Scott K. Shriver, and Samuel G. Goldberg found that, immediately after the GDPR took effect, websites curtailed their use of third-party digital tools and advertising vendors, dropping many smaller ad-tech providers. The result was a 15% reduction in overall web-technology vendors used for EU visitors and a 17% increase in market concentration among those service providers.[81] In practice, the GDPR prompted websites to rely more on a few large vendors—notably, those owned by Google and Facebook—with resources to comply with the new rules, while cutting ties with smaller analytics and advertising firms:

Google-owned vendors grow from 28.8% to 31.9% of site-vendor pairs in the short run, and Facebook grows from 3.4% to 3.6%.[82]

As Michal S. Gal and Oshrit Aviv put it:

The GDPR limits competition and increases concentration in data and data-related markets, and potentially strengthens large data controllers. It also further reinforces the already existing barriers to data sharing in the EU, thereby potentially reducing data synergies that might result from combining different datasets controlled by separate entities.[83]

These findings were echoed in an empirical study by Chinchih Chen, Carl B. Frey, and Giorgio Presidente, which concludes that:

The GDPR had the unintended consequence of harming the profitability of companies targeting European consumers through the cost channel. Technology firms experienced a 2.1% decline in profits, but not in sales. The GDPR increased extra expenses, added to firms’ wage bills, and accelerated patenting in GDPR-related technology fields. The main burdens have been borne by smaller companies.[84]

Likewise, a paper by Yu Zhao, Pinar Yildirim, & Pradeep K. Chintagunta found that the GDPR led to increased online friction, a growing disparity between large and small firms, and a less-competitive environment.[85] They conclude that:

For policy-makers, our results highlight the unintended consequences of GDPR on consumers and firms. For firms, the post-GDPR environment is anticompetitive as smaller firms see reduced consumer traffic, while for larger domains, both consumer visits and consumer checkouts increase relative to the non-EU benchmark. The higher cost of compliance for smaller domains may have exacerbated the inequality between large and small domains, as evident from the differential effects of GDPR on domain traffic and e-commerce checkout volumes.[86]

These empirical patterns underscore a key unintended consequence: privacy regulation may inadvertently entrench incumbent firms, who can comply at-scale, while raising obstacles for startups that lack similar compliance resources. Indeed, this is consistent with the alarm raised by the Draghi Report, which similarly identifies the GDPR as one of the regulations that has hindered EU companies due to its fragmented implementation.[87] The Draghi Report also cites the GDPR as an example of how compliance burdens, complexity, and inconsistencies among overlapping regulations—such as the GDPR and the AI Act—can undermine advancements in artificial intelligence.[88]

Beyond its effects on investment and competition, some authors have found indications that the GDPR has also slowed innovation output. Rebecca Janssen, Reinhold Kesler, Michael E. Kummer, and Joel Waldfogel identify a “lost generation” of apps in the EU mobile ecosystem following GDPR’s implementation. Using data on 4.1 million Google Play apps, they estimate the GDPR led approximately one-third of existing apps to exit the EU market, and the rate of new app entries fell by roughly half in the subsequent quarters:

When it took effect, GDPR precipitated the exit of over a third of available apps; and following its enactment, the rate of new entry fell by 47.2 percent, in effect creating a lost generation of apps.[89]

The authors show these changes led to significantly less consumer choice and lower usage, effectively reducing consumer surplus by roughly one-third relative to a no-GDPR scenario.[90] In their words:

Whatever the benefits of GDPR’s privacy protection, it appears to have been accompanied by substantial costs to consumers, from a diminished choice set, and to producers from depressed revenue and increased costs.[91]

Other studies reinforce this theme. Klaus M. Miller, Julia Schmitt, and Bernd Skiera find that the GDPR depressed user engagement on websites and that more popular sites lost fewer users, suggesting the regulation diverted activity to dominant platforms:

Our results show that the GDPR negatively affected online usage per website on average; specifically, weekly visits decreased by 4.88% in the first 3 months and 10.02% after 18 months post-enactment. At the 18-month mark, these declines translated into average revenue losses of about $7 million for e-commerce websites and nearly $2.5 million for ad-based websites. Nonetheless, the GDPR’s impact varied across website size, industry, and user origin, with some large websites and industries benefiting from the regulation. Notably, the largest 10% of websites pre-GDPR suffered less, suggesting that the GDPR has increased market concentration.[92]

Together, these empirical studies paint a consistent picture: The GDPR’s well-intended privacy safeguards inadvertently slowed startup innovation and market entry, while diminishing competitive dynamism. The evidence of fewer new firms, reduced product offerings, and users consolidating toward larger providers highlights a key tradeoff: stringent data protection can, and often does, come at the expense of competition and innovation. Policymakers in other areas should weigh these costs against the purported privacy benefits, as the GDPR experience demonstrates how sweeping regulation may create barriers to entry or encourage market exit among small tech firms.

The voices against the GDPR have recently gotten louder, following the EU’s “crusade against overregulation” in light of the Draghi Report.[93] The Commission is now reportedly exploring ways to scale back a law widely regarded as one of “Europe’s most complex pieces of legislation by the technology sector”.[94] The anticipated simplification package would ease reporting requirements for organizations with less than 500 people.[95] As Politico has reported:

For small and cash-strapped businesses, the reams of documentation the GDPR asks companies to produce has long been a gripe. Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath said the key takeaway from a review of the GDPR last summer “is the need for greater support [for] businesses, especially SMEs, in their compliance efforts.”[96]

The regulations that make up the EU’s Digital Package could produce adverse effects similar to those seen with the GDPR. Economic theory suggests that there are reasons to believe the higher compliance costs associated with digital regulations may particularly hamper nascent firms and dampen entrepreneurs’ incentives to pursue new ventures.

For example, building on the political momentum of the GDPR, the EU recently enacted the DMA and DSA, which aim to promote fair competition and safer online spaces, respectively.[97] The DMA targets large online “gatekeeper” platforms with ex-ante obligations—e.g., requiring interoperability and limits on self-preferencing—to ensure “contestable and fair” digital markets in which smaller competitors can thrive. The DSA updates rules for online intermediaries and content moderation, seeking to protect users while harmonizing responsibilities across platforms.

Because both acts are recent, these is not yet much rigorous empirical analysis of their outcomes. EU officials predict these regulations will open new opportunities for startups and scaleups by curbing the allegedly exploitative practices of Big Tech. For instance, the Commission asserts that, under the DMA, “innovators and technology start-ups will have new opportunities to compete… without having to comply with unfair terms and conditions” imposed by dominant platforms.[98]

By seeking to prevent gatekeepers from abusing their market power (e.g., by unfairly blocking access to data or markets), the DMA seeks to level the playing field and enable nascent firms to reach users on more meritocratic terms. Similarly, the DSA’s backers argue that clearer liability and transparency rules for online services will increase trust and safety, which could benefit emerging companies in the long run by improving the online environment for all businesses.

Many observers caution, however, that these new regulations also introduce hurdles for startups, echoing some patterns seen with GDPR. Because the DMA squarely targets the business models of Big Tech firms, there is concern about indirect effects on the startup ecosystem that interacts with those “gatekeepers”. One worry is that restricting large platforms’ behaviour might reduce important avenues for startups, such as acquisitions or platform partnerships.

Venture investors note that many startups see acquisition by a major tech company as a common exit strategy. Thus, if the DMA makes large firms more hesitant or constrained in acquiring emerging competitors (see, e.g., Art 14 DMA), the pool of venture capital and startup valuations in Europe could decline, as investors may anticipate a more difficult path to profitable exits.[99]

The DMA might also stifle TSUs by making gatekeepers’ platforms less attractive to users—such as by, e.g., limiting gatekeepers’ ability to restrict access to the platform. This could degrade platforms’ incentives to innovate and their ability to curate content in ways that maximize the platform’s total value to users.[100] In addition, the DMA’s cumbersome privacy requirements might also reduce competition—not just in advertising, but across the board. As Carmelo Cennamo and Juan Santaló contend:

It does not look like too much of a stretch to assume that the DMA implementation may have similar distortive effects in the targeted advertising markets benefitting some gatekeepers while castigating others. The risk is that in between, the real casualties will be the SMEs (and their direct-to-consumer model). Apps/webpages that have a larger user base can indeed better monitor consumer behavior and offer targeted advertising with a higher ROI than apps with a smaller user base. Overall, this may reinforce the competitive advantage of big players (with direct access to consumer’s data) at the expense of smaller ones. Note hence that the unintended effect of the DMA may be to consolidate the dominant position of big established platforms instead of making digital markets more contestable.[101]

A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) similarly notes that, while the EU intends the DMA to help European tech firms scale up, “a regulatory disabling of U.S. tech giants… could lead to perverse and unintended consequences for European businesses”, potentially benefiting “European incumbents and subsidized Chinese competitors” more than EU startups.[102]

In short, unless the DMA is carefully calibrated, it might protect competitors rather than competition, inadvertently favouring firms that are already mid-sized or well-connected over scrappy young innovators.

For the DSA, the potential burden of compliance is a key concern. The DSA imposes obligations (such as faster removal of illegal content, audits of algorithms, and new transparency requirements) that scale up with a platform’s size (with the most stringent rules for “Very Large Online Platforms”). Even so, smaller startups fear the DSA could add complex compliance costs at-odds with their limited resources. Early commentary has stressed that, if not designed with proportionality, the DSA might force startups to divert precious time and money into content moderation and legal compliance instead of innovation. As a recent GLOBSEC report argued:

The new legislation could add extra hurdle for startups, which will have to deal with complex rules regarding illegal content, regardless of their size and resources. As a result, they would not be able to focus on their core business and grow at the desired pace.[103]

For example, a young platform may struggle if it is expected to “monitor or filter all content users upload” or meet short takedown deadlines across EU jurisdictions.[104] Such requirements could slow a startup’s ability to scale, especially if they need to rapidly hire compliance staff or implement costly filtering technology.

Advocates for startups have therefore argued for graduated obligations and a “sandbox” approach to ensure that new ventures can grow without being immediately crushed by regulatory overhead. It remains to be seen how the DSA will be enforced in practice, but the principle of proportional enforcement will be crucial. As one observer noted, “small startups shouldn’t be penalized just because they don’t have the content monitoring resources of companies like Google or Facebook”.[105]

A common theme in analysing the GDPR, DMA, and DSA is that regulations often have unintended consequences. Empirical studies strongly suggest that well-intentioned regulations can inadvertently hinder competition and innovation, particularly affecting startups and new market entrants. Europe’s experience with the GDPR should serve as a cautionary tale. While it strengthened users’ privacy rights, it also coincided with a decline in venture-capital investment, fewer new market entrants, and increased concentration in various digital sectors.

Startups, which often drive disruptive innovation, appear to have been the most negatively affected by the GDPR, given their reliance on data-driven business models and dependence on external capital.[106] That policymakers did not anticipate these outcomes illustrates the tradeoffs inherent in digital market regulation.[107] As Gal and Aviv observed, the GDPR was enacted with little attention to its potential competitive side effects, which “may well constitute an unintended and unheeded welfare-reducing consequence”.[108]

Unintended effects can include not only dampened startup activity, but also shifts in competitive dynamics that favour the very incumbents that regulations seek to rein in. Large tech firms often have compliance departments and diversified data assets that allow them to adapt to new rules relatively unscathed, while a two-person startup would face a much higher relative cost. This dynamic was evident when GDPR’s implementation drove many small ad-tech vendors out of the European market, reinforcing the dominance of Google and Facebook’s ad services.[109] In the long run, such compliance-driven market concentration can reduce consumer choice and slow the pace of innovation, as fewer new firms attempt to challenge incumbents.[110]

Similar concerns are now being raised about the cumulative impact of the EU’s new digital regulations—the DMA, DSA, and AI Act—on Europe’s startup ecosystem. Many in the tech community stress vigilance to avoid repeating the GDPR’s pitfalls. Surveys of investors already indicate anxiety. For example, most European venture capitalists foresee that expansive regulatory regimes could make EU startups less competitive on the global stage. According to American Edge Project:

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) led to less investment in startups after 2018. Newer regulation such as potential AI rules and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) exacerbate that state of affairs; for instance, it is likely that the recently passed AI legislation will require costly and protracted updates to carve out certain exceptions for some businesses.[111]

Academic research on incentives for innovation also suggests that, if exit opportunities (like acquisitions) are curtailed or compliance costs rise, venture funding and entrepreneurship could shift to less regulated jurisdictions.[112] Ultimately, the challenge for regulators is to strike a balance: safeguarding consumer interests without inadvertently stifling the agile competition that startups provide. The competitive and innovative vitality of digital markets hinges on getting this balance right.

The literature underscores that regulatory interventions must be coupled with careful monitoring and periodic evaluation. If evidence shows a rule is unduly harming startup formation or investment, policymakers may need to adjust thresholds, provide exemptions for small firms, or offer guidance and support to reduce the burden. The EU’s bold regulatory moves will require ongoing assessment to ensure that “fair and open” markets[113] materialize in practice—delivering not only compliance by big platforms, but also more room for Europe’s next generation of startups to grow and compete.

III. Tech Startups’ Place in the EU’s Digital Package

Given the pitfalls of EU digital regulations discussed in the previous section, the question arises whether the Digital Package makes any concessions to TSUs or acknowledges the need to simplify rules and reduce their regulatory burden, as emphasized in the Draghi Report. Such acknowledgements would be a sign that policymakers were cognizant of, and took measures to avert, the sorts of unintended consequences discussed above.

In this section we survey the impact statements for the rules that comprise the EU’s Digital Package, which reveal varying degrees of acknowledgment and interest on the part of the regulations’ drafters for the position of TSUs. The following sub-sections assess each of the Digital Package’s regulations individually.

A. Digital Markets Act

The DMA has primary objectives, which are set out in Art. 1:

To ensure contestability and fairness for the markets in the digital sector in general, and for business users and end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers. Contestability relates to “the ability of undertakings to effectively overcome barriers to entry and expansion and challenge the gatekeeper on the merits of their products and services.[114] (emphasis added)

“Fairness”, in turn, relates to:

…an imbalance between the rights and obligations of business users where the gatekeeper obtains a disproportionate advantage. Market participants … should have the ability to adequately capture the benefits resulting from their innovative or other efforts.[115]

Overall, the obligations placed on the DMA’s designated gatekeepers are intended to lower entry barriers into the incumbents’ core and adjacent markets, thereby making it easier for TSUs to compete. The DMA aims to create new opportunities for TSUs to monetize products and services when on gatekeeper platforms by ensuring increased visibility in search rankings or product listings; enhanced ability to improve products and services through user consent, data portability, and interoperability to key services and access to APIs;[116] and to ensure better terms and conditions.[117]

One European SME lobby group noted:

For innovative SMEs, the DMA will finally create the space and level playing field they need to be competitive … For business users, this would mean being able to offer their services without being forced to comply with unfair terms and conditions forcing them to innovate according to the rules dictated by the gatekeepers.[118]

EU policymakers have frequently cited startups as key beneficiaries of the DMA. At the same time, however, the DMA’s substantive provisions do not meaningfully address TSUs. One possible exception is the act’s the high quantitative thresholds, which effectively exempt most companies—including TSUs—from the obligation to comply with the DMA. Unlike “gatekeepers”, TSUs are not required to share their infrastructure, resources, investments, or competitive advantages with third parties.

Another possible exception is Art. 14, which requires gatekeepers to inform the European Commission of any planned merger or acquisition involving a core platform service—or, indeed, any other services that enable data collection.[119] Art. 14 DMA also requires the Commission to inform national competition authorities of such transactions. The Commission can also claim jurisdiction over such transactions from a national competition authority, regardless of either the transaction value or the target company’s turnover, by triggering the referral mechanism in Art. 22 of the EU Merger Regulation.[120] This includes circumstances in which the Commission “invites” national authorities to make such a referral.

While none of the DMA’s provisions include elements expressly specific to TSUs, Art. 53 DMA establishes that, when evaluating whether the law’s aims have been achieved, the European Commission must assess not only whether regulated markets are contestable and fair, but also the impact “on business users, especially SMEs, and end users”.

The Commission’s impact assessment for the DMA (DMA IA) likewise offered little in the way of specific focus on TSUs, but it did state that “an ex ante measure which explicitly seeks to address unfair contract terms and prevent foreclosure, should provide benefits to a multitude of small businesses and start-up companies, and in turn to their employees and customers”.[121] The DMA IA further opined that SMEs would benefit from the law creating a more “innovative and competitive business environment”. The impact assessment concluded that the benefits flowing to SMEs, startups, and consumers were likely to substantially exceed the measure’s costs of the measure. David J. Teece and Henry J. Kahwaty, however, characterized these conclusions as little more than conjecture, unsupported by academic research or empirical analysis and “inconsistent with many tenets of the literature on the management of innovation”.[122]

For its part, the EU Council credits the DMA with “promoting innovation and a fairer online platform environment for technology start-ups” and “[making] it easier for smaller companies and start-ups to enter the digital market, innovate and compete”.[123] Recital 8 of the DMA offers claims that the regulation will make the economy (in general) and consumers (in particular) better off, even as it explicitly disavows economic efficiency and consumer welfare as relevant factors in delineating permissible and impermissible conduct.[124]

Claims that the DMA will benefit startups more likely reflects politically expedient language, rather than a firm legal commitment or a cognizable antitrust harm. In this way, they are typical of EU policy documents. The Commission’s Annual Reports on Competition Policy, for example, often make broad claims that competition policy has contributed to all or most of the EU’s strategic goals and priorities.[125]

Of course, the DMA could have gone further. Various provisions in the act acknowledge SMEs’ specific interests,[126] despite the lack of provisions that specifically promote those interests. There is likewise a paucity of Commission documents detailing how the DMA would foster the needs of TSUs, as distinct from the interests of other players. [127] While it is asserted that TSUs will benefit from the opportunities the DMA would create, on the question of how much weight their interests should be granted relative to end users, business users, competitors, or consumers, the DMA is silent.

