Spotlight

August 2025

HIGHLIGHTS

ICLE Brief to the 9th Circuit in Epic Games v Apple

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”)[1] is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the . . .

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”)[1] is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. ICLE promotes the use of law and economics to inform policy debates and has longstanding expertise evaluating antitrust law and policy.

ICLE has an interest in ensuring that antitrust law promotes the public interest by remaining grounded in sensible rules informed by sound economic analysis. That includes fostering consistency between antitrust law and other laws that proscribe unfair methods of competition, such as California’s Unfair Competition Law, and advising against far-reaching injunctions that could deteriorate the quality of mobile ecosystems, thereby harming the interests of consumers and app developers.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court has issued an order, No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025), ECF No. 1508 (“Order”), that would, permanently and nationwide, prohibit Apple from charging “any commission or fee” on various purchases facilitated by Apple’s platform and in-app purchasing (IAP) mechanism. Further, the Order would intrude on various of Apple’s business practices including, inter alia, steps Apple might take to protect the integrity and security of its platform and IAP and, not incidentally, the privacy and data security of consumers who use the Apple ecosystem. These permanent, nationwide injunctions are required, according to the order, to prevent Apple from “maintaining an anticompetitive revenue stream,” “reap supracompetitive operating margins” or “profits” that are “not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus . . . anticompetitive.”

These permanent, nationwide injunctions are required, moreover, despite the following: (1) neither the pricing nor the business practices enjoined here were enjoined in the District Court’s prior order in this matter; (2) no violation of the federal antitrust laws was found at trial in this matter, in which the only finding of liability was the finding of a violation of the “unfair prong” of California’s UCL; and (3) California courts have held that, because the purpose of both “federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefits of consumers,” it follows that when “the same conduct is alleged to be both an antitrust violation and an ‘unfair business act or practice for the same reason—because it unreasonably restrains competition and harms consumers—the determination that the conduct is not an unreasonable restraint of trade necessarily implies that the conduct is not ‘unfair’ towards consumers” Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 175, 184 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2001).

As we explain below, the District Court’s Order misapplies basic principles of antitrust in ways that will harm consumers and competition. If upheld and followed by courts in other cases, the Order will set a dangerous precedent—one that will dampen firms’ incentives to create and improve groundbreaking new platforms. The Order would enjoin Apple from charging “any commission or fee” on various purchases facilitated by Apple’s platform and in-app purchasing (IAP) mechanism. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025), ECF No. 1508 (“Order”). The Order claims this is required to prevent Apple from “maintaining an anticompetitive revenue stream,” id. at 75, or “reap[ing] supracompetitive operating margins” or “profits” that are “not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus …  anticompetitive.” Id. at 2. But such profits are not unlawful.

In brief, the Order would impose numerous and complex duties to deal that were not identified in the previous injunction and have not been shown necessary to prevent foreclosure. Instead, the Order reflects a maximalist interpretation of the initial injunction—requiring micromanagement of Apple’s platform and dictating that Apple must offer business users free access to its ecosystem.

At the same time, the Order would effectively obviate various of Apple’s legal business practices, including steps Apple might take to protect the integrity and security of its platform and IAP, the privacy and data security of consumers who use the Apple ecosystem, and the value of its intellectual property, all of which were previously identified by this Court as legitimate. See Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 971 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 681 (2024).

While the original injunction did not interfere with “Apple’s business justifications [which] focus on other parts of the Apple ecosystem and will not be significantly impacted by the increase of information to and choice for consumers,” Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 559 F.Supp.3d 898, 1057 (2021) (“Epic v. Apple”), the Order is premised on an interpretation of the initial injunction that is no longer a “limited measure [that] balances the justification for maintaining a cohesive ecosystem with the public interest….” Id. Rather, it imposes complex, long-running duties to deal that are unsupported by the record and inconsistent with the relevant jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s repeated caution that antitrust courts are not central planners.

ARGUMENT

I. Antitrust Courts Are Not Central Planners or Price Regulators

The Order misapplies key Supreme Court rulings, like Trinko and Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, which caution against the use of compelled access remedies. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trinko is the lodestar here. In that case, the Court made clear that antitrust law does not, as a general matter, require even a monopolist to aid its competitors by sharing infrastructure or data, warning that such forced sharing “may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest” in valuable innovations. Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“Trinko”). Court has, therefore, long cautioned against such remedies. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S.Ct. 2141 (2021) (“Alston”); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Comm’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (“linkLine”).

The Trinko Court warned against enforced sharing precisely because it would require “courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. Antitrust law does not generally require a monopolist to aid its competitors by sharing infrastructure or data because such forced sharing “may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest” in valuable innovations. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. The linkLine Court clarified that Trinko encompasses pricing obligations like those imposed here, noting that enforcement of such a duty “would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices” while “aiming at a moving target….”  linkLine, 555 U.S. at 453 (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408).

Courts must be cautious in fashioning remedies that impose such duties, lest they “wind up impairing rather than enhancing competition, impose costs that ‘exceed efficiencies gained,’” and “suppress procompetitive innovation.” Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 102 (2021) (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415).

II. The Order Ignores the Supreme Court’s Repeated Repudiation of Complex and Burdensome Duties to Deal

Such risks plainly are raised by the Order, which enjoins Apple from, inter alia, “[i]mposing any commission or any fee” on linked transactions, Order at 75, notwithstanding that “the Court did not select a rate,” Id. at 58, and that “Apple is entitled to … guard against the uncompensated use of its intellectual property.” Epic v. Apple, 559 F.Supp.3d at 1042. The factual recitations in the Order reveal the uncertainty Apple confronted in identifying a price for linked-out transactions that would comport with the original injunction. See, e.g., Order at 21.

The purported justification for a zero-price requirement is that the District Court had “found that ‘Apple’s 30% commission … allowed it to reap supracompetitive operating margins’ and was not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus, was anticompetitive.” Id. at 2. While imposing a specific commission might resolve the uncertainty, the District Court’s analysis largely serves to highlight both the difficulty of administering such duties-to-deal and the arbitrariness of its zero price mandate.

The Order notes that Apple “never correlated the value of its intellectual property to the commission it charges.” Order at 7. But what would such a correlation entail, and why would it be required of Apple? Typically, the price system tests the value of intellectual property. Antitrust law recognizes that even monopoly can arise “as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). For that reason, antitrust law does not condemn monopoly itself. Id. at 570–71; see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08.

It is conceivable that some price could be found exclusionary, foreclosing competition to an extent prohibited by, e.g., Section 2 of the Sherman Act. But given the benefits of Apple’s platform and IAP and the need to maintain incentives for future investment, competition cannot require a rate of zero percent. Apart from a conclusory declaration that a 27% commission for linked purchases is anticompetitive, neither the Order nor Epic v. Apple provides any analysis of a price threshold at which a commission would become exclusionary.

Further, attempting to maximize profits within the confines of an injunction cannot be a violation. Yet the District Court concluded that Apple’s efforts to do so were inherently anticompetitive. See, e.g., Order at 17. This Court has admonished such conflation of  “the desire to maximize profits with an intent to ‘destroy competition itself.’ … [T]he goal of antitrust law is not to force businesses to forego profits or even ‘[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices,’ which is ‘what attracts business acumen in the first place.’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 990, 994, fn. 15 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation and citation omitted)) (“Qualcomm”).

Seeking to ground its conclusion that Apple’s compliance efforts were anticompetitive, the District Court contends that summing Apple’s 27% rate and other costs entails that linked-out commission costs would exceed Apple’s 30% IAP commission. It thus finds that Apple’s linked-out commission “forecloses competitive alternatives.” Order at 60 (emphasis in original). The Court bases its conclusion of a violation on a “price squeeze” claim—asserting that, by pricing its own alternative (IAP at 30%) lower than the effective price required by its linked-out commission, Apple effectively eliminates the linked-out option as a competitive alternative.

But “[r]ecognizing price-squeeze claims would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed.” linkLine, 555 U.S. at 453. This would compound the enforcement problems inherent in duties to deal because “courts would be aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may result in a squeeze.” Id.

The Order exemplifies the problem: the District Court contends that Apple’s linked-out commission violates its prior injunction because of the interaction between Apple’s commission and developers’ other costs. To determine when that interaction effectively forecloses linked-out transactions thus depends on external payment processing (and other) costs over which Apple has no control—costs that are certain to vary across developers, apps, and times. It also depends on app developers’ choice of payment processors. For virtually any commission Apple might set, a developer could choose a payment processor with fees that, combined with Apple’s commission, exceed 30%. This moving target precludes Apple’s ability to identify the price that would comply with the Order—precisely the scenario that the linkLine Court found “perhaps most troubling.” Id. at 453.

LinkLine explains why that is untenable: “[H]ow is a judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the price charged by other suppliers of the primary product? None exist. Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary level not monopolized? How can the court determine this price without examining costs and demands, indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting proceedings of which often last for several years? Further, how is the court to decide the proper size of the price ‘gap?’ Must it be large enough for all independent competing firms to make a ‘living profit,’ no matter how inefficient they may be? … And how should the court respond when costs or demands change over time, as they inevitably will?” Linkline, 555 U.S. at 454 (internal citation omitted).

These concerns apply in spades when a duty to deal arises from a judicially-ordered injunction, the violation of which threatens criminal contempt. “‘No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.’” LinkLine, 555 U.S. at 453 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415).

The District Court’s rationale for what is manifestly rate setting is opaque. Antitrust law does not prohibit supracompetitive pricing in itself; and it recognizes that intellectual property rights are predicated on the promise of supracompetitive pricing—or, at least, the potential for profits—which provide incentives to make fixed-cost investments in research and development. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08; Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 994. The District Court’s stipulation of a zero-price commission ignores the difficulty of setting any price that will remedy prior (allegedly exclusionary) conduct, compensate for Apple’s intellectual property, or account for an allegedly anticompetitive price differential (the extent of which is partly determined by the pricing decisions and conduct of non-parties).

III. The Order Is Not Tailored to the Harm Found at Trial

As the D.C. Circuit has observed, “relief should be tailored to fit the wrong creating the occasion for the remedy.” United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Microsoft”); and it “must base its relief on some clear ‘indication of a significant causal connection between the conduct enjoined or mandated and the violation found directed toward the remedial goal intended.’” Id. at 105 (citation omitted).

The District Court insists that its order “require[s] no affirmative action on Apple’s part,” Order at 76, implying that no further findings are required. But this strains credulity. First, the practices enjoined—including the charging of any positive price for linked-out payments—were not found unlawful at trial, and there is no explanation in the Order of how they remediate the finding of a UCL violation. At the same time, there is no practical way for Apple to comply with the Order without undertaking numerous and considerable affirmative actions, or to do so without risk to its IAP, its platform, and the consumers who choose to use them. In addition, the Order goes significantly further than the original injunction: It not only requires that Apple eliminate practices that prevent competition with IAP, but, in effect, requires the creation of a frictionless steering experience for the benefit of competitors—and to do so for free. Order at 75-6.

Remedies should target specific anticompetitive acts without deterring the competitive process that benefits consumers. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 107; see also Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Structural Antitrust Relief Against Digital Platforms, 7 J. LAW & INNOVATION 57, 64 (2024). To ignore this principle risks doing more harm than good. “Fashioning appropriate equitable antitrust relief requires that courts balance the benefit to competition against the hardship or competitive disadvantage the remedy may cause.” Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir. 2010).

The history of antitrust remedies shows that they fail precisely when they overindex on harms and ignore the benefits that may also arise from ambiguous conduct and complex market structures. See generally Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Injunctive Relief in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 21 RES. LAW AND ECON. 277, 335–37 (2004) (studying effects of behavioral remedies imposed in ten major monopolization cases). “Without a firm grasp of the economic forces that are driving changes in market structure, [courts] cannot be expected to design ‘relief’ that will result in increased competition, lower prices, and consumer benefits.” Id. at 335.

IV. The Order Ignores the Competitive and Consumer Benefits of Apple’s Relatively “Closed” Distribution Model

Anti-steering provisions can be procompetitive. At issue in Amex, for example, were various anti-steering provisions American Express had placed in its contracts with merchants. Ohio V. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018). The plaintiffs had alleged that the anti-steering provisions violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 138 S. Ct. at 2283. But the Court recognized that “there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about . . . antisteering provisions.” Id. at 2289. Such vertical provisions can, among other things, prevent merchants from free-riding, thereby increasing the availability of “‘tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts’ that enhance competition and consumer welfare.” Id. at 2290 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890-91 (2007)).

That general observation is entirely consistent with this Court’s limited affirmation of the District Court’s narrower, initial finding that certain of Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated the UCL to the extent that they might diminish consumer information. Yet the Order sweeps much more broadly than that finding implies.

Apple’s “closed” distribution model also allows the company to curate the App Store’s apps and payment options. By categorically and permanently enjoining Apple from excluding “certain categories of apps and developers from obtaining link access,” the Order inhibits Apple’s ability to exclude apps that pose data security threats, threaten to impose physical harm on users, or undermine child-safety filters.

Prohibiting Apple from placing any restrictions on apps that “pass[] on product details, user details or other information that refers to the user …” ignores the risks to privacy and personal data that such practices can entail. Likewise, prohibiting Apple from requiring “anything other than a neutral message apprising users that they are going to a third-party site” prevents Apple from excluding undesirable or harmful language on its platform. Apple’s App Store guidelines address these concerns by excluding apps that pose data security threats, threaten to impose physical harm on users, or undermine child-safety filters.[2]

In addition, Apple’s rules increase trust between users and previously unknown developers, because users do not have to fear their apps contain malware. They also reduce user fears about payment fraud. More broadly, Apple’s closed business model also enables it to maintain a high standard of performance on iOS devices by excluding apps and payment systems that might slow devices or crash frequently. Users may not know when device performance is affected by a given app or purchase mechanism, so an open system would mean the potential for apps that crash the entire device. Apple’s closed model ensures that unscrupulous developers cannot impose negative externalities on the entire ecosystem.

The Order also presents a serious risk of freeriding. Rivals could mimic Apple’s curation while undercutting it on price. This would not enhance competition on the merits, but eviscerate it, by eroding Apple’s incentives to develop, refine, and enforce such rules. To impose a zero price on linked-out transactions effectively assumes that the appropriate level of curation is itself zero. But that cannot be correct: Apple’s closed business model enables it to maintain a high standard of performance on iOS by excluding apps and payment systems that might impair it, ensuring that unscrupulous developers cannot impose negative externalities on the entire ecosystem. Yet the Order does not weigh the costs and benefits of such restrictions or question whether they are necessary to remedy a violation of California law.

CONCLUSION

The District Court’s Order undermines sound application of the federal antitrust laws and the procompetitive and pro-consumer policies protected by the antitrust laws and the UCL.

[1] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), amici further state that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or part; no party, counsel for a party, or any person other than amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution toward the preparation and submission of this brief.

[2] Such concerns are illustrated by, for example, complaints by the Federal Trade Commission that the Plaintiff-Appellee, Epic Games, violated both the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule by, inter alia, knowingly collecting personal information about children without parental consent and “matchmaking children and teens with strangers while broadcasting players’ account names and imposing live on-by-default voice and text communications . . . .[and that] Children and teens have been bullied, threatened, and harassed within Fortnite, including sexually.” Separately, the FTC alleged that Epic had violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by unfair practices, charging consumers for items without first obtaining consent,” and that it has then “banned consumers from accessing previously paid-for content when they have disputed unauthorized charges with their credit card providers.” Although the FTC reports that it “has secured agreements requiring Epic Games, Inc., creator of the popular video game Fortnite, to pay a total of $520 million in relief,” the relevant settlement agreements, following established practice, do not incorporate allocutions of liability by Epic. ICLE here does not allege that Epic violated COPPA and the FTC Act as represented in the FTC complaints. Rather, we note the FTC’s allegations, based on substantial staff investigations, to illustrate the types and scale of consumer harm that are at risk if Apple cannot exclude bad actors for its app store and IAP. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fortnite Video Game Maker Epic Games to Pay More Than Half a Billion Dollars over FTC Allegations of Privacy Violations and Unwanted Charges (Dec. 19, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/12/fortnite-video-game-maker-epic-games-pay-more-half-billion-dollars-over-ftc-allegations (last accessed June 27, 2025).

 

Regulating State Interchange Fees: Evaluating the Likely Effects of the IFPA

Executive Summary The Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (IFPA) is a novel legislative measure that, if implemented, would prevent payment-card issuers, networks, and processors from . . .

Executive Summary

The Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (IFPA) is a novel legislative measure that, if implemented, would prevent payment-card issuers, networks, and processors from charging interchange fees on those portions of card transactions that represent gratuities or state or local sales taxes. While ostensibly aimed at protecting merchants from the burden of paying interchange fees on sales taxes and gratuities, the law would create a host of economic and legal problems that far outweigh its modest purported benefits.

The IFPA introduces a complex two-tier compliance mechanism, including a real-time exemption system that would require merchants to transmit detailed tax and gratuity data during payment authorization, and a rebate system that would allow merchants to retroactively recover interchange fees. Both pathways present substantial logistical and technological challenges for payment networks, processors, and merchants, with significant accompanying compliance costs and systemic inefficiencies.

Economically, interchange fees are not merely transaction costs; they are the mechanism by which payment networks balance the two-sided market of merchants and consumers, funding consumer rewards, insurance, fraud prevention, and card-system innovations. By prohibiting interchange fees on sales taxes and gratuities, the IFPA would disrupt the established economic balance of the payments ecosystem, imposing revenue losses on banks that would likely be offset through reduced consumer rewards, higher card fees, or increased borrowing costs. Historical precedents from interchange-fee regulations in the United States (the “Durbin amendment”), the EU, and Australia confirm that such interventions generally result in diminished consumer benefits without clear price reductions from merchants.

The IFPA would also have significant extraterritorial effects, imposing Illinois-specific standards on national payment systems, necessitating costly and inefficient operational adjustments nationwide. If other states were to follow suit, it would cause fragmentation of the national payments system, leading to higher transaction costs, reduced innovation, and decreased overall efficiency. The law also raises significant constitutional and legal questions, particularly concerning federal preemption. Banks and credit unions have challenged the act, arguing that it is preempted by the federal National Bank Act (NBA) and Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA). A federal court has preliminarily enjoined enforcement against nationally chartered banks and out-of-state banks. Originally scheduled to enter into force July 1, the preliminary injunction means the act’s implementation will be delayed, perhaps indefinitely.

Ultimately, the IFPA’s minimal and concentrated merchant benefits would be substantially outweighed by broader economic harms to consumers, banks, and the payments infrastructure. Given the preliminary legal injunctions and the significant practical challenges to implementation, the law’s long-term viability is questionable. If replicated elsewhere, it could severely disrupt the unified and efficient national payment systems integral to contemporary commerce.

I. Introduction

In June 2024, Illinois enacted the Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (“IFPA”), a first-of-its-kind law aimed at reshaping the economics of credit- and debit-card transactions in the state, but with implications far beyond.[1] The IFPA prohibits payment-card issuers, networks, and processors from charging or collecting interchange fees on those portions of a transaction that represent gratuities or state or local sales taxes.

If implemented, when a consumer pays by card at an Illinois merchant, that merchant would be able to deduct or recoup the interchange fee on the sales tax and tip component of the purchase. Proponents claim this will relieve merchants (and, ultimately, consumers) from paying fees on charges that do not constitute the merchant’s revenue (i.e., taxes passed through to the government, or tips passed through to employees). As we document in this white paper, however, the reality would be rather different.

Originally scheduled to take effect on July 1, the IFPA represents a novel intervention into the payment-card ecosystem; no other government anywhere in the world has attempted to prohibit the retention of only one part of the interchange fee. The act’s notional premise is to reallocate the costs of sales-tax collection from merchants and taxpayers to card-issuing banks.[2] As we have previously noted, however, these costs would be substantially passed on to consumers.[3] Moreover, the act would, if implemented, disrupt the intricate economic balance of the payment-card system and impose significant compliance burdens that would outweigh any putative benefits.

For good reason, the law currently faces serious legal challenges. Specifically, in August 2024, the Illinois Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, America’s Credit Unions, the Illinois Credit Union League, and the Illinois Retail Merchants Association brought a motion for pre-enforcement injunctive relief from the IFPA.[4] As of this writing, the judge had issued a temporary injunction barring Illinois’ attorney general from enforcing the legislation against federally chartered banks and out-of-state banks.[5]

This paper extends our previous analysis, offering more detailed examination of the IFPA from a law & economics perspective. It situates the act within broader debates on the cost of tax compliance, the regulation of interchange fees, and the question of who should bear the cost of compliance.[6] It also delves more deeply into the extraterritorial implications of the IFPA, as well as its constitutionality.