Perhaps the answer can be found in the DMA’s measures of success: the yardsticks used to measure the DMA’s effects could reveal what outcomes the new regulation seeks to achieve.[128] But what makes measuring the DMA’s impact on TSUs difficult is that the act does not dictate any specific market outcome. As Director-General of Competition Olivier Guersent has noted: “DMA obligations create opportunities rather than prescribe market outcomes”.[129] In other words, once gatekeepers comply with their DMA obligations, they are not, in principle, responsible for competitors’ or users’ decisions. Guersent further noted that:

The scale of the impact of DMA will also depend on the take up of the newly created opportunities by market players, and/or the switching by end-users to alternative service providers.[130]

This is consistent with the DMA’s review provision (Art. 53). The article focuses on assessing the law’s impact against its original objectives, which were to ensure contestability and fairness for core-platform-services users and competitors. Alas, improvements in contestestability would need to be measured to be accounted for, and the law ostensibly fails to prescribe any particular outcomes. An additional difficulty in measuring fairness and contestability is that entry and expansion are affected by factors well beyond the gatekeepers’ control—such as, e.g., access to capital or skilled labour.[131]

B. Digital Services Act

The DSA imposes obligations on very large online platforms to actively mitigate illegal activities and the spread of harmful products.[132] The act covers online intermediaries and platforms such as marketplaces, social networks, content-sharing platforms, app stores, and online travel and accommodation platforms. According to the European Commission, the DSA’s goals are to foster innovation, growth, and competitiveness, and to facilitate “the scaling up of smaller platforms, SMEs and start-ups”.[133]

The Commission’s DSA impact assessment (DSA IA) concluded that the regulations “are expected to have a positive impact on competitiveness, innovation and investment in digital services, in particular European Union start-ups and scale-ups proposing platform business models” and that “the legal certainty provided by the intervention would likely encourage investments in European Union companies”.[134] The European Parliament also noted that ex-ante regulatory remedies on the largest online platforms had “the potential to open up markets to new entrants, including SMEs, entrepreneurs, and start-ups, thereby promoting consumer choice and driving innovation beyond what can be achieved by competition law enforcement alone”.[135]

To date, however, it appears that the DSA’s primary benefit for startups is that microenterprises and small enterprises are excluded from compliance obligations.[136] This follows from the DSA IA, which noted that:

Legal burdens [resulting from national regulation of online platforms and online intermediaries at national level] create new barriers in the internal market and lead to high direct and opportunity costs, notably for SMEs, including innovative start-ups and scale-ups. This leads to a competitive advantage for the established very large platforms and digital services, which can more easily tackle higher regulatory compliance costs, and further limits the ability of newcomers to challenge these large digital platforms.[137]

To avoid imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller firms, Art. 15(2) DSA excludes microenterprises and small companies that provide intermediary services from the annual content-moderation reporting obligation. Similarly, Art. 29 DSA exempts these firms from obligations to enable consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders. Art. 19 DSA adds additional exemptions, such as setting up an effective internal-complaint-handling system.[138]

The DSA also extends the exemptions to relatively small enterprises that provide online platforms and have scaled to the point that they no longer qualify as microenterprises or small enterprise under Recommendation 2003/361/EC. Under Art. 19 DSA, such entities continue to benefit from the exemptions for 12 months following the loss of that status (unless they are designated as very large online platforms under Art. 33 DSA). Extending the period during which companies can retain SME status aims to address startups’ concerns about losing protection if they scale up.[139]

As with the DMA, the European Commission is required in its formal evaluation to review scope of DSA obligations on small enterprises and microenterprises.[140] But the DSA goes further than the DMA in requiring the Commission to undertake (by 18 February 2027) a separate and targeted impact assessment of the DSA “on the potential effect of this Regulation on the development and economic growth of small and medium-sized enterprises”.[141] One could therefore argue that the DSA is more sensitive to TSUs’ needs in that it addresses two of their core concerns: compliance costs and the dynamic nature of the transition from startup to scaleup, on the one hand, and requiring the Commission to conduct an SME-specific review, on the other. By contrast, this language is lacking in the DMA.

C. The Data Act

The EU’s Data Act[142] aims to facilitate the seamless transfer of valuable nonpersonal or industrial data within the EU by creating a legal framework on permissible data sharing. It includes several provisions specifically related to SMEs, including microenterprises and startups. This is especially noteworthy, as high-quality data is a critical resource for startups and SMEs to better understand both their own products or services and their customers. The Data Act notes that:

In sectors characterised by the presence of microenterprises, small enterprises and medium-sized enterprises … there is often a lack of digital capacities and skills to collect, analyse and use data, and access is frequently restricted where one actor holds them in the system or due to a lack of interoperability between data, between data services or across borders.[143]

The Data Act also notes that “start-ups, small enterprises … struggle to obtain access to relevant data”.[144] The Data Act therefore aims to “facilitate access to data for those entities, while ensuring that the corresponding obligations are as proportionate as possible to avoid overreach”. [145]

Among the Data Act provisions specific to microenterprises or small enterprises are that the various B2C and B2B data-sharing obligations outlines in Chapter 2[146] do not apply to data generated through the use of connected products manufactured or designed by a microenterprise or small enterprise, or related services provided by such enterprises.[147] Recital 41 clarifies that: “Given the current state of technology, it would be overly burdensome on microenterprises and small enterprises to impose further design obligations in relation to connected products manufactured or designed, or the related services provided, by them”.[148]

As with the DSA, a 12-month grace period is applied to enterprises that have grown from a microenterprise or small enterprise to a medium-sized enterprise, thus allowing them to adjust and prepare before facing market competition for services related to the connected products. This period is not available, however, where a newly medium-sized enterprise has a large investor.

Art. 9, which covers compensation principles for making data available, limits costs for data recipients that are SMEs (as well as not-for-profit research organizations). Such firms and organizations can only be asked to pay for costs directly related to making the relevant data available—i.e., the costs necessary for formatting, dissemination, and storage (per Art. 9(2)(a)). Following Recital 49, this is necessary “to protect SMEs from excessive economic burdens which would make it commercially too difficult for them to develop and run innovative business models”.

Recital 49 also recognizes that there may be “directly related costs” attributable to tailoring data to specific SME requests, such as the costs of necessary technical interfaces, software, and connectivity required on a permanent basis by the data holder.[149] Recital 51 stresses the need for price transparency and requires the data holder to provide sufficiently detailed information to the SME for the calculation of the compensation to ensure that the data holder’s compensation request is reasonable.[150] While 12-month grace period excludes medium-sized entities, thereby benefiting startups and scaleups, the provisions concerning costs do also cover medium-sized enterprises.

The Data Act also imports the “gatekeeper” notion from the DMA and excludes designated gatekeepers from benefiting from the act’s data-access rights on the basis that “[s]uch inclusion would also likely limit the benefits of this Regulation for SMEs, linked to the fairness of the distribution of data value across market actors”.[151]

Art. 15 Data Act, concerning entities with an “exceptional need to use data”, allows public-sector and certain European Union entities (the Commission, European Central Bank, and various EU bodies) to access data when performing their duties in public-emergency situations. Under Art. 20(1)(a), access to such data is generally to be provided free of charge. The Data Act acknowledges that these data-access provisions create a burden on businesses, including microenterprises and small enterprises. Thus, the obligation to provide data in public-emergency situations is limited to those circumstances in which public-sector or EU bodies have exhausted all other means at their disposal to obtain such data “in a timely and effective manner under equivalent conditions” (Art. 15(1)(b)(ii)) and Recital 63).

Art. 20(2) Data Act allows for limited compensation in circumstances not covered by Art. 20(1)(a), but for most entities, this would apply only for nonpersonal data and where technical and organizational costs were incurred to comply with the request—e.g., the costs of anonymization, pseudonymization, aggregation, and/or technical adaptation, plus a “reasonable margin”. Art. 20(3) does, however, note that the fair-compensation requirements “shall also apply where a microenterprise and small enterprise claims compensation for making data available” to public-sector or EU bodies, as the obligation to provide data “might constitute a considerable burden” for these smaller entities.[152]

In addition, the Data Act also aims to create a framework for customers to effectively switch between different cloud-services providers. On the latter point, the impact assessment for the Data Act Impact (DA IA) notes that: “SMEs and start-ups would be the greatest beneficiaries from an intervention on cloud switching, as users of cloud and edge services but also as providers of such services”.[153] This is, the DA IA asserts, because regulatory intervention to facilitate cloud switching across the EU would most benefit high-tech SMEs and startups, given the technical problems associated with a lack of standardization (e.g., application portability). In addition, according to the DA IA, “the smaller, often EU-native providers of cloud and edge services will benefit most” from intervention on cloud switching, because they generally lack the resources to move their digital assets to new platforms, as these often use proprietary standards.[154]

Chapter IV of the Data Act makes certain contract terms related to data access unenforceable. Among the areas where this would apply are terms governing contractual liability and remedies for breach or termination of data-related obligations “unilaterally” imposed by one of the parties—e.g., terms that exclude or limit the liability or the remedies, or that grant the exclusive right to determine whether the data supplied data conform with the terms of the contract. As explained in Recital 58, the Data Act seeks to prevent the exploitation of contractual imbalances that “harm all enterprises without a meaningful ability to negotiate the conditions for access to data, and which may have no choice but to accept take-it-or-leave-it contractual terms”.[155]

Recital 111 calls on the Commission to help enterprises draft and negotiate contracts and develop nonbinding model contractual terms, which “should be primarily a practical tool to help in particular SMEs to conclude a contract”.[156] This provision stems from the public-consultation finding that “microenterprises and SMEs ranked ‘unfair contract terms’ second amongst the main difficulties for companies when requesting access to data” and that “contractual imbalances between data holders and data requestors affect, in particular, SMEs and start-ups”.[157]

The scope of the Data Act’s SME provisions is based on the European Parliament’s SME Recommendation definition. A lingering question is whether the rights and obligations contained within the Data Act would be materially different if the SME Recommendation included a specific definition of startup, as called for by various EU bodies. TSUs clearly have different needs than other SMEs, including access to high-quality data; their high levels of collaboration, open systems, and interoperability; and the expectation that continued rapid growth will require significant investment. The Data Act does include provisions to address some of these issues—e.g., excluding microenterprises and small enterprises from data-sharing obligations, minimizing the cost of acquiring data, and providing a 12-month grace period after a microenterprise or small enterprise grows to a medium-sized enterprise. But whether these are provisions are sufficient is another matter altogether.

Of course, the Data Act should be seen in the broader context of the EU’s 2020 European Strategy for Data[158], of which it is one pillar, as is the Data Governance Act. The Strategy for Data recognizes that data “is an essential resource for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing products and services”, given existing market imbalances in firms’ access to and use of data. The strategy does provide some relief for TSUs, most notably in making more public data accessible.

Interestingly, the European Parliament’s recent calls for action to support European SMEs do not focus on the Digital Package. For example, in discussing market access and competition, the Parliament did not touch on digital market competition per se, but noted that it was “of the view that regulatory mechanisms must adapt to and evolve in sync with technological advancements and market shifts to uphold competitiveness and innovation, especially in relation to European start-ups”.[159] The only notable reference was one that called on the Commission to “ensure the harmonised and effective implementation of recent digital regulations”. The Parliament also called on the Commission and member states to foster a European-led ecosystem of marketplaces for nonpersonal data.[160]

D. The Artificial Intelligence Act

The EU’s AI Act[161] applies obligations to providers and users of artificial-intelligence systems, with the goal of balancing AI innovation with ensuring that AI systems are ethical and trustworthy, and that they respect EU values and fundamental rights. The act prohibits the implementation and use of AI systems that present unacceptable risks; permits the use of AI systems that present high risks, subject to compliance with specific requirements and obligations; and allows the use of limited-risk systems subject to transparency obligations. By establishing a regulatory framework for AI systems, the AI Act aims to provide legal certainty and enhance the deployment of trustworthy AI solutions.

Given their important role in the European innovation ecosystem, the AI Act aims to safeguard the interests of startups and SMEs.[162] As the Draghi Report notes, between 2008 and 2021, there were 147 “unicorns” founded in Europe—i.e., startups valued at more than $1 billion. But of these, 40 relocated their headquarters abroad, with the vast majority moving to the United States.[163] The report found that “the lack of growth potential in Europe is particularly relevant for tech-based innovative ventures, and even more so for deep tech ones”, adding that 61% of total global funding for AI startups goes to U.S. companies, 17% to those in China, and just 6% to those in the EU.[164]

The Commission’s impact assessment for the AI Act (AI IA) offers several salient points relevant to these issues. It recognizes, for example, that “without a clear legal framework, start-ups and developers working in this field will not be able to attract the required investments. Similarly, without certainty on applicable rules and clear common standards on what is required for a trustworthy, safe and lawful AI, developers and providers of AI systems and other innovators are less likely to pursue developments in this field”.[165] In particular, the AI Act highlighted the fragmented regulatory landscape across the AI single market as a key problem. The impact assessment noted that:

The impact of this increasing fragmentation is disproportionately affecting small companies. This is because large companies, especially global ones, can spread the additional costs for operating across an increasingly fragmented single market over their larger sales, especially when they already have established a dominant position in some markets. Meanwhile, SMEs and start-ups which do not have the market power or the same resources may be deterred from entering the markets of other Member States and thus fail to profit from the single market. This problem is further exacerbated since big tech players have not only a technological advantage but also exclusive access to large and quality data necessary for the development of AI.[166]

The AI Act creates compliance burdens, including for TSUs, but it also contains measures and protections intended to benefit TSUs.[167] The act’s TSU-specific provisions include:

  • Recital 73 notes the importance of taking the interests of small-scale providers and users of AI systems into account, with an emphasis on capacity building and setting appropriate conformity-assessment fees. For example, given translation-related costs, the recital proposes that EU member states should chose documentation language “which is broadly understood by the largest possible number of cross-border users”.
  • The act promotes regulatory sandboxing schemes to experiment with various AI applications. Recital 72 states: “Regulatory sandboxes should be widely available throughout the Union, and particular attention should be given to their accessibility for SMEs, including startups”. Recital 72 also notes that “The objectives of the regulatory sandboxes should be to foster AI innovation by establishing a controlled experimentation and testing environment in the development and pre-marketing phase with a view to ensuring compliance of the innovative AI systems with this Regulation and other relevant Union and Member States legislation; to enhance legal certainty for innovators and the competent authorities’ oversight and understanding of the opportunities, emerging risks and the impacts of AI use … and to accelerate access to markets, including by removing barriers for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups”.
  • 55 requires member states to grant eligible small-scale providers and startups priority access to AI regulatory sandboxes. It also promotes applying the AI Act in ways tailored to the needs of small-scale providers and users. These would include support for capacity-building efforts; facilitating networking among small providers, users, and other innovators; and encouraging SMEs to participate in the development of standards. Finally, it asserts that small-scale providers’ specific interests and needs should be considered when a relevant national body sets fees for conformity assessment, reducing those fees proportionately to the TSU’s size and the size of the market.
  • The Council and Parliament agreed to a new Art. 55a that would permit certain derogations for specific operators—notably, that qualifying microenterprises (as defined by SME Recommendation 2003/361) may fulfil elements of the quality-management system under Art. 17 in order “to ensure proportionality considering the very small size of some operators regarding costs of innovation”.[168] The article directs the Commission to develop guidelines specifying how microenterprises could fulfil the elements of the quality-management system in this simplified manner. In developing guidelines, the article directs the Commission to consider microenterprises’ needs without affecting the overall level of protection provided by the AI Act or the compliance requirements for high-risk AI systems.
  • 71 AI Act requires EU member states to set out rules on penalties—including administrative fines—for infringement of the act, as well as to ensure that they are properly and effectively implemented. Art. 71 notes that such penalties must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, but that such penalties “shall take into account the interests of SMEs including start-ups and their economic viability”.
  • Finally, under new Art. 34a, the relevant “notified bodies” responsible for administering the AI Act at the national level—such as verifying conformity by high-risk AI systems—should avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on providers. This is to include taking due account of their size, the sector in which they operate, their structure, and the degree of complexity of the AI system in question. It further establishes that “[p]articular attention shall be paid to minimising administrative burdens and compliance costs for micro and small enterprises as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC”.

The Commission’s January 2024 Communication on Boosting Startups and Innovation in Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence[169] offered a broader TSU policy framework around the AI Act, laying out the “actions and investments in 2024 that will help startups and industries in Europe fulfil their potential of becoming global frontrunners in trustworthy advanced AI models, systems and applications”. The communication focused on six principal areas of action:

  1. To facilitate access to European supercomputers that can accelerate the training of AI models (“AI factories”) to “bolster the leadership of European startups and stimulate the emergence of competitive AI ecosystems in the Union”.[170] This would include access to data storage, given the prohibitive expense of large commercial cloud-computing resources;
  2. To facilitate access to high-quality data, leveraging the Data Act and accelerating the development of Common European Data Spaces;
  3. To support trustworthy AI solutions;
  4. To strengthen the EU’s generative-AI talent pool;
  5. To promote the widespread uptake and use of generative-AI applications, notably by public bodies; and
  6. To encourage public and private investment in AI startups and scaleups, leveraging existing instruments like the European Innovation Council and InvestEU that are designed to de-risk and crowd-in private investors.

The framework’s objective is to ensure sufficient investment in the training of AI models, to accelerate the deployment of advanced AI solutions, and to scale up European TSU activities in ways that would enable them to become globally competitive. The communication stresses the Commission’s desire to empower AI TSUs to compete “confidently” on the global stage.[171]

The Commission also published a staff working document (SWD) that sets out an EU initiative on the next technological transition on Web 4.0 and virtual worlds.[172] The SWD notes that: “Web 4.0 SMEs and start-ups in the EU are also faced with a fragmented ecosystem, which leads to challenges in establishing collaborations, sharing knowledge and best practices within the sector. The lack of awareness and visibility of actors along the value chains is a major issue for cooperation. This hinders innovation and leads to other difficulties such as finding the right partner to set up consortia for calls, an issue particularly relevant for securing EU funding. Addressing these issues would build stronger collaborations across hubs and borders”.[173]

The framework proposes a broad range of measures to support AI startups and innovation, including a proposal to provide privileged access to the network of European high-performance computers, reconfigured for rapid machine learning and training large general-purpose AI models. It also envisions the launch of AI factories to support the development, testing, evaluation, and validation of large-scale AI models. These facilities would serve as one-stop shops for AI startups to create advanced AI models and applications.

In addition, the framework proposes that financial support will be provided through EU instruments like Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe Programme, mobilizing about €4 billion in additional public and private investment by 2027. It received a cautious welcome from the EU startup community.[174]

IV. The EU’s Digital Package: What’s in It for Tech Startups?

What we notice in reviewing the EU’s Digital Package is a very mixed bag for TSU interests—bearing in mind that what TSUs need, at a bare minimum, is a reduced compliance burden. This may explain why TSU lobbyists do not generally focus on the recent package of European digital regulations, nor have they often found it necessary to touch on topics related to those regulations.

A. The Digital Markets Act

While the specific interests of SMEs are acknowledged in various parts of the DMA, there are no provisions that would specifically promote the interests of SMEs, let alone startups or entrepreneurs. As discussed in Section III, the principal provision related to designated gatekeepers’ obligations vis-à-vis TSUs is laid down in Art. 14 DMA, though it remains unclear whether that provision will have the intended effect of encouraging the emergence and expansion of TSUs.

Pursuant to Art. 14 DMA, designated gatekeepers must inform the Commission of any intended merger or acquisition involving a gatekeeper’s core platform services—or, indeed, any other services in the digital sector or that entail the collection of data. Art. 14 DMA’s obligation to furnish information to the Commission, coupled with the requirement that the Commission inform national competition authorities of such transactions, effectively allows the EU to seek jurisdiction over the merger no matter how low the transaction value or turnover of the target company. The obligation is enabled through a broad reading of the referral mechanism in Art. 22 of the EU Merger Regulation,[175] under which the Commission can “invite” national authorities to refer mergers with a national scope to the Commission’s jurisdiction.

Assuming Art. 14 remains in place following the European Court of Justice’s Illumina/Grail ruling, which curtailed the Commission’s ability to review mergers that fall below the national-notification thresholds,[176] the Commission’s 2021 Guidance on Art. 22 offers insight into how it might approach a review initiated under Art. 14 DMA.

The Commission’s guidance notes an increase in acquisitions of companies that generate little or no turnover, which it asserts “appear[s] particularly significant in the digital economy, where services regularly launch with the aim of building up a significant user base and/or commercially valuable data inventories, before seeking to monetise the business”.[177] The Commission also provided an illustrative list of cases that will normally be appropriate for a referral under Art. 22, including cases where the undertaking “is a start-up or recent entrant with significant competitive potential that has yet to develop or implement a business model generating significant revenues (or is still in the initial phase of implementing such business model)”. Other relevant considerations include circumstances in which the target is an important innovator; is conducting potentially important research; provides key inputs for others; or has access to significant assets, such as data or intellectual-property rights.[178]

The DMA’s transaction-notification requirements should be seen in the context of concerns about a supposed trend toward rising concentration in digital markets and active acquisition strategies by larger digital players that are alleged to include seeking to buy “promising, innovative start-ups”. As Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson has noted, “[w]hile many observers have dubbed these ‘killer acquisitions’, these are often more like zombie acquisitions: the innovation of the start-up is not killed off, but incorporated into the powerful digital platform”.[179]

In any event, some commentators have speculated that, given these new powers, the Commission may be expected to review more mergers in the digital sector.[180] Indeed, the Commission noted in its SWD on the EU initiative on Web 4.0 and virtual worlds that:

While there are many SMEs and start-ups that are developing innovative and creative technology, the global market is dominated by a small number of large companies accountable for most developments. It is quite common practice that SMEs and start-ups in the EU are acquired by non-EU bigger players, formally removing EU companies from the overall ecosystem. This phenomenon prevents companies from growing and scaling-up in the EU and further exacerbates the challenges linked to accessing funding.[181]

Art. 14 DMA would thus appear intended to limit acquisitions by gatekeepers, in a bid to encourage the independent expansion of homegrown (European) TSUs. This approach could backfire, however, and end up stifling the same TSUs it aims to foster. For example, in the context of TSUs active in the AI space, Tomada suggests that mergers and acquisition between TSUs and larger players should be encouraged “so that the established businesses can buy out or absorb the small-business innovative activity thereby taking over all related conformity requirements and responsibilities”.[182]

It has also been suggested that the anticompetitive threat of so-called “killer acquisitions” in digital markets has been greatly exaggerated[183] and, furthermore, that such transactions are often procompetitive.[184] Recent policy statements indicate that the Commission holds a different view.[185]

Emblematic of the tension between startups’ exit strategies and proposals for an enhanced merger-control regime was a 2020 French parliamentary debate to consider amendments to the French competition act’s merger-review provisions.[186] The amendments would have granted power to the French competition authority to designate certain large players as being of “structural” importance. Thereafter, such players would be required to inform the authority of any planned transaction, including those below existing merger thresholds. In the event the authority were to investigate a transaction and express serious concerns, while there would still be an in-depth review, a presumption of anticompetitive effect would apply. The company would have had the burden to disprove the presumption and demonstrate the procompetitive nature of the transaction. The law did not come into effect only because it was superseded by the DMA.

The French parliamentary debate offers some insight into the thinking that underpins the desire to have gatekeeper-like firms undergo closer scrutiny of their transactions. During the debate, Cédric O—the secretary of state to the minister of the economy responsible for digital affairs—discussed broader concerns related to startups.[187] He bemoaned the lack of startup growth and investment in Europe, compared to the United States and China, and acknowledged that much was left to be done for startups to be able to achieve. O further argued that France and Europe needed to create the fiscal, regulatory, and investment conditions that would allow new champions to emerge: “our very own Google and Facebook”.[188] The startup question was thus considered an issue of economic sovereignty for the French government. This was the context to grant the competition authority more powers to prohibit “predatory acquisitions” by “certain platforms”—i.e., non-European, mostly U.S.-based firms.

The secretary argued that a key question for French startups was their market-exit strategy, noting that 90% of startups in the digital economy were ultimately subject to takeovers. He recognized that, if Europe’s global ecosystem was to grow, there was little choice in the short and medium term but see digital startups bought by foreign buyers, partly because large European incumbents are rarely acquisitive. O noted that, while many regret that French startups are often bought out by U.S. companies, he also regretted that he could not force French companies to buy them back. O also suggested encouraging these startups to be listed on the stock exchange.

The French government proposed a bill to limit French startups’ exit strategies, knowing that acquisition is one of the principal methods upon which startups and their investors rely.[189] Indeed, many TSUs and startups are created with the specific goal of being acquired by an incumbent.[190] Yet the French government did not propose how to fill the investment gap that would be created if the usual acquirers were prohibited or disincentivized from offering an exit strategy.

The EU’s approach with the DMA appears to hinge on the same questionable assumption—namely, that inhibiting acquisitions of EU startups is the optimal strategy to nurture their growth. This stance, however, risks eliminating a crucial exit strategy for these startups, which could ultimately undermine their ability to thrive in the competitive global market.

The Draghi Report underscores a pressing requirement for EU TSUs: increased investment and better access to capital. By restricting acquisition opportunities, the DMA might inadvertently stifle investor interest and diminish the potential for these startups to scale and become European TSUs. Instead of fostering a robust ecosystem for innovation, such regulations could lead to the opposite outcome—reducing the number of successful European TSUs capable of competing on a global scale. In this sense, it seems that the DMA is more concerned with hobbling gatekeepers than enhancing TSUs.[191]

B. The Digital Services Act

The DSA does not contain substantive TSU-focused provisions. Indeed, the European Parliament argued for specific measures to protect smaller players and proposed that:

The DSA should put forward a proposal for a new separate instrument aiming at ensuring that the systemic role of specific online platforms will not endanger the internal market by unfairly excluding innovative new entrants, including SMEs, entrepreneurs and start-ups, thereby reducing consumer choice.[192]

This was not, however, taken up in the final text.

The DSA’s main TSU focus is to shield microenterprises and small enterprises from disproportionate compliance burdens—such as, e.g., the annual content-moderation reporting obligation for intermediary service providers and online-platform service providers. There is consensus that startups and their investors must have the ability to assess regulatory costs, given that such costs can be prohibitive, with legal risks having “a chilling effect on investment and [ability to] dissuade businesses from expanding and growing in the single market-ups”.[193]

The DSA extends these exemptions to TSUs that have scaled up beyond the definition of microenterprise or small enterprise for 12 months following the loss of that status, thereby acknowledging TSUs’ tendency for “hyper-growth”. It is likely that a formal TSU definition would help the Commission to provide even more responsive protections for scaling TSU, which might include an exemption beyond the 12-month time horizon. It might therefore seem that the DSA is a step in the right direction, although the lack of focus or legal definition continues to hamper TSU interests.

Moreover, it has been argued that “The DSA still operates with complex compliance obligations that will heighten entry barriers in comparison with other parts of the world” and that the additional operational costs imposed by European digital regulations could result in TSUs choosing non-EU states to establish their business (an “innovation-cooling effect”), thereby depriving European users of the latest digital solutions and platform services. [194]

C. The Data Act

Like the DSA, the Data Act contains several provisions specifically responsive to TSU needs, including reduced compliance and cost burdens on SMEs, microenterprises, and startups. This includes TSUs, as data recipients would only be asked to pay data providers for costs directly related to making data available.

The Data Act offers further protections to TSUs as data providers, making contractual terms unilaterally imposed on them unenforceable. This provision follows in the wake of SMEs and microenterprises ranking unfair contract terms as second among the major difficulties they face when requesting access to data. The Data Act also excludes SMEs from various data-sharing obligations considered overly burdensome. In addition, TSUs are entitled to fair compensation if obliged to provide data to certain public bodies under the “exceptional need” provision (whereas other data providers receive only limited compensation). While this is welcome, it is notable that, as France Digitale member Mirakl, noted: “every new digital legislation is costing us a million euro, obliging us to do a trade-off between compliance and innovation”.[195]

As with the DSA, TSUs remain covered by the SME definition for 12 months after they grow beyond that category. But as France Digitale noted, TSUs’ tendency for “hyper-growth” means that they can quickly find themselves facing the requirement to abide by the same standards as larger established companies without having the capacity or maturity to manage such compliance burdens.[196]

D. The AI Act

In its provisions prioritizing TSUs’ access to national AI sandboxes, building AI capacity, requiring sensitivity to TSU interests when codes of conduct are developed, and showing sensitivity to costs and fine levels, the AI Act goes well beyond the other acts in the EU’s Digital Package. The AI Act permits certain derogations or simplifications for qualifying TSUs and reduces conformity-assessment fees for small-scale providers. Administrative bodies are asked to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on TSUs, and any penalties imposed must consider TSUs’ interests and their economic viability (although the latter merely reflects the principle of proportionality).

Yet the AI Act is not devoid of criticism. Tomada believes the act’s regulatory-compliance requirements for running high-risk AI systems will pose particular challenges for TSUs, and that “both the administrative and organisational costs and the time required to undergo the conformity assessment procedure may hinder the process from ideation to deployment, and this can be particularly challenging for small scale businesses”.[197] Cristiano Codagnone and Linda Weigl posit that the AI Act will create more obstacles for innovative SMEs than for large incumbents. [198] They highlight “the impression that there is an excessive reliance on regulation without a thorough appraisal of the costs imposed on businesses to deal with administrative burden, conformity tests, and audits” on TSUs.[199]

Tomada also notes that the act’s provisions to support TSUs “may not be sufficient for comprehensively supporting the business in undergoing the entire cumbersome procedure that will enable its product or service to reach the market”.[200]  In addition, a considerable penalty or risk thereof may well cause the business to fail or even impede their access to the market”.[201] She predicts that the act’s failure to address a range of TSU-specific concerns will likely mean that “small-businesses will likely keep being discouraged from deploying their AI innovations in light of the risks of considerable penalties and liability they still may face”.[202]

The EU’s AI Continent Action Plan, published in April 2025, recognizes the need to simplify rules to enable startups to scale and grow—especially the AI Act.[203] Among the measures proposed are an AI Act Service Desk, specifically to serve the needs of smaller AI-solution providers and deployers by offering practical advice to understand and comply with the act;[204] a public consultation to identify areas where regulatory uncertainty might hinder the development and adoption of AI, particularly for smaller companies;[205] and other simplification measures meant to streamline procedures and facilitate compliance (e.g., templates, webinars, guidance, etc.).[206]

It is apparent from these measures that the Commission is aware that compliance with the AI Act may divert significant resources from TSUs and stifle their development. Whether the simplification measures contemplated in the AI Continent Action Plan will ultimately work is an open question. But the fact that the Commission is already seeking to ease the regulatory burden on startups less than a year after the act’s adoption suggests that EU regulators are not only aware of this burden but acknowledge its potentially serious impact. Conversely, it also suggests that these tradeoffs are given insufficient consideration during the inception stages of major European regulations.

V. Conclusion

This white paper explores whether the EU’s recent package of digital regulations responds to TSUs’ needs. The answer appears to be that there is a high level of heterogeneity, with some acts attempting to address TSU-specific concerns and others barely acknowledging them.

One aspect that the acts in the Digital Package have in common is that they all generally provide some carveouts for SMEs to assuage their regulatory and compliance burdens. These range from the DMA only applying to large “gatekeepers” to the more comprehensive pro-startup provisions laid down in the AI Act. Of course, the more targeted a regulation is to a particular sector or sectors—as in the case of the AI Act—the easier it is for the European Commission to develop provisions that support TSUs.

Despite the various TSU-related carveouts, European policy regarding startups and innovation more generally continue to be undermined by the Digital Package’s many contradictions. These both hinder coherent efforts to support SMEs and increase compliance burdens for TSUs and other firms, all of which may harm competition, investment, and innovation. Likewise, despite some attempts in the Digital Package to acknowledge TSUs’ needs, there remain several areas where the EU is failing, and where adjustments will be necessary to address the concerns outlined in the Draghi and Letta reports.

First, the need for an agreed-upon legal definition of TSUs is obvious. This would allow for tailored exceptions to be developed that support TSUs’ specific needs. This is not a new concern, nor can it necessarily be set out in sectoral regulation; rather, it may deserve its own instrument.

Second, there is a need for the European Commission to more rigorously consider the specific perspectives and structural constraints of TSUs in its impact assessments. The impact assessments supporting the Digital Package are highly inconsistent in their focus on TSUs. Teece and Kahwaty, for instance, argue that the DMA IA’s conclusion that the benefits to SMEs, startups and consumers would substantially outweigh the costs was largely speculative.[207] This may reflect the fact that TSU interests are not always a genuine priority, despite frequent policy statements claiming otherwise.

Third, the TSU exemptions or exceptions across the Digital Package are often timid and fail to fully address TSUs’ core concerns, such as the distraction and cost compliance burdens created by the EU’s complex matrix of digital regulation. In addition, where primary legislation may not be the best vehicle to address other concerns—such as capacity-building support or easier access to procurement markets—they should be provided via flanking measures, as we see in the AI context. This should happen as a matter of course, and in parallel to the development of the regulatory framework.

Finally, there is a case to be made that TSU growth is a symptom, rather than the cause, of thriving tech industries. If true, this constitutes a further indictment of the impact assessments that led up to key pieces of European legislation. These assessments often appear to overlook important tradeoffs inherent to economic regulation, such as reduced investment and increased barriers to entry. These obstacles undermine not just the TSUs that policymakers otherwise seek to protect but also the broader industry, where many players of varying sized may be important sources of competition or innovation.

In conclusion, while European policymakers have consistently voiced a strong commitment to fostering the growth of TSUs, the design of the EU’s Digital Package—comprising the DMA, DSA, Data Act, and AI Act—demonstrates a mixed and often insufficient consideration for their specific needs and constraints. This lack of tailored attention is compounded by evidence from the Draghi Report and academic literature clearly demonstrating that misguided or excessive regulations can impose significant compliance burdens and have a chilling effect on investment. As seen in the experience with the GDPR, this limits startups’ ability to scale and hinders further innovation.

Among the crucial insights highlighted by the Draghi Report was one often overlooked in the policy focus on small companies: size matters for performance, innovation, and ultimately, European competitiveness. To the extent that the Digital Package imposes burdens on large companies and, through compliance costs and potentially restricted exit opportunities, increases the hurdles for tech startups to grow beyond a certain size, it could inadvertently run counter to the stated goal of fostering competitive European firms and reclaiming a leading position at the technological frontier.

[1] See, e.g., Frederik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, & Oscar du Roy, Keeping Up with the US: Why Europe’s Productivity Is Falling Behind, Eur. Cent. Int. Polit. Econ. (2024), at 1, https://ecipe.org/publications/keeping-up-with-the-us-why-europes-productivity-is-falling-behind. (According to the report, “[t]he European Union stands at a crossroads. For decades, the EU’s productivity growth has consistently lagged the United States, leading to slower growth in living standards and decline in global economic power”. This is due to lower R&D investment, weaker intangible capital growth, and slower business dynamism, which together hinder innovation and technology adoption. Additionally, despite being more open to trade, the EU attracts less foreign direct investment, which has limited access to global technological advancements).

[2] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — Part A, Eur. Comm’n (9 September 2024), at 12, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en. (“Yet growth in the EU has been slowing, driven by weakening productivity growth, calling into question Europe’s ability to meet its ambitions… EU economic growth has been persistently slower than in the US over the past two decades, while China has been rapidly catching up. The EU-US gap in the level of GDP at 2015 prices has gradually widened from slightly more than 15% in 2002 to 30% in 2023, while on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis a gap of 12% has emerged”.)

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id., at 5.

[6] A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, Eur. Comm’n (29 January 2025),  https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en. See also, e.g., Ursula von der Leyen, Opening Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Innovation Council Launch Ceremony, Eur. Comm’n (24 March 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/speech_21_1241. (Von der Leyen described the rationale of the European Innovation Council: “With our European Innovation Council, we make EUR 10 billion available until 2027: We fund small- and medium-size companies with high risk but also with high potential. We support innovative researchers that have ideas for the next breakthrough technology. And we offer coaching, matchmaking and support them to set up a business. The European Innovation Council is also part of our answer to the equity-funding gap in Europe. Currently, many European start-ups cannot find the risk capital they need. Experts estimate that this funding gap is as large as EUR 70 billion. Our new EIC Fund is a good start. It alone brings EUR 3 billion to the table. With the EIC Fund, the Commission is for the first time investing directly in start-ups and SMEs”).

[7] Kai Zenner, J. Scott Marcus, & Kamil Sekut, A Dataset on EU Legislation for the Digital World, Bruegel (16 November 2023) https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/dataset-eu-legislation-digital-world.

[8] A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, Eur. Comm’n (2024) ?https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age_en.

[9] See Anne Marie Knott & Carl Vieregger, Reconciling the Firm Size and Innovation Puzzle, 31 Org. Sci. 477 (2020). (Finding that “both R&D spending and R&D productivity increase with firm size. Thus, large firms seem to be acting rationally in their increasing R&D investments, as one would expect”). The classic study of the subject remains Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942).

[10] See Robert Armstrong & Ethan Wu, What Big Tech Antitrust Gets Wrong: An Interview with Herbert Hovenkamp, Financ. Times (19 January 2024) https://www.ft.com/content/4eec8bc3-c892-4704-ae66-a4432c6d4fd7. (“With Big Tech, we’re looking at probably the most productive part of the economy. The rate of innovation is high. They spend a lot of money on R&D. They are among the largest patent holders”). For instance, in 2023, Amazon topped the list of R&D spending at $85.6 billion, followed by Alphabet (Google) at $45.4 billion, Meta at $38.5 billion, Apple at $29.9 billion, and Microsoft at $27.2 billion. Brian Buntz, Top 30 R&D Leaders of 2023: Big Tech Spending Hits new Heights, R&D World (17 June 2024), https://www.rdworldonline.com/top-30-rd-spending-leaders-2023-big-tech-firms-hit-new-heights.

[11] Knott & Vieregger, supra note 9.

[12] Geoffrey A. Manne, Samuel Bowman, & Dirk Auer, Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 86 Mo. L. Rev. 1048, 1066-67 (2022).

[13] Id., at 1055.