A. The Benefits of Electronic Payments and the Role of Interchange Fees

Electronic payments have become indispensable in modern commerce. Studies show that payment cards (whether a physical card or a phone app) are, for most purposes, superior to cash transactions.[7] For consumers, they enable greater convenience (there is less need to obtain and carry cash) and security (they come with sophisticated fraud protections). Credit cards also offer the benefit of a line of credit that is interest-free if the previous month’s balance is paid in full by the due date. Many cards also come with other benefits, including purchase-protection insurance, travel insurance, and cashback or other rewards (such as airline miles or hotel points). These considerable benefits explain why most consumers prefer to pay using a payment card (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1: Payment-Instrument Share as Proportion of Number of Payments

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board [8]

For merchants, cards also offer significant benefits relative to cash, including faster check-outs, increased sales, and protection against fraud and theft.[9] When Chicago quick-serve restaurant chain Epic Burger went cashless in 2017, founder David Friedman explained that he did so to increase speed and safety, and to reduce counting errors.[10] When the Mercedes-Benz Stadium in Atlanta went cashless in 2018, it reported significantly faster transaction times, an increase in per-capita spending, and substantial reductions in total costs, underscoring the benefits to merchants of electronic payments.[11] Sports stadiums and restaurants both in Illinois and across the country have followed suit. [12]

Payment systems can only function with participation by both buyers (consumers) and sellers (merchants). Trust is fundamental to that participation, and the willingness of merchants and consumers to trust payment cards is underpinned by the billions of dollars of investments in innovation made by payment networks, by the banks that issue cards (issuers) and the banks and other payment-service providers that process payments on behalf of merchants (acquirers) in secure systems, as well as in ongoing maintenance of those systems.[13] Meanwhile, consumers will only be motivated to use cards if they perceive substantial benefits, which in many cases includes the aforementioned insurance and rewards. These costs are in large part recouped by issuing banks through the retention of an “interchange fee.”[14]

Despite the enormous benefits generated by payment cards for merchants, consumers, and society as a whole, the role of interchange fees remains poorly understood by the public. Indeed, even relatively knowledgeable commentators repeatedly assert that interchange fees are a “transaction cost.”[15] From an economic perspective, this is not correct. While the interchange fee does cover certain transaction costs, such as fraud detection and prevention and the system’s overall maintenance, a large proportion of the fee is, in fact, a transfer from merchants to consumers, covering various consumer benefits, such as purchase-protection insurance and rewards.

Economists call such transfer payments “cross-side subsidies,” as they go from one side of the market (in this case, merchants) to the other (consumers).[16] Such payments are more-or-less ubiquitous in two-sided markets. For example, merchants (advertisers) subsidize readers of newspapers and users of search engines and smartphone apps. The importance and value of such cross-side subsidies has long been established in the economics literature and was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Sometimes indirect network effects require two-sided platforms to charge one side much more than the other. For two-sided platforms, “’the [relative] price structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board.’” The optimal price might require charging the side with more elastic demand a below-cost (or even negative) price. With credit cards, for example, networks often charge cardholders a lower fee than merchants because cardholders are more price sensitive. In fact, the network might well lose money on the cardholder side by offering rewards such as cash back, airline miles, or gift cards. The network can do this because increasing the number of cardholders increases the value of accepting the card to merchants and, thus, increases the number of merchants who accept it. Networks can then charge those merchants a fee for every transaction (typically a percentage of the purchase price). Striking the optimal balance of the prices charged on each side of the platform is essential for two-sided platforms to maximize the value of their services and to compete with their rivals.[17]

B. Interchange-Fee Regulation and the IFPA

The public’s general lack of understanding of the role of interchange fees has contributed to a situation in which many larger merchants have been able to claim—often unchallenged in the media—that prevailing fees are “excessive.” Some of these merchants appear to want consumers to continue to use payment cards but don’t want to contribute to the cross-side-subsidy component of interchange fees that enhances consumers’ incentives to use their cards. Others may have a more nefarious motive: they understand that the introduction of price controls on payment cards would reduce card use overall, but believe they would gain: their larger scale and scope enables them to offer other inducements, such as merchant-specific loyalty rewards, so they could gain business away from smaller merchants for whom the loss of interchange-fee-funded incentives would be more detrimental.

Though largely driven by these larger merchants’ interests, the IFPA is couched in language that would make it appear to be motivated by a desire to help smaller merchants and consumers. As we show in this paper, the IFPA would disrupt a nationally integrated payment system, imposing costly compliance burdens on out-of-state issuers, and cause economic harm through adjustments in card rewards and card or bank-account fees. Moreover, the IFPA raises serious constitutional questions under the Dormant Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrines.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the IFPA’s provisions and contextualizes them within Illinois’s longstanding and generous sales-tax-collection allowance. Section III examines the “sales tax exception” by comparing sales-tax collection with other business-tax obligations and evaluating the justifications for merchant compensation. Section IV explores the IFPA’s extraterritorial effects, including its impact on out-of-state issuers, as well as anticipated responses like adjustments in rewards and fees, and expected legal challenges. Section V draws together the economic distortions, legal vulnerabilities, and broader implications of the act, ultimately concluding that the IFPA is both economically unsound and likely preempted by federal law.

II. Explaining the IFPA

For decades, Illinois has distinguished itself by allowing merchants to retain a significant portion of the sales tax they collect from consumers as compensation for the administrative burden of tax remittance. Prior to recent reforms, Illinois law permitted retailers to deduct 1.75% of the sales tax collected with no cap. This is a practice that, in aggregate, the Illinois Policy Institute estimates cost the state approximately $186 million annually.[18]

Until recently, many states permitted merchants to apply a “retailer’s discount,” presumably to offset the costs of manually recording and remitting sales taxes. In some cases, it was also used to encourage electronic reporting. Over time, however, as electronic filing became ubiquitous and administrative costs diminished, many states capped or eliminated such allowances.[19] In contrast, Illinois’s uncapped policy came to be viewed as a windfall for high-volume merchants, particularly large chains that could capture six- or seven-figure annual sums from the discount.[20]

Facing fiscal pressures, Gov. J.B. Pritzker in 2019 proposed capping the retailer discount at $1,000 per month, which was estimated to generate an additional $75 million in state revenue and $58 million in revenue to local governments, while only affecting around 2,400 of the largest merchants, according to the governor’s budget office.[21] But the move was resisted by the Illinois Taxpayers Federation and merchant groups.[22]

Pritzker tried again in subsequent years but was repeatedly rebuffed.[23] In 2024, his budget office claimed the measure would result in $101 million in additional revenue to the state and $85 million to local governments.[24] Again, the measure faced opposition, mainly from large retailers. While the effective $12,000 annual cap was generous compared to the caps imposed in other states, it represented a significant reduction from the six- or seven-figures many larger stores were previously able to reap. Indeed, Illinois Department of Revenue Director David Harris noted that, while only 2-3% of retailers would be affected by the cap, it would have “a significant impact on very large retailers.”[25] Walmart alone was estimated to pocket more than $70 million annually nationwide from various states’ sales-tax allowances, with Illinois’ policy contributing significantly to that sum.[26]

A. Legislative Quid Pro Quo: Large Merchant Interests and the IFPA

In the context of this friction, the IFPA was conceived as a compromise: a legislative bargain between Illinois lawmakers and the interests of large merchants. By capping the longstanding sales-tax allowance, Illinois lawmakers effectively recouped revenue that had previously been retained by merchants. In exchange, the General Assembly offered merchants a prohibition on interchange fees applied to sales taxes and gratuities.

At one level, the IFPA appears to shift the burden of collecting sales taxes from the government to the banking sector. Legislators could thus present it as a win for Illinois taxpayers, who would no longer subsidize merchants via an uncapped collection allowance. Instead, the banks would pay. Legislators could claim to be championing small businesses against big banks and “unfair fees,” while also plugging budget holes.

In reality, IFPA is a blatant sop to the interests of large merchants, who have been pushing for interchange-fee price controls for years. On a webpage devoted to “swipe fees,” the Illinois Retail Merchants Association (IRMA) states that it “has led the way in limiting these fees, working with Gov. JB Pritzker, Senate President Don Harmon, House Speaker Emanuel ‘Chris’ Welch and members of the General Assembly to pass the Interchange Fee Prohibition Act.”[27]

While IRMA contends that “eliminating interchange fees on taxes and tips will save businesses and consumers millions of dollars a year,”[28] the major beneficiaries would be high-volume merchants. A significant share of the savings from eliminating interchange on taxes and tips (more than one-fifth of the total) would accrue to just 10 of the nation’s biggest retailers.[29] Meanwhile, the costs, as will be discussed below, would fall mainly on consumers.

B. Key Provisions of the IFPA

The IFPA seeks to ensure that, if a purchase includes Illinois state or local sales tax, or if a customer adds a tip on a card payment, the portion of the transaction corresponding to the tax or tip would not incur interchange fees.[30]

The core operative provision of the IFPA provides that no person or entity involved in processing an electronic payment may “receive or charge” any interchange fee on the portion of the transaction that represents sales tax or gratuity. In practice, this means that, for a given credit- or debit-card sale in Illinois, the merchant would not have to pay interchange fees on the dollars that would be remitted as sales tax, nor on any tip amount added by the customer. To effectuate this rule, the act creates two compliance pathways: a real-time exemption and a rebate.

1. Real-time exemption

§ 150-10(a) outlines the primary means by which merchants would exclude the tax and tip portions from interchange:

An issuer, a payment card network, an acquirer bank, or a processor may not receive or charge a merchant any interchange fee on the tax amount or gratuity of an electronic payment transaction if the merchant in-forms the acquirer bank or its designee of the tax or gratuity amount as part of the authorization or settlement process for the electronic payment transaction.[31]

In order to avail itself of this option, the “merchant must transmit the tax or gratuity amount data as part of the authorization or settlement process to avoid being charged interchange fees on the tax or gratuity amount of an electronic payment transaction.”[32] In practical terms, this means merchants’ point-of-sale systems would have to distinguish the sales-tax and gratuity portions of the transaction, and include that information in the electronic message sent to the network for authorization/clearing. If the merchant does so, the issuer and network are on notice to exclude that portion from any interchange calculation.

2. Rebate

§ 150-10(b) offers an alternate method by which merchants could recoup interchange fees already paid:

A merchant that does not transmit the tax or gratuity amount data in accordance with this Section may submit tax documentation for the electronic payment transaction to the acquirer bank or its designee no later than 180 days after the date of the electronic payment transaction, and, within 30 days after the merchant submits the necessary tax documentation, the issuer must credit to the merchant the amount of interchange fees charged on the tax or gratuity amount of the electronic payment transaction.[33]

In other words, if the tax or tip data isn’t transmitted during authorization, the merchant could later submit documentation of the tax/tip amounts to be reimbursed or credited for any interchange fees charged on those amounts. This two-track approach was likely included to accommodate smaller merchants for whom the costs of upgrading payment systems would be large relative to the deduction or rebate of interchange fees.

3. Anti-circumvention and penalty provisions

To reinforce the law’s intent, §150-10(d) prohibits circumvention. It states it is “unlawful for an issuer, payment card network, acquirer bank, or processor to alter or manipulate the computation and imposition of interchange fees” in a way that would effectively negate the fee exemption on taxes and tips.[34] This anti-circumvention clause aims to prevent creative adjustments, such as increasing the interchange rate on the non-tax portion of the sale to compensate for the forbidden portion, or imposing equivalent fees under a different label. For example, an issuer could otherwise attempt to charge a higher percentage on the taxable base amount of the sale to end up with the same total fee as before; §150-10(d) seeks to bar that tactic.

The law also includes penalty provisions for violations; specifically, each violation of the IFPA is “subject to a civil penalty of $1,000 per electronic payment transaction.”[35]

4. Breadth

In practice, interchange fees are set by networks and collected by issuers; acquirers pass the fees through to issuers; processors facilitate the transaction messaging. The IFPA covers both credit and debit cards, including general-use prepaid cards. It also applies to any “issuer” of such cards, any “payment card network,” any “acquirer bank” (the merchant’s bank), and any “processor” involved in the transaction chain. Thus, every link in the payment chain is prohibited from “charging or receiving” interchange fees on the specified amounts.

The title and some of the act’s wording refer to concepts that apply only to four-party cards (i.e., cards that are issued by banks and operate over independent payment-card networks such as Visa and Mastercard), since technically only such cards entail the retention of an “interchange fee” by issuing banks. It is possible that the act was intended to also cover payments made using three-party cards (such as American Express and Discover), but national legislation currently in place to regulate interchange fees on debit cards applies only to four-party cards.[36]

It’s worth noting that the IFPA was passed not as standalone legislation vetted in subject-matter committees, but as a rider within a larger state budget bill in 2024.[37] This procedural move expedited its passage, arguably without extensive deliberation of its complex implications.

C. A Gratuitous Anomaly

The IFPA excludes from interchange fees not only any sales taxes, but also gratuities. While the nominal argument for exempting sales tax is that such funds are remitted to the government, no such argument can be made for tips, which are voluntary payments that are generally passed on directly to service employees. Their processing cost is arguably comparable to that of the underlying sale. By extending the fee exemption to gratuities, Illinois is adopting a broader anti-fee stance than might be justified by the original policy rationale. Tips, unlike sales taxes, are not mandated by law or remitted to the government; they are voluntary payments from customers to service employees (or pooled by the merchant to distribute to staff).

Merchants were not previously able to recover the cost of collecting tips for staff. So, the exclusion of tips from interchange fees under the IFPA was clearly unrelated to the effect of Gov. Pritzker’s proposed cap on the “retailer’s discount.” Rather, it seems to have been driven mainly by a desire to give restaurateurs an additional reason to support the legislation.

Proponents of the gratuity exclusion claim that merchants should not pay swipe fees on amounts they do not ultimately keep as profit: tips are passed through to employees. This, they argued, makes them similar to sales taxes.[38] From a legal perspective, however, collecting a tip is entirely optional and not a statutory duty (unlike collection of sales tax). A merchant could choose to accept only cash tips or refuse to accept tips entirely.

In practice, of course, most customers expect to be able to charge tips to their payment cards, and it is efficient to do so. The IFPA’s extension of the fee prohibition to gratuities thus suggests that, in order to assuage an important interest group, the Illinois General Assembly was willing to go beyond the narrow “tax collection cost” justification and simply maximize merchant savings on any portion of a transaction that the merchant does not retain.

Allowing an interchange exemption for tips creates anomalies. For one, Illinois law continues to allow merchants to deduct the sales-tax collection allowance (albeit now capped) for remitting taxes, but there is no analogous state allowance or credit for processing tips. Nor would it make sense, as tips are not a government levy. By lumping gratuities into the IFPA, the General Assembly signaled that the true aim was broader price controls on processing fees, not merely aligning fees with governmental functions. This casts doubt on the purported “principled fairness” argument, since the inclusion of tips makes the IFPA even more of a straightforward transfer from issuing banks (and, as discussed below, ultimately their customers) to merchants.

As noted, tip amounts should logically be treated as part of the service transaction with the customer. Paying interchange fees on tips that are included as part of a card transaction is thus part of the cost of doing business in a card-based economy, no different than paying interchange fees on the meal price itself. The IFPA’s contrary approach suggests a slippery slope: if taxes and tips merit special treatment because the merchant doesn’t keep them, one might ask, what about other pass-through charges?

For instance, if a merchant sells on consignment (not owning the goods), or collects government fees (like an auto-bureau fee), should those be interchange-fee exempt as well? Going further, merchants might argue that they should only pay interchange fees on the markup—the difference between the price for which goods are bought and the price at which they are sold—on grounds that they are merely acting as intermediaries between the producer or wholesaler and the consumer. That would, obviously, be ridiculous.

D. Is the IFPA a Trojan Horse?

On the aforementioned IRMA webpage titled “Swipe Fees,” the association states:

At the federal level, IRMA has partnered with U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin to advocate for passage of the Credit Card Competition Act. This bipartisan legislation would enhance competition and choice in the credit card network market, pushing fees down and providing relief for consumers and retailers alike.[39]

U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) filed an amicus brief supporting Illinois in the ensuing litigation, claiming that the eponymous federal provision (the “Durbin amendment”) did not preempt states from going further to protect local merchants and consumers. Durbin and others argue that, if Congress won’t tackle credit-card fees (Durbin’s attempts to expand fee regulation have stalled in Congress), states should step in. The IFPA has therefore taken on a symbolic importance in the larger debate over interchange fees, raising the question: will this state-level innovation bring relief or chaos? For all the hubris about “fairness,” the more plausible explanation for the IFPA is that it is being used as a tool to attempt to force the payments industry to accept federal regulation.

E. Explaining the IFPA Conclusion

At one level, the IFPA represents a transfer of cost from Illinois taxpayers to card-issuing banks, which may no longer retain interchange fees on the tax and tip portions of a payment. Issuing banks must either absorb the processing cost for that portion without compensation or attempt to recoup it elsewhere. In effect, the IFPA would mandate a partial unbundling of the interchange fee: what was once a single percentage applied to the full transaction is now bifurcated, with the tax and gratuity portion carved out as fee-free, from the merchant’s perspective.

By eliminating interchange fees on taxes and tips, the IFPA effectively uses banks’ revenue to subsidize large merchants. Moreover, the redistribution effected by this subsidy could be larger than the de facto subsidy that Illinois previously provided from its tax coffers via the retailer allowance. As explored in Section IV, this mandatory redistribution is partly extraterritorial, as it would be funded by out-of-state entities (large card-issuing banks headquartered elsewhere) and their customers.

In sum, the IFPA’s design was driven by a mix of political compromise and merchant lobbying, rather than a coherent economic principle. Illinois’ unusually large tax-collection discount was curtailed, and the elimination of interchange fees on taxes and tips was offered as a substitute balm for merchants. The next section evaluates whether the underlying premise—that sales-tax collection costs uniquely justify such measures—holds water, especially when comparing sales-tax obligations to other tax and regulatory burdens that businesses routinely bear without special fee exemptions.

III. The Sales-Tax Exception

Merchant groups claim that the collection of sales tax creates a substantial administrative burden that justifies states permitting merchants to deduct a portion of the sales tax or be granted a rebate to compensate for this cost.[40] Until recently, many states permitted merchant deductions or rebates on sales taxes precisely for that reason,[41] but most states have since curtailed such practices.[42]

In contrast to sales tax, few if any states allow businesses to deduct or otherwise receive compensation for the administrative costs of collecting and remitting other taxes. Nor does the federal government. Notably:

  1. Payroll Taxes: Employers withhold and remit taxes on employee wages, but receive no direct subsidy or rebate for this service.[43]
  2. State Income Tax: Businesses and individuals pay state income taxes in full, with no discount or reimbursement for the administrative tasks involved.[44]
  3. Franchise Taxes: These are generally fixed charges for the privilege of doing business in a state, not subject to any compensatory allowances for collection costs.[45]
  4. Property Taxes: The responsibility for paying property taxes lies squarely on the property owner, without any offset for collection or reporting costs.[46]
  5. Excise Taxes: Similar to sales taxes, excise taxes are collected at the point of sale but generally without any special deductions for the business.[47]
  6. Business-License Taxes and Fees: Typically collected in a lump sum without any deduction for the collection process.[48]
  7. Federal Corporate-Income Taxes: No deduction or rebate is offered for the administrative burden of remitting federal taxes.[49]

Sales taxes are thus unique, in that many states historically provided a retailer a discount or rebate for collecting and remitting the tax.[50] Given that businesses are not now, nor have they ever been, permitted deductions or rebates from other taxes—including those collected and remitted by the business effectively on behalf of others, such as payroll taxes—it seems strange and even fundamentally unfair that businesses should be permitted to do so for sales tax.

Despite this anomaly, an argument in support of a specific deduction or rebate can be made from the perspective of administrative efficiency. Specifically, to the extent that the use of electronic (digital) systems to record and transmit sales taxes results in higher levels of compliance and reduces the costs of monitoring and enforcement by the state, it may be efficient to incentivize the use of such electronic systems.[51] A deduction or rebate provides just such an incentive.