[14] See, e.g., Jacques Cre?mer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, & Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy For The Digital Era Final Report, Eur. Union (2019), at 117-118, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21dc175c-7b76-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.

[15] See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, Lazar Radic, & Dirk Auer, Regulate for What? A Closer Look at the Rationale and Goals of Digital Competition Regulations, 22 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 201 (2025).

[16] See, e.g., Sara Guidi, Innovation Commons for the Data Economy, 2 Dig. Soc. 30, 31 (2023).

[17] For example, Arts 5(7) and (8) DMA restrict gatekeepers from tying or bundling their core platform services with other services; Art 6(5) DMA prohibits gatekeepers from favouring their own products or services.

[18] Dirk Auer, The Broken Promises of Europe’s Digital Regulation, Truth Mark. (12 March 2024), https://truthonthemarket.com/2024/03/12/the-broken-promises-of-europes-digital-regulation.

[19] Manne et al., supra note 15, at 249 et seq.

[20] Draghi, supra note 2, at 7, 12, 30, 33.

[21] Id., at 30.

[22] Id.

[23] Id., at 33.

[24] Id., at 69. (“EU regulation imposes a proportionally higher burden on SMEs and small mid-caps than on larger companies, yet the EU lacks a framework to assess these costs. About 80% of Commission Work Programme items are relevant to SMEs but only around half of impact assessments substantially focused on these companies. The EU also lacks a commonly agreed definition of small mid-caps and readily available statistical data”).

[25] Enrico Letta, Much More Than a Market, Eur. Council (Apr. 2024), available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf.

 

[26] For a full exploration, see European Startup Scoreboard – Feasibility Study 4, Eur. Comm’n (2023), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/70fe2318-fb72-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en (“Feasibility Study”).

[27] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — Part B, Eur. Comm’n (9 September 2024), at 232, 242, 247, available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ec1409c1-d4b4-4882-8bdd-3519f86bbb92_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness_%20In-depth%20analysis%20and%20recommendations_0.pdf (e.g., the proposals to improve the innovation ecosystem begin with “a better financing environment for disruptive innovation, start-ups and scale-ups”).

[28] Joint Motion for a Resolution on the State of the SME Union (RC-B9-0346/2023), Eur. Parl. (2023) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0346_EN.html.

[29] European Innovation Council (EIC) Accelerator, Eur. Comm’n, https://eic.ec.europa.eu/eic-accelerator_en (last visited 28 May 2025).

[30] Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 124), Eur. Comm’n (2003), at 36, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:124:0036:0041:en:PDF.

[31] See also Letizia Tomada, Start-Ups and the Proposed EU AI Act: Bridges or Barriers in the Path from Invention to Innovation?, 13 J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L. 53 (2022). (The Commission, presumably aware of this conceptual shortcoming, recently launched an initiative to harmonize definitions related to startups, scaleups and deep-tech innovation, publishing the results of its Feasibility Study for a European Startup Scoreboard in 2023. The feasibility study found that certain key concepts in the startup ecosystem lack definitional coherence and “…the only concepts present in all categories of sources are startups and scale-ups”). See European Commission, supra note 26.

[32] For example, see Commission Communication on A New European Innovation Agenda, COM(2022) 332 final, Eur. Comm’n (5 July 2022), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0332; see also Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission Communication on A New European Innovation Agenda, Eur. Comm’n (5 July 2022) at 187, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0187; Spain Drives Technological Entrepreneurship Leadership in Europe, La Moncloa (19 October 2023), https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2023/20231019_esna-meeting.aspx; European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2023 on Increasing Innovation, Industrial and Technological Competitiveness Through a Favourable Environment for Start-Ups and Scale-Ups (2023/2110(INI)), Eur. Parl. (14 December 2023), Points 1-4, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0480_EN.html.

[33] EU 2024-2029: For a Competitive, Innovative and Sustainable Europe, France Digitale’s Manifesto for the 2024 European Elections, France Digitale (December 2023), available at https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2023/11/28111529/France-Digitale-2024-European-Manifesto-web-1.pdf.

[34] European Tech Voices, Stripe (July 2022), available at https://assets.ctfassets.net/fzn2n1nzq965/as5AW9rw46xEysdTl9Ie8/19b71550059812fcbe2a78b2c2b438f7/Stripe-European_Tech_Voices.pdf.

[35] France Digitale, supra note 33.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Parliament’s SME Resolution, supra note 28, at paras. (i), 48 and 49.

[40] Parliament’s Innovation Resolution, supra note 32,  para 36.

[41] Id., para 38.

[42] Draghi, supra note 27.

[43] Draghi, supra note 2, at 6. (“The problem is not that Europe lacks ideas or ambition. We have many talented researchers and entrepreneurs filing patents. But innovation is blocked at the next stage: we are failing to translate innovation into commercialisation, and innovative companies that want to scale up in Europe are hindered at every stage by inconsistent and restrictive regulations”).

[44] Id., at 79.

[45] Draghi, supra note 27, at 254.

[46] Id.

[47] Draghi, supra note 2, at 33.

[48] Id., at 8.

[49] Id., at 30.

[50] Id., at 69.

[51] Ursula von der Leyen, Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024–2029, Eur. Comm‘n, (18 July 2024), available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.

[52] Id., at 11.

[53] Id., at 7.

[54] Id. (“We need to make business easier and faster in Europe…I will make speed, coherence and simplification political priorities in everything we do”).

[55] Id.

[56] Id., at 6. (“We need a new momentum to complete the Single Market in sectors like services, energy, defence, finance, electronic communications and digital. This will allow our companies – especially our small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – to scale up and make the most of the market”).

[57] Ursula von der Leyen, Mission Letter to Ekaterina Zaharieva, (17 September 2024), at 5, available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/130e9159-8616-4c29-9f61-04592557cf4c_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20ZAHARIEVA.pdf (“I would like you to develop an EU start-up and scale-up strategy that improves the framework conditions for start-ups and scale-ups”).

[58] Von der Leyen, supra note 6.

[59] Id., at 4. (“The Draghi report shows that productivity growth is the result of a combination of two forces: disruptive innovation brought about by new, dynamic start-ups challenging incumbents”).

[60] Id.

[61] Id.

[62] Id., at 4-5.

[63] European Commission, Europe’s Next Leaders: The Start-Up and Scale-Up Initiative, Eur. Comm’n (22 November 2016), at 733, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2016%3A733%3AFIN.

[64] Regulation 2015/1017, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 169) 1 (EU).

[65] Startup Europe: Strengthening Networking for Deep Tech Scaleups and Ecosystem Builders, Eur. Comm’n, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/startup-europe (last visited 28 July 2025).

[66] European Commission, A New European Innovation Agenda, Eur. Comm’n (5 July 2022), at 332, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13437-A-New-European-Innovation-Agenda_en.

[67] The European Innovation Council approved €1 billion in funding for 159 deep-tech startups in its first year. See European Innovation Council (EIC), Eur. Comm’n, https://eic.ec.europa.eu (last visited 28 July 2025).

[68] Launch of New Fund of Funds to Support European Tech Champions, Eur. Invest. Bank (13 February 2023), https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-056-launch-of-new-fund-of-funds-to-support-european-tech-champions.

[69] Stripe, supra note 34, at 11.

[70] EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy: A Roadmap for European Tech Leaders, France Digitale (15 May 2025), available at https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2025/03/14182410/France-Digitale-EU-Startup-and-Scaleup-Strategy-.pdf.

[71] Draghi, supra note 2, at 2; see also id., at 25-6. (“The lack of growth potential in Europe is particularly relevant for tech-based innovative ventures, and even more so for deep tech ones. For example, 61% of total global funding for AI start-ups goes to US companies, 17% to those in China and just 6% to those in the EU. For quantum computing, EU companies attract only 5% of global private funding compared with a 50% share attracted by US companies”).

[72] European Commission, supra note 32, at para 20.

[73] Draghi, supra note 2, at 18. (“There are still other areas where the EU should do less, applying the subsidiarity principle more rigorously and showing more ‘self-restraint’. It will also be crucial to reduce the regulatory burden on companies. Regulation is seen by more than 60% of EU companies as an obstacle to investment, with 55% of SMEs flagging regulatory obstacles and the administrative burden as their greatest challenge”).

[74] Letta, supra note 25, at 107.

[75] Id., at 120. (In addition, the report finds that: “The dynamism and efficiency of the Single Market are currently being significantly impeded by a complex web of challenges, primarily due to the excessive regulatory burden and bureaucratic red tape. These issues have not only created an intolerable barrier to the effective implementation of Single Market rules but have also severely undermined business competitiveness, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises… This over-regulation places significant additional costs on businesses, proving unsustainable for SMEs and inadvertently favouring non-European companies that are not bound by the same stringent rules”).

[76] For a short overview of this literature, see Adam Thierer, GDPR & European Innovation Culture: What the Economic Evidence Shows, Medium (5 February 2023). https://medium.com/@AdamThierer/gdrp-european-innovation-culture-what-the-economic-evidence-shows-b19d2309de07#:~:text=websites%20internationally,and%20vendor%20concentration%20dissipate%20by. For an overview of research concerning privacy laws, more generally, see William Rinehart, What Is the Cost of Privacy Legislation?, Cent. Growth Oppor. (17 November 2022), https://www.thecgo.org/benchmark/what-is-the-cost-of-privacy-legislation.

[77] Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin, & Liad Wagman, The Persisting Effects of the EU General Data Protection Regulation on Technology Venture Investment, Antitrust Source (June 2021), at 2, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-magazine-online/2021/june-2021/jun2021-jia.pdf#:~:text=time%2C%20through%202020,As%20a. (“[A]fter the GDPR’s rollout, the number of monthly financing deals for EU technology ventures declined by 26.1 percent compared to their U.S. counterparts”).

[78] Id., at 1. (“Using venture investment data, we examine how the regulation may have affected investments in European technology ventures over time, through 2020. Our findings indicate a persisting reduction in the number of investment deals in nascent European technology ventures following the implementation of the legislation in comparison to technology ventures in the United States. As a result, policymakers considering tighter data regulations should weigh these costs against the potential benefits”).

[79] Id., at 4-5. (“We find evidence that the negative effect from the GDPR on EU technology venture investment persists 2.5 years after the rollout of the GDPR, although the magnitude of the effect is decreasing over time. EU technology firms, relative to their U.S. counterparts, experienced an average decline of 21.51 percent in their number of venture investment deals”). See also at 2-3. (“The negative effects are larger in the 6-month period immediately after the GDPR’s rollout in 2018, but some of them are sustained in 2019. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that such negative effects are more pronounced for younger ventures, consumer-facing ventures, earlier funding rounds, and for technology ventures that are more reliant on data”).

[80] Id., at 5. (“We also find that consumer-facing (B2C) ventures incur larger declines than business-facing (B2B) ventures. This difference between B2C and B2B ventures is potentially because consumer-facing products have more exposure to the regulation”).

[81] Garrett A. Johnson, Scott K. Shriver, & Samuel G. Goldberg, Privacy and Market Concentration: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the GDPR, 69 Mgmt. Sci. 5695, 5696 (2023).

[82] Id., at 5708.

[83]  Michal S. Gal & Oshrit Aviv, The Competitive Effects of the GDPR, 16 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 349, 352 (2020).

[84] Chinchih Chen, Carl B. Frey, & Giorgio Presidente, Privacy Regulation and Firm Performance: Estimating the GDPR Effect Globally, 62 Econ. Inquiry (2024): 1074, 1075 (2024).

[85] Yu Zhao, Pinar Yildirim, & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Privacy Regulations and Online Search Friction: Evidence from GDPR (Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series Report No. 23-141, 2023).

[86] Id., at 15.

[87] Draghi, supra note 2, at 69.

[88] Draghi, supra note 27, at 79.

[89] Rebecca Janssen, Reinhold Kesler, Michael E. Kummer, & Joel Waldfogel, GDPR and the Lost Generation of Innovative Apps, (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 30028, 2022), at 2.

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Klaus M. Miller, Julia Schmitt, & Bernd Skiera, The Impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on Online Usage Behavior, arXiv (18 November 2024), at 1, https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.11589.

[93] Ellen O’Regan, Europe’s GDPR Privacy Law Is Headed for Red Tape Bonfire Within “Weeks”, Politico (3 April 2025), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-gdpr-privacy-law-europe-president-ursula-von-der-leyen. (“Europe’s most famous technology law, the GDPR, is next on the hit list as the European Union pushes ahead with its regulatory killing spree to slash laws it reckons are weighing down its businesses”).

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Regulation 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1; Regulation 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1.

[98] The Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets, Eur. Comm’n https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en (last visited 15 May 2025).

[99] See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, Invited Statement of Geoffrey A. Manne on House Judiciary Investigation Into Competition in Digital Markets (17 April 2020), at 44, available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Manne_statement_house_antitrust_20200417_FINAL3-POST.pdf. (“There is little evidence for ‘killer acquisitions’ in digital markets, and it would be nearly impossible to identify which acquisitions are ‘killer’ before the fact. Acquisitions are often investors’ and founders’ ‘exit strategy,’ and the evidence suggests that deterring acquisitions in tech would chill investment in startups and harm innovation”); Statement of Scott Kupor, Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: FTC Hearing #3 Day 1: Multi-Sided Platforms, Labor Markets, and Potential Competition, FTC Transcript 183 (15 October 2018), (“[L]arge players play a significant role as acquirers of venture-backed startup companies, which is an important part of the overall health of the venture ecosystem”); La Actual Propuesta Sobre DMA Impacta Negativamente en el Ecosistema Europeo de Startups, Asociación Española de Startups, https://asociacionstartups.es/la-actual-propuesta-sobre-dma-impacta-negativamente-en-el-ecosistema-europeo-de-startups (last visited May 15, 2025), (“Net VC numbers could plunge in Europe for a period still to be estimated, as the impact of the DMA on the ecosystem and the uncertainty it can generate keeps under assessment. The impact could be greater and deeper in more risk-averse investment models such as corporate ventures and regular M&A”).

[100] Carmelo Cennamo & Juan Santaló, Potential Risks and Unintended Effects of the New EU Digital Markets Act (Open Internet Governance Institute Paper Series No. 4, February 2023), available at https://www.esade.edu/ecpol/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/AAFF_EcPol-OIGI_PaperSeries_04_Potentialrisks_ENG_v5.pdf.

[101] Id., at 11.

[102] Meredith Broadbent, Implications of the Digital Markets Act for Transatlantic Cooperation, Cent. Strateg. Int. Stud. (15 September 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-digital-markets-act-transatlantic-cooperation.

[103] Will the Digital Services Act Help Startups Succeed?, GLOBSEC (16 July 2020) https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/commentaries/will-digital-services-act-help-startups-succeed.

[104] Id.

[105] GLOBSEC, supra note 103.

[106] Thierer, supra note 76.

[107] Jia, Zhe, & Wagman, supra note 77. (“Data regulation, however, entails tradeoffs. On the one hand, consumers who value privacy and the ability to more readily exercise control over their data could benefit from enhanced data regulation. On the other hand, these same consumers may also encounter new market conditions that they do not like, such as higher prices or fewer innovations. Indeed, data regulations increase firms’ compliance costs, and existing economic theories also show that compliance costs can disproportionately impact nascent firms and dampen entrepreneurs’ incentives to pursue innovations as new ventures. Because these economic costs can reduce profitability, they may also affect the ability of new, innovative companies to receive funding from investors”).

[108] Gal & Aviv, supra note 83.

[109] Johnson, Shriver, & Goldberg, supra note 81, at 5695. (“The week after the GDPR’s enforcement, website use of web technology vendors falls by 15% for EU residents. Websites are more likely to drop smaller vendors, which increases the relative concentration of the vendor market by 17%. Increased concentration predominantly arises among vendors that use personal data such as cookies, and from the increased relative shares of Facebook and Google-owned vendors, but not from website consent requests”).

[110] Thierer, supra note 76.

[111] American Innovation Under Siege: Venture Capital Data Reveal Risks From Rising Global Regulatory Overreach, Am. Edge Proj. (March 2024), at 8, available at https://americanedgeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/AEP-and-PitchBook-Study-March-2024.pdf.

[112] Id., at 7.

[113] European Commission, supra note 98.

[114] DMA, recital 32.

[115] DMA, recital 33.

[116] The DMA IA does touch apps developers, many of whom may be TSUs who would benefit directly from Apple’s App Store being designated as a core platform service. The DMA IA notes at 27 that: “We have also calculated that, if the commission charged by the Apple App Store is excessive and those charges were reduced by half (from 30% to 15%), this could increase EU consumer surplus by €490m if the benefits are passed onto consumers through lower prices, or create the potential for additional investment and innovation by app developers”.

[117] For example, fair ranking (art. 6(5)); restrictions on gatekeepers using data generated by business users on their platforms—e.g., when business users seek to develop competing apps or services (art. 6(2)); data-portability provisions allowing end users to port their data from gatekeeper platforms (art. 6(9) & (10)), thus enabling end users to move their data to competitors and for business users to secure “free of charge… effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time access to, and use of, aggregated and non-aggregated data” generated by their apps, “giving competitors & new entrants a chance to capture new demand”;[117] access to anonymized “ranking query click & view” data (art. 6(11)) from gatekeeper search engines, assisting new search engines to improve their performance.

[118] Eleonor Bonel, New Rules for Digital Markets: A Roadmap to the Digital Markets Act, Eur. Digit. SME Alliance (7 July 2022), https://www.digitalsme.eu/new-rules-for-digital-markets-a-roadmap-to-the-digital-markets-act.

[119] DMA, art. 14(1): “A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest”. One of the DMA’s revolutions was to grant the Commission power under art. 18 to, for a limited time, prohibit gatekeepers from collecting data or entering any concentration in the digital sector. This remedy is likely to be exceptional, as it can only be applied in the event of a finding of systemic noncompliance and must both proportionate and necessary to maintain or restore fairness and contestability.

[120] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (the European Commission Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.

[121] The Commission’s Impact Assessment for the Digital Services Act sees the DMA as particularly relevant for innovative startups and scaleups. See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act), SWD(2020) 348 final (15 December 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020SC0348. (“The Digital Markets Act intervention focuses on large online platforms, which have become gatekeepers and whose unfair conduct in the market may undermine the competitive environment and the contestability of the markets, especially for innovative start-ups and scale-ups”).

[122] David J. Teece & Henry J. Kahwaty, Is the Digital Markets Act the Cure for Europe’s Platform Ills? Evidence From the European Commission’s Impact Assessment, in The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets 5 (Frank Fagan & James Langenfeld eds., 2023).

[123] See Digital Markets Act, Eur. Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-markets-act (last visited 18 January 2025).

[124] DMA, recitals 10, 23.