Nonetheless, from an economic perspective, it is inefficient to offer the same incentive on every transaction because there are substantial economies of scale in operating electronic systems that record and remit transactions.[52] The amount therefore required to induce the use of electronic systems and maximize compliance likely falls rapidly as sales rise.

Studies that have looked at the costs of compliance support this conclusion. A 2006 study by PwC found that, across all retailers, the weighted average compliance cost of collecting and remitting sales tax was about 3% of the tax collected.[53] These costs were, however, disproportionately higher for small businesses than for larger firms: businesses with less than $1 million in annual sales incurred compliance costs averaging about 13.5% of the sales tax they collected, while those with $1–10 million in sales had average costs of about 5.2%, and those over $10 million faced average costs of about 2.2%.[54] In other words, the smallest merchants spent roughly six times more, relative to the amount of tax collected, than the largest retailers.

Over time, these administrative costs have fallen dramatically. Data from the Federal Reserve suggest that the overhead for electronic transactions is minimal compared to the manual-processing costs that dominated the mid-20th century.[55] Thus, while a modest retailer discount may have been justified decades ago, the much lower costs now attendant to collecting and remitting sales taxes—especially for larger, more technologically sophisticated retailers—call into question the basic premise of the IFPA.

Moreover, as the costs of administration have fallen, most states have since curtailed or capped this benefit.[56] In most states, the administrative burden of tax compliance is now integrated into the general cost of doing business, rather than subsidized through a dedicated allowance.[57]

While there are legitimate reasons to provide a small incentive for electronic collection and remittance of sales taxes, the magnitude of Illinois’ traditional uncapped retailer discount likely far exceeded any reasonable estimate of actual administrative cost for larger merchants. The IFPA does not contribute toward efficient tax compliance, since that is achieved by the remaining capped retailers’ discount. Instead, it primarily distorts the cost distribution within the payment system.

IV. Extraterritorial Effects of the IFPA

The IFPA’s reach extends well beyond Illinois’ borders. Since the vast majority of credit- and debit-card issuers are headquartered or chartered in other states—or even outside the United States—the act would compel these institutions to adjust their fee structures for transactions occurring in Illinois.[58] An Illinois merchant’s credit-card transaction processed by a national bank must now exclude interchange on the sales tax and gratuity portions, regardless where the issuer is based. Broadly, these effects can be divided into two classes: compliance costs and revenue reduction.

A. Compliance Costs

Issuers and card networks will face significant costs upgrading their information-technology systems and transaction-processing software to comply with the IFPA’s data requirements. This includes modifications to authorization systems to identify sales tax and tip components, and to implement new rebate or tracking mechanisms for post-transaction adjustments.[59]

Implementing the IFPA would not be as simple as flipping a switch to “no fees on taxes and tips.” It would require significant, system-wide changes to the nation’s electronic-payments infrastructure. Payment-card networks and processors would have to adjust the format of messages and the algorithms that calculate interchange fees for “Illinois” transactions. This entails, at minimum:

  • Reliably identifying when a transaction involves Illinois sales tax and/or gratuity, and the exact amounts thereof, many of which vary by type of good and/or location within the state;
  • Modifying authorization and settlement-message formats to carry this information;
  • Altering the clearing and settlement systems to ensure interchange fees are computed only on the permitted base amount and zeroed out on the tax/tip portions; and
  • For merchants relying on the ability to recoup the sales tax and tip component of interchange fees after the fact, maintaining records of transactions for the purposes of confirming or disputing the amounts claimed.

Each of these steps raises technical and coordination challenges:

1. Transaction-data requirements

As noted, merchants wishing to exclude interchange fees on taxes and tips at the source (rather than recouping them later) must send tax and gratuity data with the transaction. To our knowledge, no point-of-sale (POS) system is currently programmed to separate data in the authorization message precisely in the way that would be required by the IFPA. While many electronic cash registers can produce an itemized receipt, transmitting an itemization through the payment network is another matter.

Standard consumer-card transactions involve the transmission of “Level 1” data, which typically contain essential information required to authorize a payment, including:

  • Cardholder Data: PAN (primary account number), card expiration date.
  • Transaction Amount: The total amount requested for authorization.
  • Merchant Data: Basic merchant information, such as the identifier or name.
  • Authorization Request: Whether the transaction should be approved or denied based on available funds or credit limits.

Most payment networks also permit additional information to be sent via “Level 2” and “Level 3” data. Level 2 data provide information typically used in business-to-businesses (B2B) corporate-card transactions, primarily to help businesses better track and manage their expenses. This can include:

  • Invoice number;
  • Sales tax;
  • More detailed data about the merchant, such as location or merchant category code (MCC); and
  • Details regarding what the transaction was for (goods/services).

Level 3 data provide even more detailed information, also primarily for B2B corporate-card purchases, including:

  • Line-item details (g., description, quantity, unit price, and total price);
  • Freight or shipping costs;
  • Any discounts applied to the transaction;
  • Any other tax amounts that need to be itemized;
  • Shipping or delivery information for physical goods; and
  • Enhanced merchant details, such as DUNS (Data Universal Numbering System) numbers.

In principle, Level 2 and Level 3 data could be used to communicate sales tax (a Level 2 item), other taxes, such as excise, and other items, such as gratuities (both Level 3 items). This would, however, amount to a change in the way the messaging system functions. As such, it would entail considerable reprogramming by all parties in the payment stack (merchants, gateways, acquirers, other processors, networks, issuers). This would inevitably result in an increase in cost for those parties.

Visa and Mastercard standards do support some tax indicators in transaction data (as Level 2 or Level 3 data) on corporate-card transactions, but there is no standard for the separate recording of tips. Adding an indicator for tips and extending the recording of tax indicators to all consumer transactions at every Illinois merchant would require entirely reprogramming the systems.

Many small businesses would need to upgrade not only software but POS equipment. Payment processors would likely need to assist their merchant clients in this transition—an administrative burden that would be magnified to the extent that merchants are unfamiliar with how the technology works. Acquiring banks would also have to reprogram their systems to accommodate the new data in the messages.

Smaller merchants will almost certainly face disproportionate costs. A study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office has found that, following the Wayfair decision—which effectively required internet retailers to remit sales tax to the state in which a product is delivered—smaller businesses faced disproportionate costs of compliance.[60] Whereas large businesses only needed to adjust or slightly expand their systems for new jurisdictions, incurring minimal new setup costs, most small businesses were often starting from scratch.

For example, one medium-sized retailer with approximately $20 million in annual revenue told GAO it spent about $8,000 to purchase tax software and $43,000 to integrate it with existing systems.[61] Another business with $42 million in sales spent roughly $200,000 on software integration to comply with multi-state tax rules.[62] By contrast, one smaller business spent $1,500 per month on compliance services to remit only about $500 in tax, effectively triple the cost relative to the revenue collected for the state. Another small online seller calculated that it spent about $2.25 in compliance costs for every $1 in sales tax collected over a multi-year period, across dozens of states.

Large retailers do not face such lopsided ratios; their high sales volumes mean the taxes collected far exceed compliance expenditures.

2. Network and issuer-system modifications

On the receiving end, card issuers’ systems (and/or their processors) would have to be reconfigured to manage a new interchange-calculation rule specific to Illinois tax/tip amounts. The interchange fee has traditionally been a simple percentage applied to the total transaction amount (plus a fixed fee, in some cases). Under the IFPA, the issuer’s system would have to subtract certain components. To the extent that networks determine the amount of interchange fee to be deducted (based on the type of card, etc.), the networks must implement state-specific logic.

Because interchange fees are normally uniform nationwide for a given card product, adding a jurisdiction-specific rule increases complexity. Every transaction would need to be checked: Does it involve an Illinois tax or tip? If yes, apply different math. This adds processing overhead to every single transaction in the nation.

In 2024, Visa and Mastercard processed between 130 and 150 billion transactions in the United States.[63] If the IFPA were implemented, every one of these transactions would now be subject to an additional step in order to segment the 5-8 billion Illinois-related transactions. These costs are essentially fixed overhead, which, ultimately, will be borne by market participants broadly. They would likely be passed on in the form of slightly higher network fees or merchant-service fees and/or lower overall efficiencies. It is telling that the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in an amicus curiae brief opposing the IFPA, observed:

Credit and debit card transactions help to propel the Nation’s economy by facilitating commerce. The interchange fees that financial institutions collect to facilitate these transactions are a core feature of an intricately-designed Nation-wide payments system in which national banks and Federal savings associations play an essential role. The Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, H.B. 4951, Section 150 (“IFPA”) is an ill-conceived, highly unusual, and largely unworkable state law that threatens to fragment and disrupt this efficient and effective system. Although the IFPA’s requirements are vague and ambiguous in many respects, this much is clear: the IFPA prevents or significantly interferes with federally-authorized banking powers that are fundamental to safe and sound banking and disrupts core functionalities that drive the Nation’s economy. In short, the IFPA constitutes both bad policy and an unlawful interference with federally granted powers.[64]

To reiterate, the “global” nature of card networks means that even out-of-state issuers and many payment intermediaries would have to adjust their systems because of one state’s law, an inefficiency that multiplies costs across the economy. The IFPA would essentially compel the industry to build a new capability—parsing and zero-rating certain components. In a seamless national payments network, that is a non-trivial ask.

3. Rebate trouble

As noted above, merchants who are unable to report the amount of taxes and tips related to a transaction in real-time—e.g., because their existing POS system is incapable of reporting Level 2/3 transactions and they choose not to incur the substantial cost of upgrading their system—may avail themselves of §150-10(b) of the IFPA.

But therein lies a paradox: if the merchants are not reporting the tax and tip amount, there will be no record of those amounts in the electronic-payments system. Neither the processor, nor the acquirer, nor the network, nor the issuer will know what those excluded amounts should have been. As such, issuers will presumably have to set aside some arbitrary amount for up to 210 days following a transaction to cover rebate requests.

Meanwhile, to address potential disputes (see below), acquirers and issuers will also need to retain data on every transaction from every merchant not reporting tax and tip amounts through the new automated-reporting mechanism for at least 210 days. They will also have to implement regular audits to ensure that amounts classified as “gratuities” are, indeed, gratuities. This alone would be enormously costly.

4. Error-handling and dispute process

With new data and complex rules, errors are inevitable. Suppose a merchant forgets to flag the tax amount; the issuer retains interchange on the full amount; and the merchant later submits documentation under §150-10(b) to reclaim that fee. That introduces a new quasi-dispute process: merchants claiming back improper fees. Networks or acquirers will have to manage these claims, verify documents, and arrange reimbursements—a process akin to handling chargebacks or billing disputes. This is an additional transaction cost injected into the system. For busy merchants, the administrative hassle might not be worth a small refund, meaning that some may not bother (leading to uneven implementation).

B. Reduced Revenue and Responses by Issuers

While compliance costs will likely be significant, much more significant will be the effects on revenue to issuing banks from interchange fees, which in turn funds consumer rewards and supports the overall cost structure of card issuance. Removing interchange fees on the sales tax and gratuity portions means that, on average, banks could lose about 0.1% of the revenue on each transaction involving Illinois merchants.[65] For large issuers, that could translate into tens of millions of dollars annually.[66] Issuers, both in-state and out-of-state, are likely to respond to these revenue losses in one or more of several ways.

1. Reducing cardholder rewards and benefits

Credit-card issuers fund rewards primarily with interchange fees. If interchange-fee revenue from Illinois transactions falls by 10% or more, banks will be less able to cover extant rewards commitments. Wherever governments have imposed price controls on interchange fees—including in the United States following the Durbin amendment; in Australia following the Reserve Bank of Australia’s price controls on interchange fees; and in the EU following the Interchange Fee Regulation—at least some issuers (and, in many cases, the vast majority) have responded by reducing the generosity of rewards programs.[67]

Banks may also cut other cardholder benefits that are currently funded by interchange fees, such as travel insurance and purchase protections, to make up some of the lost revenue, as was done in Australia and Europe following the interchange-fee price controls in those jurisdictions.[68] As with rewards, such an approach is less likely if Illinois remains the only state to impose differential interchange-fee price controls (except perhaps for local banks and credit unions, whose customers are predominantly or exclusively Illinois residents). In that case, as with rewards, out-of-state cardholders of national banks would be subsidizing the Illinois operations of big-box merchants.

In principle, issuers could offset these losses by creating state-specific Illinois rewards policies, but this would entail amending nearly every cardholder agreement, as well as agreements with rewards partners (e.g., airlines and hotels). It could also create communications challenges for issuers and add to the complexity of the transaction process.

Alternatively, issuers could offset the lost revenue by adjusting their overall rewards programs to be slightly less generous across the board. A bank might drop a cashback rate from 2% to 1.95%, for example, or devalue points by a similar proportion for all cardholders. This would also entail amendments to most cardholder and many partner agreements. But by spreading the pain more widely, it might be less challenging to communicate.

Meanwhile, widespread application would make administration more straightforward. If this option were chosen, however, Illinois’ policy would have imposed a negative externality on cardholders across the nation, with out-of-state cardholders effectively being forced to subsidize the Illinois operations of big-box merchants even if they make no purchases in Illinois.

The likelihood of issuers adjusting rewards would increase if multiple states were to pass similar legislation. Even if Illinois remains unique, issuers still may scale back benefits offered to Illinois-based customers or for transaction categories heavily composed of tax (e.g., gas purchases that include fuel excise taxes).

2. Introducing or increasing annual fees

In some cases, issuers have responded to price controls on interchange fees by introducing or increasing annual fees on credit cards. Most notably, Australian banks increased average annual fees by around 50%.[69] It seems likely that some banks would do the same for Illinois cardholders, who might find previously no-fee credit cards now carry a $20 annual fee, for instance. Meanwhile, Illinois residents with more generous rewards cards might see their annual fees rise by $50.

Debit cards, or the current accounts with which they are associated, could also see new or increased fees. This was precisely what happened following the Durbin amendment. Initially, some covered banks threatened to introduce monthly debit-card usage fees in response to the price controls on interchange fees. But following a public outcry, they sought to recoup lost revenue in other ways, with many banks increasing monthly fees and raising the minimum deposits required for free checking accounts.[70]

Given the large proportion of debit and credit cards issued by nationally chartered banks and non-Illinois based banks and credit unions, it seems likely that such an approach to the recoupment of losses resulting from the IFPA’s price controls on interchange fees in Illinois would represent a significant extraterritorial effect. This would be magnified to the extent that banks and credit unions apply these changes to non-Illinois-based customers.

3. Higher interest rates

Credit issuers might also look to the credit-term side, possibly raising their annual percentage rates (APRs). Following the introduction of the IFR, the delta between the European Central Bank’s base rate and the APR on credit cards rose.[71]

While the IFPA by itself might not cause a measurable APR hike, the cumulative pressure of any revenue loss could contribute to upward pressure on interest rates, especially for riskier borrowers. Any such changes would, again, mean that consumers pay more. And to the extent that such changes are applied to customers outside Illinois, the effect would be extraterritorial.

4. Fragmentation of the multilateral interchange-fee system

Card networks currently operate under a uniform multilateral interchange-fee schedule that applies nationwide. If other states copy Illinois and introduce their own state-specific mandates, carving out interchange fees for sales tax (and possibly other elements, such as gratuities), networks would likely be forced to develop multiple fee regimes, thereby increasing complexity, compliance costs, and operational inefficiencies. The larger the number of states that follow this approach, the more fragmented the interchange system would become, potentially making it unworkable.

5. Inequitable competitive effects

The preliminary injunction in Illinois Bankers Ass’n v. Raoul applies to national banks regulated under the National Bank Act (NBA) and the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA) due to federal preemption.[72] The court later extended the preliminary injunction to out-of-state state banks, as well, under similar preemption principles.[73] Despite this, banks chartered in Illinois (as well as federal credit unions) remain subject to the IFPA. If this is upheld, an uneven playing field will develop, distorting competition unnaturally in favor of national and out-of-state banks.

6. Adjusting default multilateral interchange fees

Finally, card networks might attempt to compensate for the revenue loss in Illinois by adjusting the default multilateral interchange-fee schedules that apply across the United States. Such adjustments, which would likely be across-the-board increases, would represent a transfer from out-of-state merchants and consumers to Illinois-based merchants.

C. Extraterritorial Effects Conclusion

The Illinois Bankers Association argues that the compliance costs for reprogramming systems to accommodate the IFPA could run into hundreds of millions of dollars for banks and networks alone.[74] Meanwhile, issuing banks would experience shortfalls in interchange-fee revenue from transactions in Illinois. In response, banks would likely be forced to compensate either by reducing cardholder benefits or increasing fees.

These compensatory actions would likely affect all cardholders, with the result that most of those affected would be cardholders living outside Illinois. Reduced rewards and increased fees would diminish the attractiveness of card use, leading to lower consumer spending and therefore harming merchants, as well.[75] There would thus be harmful extraterritorial effects across the value chain. While banks, payment processors, and networks would suffer concentrated costs and losses, these would be passed on to consumers and merchants.

If the courts deem that the IFPA does not apply to nationally chartered banks (per the preliminary injunction), then these extraterritorial effects would be muted, but the resultant competitive distortions would be significant.

V. Legal Arguments Against the IFPA

In light of the effects of the IFPA on banks, savings institutions, credit unions, and card networks, it is no surprise that the law has been challenged in court. In August 2024, the Illinois Bankers Association, along with several other bank and credit-union groups, brought a constitutional challenge against the IFPA, alleging the statute is preempted by various federal laws.[76]

Each set of plaintiffs in the case was able to assert a relevant federal law or constitutional principle the IFPA violated. Nationally chartered banks pointed to the National Banking Act (NBA) and various federal regulations that apply specifically to them. Federal savings associations looked to the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), which similarly empowers and regulates them. Federal credit unions asserted preemption under the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), because it gives the National Credit Union Administration the exclusive authority to regulate them. State banks chartered in Illinois pointed to state laws that give banks the same powers as nationally chartered banks. Out-of-state banks brought both Dormant Commerce Clause and federal law claims that they have the right to be treated similarly to in-state banks and nationally chartered banks, respectively.

In an amicus brief, one of the card networks (Mastercard) argued that the law would be unworkable in practice, not least due to the “extraordinary limitations” it places on processing card-transaction data:[77]

Specifically, the Act makes it unlawful for “[a]n entity, other than the merchant” involved in a transaction to “distribute, exchange, transfer, disseminate, or use” the associated data “except to facilitate or process the electronic payment transaction or as required by law” (the “Data Usage Limitation”). 815 ILCS 151/150-15(b). Under the statute’s plain terms, for example, participants in the system could not use aggregated transaction data to detect fraud or administer rewards programs.[78]

And concluding that:

The Data Usage Limitation would impose similarly overwhelming operational challenges. Banks and other financial institutions use transaction data for an array of key purposes including— but far from limited to—preventing fraud, administering rewards programs, and determining credit limits. Arbitrarily restricting such data’s use will make many of these activities economically or operationally infeasible, to the detriment of consumers, merchants, and financial institutions alike.[79]

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered these claims in a motion for preliminary injunction. On Dec. 20, 2024, the court granted the preliminary injunction in part against the IFPA, finding there was a likelihood the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits as to the NBA and HOLA claims,[80] but dismissed the state-law claims due to sovereign immunity not being waived by Illinois.[81] The court did not accept that any federal law preempted the IFPA as to credit-card networks. This effectively meant that IFPA could not be enforced against nationally chartered banks or savings associations, but could be enforced against state-chartered banks and credit-card networks. After more briefing, the court decided Feb. 2 that the federal-credit-union plaintiffs did not establish that the FCUA preempted the IFPA, but that 12 U.S.C. §1831a(j) did preempt the IFPA as to out-of-state state banks.[82]

Below, we will consider these arguments in more detail and consider the likely effects if the court’s preliminary-injunction analysis holds as to the underlying merits.

A. Federal Preemption: The National Bank Act and Other Federal Laws

The IFPA faces a direct federal preemption challenge due to the national laws that establish federal banks, savings institutions, and credit unions. The crux is whether Illinois’ attempt to regulate interchange fees is preempted by federal banking laws that grant national banks (and other federally chartered institutions) certain powers free from state interference. This subsection analyzes the preemption argument, focusing on the NBA and related regulatory doctrine, as well as considering whether any provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act or other federal statutes explicitly or implicitly preclude state-level interchange regulation.

1. NBA and HOLA preemption principles

The NBA, originally enacted in 1864 and now codified in Title 12 of the U.S. Code, provides that national banks (those chartered under federal law) have authority to exercise “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.”[83] Over many decades, courts have interpreted this provision to mean that national banks have broad discretion in conducting banking activities (such as lending, taking deposits, and charging fees) and that state laws may not significantly impair or interfere with those authorized powers. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that state laws are preempted if they “prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.” [84] This “significant interference” test remains the benchmark for NBA preemption, reaffirmed by the Court as recently as 2024’s Cantero v. Bank of America.[85]

This is different than normal conflict preemption, which requires a showing that an entity can’t comply with both sets of laws. Instead, it only requires a showing of significant interference with their ability to exercise their powers under national law.

Credit-card issuance and processing is unquestionably part of the “business of banking”; it involves lending (extending credit), payment services, and charging fees for those services. National banks engage in issuing credit and debit cards under their incidental powers, and they earn revenue through interest and fees (including interchange fees on card transactions). The OCC, which administers the NBA, has long promulgated regulations clarifying that national banks may charge non-interest fees, and that state attempts to regulate such fees are generally preempted.[86]

For example, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 explicitly addresses “National bank charges” (such as service fees) and indicates that banks may set those charges per their business judgment, subject to safety and soundness, not state-law limitations.[87] Likewise, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 deals with lending by national banks and preempts state laws that obstruct or condition federally authorized lending powers—specifically listing state restrictions on terms of credit, including loan-related fees, as usually preempted.[88]

While interchange fees are paid by merchants, rather than borrowers, interchange can be seen as part of the overall “terms of credit card services” offered by banks. Indeed, the OCC’s “Handbook on Credit Card Lending” explicitly lists interchange fees as part of the revenue structure of card programs,[89] signaling the OCC’s view that interchange is within the realm of bank charges protected by federal authority.

Against this backdrop, the IFPA’s interference is clear: it forbids national banks from collecting a category of fees they would otherwise collect in the normal course of offering card services. This is arguably a direct interference with a national bank’s power to set fees for its services. Just as states cannot cap the interest rate or annual fee a national bank charges on a credit card (national banks famously can “export” their home-state interest rates to other states, immune from those other states’ usury laws, per Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha[90]), likewise a state should not be able to cap the interchange fees a national bank earns through its card-network participation.

While interchange fees are not charged to the bank’s customer, they are income arising from the bank’s service—functionally, a part of the pricing of the payment service the bank provides. By stripping out a portion of that pricing (on taxes/tips), Illinois is “preventing or significantly interfering” with the bank’s revenue model in the card business.

The banks challenging the IFPA have made this case, and early indications are that courts find it persuasive. In October 2024, Judge Virginia Kendall granted a preliminary injunction preventing Illinois from enforcing the IFPA against national banks and federal savings associations, on the basis that those plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the law is preempted by federal law (the NBA in the case of national banks, and HOLA in the case of federal savings associations).[91] The court noted that federally chartered banks’ ability to charge and receive interchange fees is an aspect of their federally authorized powers, and Illinois’ law stands as an obstacle to the exercise of those powers.[92] This is a straightforward application of the Barnett Bank standard; the IFPA substantially interferes by banning a category of fees that form a not-insignificant part of the banks’ compensation for card services.

Illinois,[93] backed by Sen. Durbin in his amicus brief, [94] countered that the Durbin amendment’s silence on credit-card fees implies no federal occupation of the field, and that states have historically been allowed to protect consumers and businesses via consumer-protection regulations, absent a direct conflict with federal law. They emphasized that preemption is only appropriate when a state law interferes with a national bank’s exercise of its power to an “extreme degree.”[95] Illinois argued that the “meager limitation” on interchange fees posed by the IFPA were simply not sufficient to significantly interfere with the national banks’ powers to collect interchange fees in general.[96]

But given the evidence that compliance with the IFPA will require significant operational changes and will cost banks revenue (harming their card programs), the “significance” threshold seems crossed. It’s comparable to a state law that would say, for instance: “Banks may not charge late payment fees on credit cards for customers within our state.” That would clearly cut off a source of revenue and alter a term of credit. Such a law would almost certainly be preempted by the NBA, especially after Smiley v. Citibank, where the Supreme Court upheld the OCC’s view that late fees counted as “interest” and thus states couldn’t cap them for national bank cards.[97] IFPA might not regulate “interest,” but from the perspective of bank operations, it is regulating a fee related to extending credit.

Furthermore, the OCC itself took the unusual step of submitting an amicus brief on behalf of the nationally chartered banks in this case.[98] The OCC’s involvement signals that the chief regulator of national banks sees a serious preemption issue; the OCC described the IFPA as conflicting with federal policy and burdening national banks.

The district court also found that the same preemption analysis from the NBA applies to federal savings associations under HOLA, as HOLA directs courts to apply “the laws and legal standards applicable to national banks” in determining whether federal law preempts state regulation of federal savings associations.[99] Federal savings associations are established under HOLA and regulated by federal law much like nationally chartered banks are established under NBA and regulated by federal law.

2. The Durbin amendment

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) creates a federal framework for electronic funds transfers, including those undertaken using debit cards.[100] Under the Durbin amendment, the EFTA regulates debit-card interchange fees and routing, which implies that Congress intended for a uniform national standard, at least with respect to debit cards.[101] While the specific standard promulgated under the Durbin amendment almost certainly caused more harm than good, the basic idea of a uniform federal framework is not itself inherently bad (and, indeed, even the Durbin amendment would have been less harmful under different interpretations by the Federal Reserve).[102]

Another argument made by the plaintiffs is that the IFPA, by imposing a state-specific mandate that sets interchange fees at $0 for a component of debit transactions undertaken in Illinois, conflicts with this uniform federal mandate. This arguably affects all parties to such transactions, including the card networks. It is noteworthy that, while the Federal Reserve has, under the auspices of the Durbin amendment, imposed aggressive and harmful restrictions on the debit-card interchange fees that covered banks are permitted to retain, at no time has it publicly contemplated introducing restrictions that would carve out certain portions of transactions and subject them to even lower interchange-fee price controls.

One wrinkle is that Sen. Durbin and Illinois have argued that nothing in Durbin amendment explicitly preempts states from going further on interchange-fee regulation.[103] That’s true; the Durbin amendment was silent on credit-card fees and did not expressly preempt state laws on debit fees (if any state had wanted to set even lower caps for smaller banks or such, arguably they could try).

The lack of express preemption in Dodd-Frank does not, however, mean that states have carte blanche. State laws still must not conflict with or frustrate the purposes of federal laws. The IFPA deals with both debit and credit. For debit cards, one could argue there’s at least an argument that Congress, by regulating debit interchange fees, left some room for states to add protections, or conversely that Congress occupied the field of setting reasonable debit fees by delegating to the Fed. That debate aside, for credit cards (which are the majority of interchange dollars at stake in IFPA), there is no federal statute directly on point; it’s purely the NBA and general banking law that govern.

The district court found that, unlike the NBA (and HOLA), the Durbin amendment is analyzed under more traditional conflict principles.[104] As a result, they agreed with Illinois and Durbin that the Durbin amendment only set a ceiling on interchange fees for debit cards.[105] Moreover, the court found that a Dodd-Frank revision[106] limited the preemptive effect of the NBA, finding it did “not extend to other, non-national bank or savings associations participants in credit and debit card transactions, including Card Networks like Visa or Mastercard.”[107]

B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Discrimination Against Out-of-State Banks

State banks from outside of Illinois argued that the IFPA was unlawful as applied to them because it would set up a form of discrimination if national banks are protected from the IFPA’s mandates, but they would not. They argued both on the grounds of the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause and a provision of federal law that protects out-of-state state banks.[108]

Here, the IFPA dictates the permissible fee structure for a contract (the card transaction) that is not confined within Illinois. The fee arrangement is part of interstate commerce: funds flow from an out-of-state issuing bank to an Illinois merchant’s bank, coordinated by a network often headquartered elsewhere. By setting a fee component to $0, Illinois is effectively controlling the price of an element of an interstate service (card-payment processing) beyond its borders. If another state were to require a different fee structure (say, entirely hypothetically, if some state required a minimum interchange fee on taxes to ensure banks cover tax-handling risk), compliance would be impossible; issuers and networks cannot simultaneously obey conflicting state commands in a unified system. Arguably, this would lead to the type of impermissible extraterritorial regulation by a state that the Dormant Commerce Clause is supposed to prevent.

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority[109] is instructive: New York’s law made distillers affirm that their New York prices were no higher than prices in other states; the Supreme Court struck it down because it effectively controlled the distiller’s out-of-state pricing (the distiller had to change out-of-state prices to avoid New York penalties).[110] Similarly, IFPA pressures networks/issuers to adjust their conduct everywhere to avoid Illinois penalties (the simplest compliance is to program systems never to charge on any state’s taxes, but that then imposes Illinois’s rule nationally—a classic extraterritorial effect). In essence, Illinois is leveraging its market power (access to Illinois merchants/customers) to dictate fee terms nationwide for transactions involving Illinois components. Courts frown on such state overreach.

It’s notable that the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Illinois, has itself invalidated a state law on extraterritoriality grounds. In Legato Vapors v. Cook,[111] Indiana imposed strict regulations on out-of-state manufacturers of vaping liquid if their products were sold in Indiana. The 7th Circuit held the law unconstitutional, describing the act as written: “so as to have extraterritorial reach that is unprecedented, imposing detailed requirements of Indiana law on out-of-state manufacturing operations.”[112]

The IFPA likewise could be described as imposing Illinois’ economic regulation on out-of-state banks and networks. The parallel is not perfect (Legato involved physical manufacturing standards), but the principle is analogous: one state dictating operational requirements to producers in other states.

Nonetheless, the district court did not see it this way. The court found that the IFPA does not explicitly discriminate against out-of-state interests. It instead applies equally to all issuers and merchants regardless of domicile.[113] The out-of-state banks tried to argue the Dormant Commerce Clause would be violated because in-state banks would not be subject to the rules, due to Illinois state law. But this argument that in-state interests benefit at the expense of out-of-state interests was severely undercut by the fact that the court dismissed the challenge by the Illinois banks due to Illinois having sovereign immunity for state-law claims in federal courts.[114] The court found that since in-state banks are subject to the mandates of the IFPA, out-of-state banks would not be treated differently.

The court did, however, allow for more briefing on the question of whether federal law protects out-of-state banks by extending the preemption of state law to the same extent as national banks.[115] After more briefing, the court found that federal law did, in fact, demand similar treatment for out-of-state banks as national banks. And “because the Court granted the preliminary injunction with respect to nationally chartered banks, forcing out-of-state state banks to comply with the IFPA would run afoul” of the law.[116]

C. Field Preemption vs Conflict Preemption

Some commenters have suggested an alternate framing: that federal law (NBA and HOLA) so comprehensively covers bank charges that there is field preemption—i.e., states have no role at all in regulating the rates/fees charged by national banks. While the Supreme Court has more often used conflict-preemption language (“significant interference”), the effect is nearly field-like in areas like interest rates and fees. The IFPA could be seen as conflicting with the full purposes of federal banking regulation by disrupting a uniform nationwide system of charges.

Additionally, one could argue the law conflicts with specific provisions of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (for debit) or the Truth in Lending Act (for credit) if any such provisions implied no state additions. The Durbin amendment, for example, implicitly suggested that large issuers’ fees should be reasonable and proportional, but it did not set an exact amount for credit cards. It’s arguable (though not particularly strong) that Congress choosing not to regulate credit interchange might imply intent that it be left to the market (and thus, that state intervention undermines that intent). But courts typically hesitate to find “implied preemption” from congressional silence, especially given that the NBA covers the ground.

This, however, cuts the other way as well. Even after further briefing, the district court found that the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) is subject to more traditional conflict-preemption analysis.[117] Instead of the Barnett Bank “significant interference” standard, the law was subject to whether it would be “’impossible’… to comply with both state and federal law or… [when] state law… constitutes an ‘obstacle’ to satisfying the purposes and objectives of Congress.”[118]

The federal credit unions pointed to the statutory language that states FCUA gives the NCUA exclusive power to regulate them. But the court found that NCUA regulations do not preempt all state laws regulating credit cards.[119] As a result, the FCUA’s preemption clause does not appear to implicate the substance of what the IFPA is regulating.[120] Therefore, federal credit unions continue to be subject to IFPA at this point.

In conclusion, federal preemption—especially via the NBA and HOLA—poses a formidable obstacle to the IFPA. The early court rulings vindicate that view, carving out national banks and savings associations from the law’s reach. If the trend holds, Illinois’ experiment may only fully bind those institutions least involved in card issuance, raising the question of whether the law can achieve any meaningful effect at all. When state law collides with the entrenched powers of national banks in the domain of fees and lending terms, historically, the state law has given way. The IFPA appears destined for the same fate, unless higher courts carve out a novel exception.

D. Severability and Practical Effect

If a court definitively rules that the IFPA is preempted for all federally chartered banks and savings associations (which include most major credit-card issuers—e.g., Chase, Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, Discover Bank, and Capital One are all national banks or federal thrifts), as well as out-of-state state banks, then the law would only effectively apply to Illinois-chartered banks and state and federal credit unions.

That outcome would be somewhat perverse: Illinois’ own community banks (if state-chartered) would be subject to the fee ban, while larger national competitors would not. The competitive imbalance and reduced scope of coverage (a large majority of card volume is from federally chartered issuers) would severely undermine the law’s intent. Indeed, merchants would still pay interchange fees on taxes for most cards (since most cards are from national banks), undercutting the law’s efficacy.

The state-chartered institutions would suffer competitive harm or feel pressure to reorganize under a federal charter to escape the rule. Moreover, it is completely unclear where this would leave the card networks, who are presumably still under the law but aren’t normally in charge of collecting the interchange fees, rather than just processing payments. Given such an outcome, Illinois might abandon the law, or a court might find that the IFPA, in its entirety, is preempted due to the dominance of federal issuers in the market.

The IFPA does have a severability clause, although the courts have not yet reached the question of how that would work. It is clear, however, that the practicality of the law only applying to a few institutions is questionable.

E. Legal Arguments Against the IFPA Conclusion

Legally, the IFPA is on shaky ground. It is likely preempted by the NBA and HOLA and impermissibly harms out-of-state banks. As such, the temporary injunction is likely to be made permanent. If state-chartered banks and credit unions, federally chartered credit unions, payment networks, and other non-bank payment-service providers remain bound by the act, the consequences would be so absurd as to be almost comical. One imagines the General Assembly would likely rescind the remnants of the act.

If, on the other hand, the court finds for Illinois at the merits stage, the harms would not be merely absurd, but catastrophic. Most likely, other states would follow suit, resulting in a patchwork of interchange regulations that would fracture the seamless national payments system, ultimately harming both consumers and merchants through reduced rewards, higher banking fees, and diminished innovation in payment technologies.

VI. Conclusion

Illinois’ Interchange Fee Prohibition Act represents an unprecedented state-level effort to impose price controls on certain components of merchant transactions. While ostensibly aimed at protecting merchants from the burden of paying interchange fees on sales taxes and gratuities, it would create a host of economic and legal problems that far outweigh its modest purported benefits.

The law’s enactment was essentially a political quid pro quo, whereby Gov. Pritzker sought to shift the cost burden associated with the state’s previously over-generous sales-tax discount from taxpayers to issuing banks. But doing so would undermine the longstanding two-sided market equilibrium of the payments ecosystem. As this white paper has shown, the cost of electronic sales-tax collection does not scale in proportion to sales, so it would be inefficient and inappropriate to remove interchange fees from sales tax. Removing interchange fees from gratuities would add insult to injury.

Payment-card networks form a nationwide (indeed, global) ecosystem where uniform rules, scale efficiencies, and cross-side subsidies have achieved near-universal card acceptance and very widespread consumer adoption. The IFPA’s attempt to carve out a special rule for Illinois disrupts this uniformity and would yield, at best, modest gains to big-box retailers at significant cost to banks and consumers, both locally and nationwide.

The IFPA’s benefits would be concentrated and visible (Illinois merchants keep or are rebated the portion of each card sale related to tax and tips), while its costs are diffuse and largely hidden (consumers facing higher banking costs or fewer perks; banks and processors spending additional resources on compliance; and the system overall becoming marginally less efficient).

Empirical evidence from analogous regulatory interventions (the Durbin amendment, the EU’s Interchange Fee Regulation, Australia’s interchange-fee price controls) casts doubt on the notion that consumers will see tangible benefits through lower prices. Instead, those consumers may effectively subsidize merchants through higher bank fees or lost rewards—an outcome at odds with the populist rationale often given for such regulations.

In short, the IFPA risks distorting the balance of the two-sided card market in ways that ultimately harm one side (cardholders) more than they help the other (merchants). If laws similar to the IFPA were replicated in other states, the result would be a patchwork of varying state interchange-fee rules that would produce chaos and more widespread harm.

Legally, the IFPA appears on a collision course with well-established principles of federal supremacy in banking regulation. The potential for conflicting state policies, should others emulate or vary the Illinois approach, underscores why the Commerce Clause entrusts Congress (not individual states) with the power to regulate national economic networks.

Moreover, the overlay of federal banking law—particularly for nationally chartered card issuers—provides robust independent grounds to nullify the IFPA with respect to most major market participants. The NBA preemption doctrine, as reinforced by Barnett Bank and related OCC regulations, makes clear that states cannot dictate the fees or charges earned by national banks in providing their services, if such dictates meaningfully interfere with bank operations. Interchange fees, being a core part of credit-card operations, fall within that protected sphere. The early court injunction shielding national banks from the IFPA foreshadows a likely permanent preemption ruling. In effect, even if Illinois’ law were constitutionally permissible in theory, it might largely be inapplicable to the predominant actors in practice, due to federal preemption.

What remains, then, of the IFPA? If the preliminary injunction were to be overturned and the IFPA came into effect, it would impose great harm on the nation’s banks and their customers. If, ultimately, only state-chartered banks and credit unions must comply, the law’s impact dwindles and its distortions (penalizing local banks and their customers relative to bigger out-of-state banks and their customers) grow.

[1] Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 151/150-5 et seq.

[2] Infra Section 2.

[3] See Julian Morris, State Regulation of Interchange Fees, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Nov. 15, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/state-regulation-of-interchange-fees.

[4] See Illinois Bankers Association et al. v.  Kwame Raoul, 2024 WL 5186840 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 15, 2024) [hereinafter “IBA I”]

[5] See id.; Illinois Bankers Ass’n v. Kwame Raoul, 2025 WL 409060 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 6, 2025) [hereinafter “IBA II”].

[6] Morris, supra note 3.

[7] See Julian Morris & Ben Sperry, The Cost of Payments: A Review, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Aug. 28, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-cost-of-payments-a-review.

[8] Berhan Bayeh et al., 2024 Findings from the Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, Fed. Rsrv. (2024), available at https://www.frbservices.org/binaries/content/assets/crsocms/news/research/2024-diary-of-consumer-payment-choice.pdf.

[9] Morris, supra note 3; Claire Wang, Cash Me If You Can: The Impacts of Cashless Businesses on Retailers, Consumers, and Cash Use, Cash Prod. Off. Fed. Rsvr. Sys. (2019), available at https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/Cash-Me-If-You-Can-August2019.pdf.

[10] Daniel Gerzina, Epic Burger Is Now Cashless, Tamale Spaceship Closes Wicker Park Restaurant, More Intel, Eater Chi. (Jun. 21, 2017), https://chicago.eater.com/2017/6/21/15846364/epic-burger-cashless-tamale-spaceship-closed-wicker-park-restaurant-am-intel.

[11] Id.

[12] Morris, supra note 3.

[13] See Julian Morris, The Hidden Wealth of Payment Cards: How Innovations in Payments Transform Society, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Dec. 19, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-hidden-wealth-of-payment-cards-how-innovations-in-payments-transform-society.

[14] See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Jun. 2, 2010), available at https://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf.

[15] See Aaron Klein et al., How Better Payment Systems Can Improve Public Transportation, Brookings Ctr. Regul. Mkt. (2023), available at www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/20230109_CRM_Klein_TransitPayments_final1.pdf.

[16] Morris, supra note 3.

[17] Ohio v. American Express, 585 U.S. 529, (2018) (internal citations omitted).