[125] See, e.g., Annual Competition Report 2024, Eur. Comm’n (25 April 2024), at 2, available at https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/12ef50fd-eee5-43f1-b81b-ac014b226bdc_en?filename=annual-competition-report_2024_report_part1_en.pdf (“[T]he European Commission…and its Directorate General for Competition continued to develop EU competition policy to achieve the objectives of a green, digital, and resilient European economy, as well as to actively enforce competition rules” (emphasis added)); Annual Competition Report 2023, Eur. Comm’n (6 March 2024), at 2, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/53a4d34f-f3f6-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1. (“EU competition policy was one of many tools successfully used for the continued crisis response, the economic recovery, as well as delivering on the green and digital transitions” (emphasis added)).

[126] For example, recital 68 notes that “the Commission should publish online a link to the non-confidential summary of the [gatekeeper’s compliance] report, as well as all other public information based on information obligations under this Regulation, in order to ensure accessibility of such information in a usable and comprehensive manner, in particular for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)”. Art. 9 also required that the Commission take SME interests into account when it considers whether to suspend the application of specific DMA obligations in exceptional circumstances that are beyond the gatekeeper’s control.

[127] Eoghan O’Neill, EU’s Digital Markets Act: Opportunity Engine for Startups, Eur. Comm’n (December 2023), available at https://assets-global.website-files.com/60143b5f4bfa6c7e7f2266fb/657f926d3ca04deb2fffc368_2023%20DMA%20-%20startup%20opportunity%20engine%20(Dublin).pdf.

[128] See Giuseppe Colangelo & Alba Ribera Martinez, The Metrics of DMA’s Success, 1 Eur. J. Risk. Reg. 20-21 (2024), (Arguing that “although contestability and fairness are the proclaimed protected legal interests, they do not represent the outcomes the EU legislator aimed to embed in the Regulation”. The DMA’s success must instead be measured against its real goals, which are “market modelling, openness, neutralizing competitive advantages, and enhancing transparency”).

[129] Olivier Guersent, Keynote Speech at the Annual CRA Brussels Conference, Eur. Comm’n (6 December 2023), available at https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/20231206_CRA_conference_Olivier-Guersent_speech.pdf.

[130] Id.

[131] Letizia Tomada, Start-ups and the Proposed EU AI Act: Bridges or Barriers in the Path from Invention to Innovation?, 13 J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & ELEC. Com. L. 53 (2022).

[132] Regulation 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1.

[133] The Digital Services Act: Ensuring a Safe and Accountable Online Environment, Eur. Comm’n, available at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en (last visited 22 April 2025).

[134] Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, SWD (2020) 348 final (15 December 2020), para 182.

[135] European Parliament Resolution of 20 October 2020 with Recommendations to the Commission on the Digital Services Act: Improving the Functioning of the Single Market (2020/2018 (INL)), para 73.

[136] The European Parliament took note of the need for specific measures to protect smaller players and proposed that “the DSA should put forward a proposal for a new separate instrument aiming at ensuring that the systemic role of specific online platforms will not endanger the internal market by unfairly excluding innovative new entrants, including SMEs, entrepreneurs and start-ups, thereby reducing consumer choice”. Id., Annex VII.

[137] DSA IA, supra note 134, at 23.

[138] Others include involvement in dispute resolution (art. 21) and “trusted flaggers” (art. 22); a suspension process for manifestly illegal content (art. 23); reporting obligations for providers of online platforms (art. 24); obligations to avoid deceiving or manipulating the recipients of their service (Art. 25); transparency of online advertising (art. 26); transparency on recommender systems (Art. 27); and obligations to put in place measures to protect minors (art. 28). Under art. 24(3), however, micro or small enterprises may still have to provide information on EU average monthly active users if requested by the established digital-services coordinator or the European Commission.

[139] See Brussels, 28.9.2021 SWD(2021) 279 Final Commission Staff Working Document Evaluation of Recommendation of 6 May 2003 Concerning the Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2003/361/EC), SWD(2021) 280 final. The Commission also noted, however, that: “Problems related to operating cross-border and access to finance are actually bigger obstacles preventing SMEs from scaling-up than the loss of the SME status”.

[140] DSA, art. 91(2)(d).

[141] DSA, art. 91(1).

[142] Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on Harmonised Rules on Fair Access to and Use of Data and Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828, 2023 O.J. (L 2854) 1 (Data Act).

[143] Data Act, recital 3.

[144] Data Act, recital 40, referring to SMEs as defined in art. 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC (SMEs), Op. Cit.

[145] Id.

[146] Notably, the obligation to make product data and related service data accessible to the user (art. 3); the rights and obligations of users and data holders with regard to access, use, and making available product data and related service data (art. 4); the user’s right to share data with third parties (art. 5); and third parties’ obligations when receiving data at the request of the user (art. 6). Microenterprises or small enterprises are covered, so long as they do not have a business partner that holds more than 25% of their capital or voting rights (excluding public and venture-capital investors, “business angels” or, with some limits, universities and nonprofit research centres and institutional investors).

[147] Per art. 3 of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC. Op. Cit.

[148] Data Act, recital 41.

[149] Data Act, recital 49.

[150] Data Act, recital 51.

[151] See art. 5(3) and recital 40.

[152] Data Act, recital 75.

[153] Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Harmonised Rules on Fair Access to and Use of Data (Data Act), SWD (2022) 34 final (23 February 2022), 56.

[154] Id.

[155] Data Act, recital 58.

[156] Data Act, recital 111.

[157] European Parliament, supra note 153, at 18.

[158] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European Strategy for Data COM(2020)66 final (19 February 2020).

[159] European Parliament, supra note 135, para 36.

[160] Id., para 38.

[161] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), 2024 O.J. (L 1689) 1.

[162] Tomada, supra note 131.

[163] Draghi, supra note 2.

[164] Id., at 29-30.

[165] Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, SWD (2021) 84 final, pt. 1 (21 April 2021), at 23.

[166] Id., at 26.

[167] See Ian Mundell, The Ecosystem: Start-ups Give Cautious Welcome to Artificial Intelligence Innovation Package, Science Business (13 February 2024), https://sciencebusiness.net/news/ai/ecosystem-start-ups-give-cautious-welcome-artificial-intelligence-innovation-package.

[168] New recital 74a.

[169] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Boosting Startups and Innovation in Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, COM (2024) 28 final (24 January 2024).

[170] Id., at 4.

[171] Id.

[172] Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An EU Initiative on Web 4.0 and Virtual Worlds: A Head Start in the Next Technological Transition, SWD (2023), 250 final, pt. 1 (11 July 2023), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023SC0250.

[173] Id., at 17.

[174] Mundell, supra note 166.

[175] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (the European Commission Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.

[176] Joined Cases C-611/22 P and C-625/22 P, Illumina and Grail v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677. (Finding that the Commission had overstepped its authority by accepting referral requests under art. 22 from national competition authorities that did not have jurisdiction to review the merger under their own national laws).

[177] Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Application of the Referral Mechanism Set Out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to Certain Categories of cases, 2021 O.J (C 113) 1, 2 para 9, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021XC0331%2801%29.

[178] Id., para 19.

[179] Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson, The Future of Digital Markets in a Post-DMA World, 44 Eu. Comp. L. Rev. 447 (2023).

[180] See, e.g., Christophe Carugati, Which Mergers Should the European Commission Review Under the Digital Markets Act?,  Bruegel Policy Brief (9 December 2022), https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/which-mergers-should-european-commission-review-under-digital-markets-act. Indeed, the European Parliament’s lead committee reviewing the DMA proposed an amendment to the merger provisions. While not ultimately adopted, the proposed amendment signalled concerns about gatekeeper M&A strategies. See Report on the Proposal for a Regulation on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), A9-0332/2021 Amendment 5, Eur. Parl. (15 December 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0332_EN.html. (“Systematic mergers and acquisitions should have a clear and legal threshold to put an end to killer acquisitions where big companies buy start-ups and growing companies in order to suppress any possible competition. A special attention should be given to takeovers in important sectors such as health, education, defence and financial services”).  

[181] European Commission, supra note 171, at 3.2.

[182] Tomada, supra note 31, at 65.

[183] Marc Ivaldi, Nicolas Petit, & Selcukhan Unekbas, Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from EC Merger Cases in Digital Industries (TSE Working Paper No.13-1420 1, 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4407333. (“Pursuant to the theory of killer acquisitions, some of these cases should have led to reduced competition. Focusing on publicly available information through financial disclosures, our analysis suggests that no transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation. Skepticism about the killer acquisitions theory should prevail”); Jonathan Barnett, “Killer Acquisitions” Reexamined: Economic Hyperbole in the Age of Populist Antitrust, 3(1) Chi. Bus. L. Rev. 39, 39 (2024). (“A review of the relevant body of evidence finds that these widely-held views concerning incumbent/startup acquisitions rest on meager support, confined to ambiguous evidence drawn from a small portion of the total universe of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical market and theoretical models of acquisition transactions in information technology markets”).

[184] Id., Ivaldi, Petit, & Unekbas, at 26-29. (Finding that, in six cases of potential “killer acquisitions”, output increased, and concluding that “[i]n summary, in very few cases, a merger appeared to have been followed by a weakening, let alone a killing, of competition. The competitive landscape post-merger remained vibrant in most cases, invalidating one key condition required for the killer acquisition theory to be plausible”); id., Barnett, at 39, 70-83.

[185] See, e.g., Statement on Competition Policy in the Digital Sector, Eur. Comm’n (10 May 2024), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_24_4525. (“A company with limited turnover may still play a significant competitive role on the market, as a start-up with significant potential, or as an important innovator. Killer acquisitions seek to neutralize small but promising companies as a possible source of competition”); Lewis Crofts, Tackling Killer Acquisitions Is Most Compelling Concern, EU’s Ribera Says, MLex (15 October 2024), https://www.mlex.com/mlex/dealrisk/articles/2321350/tackling-killer-acquisitions-is-most-compelling-concern-eu-s-ribera-says (indicating that Commissioner for Competition Teresa Ribera views the acquisitions of startups by “big tech” firms as one of the EU’s most pressing competition concerns).

[186] The Autorité Publishes Its Contribution to the Debate on Competition Policy and the Challenges Raised by the Digital Economy, Autorité de la Concurrence (February 2020), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/communiques-de-presse/autorite-publishes-its-contribution-debate-competition-policy-and-challenges.

[187] Comptes Rendus de la Commission des Affaires Économiques, Audition de M. Cédric O, secrétaire d’État chargé du numérique (22 January 2020), https://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20200120/ecos.html#toc2.

[188] Id.

[189] See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 182, at 39 (“[T]he emergent regulatory and scholarly consensus fails to take into account the rich body of evidence showing the critical function played by incumbent/startup acquisitions in supplying a monetization mechanism that induces venture-capital investment and promotes startup entry in technology markets. The prospect of an acquisition transaction in the case of technical and commercial success generally promotes innovation and competition by providing a transactional device that expands startups’ access to the capital inputs required to undertake R&D and the commercialization services required to convert R&D outputs into commercially viable products. At the same time, these acquisitions enable incumbents to access the specialized innovation capacities of smaller firms”); see also at 72 (“incumbents in technology markets regularly acquire emerging firms, and emerging firms regularly seek to be acquired by incumbents, principally because this constitutes an efficient mechanism for executing the innovation and commercialization process… Rather than representing a presumptively anticompetitive strategy to extinguish competitive threats, incumbent/startup acquisitions are best construed as part of a broader set of transactional mechanisms that firms use to efficiently execute the innovation and commercialization process in response to competitive forces”).

[190] Id., at 77 (finding that, following the investments made by acquiring companies in scaling and integrating targets, “it is no surprise that smaller firms would seek to be acquired by large platforms that can offer these powerful commercialization capacities and accelerate monetization of a target’s innovation assets”).

[191] On this point, see Manne, Radic, & Auer, supra note 15 (arguing that one of the central goals of ex-ante digital competition rules like the DMA is to level gatekeepers downward); Colangelo & Ribera, supra note 138 (arguing that the DMA is intended to neutralize gatekeepers’ competitive advantages); and Oles Andriychuk, Do DMA Obligations for Gatekeepers Create Entitlements for Business Users?, 11 J. Antitrust Enforc. 123,126-129 (2023), (arguing that the nature of the DMA’s obligations is punitive).

[192] European Parliament, supra note 136.

[193] DSA IA, supra note 135, at 24.

[194] Bala?zs Hohmann & Bence Kis Kelemen, Is There Anything New Under the Sun? A Glance at the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act from the Perspective of Digitalisation in the EU, 19 Croat. Y.B. Eur. L. Pol’y. 225 (2023).

[195] EU 2024–2029: France Digitale’s Manifesto for the 2024 European Elections, France Digitale (December 2023), at 6, available at https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2023/11/28111529/France-Digitale-2024-European-Manifesto-web-1.pdf.

[196] Id., at 26.

[197] Tomada, supra note 31, at 61.

[198] Cristiano Codagnone & Linda Weigl, Leading the Charge on Digital Regulation: The More, the Better, or Policy Bubble? 2 Digital Soc’y 1 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1007/s44206-023-00033-7.

[199] Id., at 17.

[200] Tomada, supra note 31, at 64.

[201] Id., at 61.

[202] Id., at 65.

[203] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, AI Continent Action Plan COM (2025) 165 final, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-continent-action-plan.

[204] Id., at 21.

[205] Id., at 22.

[206] Id.

[207] Teese & Kahwaty, supra note 122.

PRESENTATIONS & INTERVIEWS

Mikolaj Barczentewicz on the DMA Noncompliance Decision Against Meta

ICLE Senior Scholar Mikolaj Barczentewicz took part in a recent Digital Markets Research Hub webinar on the DMA Enforcement Team’s finding that Meta Platforms’ “Consent . . .

ICLE Senior Scholar Mikolaj Barczentewicz took part in a recent Digital Markets Research Hub webinar on the DMA Enforcement Team’s finding that Meta Platforms’ “Consent or Pay” model does not comply with the EU’s Digital Markets Act. Video of the full panel is embedded below.

Eric Fruits on What Oregon and Appalachia Have in Common

ICLE Senior Scholar Eric Fruits was a guest on the Lars Larson Show  to discuss socioeconomic parallels between Oregon and Appalachia, focusing on economic decline, . . .

ICLE Senior Scholar Eric Fruits was a guest on the Lars Larson Show  to discuss socioeconomic parallels between Oregon and Appalachia, focusing on economic decline, resource exploitation, and demographic shifts. Audio of the full interview is embedded below.

ISSUE BRIEFS

A Framework for Understanding and Evaluating AI Commercialization Strategies

I. Introduction The rapid advancement of artificial-intelligence (AI) technologies has generated tremendous interest in how to regulate this emerging field. Implicit in the question are . . .

I. Introduction

The rapid advancement of artificial-intelligence (AI) technologies has generated tremendous interest in how to regulate this emerging field. Implicit in the question are various assumptions about how AI will be developed and deployed in the marketplace. As it turns out, this is not nearly as simple a forecast as it may at first appear. This is particularly evident when one examines the differences between open-source and proprietary approaches to commercialization,[1] and is particularly relevant in light of the growing power costs needed to run large-scale models.[2]

As AI continues to transform industries and reshape our social and economic landscape, understanding the various commercialization strategies available to AI developers is crucial for policymakers, business leaders, and researchers alike.

This paper examines the diverse commercialization models for AI development, exploring their strengths, weaknesses, and potential implications for innovation and competition. Our analysis is grounded in the recognition that AI is not a monolithic technology, but rather a diverse array of techniques and applications with vastly different market potentials and societal impacts.

We begin by defining AI in the context of commercialization, highlighting the complexity and variety of technologies that fall under this umbrella term. We then explore four essential commercialization strategies that are likely to shape how AI will be deployed: proprietary private, open-source private, hybrid private/public, and publicly directed models.

Throughout our analysis, we emphasize that no single commercialization approach is universally superior. Instead, the optimal strategy depends on the specific context, including the nature of the AI technology, target market, and broader ecosystem in which it operates. We also consider how these commercialization choices intersect with and are shaped by regulatory decisions and public policy.

II. Defining AI in the Context of Commercialization

The term “artificial intelligence” has become ubiquitous in popular culture since the November 2022 launch of OpenAI’s ChatGPT made individual “generative artificial intelligence” capabilities broadly available to the general public.[3] Indeed, ChatGPT was in its first year the fastest-growing consumer application in history.[4]

But what do we mean by AI? The deceptively simple term remains obscure. As Jason Potts has noted: “Generative AI is not a single technology, or even industry, and is composed of extremely complex and varied ownership and governance at each composite layer.”[5] Instead, we must consider the diverse ecosystems of AI technologies—from core technologies through foundation models and specific applications—and how they interact with various sectors and user communities.

Some economists characterize AI software as a “general purpose technology,” with some form of the technology today widely embedded in firms, as well as their products and services.[6] Yet until the advent of ChatGPT, many consumers were unaware of AI’s pervasiveness, as it was largely hidden in the back offices of business and government. It was only in the last few years that consumers began to interact with AI technologies regularly, such as when they accessed their bank accounts, paid bills, made purchases online, or interacted with online assistants. The introduction of highly capable large language models (LLMs) has rapidly changed public perception of applied AI’s still-incipient capabilities. Specifically, there is now widespread recognition of the potential impact these technologies could have on society.

McKinsey & Co. offers a functional definition: “AI is a machine’s ability to perform the cognitive functions we associate with human minds, such as perceiving, reasoning, learning, interacting with an environment, problem solving, and even exercising creativity.”[7] AI itself, however, consists of multiple technologies and designs, including such methodologies and applications as machine learning, deep learning, natural language processing, computational statistics, facial recognition, and robotics (among many others).[8] This definition is quite expansive, and is perhaps unhelpful in its tendency to give the impression that “AI” refers to a single, unified concept. It includes everything from foundational models capable of producing human-like text to algorithms that can diagnose illnesses more precisely than human physicians to “simple” algorithms that enable more personalized online experiences.

When considering commercialization models for AI, it’s crucial to recognize that we are not dealing with a monolithic technology, but rather with the intersection of a variety of techniques and technologies that often serve very different purposes. From machine-learning algorithms used in predictive analytics to natural-language processing in chatbots, from computer vision in autonomous vehicles to reinforcement learning in robotics, each AI application may require a unique commercialization approach. This diversity in AI technologies means that no single business model will be universally applicable. Instead, successful commercialization strategies must be tailored to the specific capabilities, applications, and target markets of each AI technology, while also considering the broader ecosystem in which these technologies operate and interact.

III. Commercialization Models for AI Development

There are a variety of commercialization paths for AI developers. For our purposes, we will discuss four essential commercialization strategies, and related public policies that we believe are most likely to shape how AI will be deployed: proprietary private, open-source private, hybrid private/public, and publicly directed.