[18] See Patrick Andreisen, Illinois Retailers Taxed $186M by Capping Sales Tax Credit, Ill. Pol’y (May 30, 2024), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-retailers-taxed-186m-by-capping-sales-tax-credit.

[19] See Sales and Use Tax, Wis. Dept. Revenue (Feb. 23, 2018), available at https://www.revenue.wi.gov/DORReports/salusetx.pdf (for example, neighboring Wisconsin reduced its discount to 0.5% of the tax liability and, in 2009, it capped its discount at $1,000 per filing period); Sales Tax by State: How to Discount Your Sales Tax Bill, TaxJar (Dec. 19, 2024), https://www.taxjar.com/blog/file/state-sales-tax-discounts.

[20] Philip Mattera & Leigh McIlvaine, Skimming the Sales Tax: How Wal-Mart and Other Big Retailers (Legally) Keep a Cut of the Taxes We Pay on Everyday Purchases, Good Jobs First (2008), available at https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/docs/pdf/skimming.pdf.

[21] See Mary Hansen, Unpacking Pritzker’s Tax Proposals: Retail Discount, NPR Ill. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nprillinois.org/illinois-economy/2019-03-07/unpacking-pritzkers-tax-proposals-retail-discount.

[22] Id.

[23] Richard M. Silverman, Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker’s 2022 Budget Proposes Numerous Business Tax Changes, Tax. Update (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2021/02/gov-jb-pritzkers-2022-budget-proposes-numerous-business-tax-changes.

[24] See Jerry Nowicki, Pritzker Agency Heads Questioned on $1.1 Billion Revenue Proposals, Cap. News Ill. (Mar. 14, 2024), https://capitolnewsillinois.com/news/pritzker-agency-heads-questioned-on-11-billion-revenue-proposals.

[25] Id.

[26]  Mattera & McIlvaine, supra note 20.

[27] Swipe Fees, Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, https://irma.org/government-affairs/policy-and-positions/swipe-fees (last visited Apr. 19, 2025).

[28] Id.

[29] New Illinois Law Creates Windfall for Largest Corporate Mega-Stores, Elec. Payments Coal. (2024), available at https://guardyourcard.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Illinois-State-Sales-Tax-Interchange-Report-9.24.24.pdf.

[30] Public Act 103-0027, 103rd Gen. Assemb., Regul. Sess. (Ill. 2024); Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 151/150-1 et seq.

[31] Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 151/150-5, -10(a) (2024).

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at §150-10(b).

[34] Id. at §150-10(d)

[35] Id. at §150-10(a).

[36] See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1075(a)(3) (2010), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173; Regulation II, Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,393, 43,475 (Jul. 20, 2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/frn-reg-ii-20231025.pdf; Darry E. Getter, Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees, Cong. Rsch. Servs. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41913; Stacie E. McGinn & Mark Chorazak, Debit Interchange Regulation: Another Battle or the End of the War?, 2 Harvard Business L. Online 47 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20250125015426/https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr/2011/07/debit-interchange-regulation-another-battle-or-the-end-of-the-war (last visited Apr. 19, 2025).

[37] See Bill Status of HB4951, 103rd Ill. Gen. Assembly, available at https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=4951&GAID=17&GA=103&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=152864&SessionID=112 (last visited Apr. 19, 2025).

[38] Howard W. Herndon, The Complexities and Costs of Eliminating Interchange Fees on Sales Tax Portions, Womble Bond Dick., (Jun. 14, 2024), https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/us/insights/alerts/complexities-and-costs-eliminating-interchange-fees-sales-tax-portions.

 

[39] Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, supra note 27.

[40] Herndon, supra note 41

[41] See Sales Tax Rebates by State, Davo by Avalara, https://www.davosalestax.com/sales-tax-rebates-by-states (last visited Apr. 4, 2025).

[42] Comparison of State Retail Sales Tax Administrative Provisions, Fed. Tax Adm., https://www.taxadmin.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2025); John Mikesell, Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector (Cengage Learning, 9th ed., 2013).

[43] The IRS’ guidance makes clear that, while an employer’s share of payroll taxes (such as FICA taxes) is deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense, no additional deduction or rebate is permitted for the expense of administering those payroll taxes. For example, IRS Publication 15 (Circular E, Employer’s Tax Guide) explains that payroll-tax liabilities must be paid in full and that the costs incurred in collecting, calculating, and remitting these taxes are not eligible for a separate tax deduction or rebate beyond what is already allowed for the employer’s tax expense. See Guide to Business Expense Resources, Intern. Revenue Serv., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/guide-to-business-expense-resources (last visited Apr. 4, 2025).

[44] In the United States, the costs a business incurs for administering its corporate-income tax are generally treated as ordinary and necessary business expenses. As such, the administrative costs associated with such taxes—such as fees paid for tax preparation, internal tax administration, or related professional services—are typically deductible. They reduce the taxable income reported on the corporation’s federal income-tax return, provided they meet the criteria under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code for ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, there is no separate mechanism to “rebate” these administrative costs. In other words, while a business can deduct them from its taxable income, it cannot claim them as a tax credit or receive a direct refund for them. (See IRS Publication 535, which outlines the rules for deducting business expenses, including those related to tax administration).

[45] Franchise Taxes: A Tax for the Privilege of Existing Within a State, LexisNexis (Feb. 18, 2025), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/b/practical-guidance/posts/franchise-taxes-a-tax-for-the-privilege-of-existing-within-a-state; Jerome R. Hellerstein et al., State Taxation § 7.01 (3rd ed. 1998), https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/books/126.

[46] See 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation §§ 684, 687, 693 (2023 update).

[47] Antonio Del Cueto, Do You Understand the Differences Between Sales Tax and Excise Tax?, TaxFyle (Mar. 5, 2025), https://www.taxfyle.com/blog/differences-between-sales-tax-and-excise-tax.

[48] See Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, at 9, §§ 26:29-26:36 (3d ed. & Supp.).

[49] See Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (7th ed. & updates) (In addition, an examination of the relevant provisions of the federal code that govern corporate-income tax (e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§?11, 6012–6151), there is no provision offering a “discount” or “rebate” for compliance costs. The prohibition on deducting federal income taxes themselves can be found in 26 U.S.C. §?275. While various credits exist for specific policy reasons (e.g., foreign tax credit, R&D credit, etc.), none is designed to compensate for the administrative burden of remitting corporate-income taxes.)

[50] See John L. Mikesell, Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector (9th ed.), https://www.amazon.com/Fiscal-administration-Analysis-applications-public/dp/0256024529.

[51] Morris, supra note 3, at 12-13

[52] Many compliance tasks—such as filing returns or keeping abreast of tax-law changes—have a fixed element that does not scale down with a company’s size or sales volume. As a result, smaller retailers spend a greater percentage of their resources to fulfill tax obligations.

[53] See Retail Sales Tax Compliance Costs: A National Estimate, Nat’l Econ. Consulting (Apr. 7, 2006), https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/cost-of-collection-study-sstp.pdf#:~:text=The%20top%20three%20sales%20tax,training%20of%20personnel%20on%20sales.

[54] Id. at E-2.

[55] See Bruce Donald et al., To Tax or not to Tax? The Case of Electronic Commerce, 21 (1) Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 25-40 (2003), https://www.proquest.com/docview/274262391; id.; Mikesell, supra note 52.

[56] Gail Cole, Vendor Discounts for Filing Sales Tax on Time, A State-by-State Guide, Avalara (Dec. 30, 2024), https://www.avalara.com/blog/en/north-america/2021/10/vendor-discounts-for-filing-sales-tax-on-time.html.

[57] Federation of Tax Administrators, supra note 43; Illinois General Assembly, supra note 37; David Brunori, State Tax Policy: A Political Perspective (5th ed.). https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538173312/State-Tax-Policy-A-Primer-Fifth-Edition.

[58] Large Commercial Banks, Fed. Reserve Stat. Release (Dec. 31, 2024), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current; Paul Calem & Benjamin Gross, The Credit Card Market Is Not Even Close to Being Overly Concentrated, Bank Pol’y Inst. (Apr. 18, 2024), available at https://bpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Credit-Card-Market-is-Not-Even-Close-to-Being-Overly-Concentrated.pdf (The largest of these is BMO Bank, a subsidiary of a Canadian bank, which has about 0.1% of U.S. market share in outstanding credit-card balances).

[59] Morris, supra note 3, at 19.

[60] See Remote Sales Tax: Federal Legislation Could Resolve Some Uncertainties and Improve Overall System, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. (GAO-23-105359, Nov. 14, 2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105359.pdf.

[61] Id. at 24.

[62] Id.

[63] See Visa Annual Report 2024, Visa (2024), available at https://s29.q4cdn.com/385744025/files/doc_downloads/2024/Visa-Fiscal-2024-Annual-Report.pdf.

[64] Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Comptroller in Support to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Illinois Bankers Association et al v. Kwame Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-07307 (Oct. 4, 2024), available at https://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-and-regulations/litigation/amicus-curiae-brief-illinois-bankers-assoc-v-raoul.pdf.

 

[65] See Taxes in Illinois, Tax. Found., https://taxfoundation.org/location/illinois (last visited Apr. 20, 2025) (The Tax Foundation estimates that the average sales tax in the state is 8.86%. If gratuities are made on about 7% of those sales at a rate of 15%, that takes the total up to about 10% of the sale, on average. Assuming interchange fees of 1%, the total loss is 0.1% of the sale amount).

[66] According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Illinois retail sales were around $244 billion in 2022. See QuickFacts: Illinois, U.S. Census Bur., https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/IL/PST045223 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Assuming modest growth gives at least $250 billion this year, interchange-fee revenue from sales tax and gratuities might account for about $250 million. For issuers with market share of 4% or more, that is at least $10 million.

[67] See Todd J. Zywicki et al., The Effects of Price Controls on Payment- Card Interchange Fees: A Review and Update, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Mar. 2, 2022), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-effects-of-price-controls-on-payment-card-interchange-fees-a-review-and-update.

[68] Id.; Iris Chan et al., The Personal Credit Card Market in Australia: Pricing Over the Past Decade, Rsrv. Bank of Austl. (2012), available at https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2012/mar/pdf/bu-0312-7.pdf.

[69] See GAO Suggests Federal Solution for Remote Sales Tax, supra note 64; Zywicki et al., supra note 70.

[70] Todd J. Zywicki et al., Unreasonable and Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small Businesses, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/unreasonable-and-disproportionate-how-the-durbin-amendment-harms-poorer-americans-and-small-businesses; Todd J. Zywicki et al., Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 14-18, 2014), https://www.law.gmu.edu/pubs/papers/14_18.

[71] See Julian Morris, The Credit Card Competition Act’s Potential Effects on Airline Co-Branded Cards, Airlines, and Consumers, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Nov. 17, 2023), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-credit-card-competition-acts-potential-effects-on-airline-co-branded-cards-airlines-and-consumers.

[72] IBA I.

[73] IBA II.

[74] IBA I, at 6 (“Illinois Bankers has presented sufficient evidence to establish irreparable harm. The alleged compliance would likely be more crippling for some Illinois financial institutions than the State claims. Illinois Bankers submitted declarations, in which financial institutions and business owners claim that the money they would have to spend to come into compliance with the IFPA would be so devastating to their business that it may drive them form the market altogether… Likewise, leadership from the American Bankers Association, which represents over 1,100 branches in Illinois, explained that some of their members would likely cease providing credit and debit card services and no longer be able to serve as Acquiring banks to merchants.”).

[75] Morris & Sperry, supra note 7 (This is because card use increases both spending and throughput).

[76] See IBA I.

[77] See IBA I.

[78] Id. at 2.

[79] Id. at 4.

[80] See Federal Court Partially Grants Preliminary Injunction in Illinois Interchange Fee Lawsuit, Am. Bankers Ass’n (Jan. 3, 2025), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2025/01/federal-court-partially-grants-preliminary-injunction-in-illinois-interchange-fee-lawsuit.

[81] Id. at 37 (dismissing the state-law claims of the Illinois state banks, arguing that state law gave them the same powers as nationally chartered banks).

[82] See IBA II.

[83] 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh).

[84] Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).

[85] Id. at 33 (“[T]he National Bank Act preempts a state law ‘only if’ the state law… ‘prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers’”); Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., 602 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2024).

[86] See IBA I at 18 (discussing OCC regulations and interpretive letters).

[87] 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2).

[88] 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008.

[89] Credit Card Lending, Off. Comptrol. Curr. (2021), at 59, available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-handbook/files/credit-card-lending/pub-ch-credit-card.pdf.

[90] Marquetta Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).

[91] IBA I at 8-12

[92] Id. at 9-10

[93] See Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Comptroller in Support to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Illinois Bankers Association et al v. Kwame Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-07307 (Oct. 4, 2024), available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.463030/gov.uscourts.ilnd.463030.76.0.pdf.

[94] See Amicus Curiae of Senator Richard J. Durbin’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Illinois Bankers Association et al v. Kwame Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-07307 (Oct. 4, 2024), available at https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/durbin_files_amicus_brief_in_support_of_illinois_interchange_fee_prohibition_act.pdf.

[95] OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at 23.

[96] Id. at 25-26.  

[97] See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).

[98] OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 67.

[99] IBA I, at 12 (“[T]he preemption standard governing the NBA and HOLA is the same.”); 12 U.S.C. § 1465(a).

[100] 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.

[101] 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2.

[102] See Julian Morris, ICLE Comments to Federal Reserve Board on Regulation II NPRM, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Apr. 23, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-comments-to-federal-reserve-board-on-regulation-ii-nprm.

[103] Durbin Amicus, supra note 99, at 11; Illinois Brief, supra note 98, at 26-29.

[104] IBA I, at 14.

[105] Id.

[106] 12 U.S.C. § 25b(h)(2).

[107] IBA I, at 13.

[108] See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1).

[109] See Brown-Forman v. N.Y. State Liq. Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).

[110]Id. at 582-84.

[111] See Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2017).

[112] Id. at 827.

[113] IBA I, at 31 (“[T]he wildcard laws apply to all entities doing business [in] Illinois.]]”).

[114] Id. at 6 (dismissing the state banks’ claims that state law was violated on sovereign immunity grounds).

[115] Id. at 30-31.

[116] IBA II, at 7-8.

[117] Id. at 4.

[118] Id. at 4 (quoting Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 629, 650 (7th Cir. 2019)).

[119] Id. at 3-5.

[120] Id.

Kristian Stout Testimony to the CRTC

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy Kristian Stout testified July 3 to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s hearing (CRTC) in Gatineau, Quebec, on working towards . . .

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy Kristian Stout testified July 3 to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s hearing (CRTC) in Gatineau, Quebec, on working towards a sustainable Canadian broadcasting system. Video of his full testimony is embedded below. 

SHORT FORM WRITTEN OUTPUT

Claims of Monopsony in the Wireless Industry Don’t Add Up

A recent report prepared for NATE: The Communications Infrastructure Contractors Association by the Brattle Group paints a troubling picture of the U.S. wireless-infrastructure industry. But a . . .

A recent report prepared for NATE: The Communications Infrastructure Contractors Association by the Brattle Group paints a troubling picture of the U.S. wireless-infrastructure industry. But a closer look at the report’s narrative demonstrates that it is built on faulty premises, misapplied economics, and a failure to connect the dots.

While the report serves as a powerful piece of advocacy for contractors and will no doubt catch some policymakers’ attention, its core arguments collapse under basic law & economics analysis.

Brattle’s central claim is that the “Big 3” mobile-network operators (MNOs)—AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon—wield “monopsony” power to squeeze the small contractors who build and maintain cell towers. The report argues that this is driving skilled labor from the field, creating a risk to national security. While the report does not allege collusion or any other violation of antitrust law, it leaves it to the casual reader to infer some sort of antitrust shenanigans.

Read the full piece here.

The Washington Effect: Will the Brussels Bureaucracy Bend?

Much has been said about the so-called “Brussels Effect”—that is, the European Union’s animating conceit that its mission is to make rules for the entire . . .

Much has been said about the so-called “Brussels Effect”—that is, the European Union’s animating conceit that its mission is to make rules for the entire world. Without irony, the EU has embraced the meme that others innovate, while the EU regulates.

Recent shifts in U.S. trade policy have introduced the threat of tariffs against jurisdictions that adopt such far-reaching regulatory regimes to target U.S. firms, particularly the tech giants, in what we might call the “Washington Effect.”

The just-announced trade deal between the United States and the European Union, however, reveals a more complex picture. While the EU agreed to abandon network fees as a part of the agreement, it is officially signaling defiance on its core digital regulations.

This raises a fundamental question: can the Washington Effect truly succeed when EU bureaucrats’ identity depends on maintaining their regulatory empire? Or would even limited success demonstrate that external pressure is the only force capable of breaking the cozy relationships between EU officials and entrenched interests that harm Europeans as consumers, workers, and innovators?

Read the full piece here.

Crime and Punishment Online: Evaluating the TAKE IT DOWN Act

Large language models (LLMs) have become a major touchpoint at the state and local level in recent years. LLMs’ ability to create images, videos, music, . . .

Large language models (LLMs) have become a major touchpoint at the state and local level in recent years. LLMs’ ability to create images, videos, music, writing, and other artistic works of varying social value has sparked a rush across the states to introduce legislation and regulations to limit the possible harms that might ensue.

More recently, that rush has also extended to the federal level. In May, President Donald Trump signed S. 146, the TAKE IT DOWN Act (formally, the “Tools to Address Known Exploitation by Immobilizing Technological Deepfakes on Websites and Networks Act.”) Sponsored by Senate Commerce Committee Chair Ted Cruz (R-Texas), the law focuses on harms arising from so-called “revenge porn,” in which either genuine photos or video or “digital forgeries” intended to look like real persons are shared online without the subject’s consent.

Read the full piece here.

The White House’s AI Action Plan

TL;DR Background: In October 2023, former President Joe Biden signed an executive order on artificial intelligence that emphasized caution, with a focus on governance frameworks, . . .

TL;DR

Background: In October 2023, former President Joe Biden signed an executive order on artificial intelligence that emphasized caution, with a focus on governance frameworks, safety protocols, and AI risk management. The Trump administration’s just-released AI Action Plan, in contrast, treats the development of AI as a national imperative akin to the Space Race, with a coordinated plan to advance innovation, infrastructure, and international leverage.

And… The plan calls for aggressively removing state and federal restrictions that could slow AI progress, repurposing federal lands for data centers and energy infrastructure, and channeling federal resources toward chip manufacturing, open-source models, and regional AI hubs. It also proposes denying federal funds to states that impose burdensome AI rules. Its animating assumption is that AI infrastructure and model development are essential to maintain U.S. economic and geopolitical dominance.

However… The plan is silent on copyright, which has been one of the most hotly contested legal questions facing generative AI. The omission may reflect limits on executive authority. But given the U.S. Copyright Office’s recent criticism of fair use and ongoing litigation over model training, this silence is conspicuous. The absence of any position leaves unresolved a core risk to AI deployment: the threat of unpredictable copyright liability for foundational model developers. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS

A Full-Stack Strategy

A centerpiece of the AI Action Plan is its embrace of a “full-stack” strategy that treats AI not merely as a set of models, but a vertically integrated ecosystem that spans research, infrastructure, talent, and deployment. Moreover, the federal government would play a coordinating role across each layer of this stack. It proposes new federal investments in scientific labs equipped for AI-accelerated experimentation, as well as long-term support for focused research organizations aimed at enabling breakthroughs in material science, biology, and engineering. These initiatives are coupled with a forthcoming “National AI R&D Strategic Plan,” which is intended to guide federal priorities toward frontier scientific questions, including interpretability, robustness, and model control.

The plan identifies energy and computing-power constraints as central bottlenecks to the future development of AI to address these barriers, it calls for permitting reform to facilitate rapid construction of data centers and semiconductor manufacturing facilities, particularly on federal lands. To address shortfalls in access to computing power, it proposes creating spot and forward markets for cloud access. 

Notably, the plan gives special attention to open-weight and open-source models, framing them as geopolitical assets. These models, it argues, should be accessible to researchers and smaller firms that cannot afford the proprietary licenses and data restrictions of closed models. The federal government would support these efforts by granting expanded access to the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR), new partnerships with private cloud providers, and coordinated technical support from agencies like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

A Geopolitical Framing

While positioning AI technology as a domain of strategic competition, the plan asserts that global leadership in AI requires control over both upstream inputs and downstream influence. Chief among its priorities is continued restrictions on trade of advanced semiconductors and AI computing power from adversarial states like China. The document proposes stronger export enforcement, including deployment of location-verification tools embedded in AI-related hardware to track illicit diversion. These controls would be designed to prevent foreign military and intelligence entities from leveraging U.S.-origin technologies to undermine American interests.

The plan also calls for coordinating export-control regimes with allied nations, signaling a shift toward plurilateral enforcement. It suggests that the United States should pressure partners to adopt complementary restrictions, including through the use of tools like the Foreign Direct Product Rule and secondary tariffs. It further suggests leveraging U.S. dominance in key supply-chain components like lithography, advanced substrates, and software frameworks to prevent backfilling by third parties.

In order to deploy AI exports as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, the plan recommends creating full-stack AI export packages of models, infrastructure, training, and standards for use by allied and partner nations. This would mirror Cold War-era strategies around nuclear energy and telecommunications, whose export was as much about setting global norms as capturing markets.

Federal Preemption by Other Means

While the AI Action Plan does not explicitly invoke federal preemption, it proposes conditioning federal funds on states’ regulatory choices, and withholding discretionary funds from states whose AI laws are overly burdensome or obstructive. This would be similar to earlier efforts to use fiscal leverage to shape states’ behavior. The strategy emerges in response to a growing state-level patchwork of AI rules across the states. The plan treats such heterogeneity not as benign federalism, but as a potential structural impediment to national innovation capacity.

This framing reflects a recognition that overlapping and inconsistent compliance regimes can generate fixed costs that scale poorly and deter new entrants. A temporary federal moratorium on new state AI regulations would allow space for a coherent national framework to emerge that aligns risk-based oversight with the technical realities of AI systems. While the plan stops short of such a moratorium, it acknowledges that the economic consequences of legal fragmentation may rival those of technological stagnation.

The Copyright Question

One of the most conspicuous omissions from the AI Action Plan is the question of copyright—an area of mounting legal uncertainty for developers of generative-AI services. Indeed, the plan says nothing about how foundational models interact with the Copyright Act or how developers should navigate fair use doctrine.

This silence is particularly notable given the Copyright Office’s recent report casting doubt on whether training models on copyrighted material constitutes transformative use. The report implied that model weights might themselves be treated as a form of infringing database or derivative work.

This view risks collapsing the distinction between functional expression and expressive content, misunderstanding how generative models encode statistical relationships, rather than expressive copies. The result is a growing threat that litigation or regulatory overreach—rather than market failure—will dictate the boundaries of lawful AI development. By declining to engage with these questions, the plan effectively punts a critical issue that could undermine the very innovation it seeks to promote.

For more on this issue, see Kristian Stout’s earlier tl;dr “State Approaches to AI Regulation Are a Patchwork”; his WLF Legal Pulse post “Federal Preemption and AI Regulation: A Law and Economics Case for Strategic Forbearance”; and his Truth on the Market post “Bartz v. Anthropic: Mapping Fair-Use Boundaries in the Age of Generative AI.”

The More Things Change: Exits, Reversals, and the Revolving Door

I’d like to begin with a tip of the hat to my former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) colleague Tara Koslov, who recently announced her retirement from the . . .

I’d like to begin with a tip of the hat to my former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) colleague Tara Koslov, who recently announced her retirement from the FTC after more than 28 years of service. Tara and I agreed on much, but far from everything. Heck, I have it on good authority that she hated my blog posts. But she was an excellent public servant whose contributions to antitrust enforcement, policy work, and the Bar were widely—and rightly—appreciated. I found her to be a smart and thoughtful antitrust lawyer who was also a smart and thoughtful manager—not the most common combination in the field. And her institutional knowledge was second to none.

Many good people have left the building over the past five years. It happens, but it adds up. There are more to follow, no doubt

Read the full piece here.

M&A Enforcement Easing Under the Trump Administration

The federal antitrust agencies appear to be easing up on merger enforcement, ditching a Biden administration policy of discouraging mergers. This change in direction could . . .

The federal antitrust agencies appear to be easing up on merger enforcement, ditching a Biden administration policy of discouraging mergers. This change in direction could promote enhanced American innovation and economic growth.

Read the full piece here.

Lessons from the UK for Brazil’s Digital Market Strategy

Brazil is broadly expected to move forward in the very near future with plans to adopt ex-ante competition regulations to govern digital platforms. Indeed, in the wake . . .

Brazil is broadly expected to move forward in the very near future with plans to adopt ex-ante competition regulations to govern digital platforms. Indeed, in the wake of a public consultation launched by the Ministry of Finance in early 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the administration have spent much of the past year actively promoting plans for this new regulatory regime, although the formal bill text has not yet been introduced.

Read the full piece here.

OECD Cloud-Computing Competition Study Offers Solutions in Search of a Problem

Arecent Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) policy paper on competition in cloud computing frames the sector as fragile, with an imminent threat of anticompetitive behavior. . . .

Arecent Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) policy paper on competition in cloud computing frames the sector as fragile, with an imminent threat of anticompetitive behavior. As the paper notes, 70-80% of the global cloud share is controlled by Microsoft, AWS (Amazon Web Services), and Google. This paints the picture of a concentrated market.

It isn’t, however, the full story. The cloud market continues to experience shifting market shares, meaning that entrenched incumbents may not be entrenched for long. For instance, AWS’ market share dipped from 45% in 2019 to 39% in 2021. Despite the continued potential for such rapid shifts, coupled with trends toward declining prices and fast-paced innovation, the paper’s authors still raise concerns about the potential for future anticompetitive behavior, flag how it may come about, and raise options for enforcers and policymakers to address it.

Are they jumping the gun? Let’s consider the evidence.

Read the full piece here.

Antitrust and Collusion on Regulating Misinformation: Thoughts on the DOJ’s Statement of Interest

The U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) Antitrust Division filed a statement of interest late last week in a private antitrust case brought against a number of major news publishers by, . . .

The U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) Antitrust Division filed a statement of interest late last week in a private antitrust case brought against a number of major news publishers by, among others, the Children’s Health Defense—the organization previously chaired by U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

Nominally, the DOJ’s statement can be distinguished from an amicus brief filed on behalf of or in support of a party, and the department is careful to note that it “takes no position on the application of the law to the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint or on the resolution of Defendants’ motion.” Still, there is no mistaking the fact that the DOJ’s statement is supportive of the plaintiffs.

This marks the agencies’ latest foray into issues at the intersection of antitrust and content moderation (or, as some FTC statements would have it, private “censorship.”) Our prior ruminations in this space were motivated by, e.g., the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Feb. 20 request for comments on “technology platform censorship” and informal comments by FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson (here and here). And the DOJ’s statement was preceded, if only barely, by its statement of intent to file the statement and by relevant remarks on “product fixing” by Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General Dina Kallay, who is also an FTC veteran.

Having spilled a fair amount of ink on the intersection of antitrust and speech, we read the statement and the plaintiffs’ complaint with great interest. Below, we offer some initial thoughts. Spoiler alert: this may be the strongest of these recent agency forays onto a hazy field of battle; but that’s not to argue that it isn’t, as the kids say, “problematic.”

Read the full piece here.

Competition Law and Technology-Platform Censorship

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently launched a public inquiry into technology platform censorship. Digital-platform censorship clearly raises serious policy concerns. Nevertheless, before filing lawsuits, the . . .

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently launched a public inquiry into technology platform censorship. Digital-platform censorship clearly raises serious policy concerns. Nevertheless, before filing lawsuits, the FTC and its fellow enforcement agency, the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) will need to factor in platforms’ First Amendment protections and limitations on agency statutory authority. Bringing platform-censorship cases may not be the best use of limited agency resources.

Read the full piece here.

US Trade Retaliation May Be the Consequence for Imitating the EU’s Digital Rulebook

In a tense meeting room last month in Brussels, U.S. trade negotiators leaned forward and delivered a pointed warning to their European counterparts: “Europe’s digital rules? They’re . . .

In a tense meeting room last month in Brussels, U.S. trade negotiators leaned forward and delivered a pointed warning to their European counterparts: “Europe’s digital rules? They’re on the table—if the EU digs in, your exports face consequences.”

South Korea now stands on the same precipice. By moving forward with the proposed Online Platform Monopoly Act (OPMA) and reforms to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA)—both modeled on the EU’s Digital Markets Act—Seoul risks not only hamstringing its digital ecosystem, but also drawing the ire of a U.S. administration determined to shield its tech champions.

Read the full piece here.

Turning Credit Cards into Comprehensive Financial Surveillance

In 2011 the Obama administration unleashed Operation Choke Point to use informal regulatory pressure on banks to debank the firearms industry, but that plan withered . . .

In 2011 the Obama administration unleashed Operation Choke Point to use informal regulatory pressure on banks to debank the firearms industry, but that plan withered when exposed in congressional hearings. A few years later, the gun prevention lobbies convinced several states to mandate separate merchant category codes (MCCs) for stores that sell firearms; unfortunately for this initiative, the number of states with statutes that (opens in a new tab)forbid special MCCs for such stores far exceeds the number of states that mandate them. Today, the gun prevention movement is receiving an unexpected gift from merchant lobbies who are pushing to embed sophisticated surveillance infrastructure into the basic architecture of electronic commerce. With that architecture in place, the government will be able to track every item purchased with a credit card — firearms and everything else.  The surveillance scheme emerges as an unintended consequence of superficially appealing legislation — namely state-level interchange fee laws — which are promoted as being aimed at helping waitresses, waiters, and small mom-and-pop shops.

Don’t Break Up the NFL’s Sunday Ticket Package

A federal jury in Los Angeles delivered an eye-popping $4.7 billion verdict last year against the National Football League, finding that the bundling and exclusive-distribution . . .

A federal jury in Los Angeles delivered an eye-popping $4.7 billion verdict last year against the National Football League, finding that the bundling and exclusive-distribution features of the league’s Sunday Ticket package harmed consumers. A federal judge later overturned the verdict, but the plaintiffs have challenged that decision in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The federal judge was right to be skeptical of the plaintiffs’ argument, and the Ninth Circuit should be, too. Despite plaintiffs’ claims to the contrary, bundling games is good for fans—and essential to maintaining the league’s competitive balance.

Read Brian Albrecht’s oped in City Journal.

Why the United States May Confront Nontariff Attacks Against Tech Firms

I recently explained in Forbes that U.S. trade negotiators could leverage the planned withdrawal of anticompetitive federal regulations to obtain a cutback in foreign anticompetitive market . . .

I recently explained in Forbes that U.S. trade negotiators could leverage the planned withdrawal of anticompetitive federal regulations to obtain a cutback in foreign anticompetitive market distortions (ACMDs) that harm American firms and consumers.

A July 2 nonpartisan letter to senior administration officials from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), joined by senior policy scholars, strikes a similar theme in calling on the administration to target foreign governments’ nontariff attacks (NTAs) on America’s leading technology companies. The letter recommends a three-pronged negotiating strategy to counteract NTAs. Administration adoption of that strategy could bestow substantial benefits on U.S. producers, workers, and consumers.

Read the full piece here.

The Digital Markets Act as an EU Digital Tax: When Compliance Costs Dwarf Regulatory Estimates

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) has emerged as one of the most consequential pieces of digital regulation in recent years. While officially presented . . .

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) has emerged as one of the most consequential pieces of digital regulation in recent years. While officially presented as pro-competition legislation designed to ensure fair and open digital markets, mounting evidence suggests the DMA functions as a de facto digital tax on American technology companies. This analysis draws on insights from recent DMA workshops with the companies designated as “gatekeepers” by the EU Commission (detailed analysis available here) to reveal how the staggering gap between initial regulatory cost estimates and actual compliance burdens, combined with enforcement threats that go far beyond monetary fines, creates a regulatory regime that operates as a tax on and a protectionist industrial policy against successful U.S. companies.

Read the full piece here.

The State of Online Age Verification Post-Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton gave policymakers a big win in the battle for age verification for access to online . . .

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton gave policymakers a big win in the battle for age verification for access to online pornography. But the broader war over age verification and parental consent online isn’t over. In fact, the majority’s opinion suggests that age verification for protected speech to minors will be subject to “strict scrutiny,” which it is unlikely to survive. Thus, the majority’s holding that unprotected, “obscene” speech to minors receives only “intermediate scrutiny” may be fairly narrow. Ultimately, this suggests that more expansive age-verification and parental consent regimes for social media or for the Internet more broadly through the app store or device filters are likely to fail under First Amendment analysis.

Read the full piece here.

Merger Control or Political Tool? Lessons from Spain’s Attempt to Stall the Sabadell Merger

The Spanish government has approved BBVA’s hostile takeover bid for Banco Sabadell but as I anticipated in an earlier Truth on the Market post, it did so . . .

The Spanish government has approved BBVA’s hostile takeover bid for Banco Sabadell but as I anticipated in an earlier Truth on the Market post, it did so while imposing stringent conditions. Both banks will be required to maintain separate legal identities, management, and operations for at least three years, potentially extendable to five. These conditions effectively delay the merger’s synergies (cost reduction, unified governance, scale efficiencies) and raise questions about the government’s legal authority to impose such constraints.

I noted in my previous post that the government could execute a form of indirect intervention through conditions so demanding that the operation would become unfeasible. What was then a hypothesis has now materialized in all its starkness. The decision, contained in a lengthy 25-page document, is light on technical or legal findings and heavy on unsupported assertions, circular justifications, and conditions that are difficult to reconcile with the principles of legal certainty and proportionality.

Justified with appeals to vague notions of the “public interest,” the decision lacks a clear legal basis under the Spanish Competition Act. Notably, the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) had already approved the merger with commitments proposed by BBVA. The additional conditions imposed by the government appear to overstep its authority—potentially rendering them unenforceable.

Read the full piece here.

First Impressions from the DOJ/FTC Listening Session on Drug-Price Competition

Last week’s “listening session” on pharmaceutical competition, hosted jointly by the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), may go down as an . . .

Last week’s “listening session” on pharmaceutical competition, hosted jointly by the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), may go down as an important precursor to the Trump administration’s promised campaign to lower drug prices. While billed as a fact-finding exercise, the discussion revealed competing visions to reform the U.S. pharmaceutical ecosystem, with potentially far-reaching implications for innovation incentives and patient access.

Read the full piece here.

Strong Support for Patent Rights Could Promote US Innovation

Recent U.S. executive branch actions point to enhanced support for patent rights. This could help accelerate American innovation in a time of growing international competition. . . .

Recent U.S. executive branch actions point to enhanced support for patent rights. This could help accelerate American innovation in a time of growing international competition.

Read the full piece here.

Digital Rules? Not EU’s Way

In 2024, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) released a draft ex-ante digital competition law, following the lead of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). But does India need a . . .

In 2024, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) released a draft ex-ante digital competition law, following the lead of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). But does India need a new law that is an inspiration from a dubious DMA or is existing competition law enough?

India’s Competition Act 2002-especially in the wake of significant amendments made in 2023-offers a flexible and comprehensive framework to address anticompetitive conduct in the digital economy. It also includes sections that cover such core digital concerns as deep discounting, bundling, self-preferencing, exclusive tie-ups and the misuse of data by dominant platforms- without automatically prejudging whether such conduct is anti-competitive.

Read the full piece here.

The Courts that Quietly Rule the Internet

Who do you think is deciding what you see and how you interact with your favorite online services? Many people would assume that Silicon Valley engineers and . . .

Who do you think is deciding what you see and how you interact with your favorite online services? Many people would assume that Silicon Valley engineers and product managers are tinkering behind the scenes. However, an underestimated reality is emerging: That means judges and regulators are increasingly deciding how online platforms should operate. The blueprint for the future of the internet is being drawn up in courts and government agencies. This should concern us all.

Read the full piece here.

Mi CASA es Mi CASA

A little bird (ok, a normal-size adult human being) has asked me a question about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. CASA. . . .

A little bird (ok, a normal-size adult human being) has asked me a question about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. CASA. It might not be the question on the tip of everyone’s tongue, although it’s a natural one for those interested in competition policy, administrative law, or all things (or at least some things) related to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). That is, what does—or might—Trump v. CASA mean for the ultimate fate of the FTC’s now-stayed noncompete rule?

Spoiler alert: not much. At least, I shouldn’t think so. Then again, there may be significant implications down the road for other competition matters—especially those involving private plaintiffs.

Read the full piece here.

AMICUS BRIEFS

ICLE Brief to the 9th Circuit in Epic Games v Apple

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”)[1] is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the . . .

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”)[1] is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. ICLE promotes the use of law and economics to inform policy debates and has longstanding expertise evaluating antitrust law and policy.

ICLE has an interest in ensuring that antitrust law promotes the public interest by remaining grounded in sensible rules informed by sound economic analysis. That includes fostering consistency between antitrust law and other laws that proscribe unfair methods of competition, such as California’s Unfair Competition Law, and advising against far-reaching injunctions that could deteriorate the quality of mobile ecosystems, thereby harming the interests of consumers and app developers.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court has issued an order, No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025), ECF No. 1508 (“Order”), that would, permanently and nationwide, prohibit Apple from charging “any commission or fee” on various purchases facilitated by Apple’s platform and in-app purchasing (IAP) mechanism. Further, the Order would intrude on various of Apple’s business practices including, inter alia, steps Apple might take to protect the integrity and security of its platform and IAP and, not incidentally, the privacy and data security of consumers who use the Apple ecosystem. These permanent, nationwide injunctions are required, according to the order, to prevent Apple from “maintaining an anticompetitive revenue stream,” “reap supracompetitive operating margins” or “profits” that are “not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus . . . anticompetitive.”

These permanent, nationwide injunctions are required, moreover, despite the following: (1) neither the pricing nor the business practices enjoined here were enjoined in the District Court’s prior order in this matter; (2) no violation of the federal antitrust laws was found at trial in this matter, in which the only finding of liability was the finding of a violation of the “unfair prong” of California’s UCL; and (3) California courts have held that, because the purpose of both “federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefits of consumers,” it follows that when “the same conduct is alleged to be both an antitrust violation and an ‘unfair business act or practice for the same reason—because it unreasonably restrains competition and harms consumers—the determination that the conduct is not an unreasonable restraint of trade necessarily implies that the conduct is not ‘unfair’ towards consumers” Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 175, 184 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2001).

As we explain below, the District Court’s Order misapplies basic principles of antitrust in ways that will harm consumers and competition. If upheld and followed by courts in other cases, the Order will set a dangerous precedent—one that will dampen firms’ incentives to create and improve groundbreaking new platforms. The Order would enjoin Apple from charging “any commission or fee” on various purchases facilitated by Apple’s platform and in-app purchasing (IAP) mechanism. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025), ECF No. 1508 (“Order”). The Order claims this is required to prevent Apple from “maintaining an anticompetitive revenue stream,” id. at 75, or “reap[ing] supracompetitive operating margins” or “profits” that are “not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus …  anticompetitive.” Id. at 2. But such profits are not unlawful.

In brief, the Order would impose numerous and complex duties to deal that were not identified in the previous injunction and have not been shown necessary to prevent foreclosure. Instead, the Order reflects a maximalist interpretation of the initial injunction—requiring micromanagement of Apple’s platform and dictating that Apple must offer business users free access to its ecosystem.

At the same time, the Order would effectively obviate various of Apple’s legal business practices, including steps Apple might take to protect the integrity and security of its platform and IAP, the privacy and data security of consumers who use the Apple ecosystem, and the value of its intellectual property, all of which were previously identified by this Court as legitimate. See Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 971 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 681 (2024).

While the original injunction did not interfere with “Apple’s business justifications [which] focus on other parts of the Apple ecosystem and will not be significantly impacted by the increase of information to and choice for consumers,” Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 559 F.Supp.3d 898, 1057 (2021) (“Epic v. Apple”), the Order is premised on an interpretation of the initial injunction that is no longer a “limited measure [that] balances the justification for maintaining a cohesive ecosystem with the public interest….” Id. Rather, it imposes complex, long-running duties to deal that are unsupported by the record and inconsistent with the relevant jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s repeated caution that antitrust courts are not central planners.