A. Private Models: Tradeoffs Between Proprietary and Open Approaches

1. Private-proprietary commercialization

A fully private business model for AI production would operate on a presumption that the technology that drives the AI development is proprietary, and the firm is free to leverage this proprietary technology along a spectrum of deployments, from a fully integrated/closed ecosystem to one that is relatively open to external integrators. This approach relies on a mix of different forms of intellectual-property protections and contractual obligations. For example, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets may form the basis for the core business model, while contractual relationships with integrators and other developers could then be used to facilitate functional integration (to varying degrees) via licensing.

A fully closed business model for AI production would leverage the firm’s proprietary technology and intellectual property to create a vertically integrated ecosystem. Under this model, the firm maintains tight control over the development, deployment, and commercialization of its AI technology.[9] The primary objective would be to capture value by creating a unique, differentiated offering that is difficult for competitors to replicate.

The foundation of this model rests on various forms of intellectual-property protection. Copyrights protect the original expression of ideas, such as the source code and documentation associated with the AI system.[10] Patents provide a time-limited exclusive property right over novel, non-obvious, and useful inventions, including (in some cases) AI algorithms and architectures.[11] Trade secrets protect confidential information that derives economic value from not being generally known, such as the training data, hyperparameters, data-center design, and optimization techniques used in the AI system.[12] Building on this intellectual-property foundation, the firm can then create a fully integrated ecosystem around its AI technology. This ecosystem may include proprietary hardware (e.g., specialized AI accelerators); software (e.g., development tools, APIs, and applications); and services (e.g., cloud-based AI platforms).

A license involves a mutually negotiated, contractual agreement—often employing a nondisclosure agreement during licensing negotiations—whereby the licensor retains title to the underlying IP but assigns a right to exploit the IP to a third-party licensee.[13] The licensee can typically make, use, and sell a product using the licensed AI technologies—either through an exclusive license or nonexclusive license—for specified financial terms or by paying a stream of predetermined royalties.[14] A similar arrangement can be struck for access to proprietary software through more restricted means—for instance, for providing consumption of services via an API.

Recent inquiries from federal regulators have raised concerns about the potential implications of various proprietary business models in the AI industry.[15] There is, however, little for lawmakers and enforcers to assume ex ante when considering whether firms should pursue an open or closed proprietary strategy. As federal regulators grapple with the challenges of overseeing this rapidly evolving industry, it is crucial to recognize that the commercialization choices firms make are a reflection of the unique contingencies of their production processes. Firms often blend elements of both open and closed models to strike a balance that aligns with their goals, market dynamics, and consumer preferences.

Open approaches to AI development (e.g., offering interoperable services) offer numerous benefits, such as fostering innovation, enabling scientific research, and promoting competition in the marketplace. By making foundational AI models accessible and adaptable, open approaches can lower entry barriers and encourage a diverse ecosystem of applications tailored to various needs and challenges. This openness can drive technological advancements, price efficiencies, and ultimately benefit consumers and society at-large.

But closed approaches (also known as “walled gardens”) also have their merits. Closed proprietary development can provide enhanced security, privacy, and a more streamlined user experience. Closed models may also allow firms to maintain greater control over their intellectual property, ensuring a level of competitive advantage and providing incentives to invest in research and development (R&D). Under the right conditions, closed systems can likewise foster a healthy ecosystem of complementary products and services.

Indeed, ecosystem development is not really an either/or matte, as even closed/proprietary approaches to monetizing AI can have downstream “market making” effects on AI development:

Licenses are…a direct rent, and a way to gate or control competition through their issuance. Additionally, the terms of these licenses influence subsequent related markets, such as product embeddings, thereby also governing the development of business ecosystems, typically by restricting their growth or creating bottlenecks. A critical aspect of using licenses to manage rents and ecosystems relates to the discovery of value and the property rights that accrue from opportunities identified by third parties or users. The implication of a right, akin to an option, within the license aligns with real options theory. Effectively, the license determines where the financial value of these strategic real options is capitalized, whether in the licensor or the licensee.[16]

Moreover, whether any given ecosystem is “open” or “closed” is not a binary question:

[AI] technology is a cumulative result of decades of research and development by individuals and teams that have built extremely powerful and often valuable capabilities and products. Some of this work circulates in public (open-source code), but also in publications, open forums, institutions (universities), labour markets (hires) and financial markets (acquisitions). Still, many elements remain closed and protected with intellectual property and corporate secrecy (algorithms, private training data), and through tacit knowledge (especially in training). So, its development through innovation is both open and closed, simultaneously public and private. It is institutionally complex. [17]

The optimal choice between open and closed models depends on the relevant market participants’ specific needs and preferences. As Jonathan M. Barnett notes in the context of digital platforms, open systems may yield no net social gain over closed systems; can pose a net social loss under certain circumstances; and can impose a net social gain under yet other circumstances.[18] According to Barnett, there is a “fundamental welfare tradeoff between two-sided proprietary…platforms and two-sided platforms which allow ‘free entry’ on both sides of the market.”[19] Consequently, “it is by no means obvious which type of platform will create higher product variety, consumer adoption and total social welfare.”[20]

The interplay between consumer and developer preferences significantly influences the adoption of open versus closed AI models. Consumers often prioritize ease-of-use, security, and seamless integration, which can favor closed ecosystems. But some users may place greater value on the flexibility and customization options of open systems. For instance, while Linux is popular among developers for its openness, consumer-oriented operating systems like Windows and MacOS dominate the desktop market due to their user-friendly interfaces and extensive software ecosystems.[21]

These dynamics give rise to a complex landscape in which the success of a model depends on its ability to balance the sometimes conflicting needs of both consumers and developers. Ultimately, the coexistence of open and closed models in the AI ecosystem fosters innovation and provides diverse options to meet varying user requirements. Furthermore, the distinctions between open and closed models can significantly influence competition between brands. If public policy is enacted that favors one business model over another, it would likely lead to reduced choice and lower overall benefits along this dimension.[22]

The diffusion of firms exploring different business models yields benefits in many ways. For example, when it comes to ethical AI development, various types of organizations should be encouraged to explore different approaches, and even to combine them when appropriate. Anthropic’s “Collective Constitutional AI” approach adopts a “semi-open” model that combines private elements with certain aspects of openness in order to encourage innovation, while maintaining some degree of control.[23] This model may strike a suitable balance by ensuring a degree of proprietary innovation and competitive advantage, while still benefiting from community feedback and collaboration.

Conversely, a completely open-source approach to development could yield different, and possibly superior, outcomes that address a wider range of needs through community-driven evolution and iteration. It is impossible to determine, in advance, whether an open or closed approach to AI development will inherently lead to better results in creating “ethical” AI. Both approaches have their merits, and the most effective solutions will likely incorporate elements of both.

By differentiating themselves through a focus on ease-of-use, quality, security, and user experience, closed systems contribute to a vibrant competitive landscape in which consumers have clear choices between differing “brands” of AI. In essence, codifying a regulatory preference for one proprietary business model over the other would oversimplify the intricate balance of tradeoffs inherent to AI development.

2. Private/open-source commercialization

The next flavor of private AI commercialization models is open source. This is distinct from the “open vs. closed” private models discussed in the previous subsection. In contrast to the restrictions inherent in the proprietary models discussed above, “open source” is a decentralized software-development model that encourages open collaboration among potential developers.[24] The term generally refers to source code made freely available to individuals and companies to modify and redistribute, and includes legal permission to use the source code, design documents, or product content.[25] Source code is typically released under the terms of a software license, which typically allows other users to download, modify, and subsequently publish their enhanced versions.[26]

Stable Diffusion, an open-source text-to-image generation model developed by Stability AI, is a prominent example of open-source generative AI.[27] The model was trained on a large dataset of images and their associated captions, allowing it to generate novel images from textual descriptions. The source code, model weights, and training data were made freely available, enabling developers to experiment with and build upon the technology.[28] Another prominent example is PyTorch, an open-source machine-learning framework led by Meta’s AI Research lab.[29] PyTorch provides a flexible and intuitive interface for defining and training neural networks. Other notable open-source AI projects include TensorFlow, Keras, Scikit-learn, and OpenCV.[30] These frameworks and libraries provide powerful tools to develop machine-learning and computer-vision applications, lowering the barrier to entry for AI development and enabling rapid prototyping and experimentation.[31]

While there are more than 100 Open Source Interconnection (OSI) licenses, for our purposes, we will categorize them into two typologies: permissive and copyleft.[32] An open source permissive license governs how others (i.e., those other than the copyright holder) can inspect, use, modify, distribute (and freely redistribute), or enhance software code.[33] The open-source software licensor has the option to change the terms and conditions to grant the licensee the permission and rights to use or repurpose the code for new applications or to include the code in other derivative work.[34]

Users of open-source licenses must accept the legal terms of a license, but the terms of an open-source license differ from those of a proprietary license.[35] For example, in the open source copyleft AI license, the licensor grants the licensee permission to use, modify, and share the source code, but offers stipulations against relicensing through specific terms and conditions in the agreement, including that any derivative work is required to be released under copyleft license terms and conditions identical to those of the original work.[36]

There are numerous examples of open-source licenses, including Standard License (“non-copyleft”); General Public License (“strong copyleft”); Lesser General Public License (“weak copyleft”); Eclipse License (“weak copyleft”); Mozilla Public License (“weak copyleft”); Apache License (“non-copyleft”); MIT License (“non-copyleft”); and Berkeley Source Distribution (BSD) License (“non-copyleft”).[37]

A common example of permissive licensing can be found in the Creative Commons (CC) suite of licenses. Creative Commons offers a range of standardized licenses that creators can apply to their work, each with different levels of permissiveness.[38] While not strictly open source in the software sense,[39] these licenses share similar principles of openness and accessibility. A typical Creative Commons license allows the license holder to grant broad permissions for others to share, remix, use commercially, or otherwise utilize the license holder’s work without seeking specific authorization for each use.[40] This flexibility makes Creative Commons licenses a popular choice for various types of content—from academic papers to multimedia works—fostering a culture of sharing and collaboration similar to that seen in open-source software communities.

The Creative Commons license works alongside the rules of copyright, allowing the owner to authorize a license base from more strict to more open usage of the owner’s work, and thus to choose the level of protection that best suits the owner’s needs.[41] Under the Creative Commons license, there are six primary variants: attribution, attribution share alike, attribution no derivatives, attribution non-commercial, attribution non-commercial share alike, and attribution non-commercial no derivatives.[42] There are, however, also variants of the Creative Commons license (such as “commercial use is forbidden” and “derivatives are forbidden”) that are not OSI-approved.[43]

Meta’s Llama 3 is a good example of an AI system released permissively under a quasi-open-source license.[44] Like traditional open-source software, it allows for free use, modification, and redistribution of the model and its code.[45] But it diverges from standard open-source practices by including specific restrictions—such as prohibiting the use of Llama materials to improve competing LLMs and requiring prominent attribution—that are not typically found in open-source licenses.[46]

More broadly, an open-source-specific AI license would likely incorporate elements from existing open-source software licenses, while addressing the unique characteristics of AI systems. Key components might include:

  1. Granting users the freedom to study, use, modify, and share the AI system and its components, including source code, model weights, and training data;
  2. Requiring any derivative works or modifications to be released under the same open-source license terms, ensuring the continued openness of the technology (copyleft provisions);
  3. Permitting commercial use of the AI system, fostering its adoption and integration into real-world applications;
  4. Requiring attribution to the original creators and contributors, acknowledging their work and promoting collaboration; and
  5. Disclaiming warranties and limiting liability, protecting the licensors from potential legal issues arising from the use or misuse of the AI system.[47]

The development of AI systems under an open-source model offers both benefits and challenges. On the positive side, open-source AI can promote transparency, collaboration, and rapid innovation. By making the underlying technology accessible to a wide range of developers and researchers, open-source AI enables diverse perspectives and approaches, leading to more robust and adaptable systems. Open-source development can also foster trust, as the AI system’s inner workings can be scrutinized and verified by the community.[48]

But open-source AI also presents legal and economic challenges. The lack of proprietary control over the technology may discourage commercial investment, as companies may struggle to monetize their efforts.[49] A flip side of the benefits of the open nature of the software is that, in some cases, malicious actors can access and modify the technology for harmful purposes.[50] Additionally, the open nature of the development process may complicate issues of liability and accountability, as the responsibility for any the AI system’s negative consequences may be diffused among multiple contributors.

To balance these tradeoffs, a hybrid approach that combines open-source and proprietary elements may be optimal. For example, companies could release certain components of their AI systems as open source while maintaining control over others, thus enabling collaboration and transparency while preserving competitive advantages.[51]

B. Hybrid Models: The Role of Standards

The third model for commercialization comprises various forms of hybrid public/private standards. The fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) licensing approach is one example common in some patent contexts. FRAND licensing involves a voluntary agreement between a holder of a standards-essential patent (SEP) and a manufacturer or implementer, with the agreement allowing the implementer to use the patentee’s technology in its manufactured products.[52] Established by standards-setting organizations (SSOs) to ensure technical compatibility and interoperability in their products,[53] these SEPs are “patents that are considered essential to implement a specific industry standard” and are “governed by the terms and conditions of the licensing agreement.”[54]

The fair and reasonable part of FRAND means that “the patent holder should charge a licensing fee that reflects the economic value of the patent,” while “taking into account factors such as the importance of the patent to the standard, the contributions of the patent to the product, and the prevailing licensing rates in the industry.”[55] The non-discriminatory part of FRAND means that “the patent holder should offer the same terms to all companies wanting to license the patent,” thus “preventing the patent holder from discriminating against certain companies.”[56]

As it has been traditionally understood, however, patenting the core technologies underlying AI is exceedingly difficult under prevailing U.S. law.[57] It is therefore unlikely that a true FRAND approach is possible in the United States, although that doesn’t rule out that other forms of government involvement could be used to establish a similar forced-sharing regime. For example, a weaker form of this model would be to create “standards” to guide the development and commercialization of AI technologies, either through a direct governmental standards-setting approach, or a hybrid public/private model that involves government-led and/or enforced standards development.[58]

Standards setting, either on a private basis or through government-led initiatives, can play a role in shaping development practices and ensuring safety and interoperability across technologies in a way that can potentially lead to more commercialization options as a result of elevated consumer trust.  As is always true, however, there are both benefits and costs when thinking about the way that public or public/private standards shape commercialization decisions.

These standards can not only help to organize the industry by establishing common frameworks and protocols but can also enhance public trust by providing assurances that AI development is under diligent oversight. As AI systems increasingly permeate such critical sectors as health care, transportation, and finance, the perceived need for assurance regarding their safety, reliability, and ethical implications grows. Commercialization of these technologies is necessarily shaped by these realities.

These standards can originate in a number of ways. Firms can develop standards as part of the process of instituting their own internal best practices.[59] Large professional organizations also contribute important work in this area. For example, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has been working to develop an “Ethics Certification Program for Autonomous and Intelligent Systems,” the goal of which is to “create specifications for certification and marking processes that advance transparency, accountability and reduction in algorithmic bias in Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (AIS).”[60] The IEEE also has a number of similar efforts underway.[61]

In 2017, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 Artificial Intelligence Committee,[62] tasked with developing universal AI standards that would apply across different industries and applications. Their current projects include creating a comprehensive interoperable framework for AI systems.[63] The Consumer Technology Association (CTA) develops trustworthiness standards to address the use of AI in health care,[64] assessing the impact of AI’s trustworthiness from multiple perspectives—including those of physicians, consumers, professional and family caregivers, public-health officials, medical societies, and regulators.[65]

Since 2019, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has actively contributed to AI governance, recommending strategies for the federal adoption of AI to enhance both the U.S. economy and national security. A February 2019 White House executive order directed NIST to promote the use of voluntary standards in AI,[66] coordinate with standards development organizations via the National Science and Technology Council,[67] and engage with the private sector on emerging AI standards.[68]

More recently, NIST developed the AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF), a set of guidelines to improve trustworthiness in AI design and use, emphasizing consensus-driven, outcome-focused, and nonprescriptive standards.[69] The recently proposed bipartisan U.S. Senate framework also contains many of these elements, recommending studies where laws are insufficient to capture AI systems’ potential harms but otherwise recommending federal coordination on standards with largely voluntary compliance.[70]

On the more extreme side, there are calls to create a central AI regulator, with the proposed regulator having authority to grant licenses before AI development can be undertaken, and enforce ongoing compliance.[71] This centralization aims to standardize oversight and ensure adherence to established standards across the AI industry.[72]

It’s crucial to recognize that nominally voluntary standards can effectively become mandatory in practice. This can occur, for example, when courts adopt these standards in negligence litigation as benchmarks to establish a duty of care.[73] Thus, even in the absence of any direct regulatory mandates or common agreement, standards often shape legal obligations and liabilities, influencing practices across industries by establishing a de-facto regulatory framework.

While we should not understate the benefit of some government participation in developing AI standards, the introduction of mandatory standards can carry substantial costs, depending on their scope and content. Applying the schema proposed by Knut Blind et al. to AI commercialization, we can consider how the impact of standards and regulations might vary depending on market uncertainty.[74] In markets with low uncertainty, formal standards may lead to higher innovation costs than regulations would.[75] This could be due to regulatory capture, where established firms influence standards to their advantage, potentially raising costs for competitors.[76] Conversely, in highly uncertain markets, regulations might impose higher innovation costs than standards. This may occur because regulators have less information about rapidly evolving technologies, leading to potential mismatches between regulations and technological realities.[77]

A good example of the double-edged sword of government involvement in standards setting can be seen in the campaign to require interoperability and compatibility among diverse technology providers.[78] Standardization can help to reduce fragmentation, thus facilitating smoother integration and interaction between different AI products and services. By fostering a common understanding and predictable environment, these standards might aid in accelerating technological advancements and innovation within a structured and well-defined boundary. But as noted above, a more open, interoperable business model is not a panacea, and it’s not at all clear that regulation-driven interoperability standards are the best way to reduce friction among various AI systems. There are tradeoffs in pursuing varying degrees of openness, whether imposed by fiat or market demand.

Moreover, government-led standards can restrict AI firms from fully capitalizing on unique, proprietary technologies by mandating uniformity that may dilute the distinctiveness of more innovative or advanced solutions. This can discourage investment in new technologies that don’t conform to existing standards, potentially stunting growth and innovation within the sector. Firms often leverage proprietary advantages for competitive gain and market differentiation; thus, stringent standards could limit their ability to offer something unique to the market, reducing the incentive for groundbreaking developments.

Further, adhering to mandatory AI standards can result in significant compliance costs, particularly affecting smaller firms and startups with limited resources.[79] These costs include not only the financial burden of implementing new systems and processes to meet the standards but also the ongoing expenses associated with maintaining compliance. This financial strain can divert funds from other critical areas like product development and research, potentially stifling innovation and limiting the company’s growth potential in a highly competitive market.