ARGUMENT

I. Antitrust Courts Are Not Central Planners or Price Regulators

The Order misapplies key Supreme Court rulings, like Trinko and Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, which caution against the use of compelled access remedies. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trinko is the lodestar here. In that case, the Court made clear that antitrust law does not, as a general matter, require even a monopolist to aid its competitors by sharing infrastructure or data, warning that such forced sharing “may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest” in valuable innovations. Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“Trinko”). Court has, therefore, long cautioned against such remedies. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S.Ct. 2141 (2021) (“Alston”); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Comm’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (“linkLine”).

The Trinko Court warned against enforced sharing precisely because it would require “courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. Antitrust law does not generally require a monopolist to aid its competitors by sharing infrastructure or data because such forced sharing “may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest” in valuable innovations. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. The linkLine Court clarified that Trinko encompasses pricing obligations like those imposed here, noting that enforcement of such a duty “would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices” while “aiming at a moving target….”  linkLine, 555 U.S. at 453 (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408).

Courts must be cautious in fashioning remedies that impose such duties, lest they “wind up impairing rather than enhancing competition, impose costs that ‘exceed efficiencies gained,’” and “suppress procompetitive innovation.” Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 102 (2021) (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415).

II. The Order Ignores the Supreme Court’s Repeated Repudiation of Complex and Burdensome Duties to Deal

Such risks plainly are raised by the Order, which enjoins Apple from, inter alia, “[i]mposing any commission or any fee” on linked transactions, Order at 75, notwithstanding that “the Court did not select a rate,” Id. at 58, and that “Apple is entitled to … guard against the uncompensated use of its intellectual property.” Epic v. Apple, 559 F.Supp.3d at 1042. The factual recitations in the Order reveal the uncertainty Apple confronted in identifying a price for linked-out transactions that would comport with the original injunction. See, e.g., Order at 21.

The purported justification for a zero-price requirement is that the District Court had “found that ‘Apple’s 30% commission … allowed it to reap supracompetitive operating margins’ and was not tied to the value of its intellectual property, and thus, was anticompetitive.” Id. at 2. While imposing a specific commission might resolve the uncertainty, the District Court’s analysis largely serves to highlight both the difficulty of administering such duties-to-deal and the arbitrariness of its zero price mandate.

The Order notes that Apple “never correlated the value of its intellectual property to the commission it charges.” Order at 7. But what would such a correlation entail, and why would it be required of Apple? Typically, the price system tests the value of intellectual property. Antitrust law recognizes that even monopoly can arise “as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). For that reason, antitrust law does not condemn monopoly itself. Id. at 570–71; see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08.

It is conceivable that some price could be found exclusionary, foreclosing competition to an extent prohibited by, e.g., Section 2 of the Sherman Act. But given the benefits of Apple’s platform and IAP and the need to maintain incentives for future investment, competition cannot require a rate of zero percent. Apart from a conclusory declaration that a 27% commission for linked purchases is anticompetitive, neither the Order nor Epic v. Apple provides any analysis of a price threshold at which a commission would become exclusionary.

Further, attempting to maximize profits within the confines of an injunction cannot be a violation. Yet the District Court concluded that Apple’s efforts to do so were inherently anticompetitive. See, e.g., Order at 17. This Court has admonished such conflation of  “the desire to maximize profits with an intent to ‘destroy competition itself.’ … [T]he goal of antitrust law is not to force businesses to forego profits or even ‘[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices,’ which is ‘what attracts business acumen in the first place.’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 990, 994, fn. 15 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation and citation omitted)) (“Qualcomm”).

Seeking to ground its conclusion that Apple’s compliance efforts were anticompetitive, the District Court contends that summing Apple’s 27% rate and other costs entails that linked-out commission costs would exceed Apple’s 30% IAP commission. It thus finds that Apple’s linked-out commission “forecloses competitive alternatives.” Order at 60 (emphasis in original). The Court bases its conclusion of a violation on a “price squeeze” claim—asserting that, by pricing its own alternative (IAP at 30%) lower than the effective price required by its linked-out commission, Apple effectively eliminates the linked-out option as a competitive alternative.

But “[r]ecognizing price-squeeze claims would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed.” linkLine, 555 U.S. at 453. This would compound the enforcement problems inherent in duties to deal because “courts would be aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may result in a squeeze.” Id.

The Order exemplifies the problem: the District Court contends that Apple’s linked-out commission violates its prior injunction because of the interaction between Apple’s commission and developers’ other costs. To determine when that interaction effectively forecloses linked-out transactions thus depends on external payment processing (and other) costs over which Apple has no control—costs that are certain to vary across developers, apps, and times. It also depends on app developers’ choice of payment processors. For virtually any commission Apple might set, a developer could choose a payment processor with fees that, combined with Apple’s commission, exceed 30%. This moving target precludes Apple’s ability to identify the price that would comply with the Order—precisely the scenario that the linkLine Court found “perhaps most troubling.” Id. at 453.

LinkLine explains why that is untenable: “[H]ow is a judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the price charged by other suppliers of the primary product? None exist. Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary level not monopolized? How can the court determine this price without examining costs and demands, indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting proceedings of which often last for several years? Further, how is the court to decide the proper size of the price ‘gap?’ Must it be large enough for all independent competing firms to make a ‘living profit,’ no matter how inefficient they may be? … And how should the court respond when costs or demands change over time, as they inevitably will?” Linkline, 555 U.S. at 454 (internal citation omitted).

These concerns apply in spades when a duty to deal arises from a judicially-ordered injunction, the violation of which threatens criminal contempt. “‘No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.’” LinkLine, 555 U.S. at 453 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415).

The District Court’s rationale for what is manifestly rate setting is opaque. Antitrust law does not prohibit supracompetitive pricing in itself; and it recognizes that intellectual property rights are predicated on the promise of supracompetitive pricing—or, at least, the potential for profits—which provide incentives to make fixed-cost investments in research and development. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08; Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 994. The District Court’s stipulation of a zero-price commission ignores the difficulty of setting any price that will remedy prior (allegedly exclusionary) conduct, compensate for Apple’s intellectual property, or account for an allegedly anticompetitive price differential (the extent of which is partly determined by the pricing decisions and conduct of non-parties).

III. The Order Is Not Tailored to the Harm Found at Trial

As the D.C. Circuit has observed, “relief should be tailored to fit the wrong creating the occasion for the remedy.” United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Microsoft”); and it “must base its relief on some clear ‘indication of a significant causal connection between the conduct enjoined or mandated and the violation found directed toward the remedial goal intended.’” Id. at 105 (citation omitted).

The District Court insists that its order “require[s] no affirmative action on Apple’s part,” Order at 76, implying that no further findings are required. But this strains credulity. First, the practices enjoined—including the charging of any positive price for linked-out payments—were not found unlawful at trial, and there is no explanation in the Order of how they remediate the finding of a UCL violation. At the same time, there is no practical way for Apple to comply with the Order without undertaking numerous and considerable affirmative actions, or to do so without risk to its IAP, its platform, and the consumers who choose to use them. In addition, the Order goes significantly further than the original injunction: It not only requires that Apple eliminate practices that prevent competition with IAP, but, in effect, requires the creation of a frictionless steering experience for the benefit of competitors—and to do so for free. Order at 75-6.

Remedies should target specific anticompetitive acts without deterring the competitive process that benefits consumers. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 107; see also Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Structural Antitrust Relief Against Digital Platforms, 7 J. LAW & INNOVATION 57, 64 (2024). To ignore this principle risks doing more harm than good. “Fashioning appropriate equitable antitrust relief requires that courts balance the benefit to competition against the hardship or competitive disadvantage the remedy may cause.” Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir. 2010).

The history of antitrust remedies shows that they fail precisely when they overindex on harms and ignore the benefits that may also arise from ambiguous conduct and complex market structures. See generally Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Injunctive Relief in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 21 RES. LAW AND ECON. 277, 335–37 (2004) (studying effects of behavioral remedies imposed in ten major monopolization cases). “Without a firm grasp of the economic forces that are driving changes in market structure, [courts] cannot be expected to design ‘relief’ that will result in increased competition, lower prices, and consumer benefits.” Id. at 335.

IV. The Order Ignores the Competitive and Consumer Benefits of Apple’s Relatively “Closed” Distribution Model

Anti-steering provisions can be procompetitive. At issue in Amex, for example, were various anti-steering provisions American Express had placed in its contracts with merchants. Ohio V. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018). The plaintiffs had alleged that the anti-steering provisions violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 138 S. Ct. at 2283. But the Court recognized that “there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about . . . antisteering provisions.” Id. at 2289. Such vertical provisions can, among other things, prevent merchants from free-riding, thereby increasing the availability of “‘tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts’ that enhance competition and consumer welfare.” Id. at 2290 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890-91 (2007)).

That general observation is entirely consistent with this Court’s limited affirmation of the District Court’s narrower, initial finding that certain of Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated the UCL to the extent that they might diminish consumer information. Yet the Order sweeps much more broadly than that finding implies.

Apple’s “closed” distribution model also allows the company to curate the App Store’s apps and payment options. By categorically and permanently enjoining Apple from excluding “certain categories of apps and developers from obtaining link access,” the Order inhibits Apple’s ability to exclude apps that pose data security threats, threaten to impose physical harm on users, or undermine child-safety filters.

Prohibiting Apple from placing any restrictions on apps that “pass[] on product details, user details or other information that refers to the user …” ignores the risks to privacy and personal data that such practices can entail. Likewise, prohibiting Apple from requiring “anything other than a neutral message apprising users that they are going to a third-party site” prevents Apple from excluding undesirable or harmful language on its platform. Apple’s App Store guidelines address these concerns by excluding apps that pose data security threats, threaten to impose physical harm on users, or undermine child-safety filters.[2]

In addition, Apple’s rules increase trust between users and previously unknown developers, because users do not have to fear their apps contain malware. They also reduce user fears about payment fraud. More broadly, Apple’s closed business model also enables it to maintain a high standard of performance on iOS devices by excluding apps and payment systems that might slow devices or crash frequently. Users may not know when device performance is affected by a given app or purchase mechanism, so an open system would mean the potential for apps that crash the entire device. Apple’s closed model ensures that unscrupulous developers cannot impose negative externalities on the entire ecosystem.

The Order also presents a serious risk of freeriding. Rivals could mimic Apple’s curation while undercutting it on price. This would not enhance competition on the merits, but eviscerate it, by eroding Apple’s incentives to develop, refine, and enforce such rules. To impose a zero price on linked-out transactions effectively assumes that the appropriate level of curation is itself zero. But that cannot be correct: Apple’s closed business model enables it to maintain a high standard of performance on iOS by excluding apps and payment systems that might impair it, ensuring that unscrupulous developers cannot impose negative externalities on the entire ecosystem. Yet the Order does not weigh the costs and benefits of such restrictions or question whether they are necessary to remedy a violation of California law.

CONCLUSION

The District Court’s Order undermines sound application of the federal antitrust laws and the procompetitive and pro-consumer policies protected by the antitrust laws and the UCL.

[1] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), amici further state that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or part; no party, counsel for a party, or any person other than amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution toward the preparation and submission of this brief.

[2] Such concerns are illustrated by, for example, complaints by the Federal Trade Commission that the Plaintiff-Appellee, Epic Games, violated both the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule by, inter alia, knowingly collecting personal information about children without parental consent and “matchmaking children and teens with strangers while broadcasting players’ account names and imposing live on-by-default voice and text communications . . . .[and that] Children and teens have been bullied, threatened, and harassed within Fortnite, including sexually.” Separately, the FTC alleged that Epic had violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by unfair practices, charging consumers for items without first obtaining consent,” and that it has then “banned consumers from accessing previously paid-for content when they have disputed unauthorized charges with their credit card providers.” Although the FTC reports that it “has secured agreements requiring Epic Games, Inc., creator of the popular video game Fortnite, to pay a total of $520 million in relief,” the relevant settlement agreements, following established practice, do not incorporate allocutions of liability by Epic. ICLE here does not allege that Epic violated COPPA and the FTC Act as represented in the FTC complaints. Rather, we note the FTC’s allegations, based on substantial staff investigations, to illustrate the types and scale of consumer harm that are at risk if Apple cannot exclude bad actors for its app store and IAP. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fortnite Video Game Maker Epic Games to Pay More Than Half a Billion Dollars over FTC Allegations of Privacy Violations and Unwanted Charges (Dec. 19, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/12/fortnite-video-game-maker-epic-games-pay-more-half-billion-dollars-over-ftc-allegations (last accessed June 27, 2025).

 

COMMENTS & STATEMENTS

ICLE Comments Re: Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband

I. Introduction We thank the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or “the Commission”) for the opportunity to comment on this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Modernizing . . .

I. Introduction

We thank the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or “the Commission”) for the opportunity to comment on this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband.”[1] The NPRM’s central proposal is to conduct a comprehensive review and modernization of the spectrum-sharing regime for non-geostationary (NGSO) and geostationary (GSO) satellite systems operating in the 10.7-12.7 GHz, 17.3-18.6 GHz, and 19.7-20.2 GHz frequency bands. The Commission’s overarching objectives are clear: to ensure “highly efficient and effective use of the shared spectrum,”[2] to support “a more competitive market for satellite broadband,”[3] and to “uncap[] the potential of satellite constellations.”[4]

A primary focus of this review is the set of equivalent power-flux density (EPFD) limits, which the NPRM identifies as potentially the “the single most constraining regulatory requirement on NGSO satellite systems.”[5] These limits—adopted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2000 and subsequently incorporated into FCC rules—were designed to protect GSO networks from harmful interference from NGSO systems.[6] The NPRM questions whether these limits—based on technological assumptions from the 1990s—remain appropriate, given the evolution of both NGSO and GSO technologies. The document notes claim the current rules may be predicated on “flawed and outdated assumptions” that lead to “inefficient spectrum sharing.”[7]

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center whose core mission is to promote the application of law & economics methodologies to inform public-policy discussion. Our work focuses on developing intellectually rigorous, data-driven analyses to foster efficient policy solutions that enhance consumer welfare and global economic growth. In our comments to the FCC in the “Delete, Delete, Delete” proceeding, we recommended:

A top-to-bottom review of FCC space and satellite policies is warranted to identify and eliminate regulatory asymmetries disadvantaging U.S.-licensed providers. Disparate treatment—such as more onerous licensing timelines, excessive equipment pre-certification requirements, and redundant importation rules—can generate substantial uncertainty and delays. These regulatory burdens impose direct costs on companies and broader costs on U.S. consumers and national interests—deterring innovation, discouraging capital investment, and reducing America’s global market share.

A particularly urgent area for reform concerns the equivalent power flux-density (EPFD) limits that govern the signal strength permitted for non-geostationary (NGSO) satellite transmissions. These limits—established by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the late 1990s—were designed to prevent harmful interference with geostationary (GSO) satellites, but they reflect technological assumptions from a much earlier era. Modern NGSO systems—equipped with steerable beams, advanced signal processing, and adaptive interference mitigation—are artificially constrained by these outdated rules. As a result, current EPFD limits are a tremendous regulatory restriction on the ability of NGSO systems to serve consumers efficiently and cost-effectively.

The FCC has already recognized this issue by initiating an NPRM (SB Docket No. 25-157) to study the NGSO-GSO sharing regime in the 10.7–12.7 GHz, 17.3–18.6 GHz, and 19.7–20.2 GHz bands. The Commission should exploit the existing NPRM process to fully evaluate modernized EPFD methodologies and accelerate a transition toward a more efficient and evidence-based spectrum-sharing framework that maintains GSO protections while enabling the full potential of NGSO constellations. Ensuring that NGSO providers can deliver affordable high-capacity broadband to unserved and underserved populations is a national imperative, and the FCC must not allow regulatory inertia to serve as a barrier to this goal.[8]

Applying a law & economics framework can inform the FCC’s review by focusing on how differing regulatory approaches affect spectrum efficiency, incentives for investment and innovation, transaction costs in sharing and coordination, and overall consumer welfare. Specifically, the current reliance on potentially outdated technical assumptions may lead to an inefficient allocation of spectrum by overly restricting NGSO operations, thereby limiting the provision of high-speed, low-latency broadband services. While existing rules were designed to protect GSO systems from harmful interference, modern NGSO technology and market demands suggest a need to reexamine the balance between protecting incumbents and enabling new services. The NPRM appropriately seeks a robust technical record to assess these issues, explicitly requesting comment on the costs and benefits of alternative sharing frameworks.

Economic analysis can provide valuable insights into the questions the NPRM raises, such as determining appropriate protection criteria for modern GSO systems that avoid economically costly overprotection, evaluating alternative methodologies (like throughput-based criteria for systems with adaptive coding and modulation (ACM)), and assessing how information-sharing requirements and compliance mechanisms affect transaction costs and incentives Thorough consideration of transitional measures—including potentially sunsetting protections based on outdated technologies—is also critical to avoid perpetuating inefficient entitlements.

Ultimately, a law & economics approach supports the FCC’s goal to ensure highly efficient and effective use of shared spectrum and to promote a more competitive market for satellite broadband. By analyzing the incentives created by regulatory rules and evaluating the costs and benefits of various sharing frameworks, the Commission can adopt rules that maximize the welfare benefits of this spectrum for American consumers and foster continued U.S. leadership in the space economy.

II. The Economic Foundation: Spectrum as a Scarce Resource and the Goal of Efficient Allocation

The radiofrequency spectrum is a finite and incredibly valuable resource, serving as the invisible infrastructure for modern communications from television broadcasting to high-speed internet. Regulatory bodies like the FCC aim to ensure this limited resource is used to maximize its overall social value—promoting efficiency, competition, and consumer welfare.[9] Historical regulatory frameworks, such as those established by the Communications Act of 1934, often reflect outdated technological distinctions that no longer align with current market realities.[10] Therefore, modernizing these frameworks to be technology-neutral is essential to unlock the full potential of communications markets and prevent U.S. firms from seeking more permissive foreign regulatory environments.

One of the primary challenges to managing shared spectrum is dealing with interference, which functions as a negative externality.[11] If operators were not compelled to avoid causing unacceptable interference, they would have an incentive to exploit shared spectrum to the fullest, potentially imposing significant costs on others and society at-large. This scenario mirrors the “tragedy of the commons,” in which a shared resource is depleted when individuals act in their own self-interest without clear boundaries.[12] Clear rules and defined property rights allow satellite operators to use spectrum resources effectively and constrain the overexploitation of these common resources. As the late economist Ronald Coase concluded, the goal of regulation should not be to eliminate all interference, but rather to maximize overall output by ensuring the benefits gained from any interference outweigh the harms it causes.[13]

In the satellite-communications sector, the EPFD limits established by the ITU serve as a primary regulatory mechanism to manage this potential for interference.[14] These limits define the amount of interference a GSO network must tolerate from any given NGSO system, as well as from all NGSO systems combined. By adhering to these limits, NGSO systems are considered to have fulfilled their obligation to prevent unacceptable interference with GSO networks. For decades, these EPFD limits have successfully allowed both GSO and NGSO operators to share radiofrequency spectrum, fostering the growth of fixed and mobile broadband and broadcast services globally.

There is, however, a growing consensus that, given significant technological advancements, the effectiveness and efficiency of current EPFD limits need to be reevaluated.[15] The existing rules, provisionally adopted in 1997 and formally in 2000, were developed based on 1990s technology and assumptions, such as a hypothetical 80-satellite system.[16] Modern NGSO constellations, which deploy at a rapid pace, bear little resemblance to these older theoretical systems.

For example, many NGSO and GSO links now use ACM technology, which improves spectrum-sharing capabilities significantly but was not fully considered in the original EPFD framework.[17] Critics argue that the outdated EPFD limits provide more protection than is needed for GSO networks to function.[18] They are therefore spectrally inefficient, unnecessarily constraining NGSO operations and their ability to provide high-speed, low-latency broadband.[19] These constraints can limit radiated power levels, reduce coverage through wide “avoidance angles,” restrict the number of simultaneous satellite beams, and impact coordination options, ultimately hindering the full potential of next-generation satellite systems.[20]

The FCC has recognized that these limits “significantly penalize[]” NGSOs[21] and “directly degrade the efficiency of spectrum use.”[22] While some, such as Viasat, argue that NGSO systems thrive under the current framework and that degrading the limits would impose high costs on GSO networks,[23] others, including Amazon and SpaceX, contend that revising these limits is urgently needed to promote innovation and competition.[24]

The FCC has acknowledged this debate with this NPRM, which seeks to take a “fresh look” at the decades-old spectrum-sharing regime in specific frequency bands and to develop a substantial technical record to ensure efficient spectrum use and a competitive market. This domestic review aims to allow American consumers and industries to benefit from modernized GSO/NGSO sharing as soon as possible, even as international discussions continue.