Standards may also significantly limit AI developers’ flexibility to engage in creative and technical decisionmaking. When standards dictate or prohibit specific aspects of AI system design and functionality, developers might find their hands tied, unable to explore alternative or potentially more innovative solutions that fall outside the set guidelines.[80] This could slow the pace of innovation in AI development, as companies might be forced to prioritize compliance over creativity and innovation.

C. Public Models of Commercialization

The fourth approach would be some form of compulsory-licensing or forced-sharing regime that creates a public commercialization model.[81]  The term “compulsory license” refers to a governmental entity that provides permission to enterprises that seek to use intellectual property without the owner’s consent, while offering financial compensation to the rightsholder.[82] Advocates for this licensing approach favor “policies that shape US markets while aligning innovation and competition policies towards creating a domestic AI innovation system that better serves the public interest.”[83]

The exact shape such a policy might take is highly contingent on the forms of intellectual property employed, and the conditions under which such use is deemed necessary. For example, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) permits member nations to institute compulsory licensing of patents under certain circumstances.[84] Compulsory licenses for patents are most often applied to pharmaceuticals and public-health-related inventions, but may apply to any patented invention.[85]

In the context of copyright, Congress has seen fit to institute compulsory licenses in certain instances, such as satellite and cable retransmission[86] and the use of musical compositions in recording “cover songs.”[87] The compulsory license is a concept that has been formally part of U.S. intellectual-property law since the enactment of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1909.[88] U.S. patent law has not paralleled copyright law, however, as compulsory licenses have been uncommon in the patent arena.[89]

Additionally, Congress is able to place compulsory-license stipulations on funding it provides to researchers and developers. The U.S. government—representing all U.S. taxpayers—has historically played a role in funding R&D to develop the nation’s computer-technology infrastructure. This extends to AI technologies and efforts to bring these AI technologies to the marketplace.[90] Moreover, public-interest advocates who push for broader “fully public” models often argue that their approach will “better align domestic investment and AI capability development with economic, societal and national security objectives.”[91]

This fully public commercialization policy might, for example, focus on a nationwide health emergency (such as developing a public-health vaccine) or some nonprofit purposes (such as meeting an environmental-policy goal). Indeed, the Biden administration indicated its willingness to use the Defense Production Act (DPA) to intervene in how AI is developed and produced.[92] Some advocates have also raised the threat of eminent domain-like actions against intellectual property.[93]

Relatedly, some recent public discourse has focused on the possibility that AI companies might obtain monopoly status, with attendant conversation about the need to act to deter this likelihood.[94] This is another flavor of treating core AI technologies as some sort of public good or essential facility that would be fully subject to governmental licensing. In many respects, such advocacy closely mirrors conversations from a decade ago about “data monopolies.”[95] But as Geoffrey Manne and Dirk Auer suggest, this characterization is overly simplistic and potentially misleading.[96] History has shown that, despite the leading tech platforms’ vast accumulations of data, their market dominance in the realm of generative AI has not been as unassailable as one might expect.[97]

The concept of market “moats” (a term used to describe barriers to entry that protect incumbents from competitive pressures) is central to this discussion. While the urge to dismantle these moats through aggressive antitrust actions is strong in some quarters, pursuing this urge would likely be a mistake. The rapid advancement and dynamic nature of AI technologies often render these moats less impenetrable than they might appear, and their existence is unlikely to be supported by rigorous empirical examinations.[98]

Moreover, using competition law to force open the business models of leading AI firms carries significant risks. Chief among these is that such policies could stifle innovation and impede the growth of the AI sector, rather than foster competitive markets. Of course, it’s not impossible that competition harms might emerge in the AI industry, as they can in any industry, but the assertions that these firms and their products should be treated as anything like an essential facility or public utility should be subject to heightened scrutiny in order to avoid high error costs and reduced innovation and consumer welfare.

A mandated forced-sharing regime would be a special (and extreme) case of the “open” business models discussed above. Thus, it’s worth considering some of the recent history of governmental interoperability requirements, and their effects on the commercialization paths that firms take.

Open-banking initiatives are a prime example. The regulatory push in the United States fundamentally aims to democratize data access within the financial sector by enabling customers to have control over their financial data, promoting a shift towards more customer-centric financial services.[99] This transition is, however, fraught with complexities that could undermine its intended benefits.[100]

One significant issue with the implementation of open banking relates to the technical and operational challenges involved in ensuring seamless and secure data sharing. The infrastructure required to support secure APIs that allow third parties to access bank data must be robust, resilient, and effective.[101] There is a risk that inconsistencies in the technological capabilities of different financial institutions and third-party providers could lead to vulnerabilities in the system that expose sensitive data or cause service disruptions. Further, in at least some implementations of open banking, obligations are placed on providers in ways that distort the competitive landscape.[102]

So-called “device neutrality” or “sideloading” represents another cautionary tale for forced openness. Article 6(1)(c) of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) addresses “sideloading”—the installation of third-party software through app stores other than the one provided by the manufacturer (e.g., Apple’s App Store for iOS devices).[103] The sideloading mandate aims to give users more choice but can only achieve this by removing the option of choosing a device with a “walled garden” approach to privacy and security, such as Apple’s iOS.[104]

By eliminating the choice of a walled-garden environment, a sideloading mandate essentially forces users to use alternative app stores preferred by app developers, who have incentives to create their own app stores or move to those with the least friction. This may also mean the app stores that invest least in privacy and security. Apple is well-known for its commitment to user privacy and security. Thus, regulations like the DMA and similar attempts in the United States[105] represent a reordering of digital-ecosystem providers that currently have the incentive to account for a broad array of consumer demands. In the place of such nuance, mandated openness overrides the preferences of a vast swathe of consumers.

As suggested above, implementing strong forced-sharing obligations could severely limit the commercialization paths available to AI developers. One of the primary challenges with compulsory licensing is the potential disruption to proprietary business models. AI firms often rely on exclusive control over their intellectual property to maintain a competitive edge and secure funding for further R&D. Mandating that these firms license their technology to third parties could dilute that competitive advantage, making it less attractive for investors to fund high-risk, high-reward AI projects. This could ultimately slow the pace of innovation, as firms might be less willing to invest in groundbreaking technologies if they are not able to fully capitalize on their proprietary developments.

Additionally, imposing forced sharing could lead to a homogenization of AI offerings, reducing the diversity and specialization that currently characterizes the AI market. AI firms tailor their technologies to specific market needs, while forced-sharing regimes could undermine this customization by requiring firms to share their innovations broadly—including potentially with competitors. This could lead to a scenario where AI technologies become more standardized and less differentiated, which might diminish the overall quality and effectiveness of AI solutions available to consumers.

Furthermore, the administrative and regulatory burden associated with enforcing compulsory licensing could create significant operational challenges for both AI firms and regulators. Ensuring compliance with licensing agreements or the requirements of a strong regulatory regime, monitoring the use of an incredibly wide scope of shared technology, and resolving disputes over access would require substantial resources and oversight. This could divert attention and resources away from innovation and toward regulatory compliance, further hindering the growth and development of the AI sector.

IV. Conclusion

The commercialization of AI technologies offers a complex landscape of opportunities and challenges. As we have explored, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to bring AI innovations to market. Instead, a variety of models—from fully proprietary to open source, and hybrid approaches in between—each offer distinct advantages and tradeoffs.

Proprietary models allow firms to maintain tight control over their intellectual property, potentially driving focused innovation and creating unique value propositions. These closed systems may, however, limit broader collaboration and slow the overall pace of advancement in the field. On the other hand, while open-source approaches could foster transparency, collaboration, and rapid innovation, they also present challenges in the difficulty inherent in finding sustainable business models and exercising appropriate quality control.

Hybrid models and industry standards attempt to strike a balance, promoting interoperability and shared progress while still allowing for proprietary advantages. These approaches, however, require careful management to avoid stifling innovation or inadvertently creating barriers to entry for smaller players.

Public models of commercialization, including compulsory licensing and government-directed development, offer potential benefits in terms of equitable access and alignment with public-interest goals. But they also risk dampening private-sector innovation and investment if not carefully implemented.

The diversity of AI technologies and their applications means that different commercialization strategies may be appropriate in different contexts. What works for a general-purpose LLM may not be suitable for a specialized medical diagnostic tool or a financial-trading algorithm.

As the AI landscape continues to evolve, it is crucial that policymakers and industry leaders remain flexible and adaptive in their views of commercialization (with perhaps the fully public models being the only ones presumed inappropriate, pending strong evidence to the contrary). Regulatory frameworks should aim to foster innovation and competition while addressing legitimate concerns about safety, privacy, and the ethical use of AI. They should avoid prematurely locking in any single commercialization model, instead allowing for experimentation and learning as the field matures.

Ultimately, the success of AI commercialization will depend on finding the right balance between openness and proprietary development, between rapid innovation and responsible deployment, and between market forces and public interest. By understanding the strengths and limitations of various commercialization models, stakeholders can make more informed decisions that will shape the future of AI and its impact on society.

[1] See infra at nn. 9-80, and accompanying text.

[2] See Lynne Kiesling, Data Center Electricity Use III: Make or Buy?, Knowledge Problem (Aug. 1, 2024), https://knowledgeproblem.substack.com/p/data-center-electricity-use-iii-make.

[3] Introducing ChatGPT, OpenAI (Nov. 30, 2022), https://openai.com/blog/chatgpt.

[4] Laurie A. Harris, Generative Artificial Intelligence: Overview, Issues, and Questions for Congress, Cong. Research Serv. (2023), at 1, available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12426.

[5] Jason Potts, Sources of Innovation in Generative AI, The Network L. Rev. (Feb. 12, 2024), https://www.networklawreview.org/jason-potts-generative-ai.

[6] Nicholas Crafts, Artificial Intelligence as a General-Purpose Technology: An Historical Perspective, 37 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 521 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093 oxrep /grab012. It is not, however, absolutely clear how to regard “AI.” Indeed, as we note below, there is no single technology that can be called “AI.” What exists are a varied collection of techniques and technologies that add some form of intelligence to automated systems.

[7] What Is AI, McKinsey & Co. (April 24, 2023), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-is-ai.

[8] Id.; Matt Vella, How AI Is Transforming Our World, in Artificial Intelligence: The Future of Humankind, Time (Nov. 1, 2017); Michael Atleson, Keep Your AI Claims in Check, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2023/02/keep-your-ai-claims-check.

[9] For an example of this approach, see Apple Intelligence: AI for the Rest of Us, Apple, https://www.apple.com/apple-intelligence (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[10] See Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 George Wash. L. Rev. 1746 (2011);Copyright could theoretically be invoked to protect models’ parameter-embedding weights as a means to control distribution. See Thibault Schrepel & Jason Potts, Measuring the Openness of AI Foundation Models: Competition and Policy Implications (Sciences Po Digital, Governance and Sovereignty Chair, Working Paper 11, 2024), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4827358.

[11] See generally Adam Mossoff, Why History Matters in the Patentable Subject Matter Debate, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 23 (2012).

[12] See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 751 (2019).

[13] See, e.g., Patent Licensing & Legal Options, Justia, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/patents/licensing (last visited Aug. 2, 2024); Nathan C. Lovette & Carlos P. Garritano, Patent Licensing: A Brief Summary, Tucker Ellis LLP (Aug. 16, 2022), https://www.tuckerellis.com/ip-tip-of-the-month-blog/patent-licensing-a-brief-summary; Proprietary Software License: Everything You Need to Know, Upcounsel, https://www.upcounsel.com/ proprietary-software-license (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[14] Patent Licensing and Its Types: Everything You Need to Know, GreyB, https://www.greyb.com/blog/patent-licensing-101 (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[15] See, e.g., Kristian Stout, ICLE Comments to NTIA on Dual-Use Foundation AI Models with Widely Available Model Weights, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-comments-to-ntia-on-dual-use-foundation-ai-models-with-widely-available-model-weights.

[16] Schrepel & Potts, supra note 10, at 10-11.

[17] Potts, supra note 5, at 2.

[18] See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1861, 1927 (2011).

[19] Id. at 2.

[20] Id. at 3.

[21] Linux adoption rates consistently trail MacOS and Windows. See Desktop Operating System Market Share Worldwide Feb 2023 – Feb 2024, StatCounter, https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/desktop/worldwide (last visited Aug. 2, 2024); Nonetheless, many developers have a preferences for Linux systems. See Joey Sneddon, More Developers Use Linux than Mac, Report Shows, Omg Linux (Dec. 28, 2022), https://www.omglinux.com/devs-prefer-linux-to-mac-stackoverflow-survey.

[22] See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 93, 110 (1994), (“[T]he primary cost of standardization is loss of variety: consumers have fewer differentiated products to pick from, especially if standardization prevents the development of promising but unique and incompatible new systems”).

[23] Collective Constitutional AI: Aligning a Language Model with Public Input, Anthropic (Oct. 17, 2023), https://www.anthropic.com/news/collective-constitutional-ai-aligning-a-language-model-with-public-input.

[24] Sheen S. Levine & Michael J. Prietula, Open Collaboration for Innovation: Principles and Performance, 25 Organization Science 1414 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2013.0872.

[25] The Open Source Definition, Open Source Initiative https://opensource.org/osd (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[26] Id. at 18.

[27] Stable Diffusion Public Release, stability.ai, https://stability.ai/news/stable-diffusion-public-release (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[28] Id.

[29] Learn the Basics, PyTorch, https://pytorch.org/tutorials/beginner/basics/intro.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2024)

[30] See Tim Mucci, Five Open-Source AI Tools to Know, IBM (Dec. 15, 2023), https://www.ibm.com/blog/five-open-source-ai-tools-to-know.

[31] See Robert Gorwa & Michael Veale, Moderating Model Marketplaces: Platform Governance Puzzles for AI Intermediaries, 16(2) Law Innovation & Technology 9-10 (2024), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4716865 (noting how Hugging Face “is developing a business model where it can bundle additional ‘premium’ deployment features, lowering the  barrier to entry for less technical users or those simply seeking convenience. For instance, one product, ‘Inference Endpoints,’ advertises itself as a way to ‘deploy models in minutes’ on Hugging Face’s own infrastructure. Similarly, their ‘AutoTrain’ product allows one to ‘train, evaluate and deploy state-of-the-art Machine Learning models’ by simply uploading a dataset, without having to write a single line of code.”).

[32] Open Source License: Types and Comparisons, Snyk, https://snyk.io/learn/open-source-licenses (last visited Aug. 2, 2024); 5 Potential Risks of Open Source Software, Snyk, https://snyk.io/learn/risks-of-open-source-software (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[33] Jeanelle Horcasitas, Understanding Open-Source Software Licenses, DigitalOcean (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/understanding-open-source-software-licenses; What Is Open Source, OpenSource.com, https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Sylvan Leroux, Open Source Licenses Comparison [Guide], It’s Foss (Sep. 9, 2023), https://itsfoss.com/ open-source-licenses-explained; Gina Häußge, A Dev’s Guide to Open Source Software Licensing, GitHub https://github.com/readme/guides/open-source-licensing (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[38] Id.

[39] While some Creative Commons licenses (like CC0 and CC BY) can be considered “open” in a broad sense, they are not recognized as open-source licenses by the Open Source Initiative, the body that formally approves open-source software licenses. See About, Open Source Initiative, https://opensource.org/about (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[40] Michelle Kaminsky, What Is Creative Commons? 5 Frequently Asked Questions, LegalZoom (Mar. 27, 2023), https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/what-is-creative-commons-5-frequently-asked-questions.

[41] Id.; Kela Parker, Creative Commons License – Pros and Cons Explained, Studiobinder (May 28, 2023), https://www.studiobinder.com/blog/creative-commons-license.

[42] Id.

[43] See Häußge, supra note 37.

[44] Meta Llama 3 Community License Agreement, Meta (Apr. 18, 2024), https://llama.meta.com/llama3/license.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] See, e.g., Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Software Licensing (2004), available at https://people.debian.org/~dktrkranz/legal/Understanding%20Open%20Source%20and%20Free%20Software%20Licensing.pdf.

[48] Niklas Leicht, Given Enough Eyeballs, All Bugs are Shallow – A Literature Review for the Use of Crowdsourcing in Software Testing, Scholar Space (2018), http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50404.

[49] Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond, 19(2) J. Econ. Perspectives 99, 105 (2005), (“Because firms do not capture all the benefits of the investments in the open source project, however, the free-rider problem often discussed in the economics of innovation should apply here as well”).

[50] Liam Tung, Open Source: Almost One in Five Bugs Are Planted for Malicious Purposes, ZDNet (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/open-source-software-how-many-bugs-are-hidden-there-on-purpose.

[51] In many cases, this will be a commercialization strategy that tries to quickly build a set of complimentary products supporting the firm’s primary revenue source. Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Challenges of Open Innovation: The Paradox of Firm Investment in Open-Source Software, 36(3) R&D Mgmt. 13-14 (2006). Apple, for example, released Swift and WebKit as open-source projects at least partly as a strategy to encourage development of software generally—and web apps, specifically—that would work well for MacOS- and iOS-based hardware products. See Open Source at Apple, Apple, https://opensource.apple.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[52] What Is FRAND Licensing?, Lerman Law Associates P.C. (Jun. 26, 2023), https://www.lermanlawpc.com/blog/ 2023/06/what-is-frand-licensing.

[53] Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 106(1) Cornell L. Rev. (2020), https://www.cornelllawreview.org/2020/09/15/frand-and-antitrust.

[54] Garth Brian Hedenskog, What Is a Standard Essential Patent (SEP)? SHIP Global Intellectual Property (Oct. 29, 2019), https://shipglobalip.com/blog/what-is-a-standard-essential-patent-sep-.

[55] Id.

[56] Id.

[57] See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold to Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 George Mason L. Rev. 939, 955 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=294343; see also Eric Schmidt et al., Final Report, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, NSCAI (2021), at 201-202, available at https://www.dwt.com/-/media/files/blogs/artificial-intelligence-law-advisor/2021/03/nscai-final-report–2021.pdf.

[58] See U.S. Leadership in AI: A Plan for Federal Engagement in Developing Technical Standards and Related Tools, NIST (2019), available at https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2019/08/10/ai_standards_fedengagement_plan_9aug2019.pdf; see also AI Risk Management Framework, NIST, https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[59] Navdeep Gill, Abhishek Mathur, & Marcos V. Conde, A Brief Overview of AI Governance for Responsible Machine Learning Systems, arXiv (Nov. 21, 2022), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.13130.

[60] The Ethics Certification Program for Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (ECPAIS), IEEE SA, https://standards.ieee.org/industry-connections/ecpais (last visited Aug. 2, 2024)

[61] See also IEEE Standard Model Process for Addressing Ethical Concerns during System Design, IEEE SA, https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/7000/6781 (last visited Aug. 2, 2024); 7000-2021 – IEEE Standard Model Process for Addressing Ethical Concerns during System Design, IEEE Xplore, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9536679 (last visited Aug. 2, 2024), (Aiming to develop organizational standards for incorporating ethical considerations into system design); The IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, IEEE SA, https://standards.ieee.org/industry-connections/ec/autonomous-systems (last visited Aug. 2, 2024), (General project for developing ethical standards for technology).

[62] Congratulations, AI Trailblazers! Iso/Iec Jtc 1/Sc 42 Receives Prestigious Iso Lawrence D. Eicher Award, ANSI (Sep. 22, 2023), https://www.ansi.org/standards-news/all-news/2023/09/9-22-23-congratulations-ai-trailblazers-isoiec-jtc-1sc-42-receives-prestigious-iso; ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 Artificial intelligence, ISO, https://www.iso.org/committee/6794475.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[63] Id.

[64] The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Trustworthiness (ANSI/CTA-2090), Consumer Tech. Assoc. (2021), https://shop.cta.tech/products/the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-healthcare-trustworthiness-cta-2090.

[65] Id.

[66] U.S. Leadership in AI: A Plan for Federal Engagement in Developing Technical Standards and Related Tools, NIST 18 (2019), available at https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2019/08/10/ai_standards_fedengagement_plan_9aug2019.pdf.

[67] Id. at 22.

[68] Id. at 19.

[69] NIST, supra note 58.

[70] Majority Leader Schumer Floor Remarks on the Release of the Roadmap for AI Policy by the Senate Bipartisan Senate AI Working Group, Senate Democrats (May 15, 2024), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/majority-leader-schumer-floor-remarks-on-the-release-of-the-roadmap-for-ai-policy-by-the-senate-bipartisan-senate-ai-working-group.

[71] See Model Legislation: Responsible Advanced AI Act, Center for AI Policy (Apr. 9, 2024), https://www.aipolicy.us/work/model.

[72] Id.

[73] See, e.g., The Tj Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (industry standards can inform the bounds of negligence even though they do not necessarily define the limits of negligence; instead, what is “reasonably prudent under the circumstances” might go beyond current practices); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), (consideration of whether the claimed expert scientific methods adhere to standards recognized in the relevant scientific community.); Nikolov v. Associated Env’t Servs., 52 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (9th Cir. 2002).

[74] Knut Blind, Sören S. Petersen, & Cesare A.F. Riillo, The Impact of Standards and Regulation on Innovation in Uncertain Markets, 46(1) Research Pol’y 249 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.11.003.

[75] Id. at 251.

[76] Id.

[77] Id. at 253.

[78] See infra, nn. 99-105 and accompanying text.

[79] See Jennifer Huddleston, The Price of Privacy: The Impact of Strict Data Regulations on Innovation and More, American Action Forum (Jun. 3, 2021), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/the-price-of-privacy-the-impact-of-strict-data-regulations-on-innovation-and-more/#ixzz8hmX9sfiS (Discussing how the GDPR’s privacy regulations, which generate large compliance costs, affect innovation in the EU).

[80] See, e.g., Mikolaj Barczentewicz, Does the DMA Let Gatekeepers Protect Data Privacy and Security?, Truth on Mkt. (Apr. 4, 2024), https://truthonthemarket.com/2024/04/04/does-the-dma-let-gatekeepers-protect-data-privacy-and-security (Noting how the EU’s interoperability mandates work at odds with its privacy mandates, putting firms in a bind when considering how to design their business processes. This extends to AI developers insofar as strict standards that operate at odds with each other will ultimately make certain kinds of AI behavior prohibited).

[81] We begin to strain the meaning of “commercialization” in this sense, as this would essentially turn related AI research and development into a commons. Thus, it’s perhaps better to think of this more generally as a distribution method, as the incentives to fully develop the technology that attend commercialization processes will be rather attenuated.

[82] John R. Thomas, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions, Cong. Research Serv. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43266.

[83]Marianna Mazzucato, Marietje Schaake, Seb Krier, & Josh Entsminger, Governing Artificial Intelligence in the Public Interest, Stanford Cyber Policy Center (2022); see also Bryanna Devonshire & Nicolas Harris, Government Regulation of AI – When Is It Coming?, Seacoastonline (Aug. 24, 2023), https://www.seacoastonline.com/story/business/ 2023/08/24/government-regulation-of-ai-when-is-it-coming/70671063007.

[84] Part II — Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 31, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2024).

[85] John R. Thomas, supra note 82.

[86] Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010, S. 3333, 111th Cong. (2010).

[87] 17 USC § 115.

[88] William N. Monte, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 25(3) Info. & Comm. Tech. L. 246 (2016).

[89] Id.

[90] Funding a Revolution: Government Support for Computing Research, National Research Council (1999), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/6323/chapter/1#vii.

[91] Id.

[92] Kristian Stout, Biden’s AI Executive Order Sees Dangers Around Every Virtual Corner, Truth on Mkt. (Nov. 1, 2023), https://truthonthemarket.com/2023/11/01/bidens-ai-executive-order-sees-dangers-around-every-virtual-corner.

[93] See John R. Thomas, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions, Cong. Research Serv. (Jan. 14, 2014), available at  https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43266.

[94] Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, From Data Myths to Data Reality: What Generative AI Can Tell Us About Competition Policy (and Vice Versa), CPI Antitrust Chronicle (Feb. 23, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/from-data-myths-to-data-reality-what-generative-ai-can-tell-us-about-competition-policy-and-vice-versa.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Required Rulemaking on Personal Financial Data Rights, Docket No. 2023-CFPB-0052, CFPB (Jun. 11, 2024), available at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_personal-financial-data-rights_final-rule_2024-06.pdf.

[100] Giuseppe Colangelo, Open Banking Goes to Washington: Lessons from the EU on Regulatory-Driven Data Sharing Regimes, 54 Computer L. & Security Rev., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2024.106018.

[101] See, e.g., Ivan Bosch Chen et al., A Study on the Application and Impact of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on Payment Services (PSD2), Publications Office of the European Union (2023), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2874/996945 (Estimating that TPPs spent €35 million on problems linked to accessing APIs, and €140 million on maintaining legacy systems, due to APIs not working properly).

[102] See Miguel de la Mano & Jorge Padilla, Big Tech Banking, 14 J. Competition L. & Econ. 494, 503 (2018). It’s also important to note that none of this occurs in a vacuum. In some respects, open-banking rules are broached as a way to deal with the prevalent practice of “screen scraping” in order to enable different fintech services to work. See Laurent van Huffel, From Screen Scraping to Open Banking, BAI (Oct. 20, 2023), https://www.bai.org/banking-strategies/from-screen-scraping-to-open-banking.

[103] See Barczentewicz, supra note 80.

[104] Id.

[105] See Open App Markets Act, S.2710, 117th Cong. (2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2710/text.

IN THE MEDIA

Trump BLS Nominee Floats Ending Key Jobs Report

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in The Week article on President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in The Week article on President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Antoni’s proposal to suspend the monthly jobs report, a move that has sparked concerns over politicizing the agency and limiting key economic data. Read the full article here.

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Julian Morris, Senior Scholar at ICLE, was quoted in this CardRates.com article on how a North Dakota judge’s ruling limiting debit card interchange fees could prompt large banks to alter strategies, with Capital One benefiting by using Discover’s debit network to bypass the Durbin Amendment. Read the full article here.

If there’s any large card issuer that greeted the ruling with enthusiasm, it may have been Capital One, according to Julian Morris, a Senior Scholar at the International Center for Law & Economics.

“This creates an even bigger opportunity for Capital One, which can shift its customers to Discover’s three-party debit network, thereby avoiding the Durbin Amendment altogether and enabling it to both offer premium debit products and enhance its offerings to lower income customers,” Morris told us.

Morris told us “banks will be further incentivized to encourage customers to use and switch to credit cards” if Traynor’s decision stands.

Nomeado Por Trump Para Chefiar BLS Enfrenta Enxurrada De Criticas

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in Correio Popular article on President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in Correio Popular article on President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Antoni’s proposal to suspend the monthly jobs report, a move that has sparked concerns over politicizing the agency and limiting key economic data. Read the full article here.

“Não há nada em seus escritos ou em seu currículo que sugira que ele seja qualificado para o cargo, além do fato de que ele está sempre manipulando os dados para favorecer Trump de alguma forma”, disse Brian Albrecht, economista-chefe do Centro Internacional de Direito e Economia.

“O mercado de ações se move claramente com base nesses números de emprego e, portanto, as pessoas envolvidas no jogo acham que isso lhes diz algo sobre o futuro de seus investimentos”, disse Albrecht. “Poderia ser melhorado? Com certeza.”

Trump’s Nominee to Oversee Jobs, Inflation Data Faces Shower of Criticism

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Associated Press article discussing concerns over President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Associated Press article discussing concerns over President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The paper talks about skepticism about Antoni’s qualifications and his history of partisan interpretations of economic data. Read the full article here.

“There’s just nothing in his writing or his resume to suggest that he’s qualified for the position, besides that he is always manipulating the data to favor Trump in some way,” said Brian Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law and Economics.

“The stock market moves clearly based on these job numbers, and so people with skin in the game think it’s telling them something about the future of their investments,” Albrecht said. “Could it be improved? Absolutely.”

White House Hopes Monthly U.S. Jobs Report to Continue Despite Claim by Labour Statistics Nominee

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in CBC Lite article on concerns that President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in CBC Lite article on concerns that President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics could politicize the agency and also noting that although the monthly jobs report could be improved, it remains a key indicator for markets. Read the full article here.

“The stock market moves clearly based on these job numbers, and so people with skin in the game think it’s telling them something about the future of their investments,” said Brian Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law and Economics. “Could it be improved? Absolutely.”

Trump Wants a Bureau of MAGA Statistics

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in National Review paper criticizing President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in National Review paper criticizing President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics, highlighting how he is unqualified and has a history of misrepresentation economic data. Read the full article here.

(Thanks to Brian Albrecht, Jeremy Horpedahl, Gary Winslett, Daniel Di Martino, Matt Darling, and Joey Politano for helping to compile and debunk Antoni’s errors online.)

Tariffs are not Costless

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Bloomberg article on President Trump’s nomination of EJ Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Bloomberg article on President Trump’s nomination of EJ Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the concerns it has raised about politicizing the agency. Read the full article here.

And here’s Brian Albrecht.

Anyway, one interesting thing that I hadn’t realized before talking to Beach is the kind of history of this role as non-partisan or non- aligned to the presidential cycle. So for example, Beach was confirmed by the Senate in March 2019, during the Trump administration, and served through March 2023, largely under Biden.

Trump’s Labor Statistics Nominee Raises Concerns About Agency Politicization

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was quoted in this Common Dreams article discussing concerns about President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was quoted in this Common Dreams article discussing concerns about President Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the potential for politicizing the agency. Read the full article here.

“[…] Brian Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law and Economics, highlighted on the social media platform X a number of instances of Antoni “completely not understanding economic statistics, being partisan hack, or both.”

Trump Names ‘Utterly Unqualified’ Project 2025 Economists as New Labor Stats Chief

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Common Dreams article criticizing President Donald Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Common Dreams article criticizing President Donald Trump’s nomination of E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics and highlighting the past examples of Antoni’s misunderstanding economic data and making partisan claims. Read the full article here.

He said on former Trump aide Steve Bannon’s podcast that the absence of a Trump appointee in the top position at the BLS is “part of the reason why we continue to have all of these different data problems,” but Brian Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law and Economics, highlighted on the social media platform X a number of instances of Antoni “completely not understanding economic statistics, being partisan hack, or both.”

Economists Call Trump’s BLS Pick ‘Completely Unqualified’ For The Job: ‘…Does Not Have Any Relevant Expertise’

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Benzinga article covering economists’ criticism of Donald Trump’s nominee for Bureau of Labor Statistics chief, Dr. EJ . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in Benzinga article covering economists’ criticism of Donald Trump’s nominee for Bureau of Labor Statistics chief, Dr. EJ Antoni, as unqualified and lacking relevant expertise. Read the full article here.

Other economists, including Brian Albrecht, highlighted concerns about Antoni’s grasp of economic statistics,
with one user sharing a post suggesting Antoni misunderstood the import price index. 

BLS Commissioner Nominee’s Suggestion to Suspend Monthly Jobs Report Is ‘Like Gouging Our Eyes Out’

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in a Talking Points Memo article on the controversy surrounding President Trump’s nomination of Heritage Foundation economist . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently mentioned in a Talking Points Memo article on the controversy surrounding President Trump’s nomination of Heritage Foundation economist E.J. Antoni to lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Read the full article here.

Brian Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law and Economics, posted a thread to X purportedly showing several times Antoni was hyper-partisan or displayed insufficient economic knowledge.

Why Tariffs On More Countries Can Be Better

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in Marginal Revolution article discussing how uniform tariffs can be less distortionary than selective tariffs by avoiding . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in Marginal Revolution article discussing how uniform tariffs can be less distortionary than selective tariffs by avoiding costly trade diversion. Read the full article here.

In general, as Brian Albrecht argues, tariffs are a costly way to raise revenue. Selective tariffs are especially inefficient and wasteful. Sad to say, the U.S. tariff system today is highly selective — wildly different rates on different countries and times. Trade diversion isn’t a necessary consequence of selective tariffs but our current high and chaotic tariff structure makes it all but inevitable. Thus selective tariffs mean standard deadweight losses will compound with large-scale trade diversion and inefficiency, raising losses above headline numbers. Finally, the selective structure invites rent seeking, as firms and industries lobby for favorable treatment — adding yet another layer of economic waste.

Latest T-Mobile Deal Suggests DOJ-FCC Spectrum Tension

Kristian Stout, ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in this Law 360 article on the FCC’s approval and the DOJ’s cautious stance on T-Mobile’s . . .

Kristian Stout, ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in this Law 360 article on the FCC’s approval and the DOJ’s cautious stance on T-Mobile’s $4.4 billion acquisition of UScellular’s wireless operations. Read the full article here.

Kristian Stout, director of innovation policy at the International Center for Law & Economics, said the statement sends important signals for future DOJ scrutiny. “What they’re signaling is they’re not going to be laissez-faire,” Stout said. “They’re going to look for where it’s not pro-consumer.” While companies can still rely on traditional economic analysis for antitrust review, Stout said they’ll “face a DOJ that is not going to look the other way if there’s ambiguous evidence.”

Why Tariffs are Especially Bad Taxes

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in NR Capital Matters article discussing his six key reasons why tariffs are an especially inefficient and . . .

Brian Albrecht, ICLE Chief Economist, was recently quoted in NR Capital Matters article discussing his six key reasons why tariffs are an especially inefficient and harmful way to raise government revenue. Read the full article here.

On the tax badness spectrum, tariffs are among the worst. Economist Brian Albrecht gives six reasons why in a new article for his newsletter, Economic Forces.

  1. Tariffs distort consumption. For a consumption tax to be less harmful, it should have as broad a base as possible. Tariffs have some of the narrowest bases possible: Specific goods from specific countries. That means they end up being taxes that also function as regulations or subsidies by discouraging or encouraging purchases that people would not have made otherwise.
  2. Tariffs also distort work. Part of the reward to working is the stuff that your income can buy. Albrecht gives a simple example of a worker in a country that produces coconuts. Workers in that country buy bananas from another country. If the government puts a tariff on bananas, it has effectively reduced the reward for producing coconuts.
  3. Tariffs reduce productivity. They apply to inputs to production along with final goods. That’s why they aren’t really a consumption tax. Any well-designed consumption tax only taxes final products. Tariffs on steel, aluminum, copper, and other inputs raise costs of production and take away money that could have gone to paying workers or buying better machines.
  4. Tariffs are bad at redistribution. “If you want to redistribute from rich to poor, it’s better to do it directly through progressive income taxes than indirectly by trying to guess which goods rich people buy more of,” Albrecht writes. On top of that, tariffs apply to goods, not services, and poorer people tend to spend more of their incomes on goods than richer people do.
  5. Tariffs are a tax on growth. Capital accumulates over time, to the benefit of people who can use it to be more productive. Tariffs don’t just reduce productivity in the present. They hinder further accumulation of capital into the future, reducing the growth potential of the economy in the long run. That then reduces incomes below what they would have otherwise been, which makes capital less affordable, compounding the problem.
  6. Tariffs invite wasteful rent-seeking. Inefficient producers benefit more from tariffs than efficient ones, so they now have strong incentives to lobby for them. The efficient producers, who don’t need the tariffs to compete effectively, now hire their own lobbyists to counter. Now, on the sidelines of actual economic activity, there’s a zero-sum battle between lobbyists that wouldn’t exist if the tariffs didn’t exist.

T-Mobile Buys USCellular After Clearing Antitrust Review

Eric Fruits, senior scholar at ICLE, is quoted in this JD Supra article on T-Mobile’s $4.4 billion acquisition of UScellular’s wireless operations, with a focus on . . .

Eric Fruits, senior scholar at ICLE, is quoted in this JD Supra article on T-Mobile’s $4.4 billion acquisition of UScellular’s wireless operations, with a focus on the transaction’s clearance by the DOJ and FCC, its competitive and structural implications in the U.S. wireless market, and its potential effects on rural connectivity and market consolidation. Read the full article here.

Economist Eric Fruits of the International Center for Law & Economics agreed that the deal is a positive one, saying, “UScellular provides no meaningful competitive constraints on T-Mobile… The transaction presents an opportunity to address the structural challenges of a struggling regional carrier, while boosting competition and innovation across the wireless industry.”

Portland Shoppers Feel ‘Majorly Stressed’ About Grocery Prices as Tariff Concerns Grow

Eric Fruits, senior scholar at ICLE, is quoted in this KGW8 article on growing consumer stress in Portland over rising grocery prices driven by inflation . . .

Eric Fruits, senior scholar at ICLE, is quoted in this KGW8 article on growing consumer stress in Portland over rising grocery prices driven by inflation and impending tariffs. Read the full article here.

Economist Eric Fruits, a senior scholar from the International Center for Law and Economics, agreed.

Fruits used the example of buying a can of soda or tomatoes.

“Those tariffs haven’t fully hit yet,” said Fruits, “and when they do, they’re going to ripple through in so many ways.”

USF Contribution Factor is Expected to Leap, but Reform Could Prove Difficult

Kristian Stout, ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in this Communications Daily article on the projected record-high Universal Service Fund contribution factor from 36 . . .

Kristian Stout, ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in this Communications Daily article on the projected record-high Universal Service Fund contribution factor from 36 % in Q3 to 39.3 % in Q4 and the growing pressure for USF reform. Read the full article here.

Kristian Stout, innovation policy director for the International Center for Law & Economics, said “every new bit of news on USF points toward only greater pressure to reform the system.” But what will happen and when is “anyone’s guess, as there are so many other political footballs in play.”

ICLE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

August Threads 2025

Threads from ICLE scholars on trending issues for the month of August 2025. Right after the Google Search case was filed in 2020, I wrote . . .

Threads from ICLE scholars on trending issues for the month of August 2025.