III. Economic Costs of Current Rules

The current EPFD limits established in the 1990s represent what the FCC has identified as the “single most constraining regulatory requirement” on modern NGSO-satellite systems. These constraints create substantial economic costs that manifest across multiple dimensions of satellite operations and broader market dynamics. The economic burden extends beyond direct compliance costs to encompass opportunity costs, efficiency losses, and reduced incentives for innovation, which together serve ultimately to harm consumer welfare and economic growth.

The current EPFD rules represent a classic example of regulatory failure. While the regulations may have been efficient at the time they were put in place, they have simply not kept pace with economic and technological developments. Over time, they have contributed to significant market distortions, creating deadweight losses that harm overall economic welfare. The current EPFD limits force NGSO systems to operate with artificially constrained power levels, reduced coverage areas, and limited satellite density. These constraints prevent mutually beneficial exchanges between satellite operators and consumers, representing a textbook case of regulatory-induced market failure.

A. Property Rights and the Coase Theorem

The current regulatory framework fails to establish clear and transferable property rights in spectrum use, creating the conditions for inefficient resource allocation. Coase’s seminal work on spectrum allocation demonstrates that, with well-defined property rights and low transaction costs, private parties can negotiate efficient solutions to interference problems.[25] As noted by Doug Brake, writing about terrestrial spectrum:

What we care about are markets driving efficient use of spectrum, not simply efficient allocation of spectrum in the abstract. The initial allocation of rights, however defined, has a profound effect on the structure of and architecture of a particular radio service.

However, the “theorem” formulation—low transaction costs plus well-defined rights equals efficient outcomes—clarifies the two general approaches for policymakers to attack negative externality problems. One can economize on transaction costs and/or clarify the definition of rights. Obviously, work in both areas is good, but there is no reason to think that one single rights definition or level of transaction costs that is ideal for all situations.[26]

By imposing rigid technical constraints that cannot be adjusted through market mechanisms, however, the current EPFD rules prevent negotiations that would lead to efficient solutions that balance interference protection with spectrum utilization. This represents a fundamental misalignment between regulatory structure and the principles of economic efficiency.

B. Opportunity Cost and Resource Misallocation

The current EPFD rules’ full cost is found not only in their direct effects on NGSO operations, but in the opportunity costs they generate—that is, the foregone benefits from more efficient spectrum use. When regulations force NGSO systems to operate inefficiently, they foreclose realization of consumer surplus that would result from more efficient provision of services.

Current EPFD limits force NGSO systems to operate with artificially constrained power levels, creating significant spectrum inefficiencies. Economic research by Harold Furchtgott-Roth demonstrates that these power limitations reduce spectral efficiency by substantial margins, with potential capacity increases of 74% to 180% in different frequency bands under updated rules.[27] These efficiency losses translate directly into higher costs per unit of capacity delivered to consumers, as operators must deploy more satellites and infrastructure to achieve the same service levels. The economic waste inherent in this inefficient spectrum use represents a classic case of regulatory-induced resource misallocation.

The coverage restrictions imposed by current EPFD rules create additional economic costs through reduced service availability and quality. NGSO operators must implement wide “avoidance angles” of the geostationary arc, which reduces system coverage and requires other satellites to compensate for gaps in service.[28] This operational constraint forces operators to maintain larger constellation sizes than would be economically optimal, increasing both capital expenditures and ongoing operational costs. The economic impact extends to consumers who receive degraded service quality or pay higher prices to compensate for these artificial constraints.

The current rules’ satellite-density limitations also impose significant infrastructure cost burdens on NGSO operators. The restrictions on the number of satellites that can simultaneously serve a particular location (Nco) directly limit system capacity and require operators to deploy more expensive solutions to meet demand.[29] Research indicates that one hypothetical NGSO system would require 462 satellites under current rules, compared to just 360 satellites under updated limits—a 28% reduction in required infrastructure.[30] These unnecessary infrastructure costs represent economic waste that ultimately increases consumer prices and reduces service accessibility.

The opportunity-cost framework reveals that current rules impose costs on society by preventing higher-valued uses of spectrum resources. Economic research on spectrum allocation demonstrates that administrative-allocation methods often fail to achieve the efficiency gains possible through market-based approaches. The current EPFD rules exemplify this problem by locking in allocations based on 1990s technology, rather than allowing market forces to determine optimal spectrum use.

C. Transaction Costs and Coordination Failures

Transaction costs are the expenses incurred in process of an economic exchange, including the costs of searching for information, bargaining, and enforcing agreements. With respect to spectrum management, these costs encompass the effort and resources spent on defining usage rights, monitoring compliance, and resolving disputes. The existing EPFD framework, despite its regulatory intent, generates such costs by forcing operators into inefficient practices and complex, often unproductive, interactions.[31]

A significant source of these transaction costs stems from the overprotection of GSO incumbents. As noted above, to comply with these overly restrictive EPFD limits, modern NGSO systems are compelled to operate inefficiently. This includes:

  • Limiting their radiated power levels (EIRP), which can degrade signal quality and consistent service;
  • Implementing wide “avoidance angles” around the geostationary arc, which force satellites to divert, thereby reducing overall system coverage and making valuable capacity unusable, even in areas where no harmful interference to GSO networks is likely; and
  • Restricting the number of satellites that can simultaneously serve a particular ground location (Nco).

The conditions for effective Coasean bargaining are not met in the satellite industry. Satellite licensees generally do not possess the “full property rights” that would encourage efficient transfers or broad negotiations (e.g., they cannot easily benefit from transferring licenses).[32] Furthermore, the sheer number of parties involved in global satellite operations creates prohibitively high transaction costs for direct negotiation.

Scores of systems—including commercial, government, and military operators—are licensed in the EPFD bands. The cost would be “extraordinarily high” for an NGSO system to negotiate EPFD limits with every GSO-satellite owner globally.[33] The absence of widespread, successful negotiations for NGSO operators to compensate GSO operators for degraded EPFD limits suggests that the benefits under the current high-transaction-cost environment do not outweigh the costs.

Moreover, the complexity and opaqueness of the existing system can lead to regulatory gamesmanship. For example, Viasat alleges that some NGSO operators might artificially split systems or manipulate EPFD inputs to achieve “favorable findings” from the ITU that do not accurately reflecting the actual potential for interference.[34] This lack of transparency undermines trust and adds hidden costs to effective spectrum management. Indeed, actual interference may go unaddressed while theoretical compliance is maintained.

Ultimately, these accumulated transaction costs translate into reduced competition and lower consumer welfare. The current rules inhibit competition in the broadband market by limiting NGSO systems’ capabilities and increasing their costs.[35] This restricts the delivery of advanced services to consumers, particularly in unserved and underserved areas where NGSO systems could provide valuable and cost-effective broadband solutions. The economic benefits of updating these rules are estimated to be tens of billions of dollars annually, emphasizing the societal cost imposed by the current framework.[36]

IV. Applying a Law & Economics Framework

The NPRM asks many thoughtful, detailed questions, many of which require large amounts of data and technical analysis. But the core economic question is straightforward: What is the economically efficient level of protection for GSO systems today and in the near future?

Answering this question requires evaluating modern GSO links’ actual capabilities and economic value, rather than relying on outdated assumptions. The NPRM asks crucial questions about how current GSO networks’ ability to share spectrum has changed and what levels of protection they reasonably require, particularly in light of modern technologies like ACM. Overprotection of incumbent GSO systems can impose significant opportunity costs by stifling the growth and innovation of NGSO systems that offer high-speed, low-latency broadband.

As noted above, current EPFD limits are criticized as “overprotective” and that they “unnecessarily limit” NGSO operations, forcing them to adopt strategies like reducing power levels, implementing wide avoidance angles, and restricting the number of simultaneous beams, all of which degrade service quality and capacity. Kuiper, for instance, highlights that current EPFD limits can be hundreds of times more restrictive than interference-to-noise (I/N) ratios recommended by ITU for acceptable interference.[37] This indicates the potential for substantial spectral inefficiency, where valuable spectrum resources are underutilized due to overly conservative rules.

From an economic standpoint, the choice of short-term and long-term protection criteria is critical to balance GSO protection with NGSO innovation and competition. The NPRM’s tentative conclusion that a degraded throughput methodology is more appropriate for GSO operations that use ACM is economically sound.[38] This methodology, already used in NGSO-NGSO sharing and supported by Amazon,[39] accounts for modern system capabilities like ACM, which allows systems to maintain connection—even with signal degradation—by adjusting data rates. Such a performance-based approach, rather than rigid power limits, can foster greater efficiency by protecting actual service quality without unduly constraining the design of NGSO systems.

For GSO links that do not use ACM, the NPRM explores an I/N threshold as an alternative long-term protection criterion.[40] The choice of specific thresholds for both short-term and long-term criteria, whether for degraded throughput or I/N, must be carefully considered to balance incumbent protection with maximizing benefits from NGSO systems. Setting these criteria too restrictively can lead to significant economic costs by limiting NGSO capacity and innovation, while insufficient protection could harm GSO service reliability and revenue streams.

Although some incumbents argue that relaxing EPFD limits would degrade GSO service,[41] the record lacks evidence that current levels of protection are economically justified or proportionate to modern GSO-system resilience. Indeed, ITU recommendations themselves suggest less conservative thresholds (e.g., I/N ratios) than are currently mandated,[42] indicating a disconnect between legacy policy and technical necessity. The important metric, from an economic perspective, is not whether changes to the EPFD limits would cause harm to GSO operators, but whether net consumer welfare is enhanced by the tradeoffs entailed in such a change.

The goal should be to create a more technology-neutral regulatory environment focused on competitive outcomes, rather than outdated technological distinctions. The NPRM suggests, for instance, that allowing NGSO systems to operate at a minimum avoidance angle (e.g., four degrees) from the GSO arc could serve as a reasonable backstop, potentially providing flexibility without requiring highly detailed GSO reference-link evaluations.[43] This type of specific, empirically derived parameter can yield significantly more efficient spectrum use than broad, overly restrictive limits.

Different sharing models create distinct economic incentives. The NPRM asks whether the Commission should require good-faith coordination between GSO and NGSO operators.[44] While some argue that overly protective metrics discourage coordination by giving incumbents undue leverage,[45] a framework that encourages decentralized negotiation and information sharing is often more efficient. Amazon points out that a degraded throughput methodology inherently encourages information sharing, aligning with the Commission’s policy goals.[46] Clear “rules of the road” that define spectrum-usage rights are crucial to prevent a “tragedy of the commons,” where common resources are overexploited without accountability.

Addressing aggregate interference from multiple NGSO systems is a significant economic challenge. If not effectively managed, there is a risk that each individual NGSO system’s emissions, while within single-entry limits, cumulatively cause unacceptable interference to GSO networks. The NPRM questions if an aggregate limit is even necessary, or if its costs might outweigh its benefits, suggesting reliance on coordination.[47] Designing rules that manage aggregate interference efficiently, without unduly restricting individual NGSO operators, is key. This could involve, for example, a framework that facilitates coordination and allows operators to adjust their operations dynamically, rather than imposing rigid, one-size-fits-all limits that might stifle innovation and competition for new entrants.

The NPRM’s request for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is critically important. A thorough economic assessment must quantify both the benefits of less restrictive limits on NGSO operations, as well as the costs potentially imposed on GSO services or terrestrial services. This would align with ICLE’s broader advocacy for deregulation guided by a clear demonstration of net positive value.

Key benefits to quantify include:

  • Increased consumer access to broadband: Particularly for unserved and underserved populations in rural areas,[48] modernizing EPFD rules could expand NGSO capacity, enabling more extensive and reliable service coverage.
  • Lower service costs and prices: Updating EPFD rules can significantly reduce NGSO system costs by increasing spectral efficiency and potentially reducing constellation sizes. In a competitive market, these cost reductions would be expected to translate to lower prices for consumers.[49]
  • Value of innovation and competition: Reducing regulatory burdens and fostering a more dynamic environment would encourage investment in new technologies and services, leading to greater competition in the space sector.[50]
  • S. economic growth and leadership in the space sector: Promoting a favorable regulatory environment can enhance the United States’ position as a global leader in space innovation and attract investment.[51]

Key costs to quantify include:

  • Potential degradation of GSO services: This encompasses losses in capacity, disruptions to service levels, and the potential to forestall continued technological innovation by GSO networks if interference is not adequately managed.[52] The NPRM asks about expected loss in throughput or increase in unavailability for GSO links.
  • Compliance costs: This includes the administrative burdens and financial outlays associated with adhering to any new or modified rules.
  • Transition costs: The economic impacts of moving from the current regulatory framework to a new one, including the reevaluation of existing licenses and potential adjustments for operators.
  • Administrative costs: This involves the resources the Commission would need to monitor and enforce any new sharing framework effectively, as well as the potential for increased compliance and monitoring costs near international borders.

By thoroughly examining these economic dimensions, the Commission can ensure that its revised rules for satellite spectrum sharing are not only technically sound, but also optimally designed to foster innovation, competition, and widespread consumer benefits, while effectively managing potential harms.

V. Conclusion

The FCC’s efforts to modernize its satellite spectrum-sharing rules come at a pivotal moment for broadband competition and space-based connectivity. The current EPFD framework imposes substantial economic costs, inhibits efficient spectrum use, and constrains the deployment of next-generation NGSO systems. By adopting a more flexible, performance-based regime—one that reflects actual system capabilities and minimizes unnecessary regulatory burdens—the Commission can unlock greater innovation, investment, and consumer benefits. We urge the FCC to act decisively to realign its rules with technological and economic realities, ensuring the continued growth and competitiveness of the U.S. satellite-broadband sector.

[1] In the Matter of Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband, SB Docket No. 25-157; Revision of the Commission’s Rules to Establish More Efficient Spectrum Sharing between NGSO and GSO Satellite Systems, RM-11990 (Terminated) (Apr. 28, 2025), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-23A1.pdf.

[2] Id., ¶ 2.

[3] Id., ¶ 1.

[4] Id., ¶ 2.

[5] Id., ¶ 2.

[6] Id., ¶ 5.

[7] Id., ¶ 8.

[8] Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics, In Re: Delete, Delete, Delete, GN Docket No. 25-133 (Apr. 11, 2025), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Delete-Delete-Delete-Comments-r3.pdf.

[9] See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (The FCC was established to help “make available, so far as possible, … a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”); id., § 157(a) (“It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public.”); id., § 303(g) (The Commission shall “[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”); id., § 1302(a) (The Commission is exhorted to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, preamble (The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted “[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”).

[10] ICLE, supra note 8 (“As private enterprises drive innovation in satellite technology and low-earth-orbit (LEO) deployments, overly restrictive or outdated domestic regulations risk ceding American leadership to foreign competitors operating under less burdensome oversight frameworks. Indeed, establishing a regulatory regime that encourages innovation, investment, and competition is critical to ensure continued U.S. dominance in the sector.”).

[11] Randall Berry, Pedro Bustamante, Dongning Guo, Thomas Hazlett, Michael Honig, Ilia Murtazashvili, Scott Palo, & Martin B. H. Weiss, Spectrum Rights in Outer Space: Interference Management for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Broadband Constellations, 14 J. Info. Pol’y 747, 767 (Dec. 2024) (“Of special note are mechanisms to address externalities. Uncompensated interference is an outcome that does not enter an operator’s decision process (much like pollution for power plants prior to emissions caps). This may allow a satellite operator to treat bandwidth as ‘free’ when it is, in fact, contentious (valuable at the margin to other parties), and effectively blocks rival wireless services that could use the bandwidth to produce more value. For social efficiency, rights and regulations should support mechanisms that internalize externalities, prompting actors to face prices that reflect true opportunity costs, or benefits, of given actions.”).

[12] Id., 779.

[13] Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. Econ. 1, 27 (“It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the radio industry should be to minimize interference. But this would be wrong. The aim should be to maximize output. All property rights interfere with the ability of people to use resources. What has to be insured is that the gain from interference more than offsets the harm it produces. There is no reason to suppose that the optimum situation is one in which there is no interference.”)

[14] Berry et al., supra note 11 at 750.

[15] NPRM, supra note 1 at note 44.

[16] Comments of Kuiper Systems LLC, In the Matter of Revision of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Sharing Spectrum Between NGSO and GSO Satellite Systems, Docket No. RM-11990 (Nov. 1, 2024), (“To develop these limits, the ITU studied a set of GSO reference links based on 1990s technology and services—focusing mostly on an 80-satellite NGSO system called Skybridge, initially proposed in 1997.” Skybridge was never deployed and its “technology was out-of-date by the time it was authorized”).

[17] Comments of Kuiper Systems LLC, In the Matter of Office of International Affairs Seeks Comments on Recommendations Approved by The World Radiocommunication Conference Advisory Committee, IB Docket No. 16-185 12 (Apr. 21, 2023).

[18] Id., 12 (“By failing to account for these technological advances, the existing EPFD framework is overly protective to GSO networks and spectrally inefficient, to the detriment of consumers of NGSO services with no added benefit to GSO.”).

[19] Id., 12 (“The current EPFD limits force NGSO systems to reduce power globally even where there are no GSO customers to protect, reducing the capacity available to offer NGSO services to customers in critical need of reliable, low-latency broadband connection that NGSO systems can provide.”).

[20] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 11.

[21] Id., at note 49.

[22] Id., ¶ 11.

[23] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 9; see also Coleman Bazelon & Paroma Sanyal, Unacceptable Interference: Economic Analysis Does Not Support Degrading Protections for GSO Networks, Brattle Group (Oct. 26, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4634764 (“NGSO operators are successfully deploying systems within the framework established by the existing EPFD limits, and NGSO deployment has thrived under the current EPFD limits.”).

[24] Kuiper Comments, supra note 16 6-9. NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 10.

[25] Coase, supra note 13; see also Berry et al., supra note 11 at 778 (“If transaction costs are low and access rights are clearly defined, regardless of their specific forms, the Coase Theorem suggests that rights will end up in their most socially beneficial configuration.”)

[26] Doug Brake, Coase and WiFi: The Law and Economics of Unlicensed Spectrum, Inf. Technol. Innov. Found. (Jan. 2015), available at https://www2.itif.org/2015-coase-wifi.pdf.

[27] Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The Economic Benefits of Updating Regulations that Unnecessarily Limit Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Systems, SSRN (Aug. 13, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4538619.

[28] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 11.

[29] Id.

[30] Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27, A-4 (“NGSO operators today are paying a 28% premium to fly additional satellites needed to offer 100 percent continuity of service while also meeting the conservative short-term protection objectives prescribed in the current epfd limits”).

[31] See, e.g., Bazelon & Sanyal, supra note 23 at 7 (reporting that, while NGSO operators could offer to compensate GSO operators to accept higher levels of interference, they have not done so); see also Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The Economic Benefits of Updating Regulations That Unnecessarily Limit Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Systems: Part II, SSRN (Nov. 2023), at 9 https://ssrn.com/abstract=4649941 (“The Brattle Group Report does not cite an example of successful negotiation between an NGSO and all GSOs globally over epfd rules, and I am not aware of any.”).

[32] Furchtgott-Roth, id., 8.

[33] Id., 9.

[34] Ensuring Innovation and Growth Opportunities in the New Space Age, Viasat (Mar. 2024), 10, 34, available at https://www.viasat.com/content/dam/us-site/corporate/documents/Ensuring%20Innovation%20and%20New%20Opportunities%20in%20the%20New%20Space%20Age%20(Updated%20March%2013%202024)(A4).pdf.

[35] Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27 at 1 (“The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) equivalent power flux-density (epfd) rules crafted 25 years ago limit the capacity and effectiveness of NGSO fixed-satellite service (FSS) systems, reducing the availability and increasing the cost of services provided by NGSO FSS systems.”).

[36] Id., 2.

[37] Kuiper Comments, supra note 16 at 4 (“Recommendation ITU-R S.1432 states that NGSO system interference should be no more than 25% of the clear sky system noise. As the Petition for Rulemaking points out, that equates to a -6 dB interference-to-noise ratio (‘I/N’) limit, whereas applying the ITU’s EPFD limits to downlinks in the 10.7 GHz band yields limits that are 3.5 to 12 times more restrictive. Even worse, the ITU’s EPFD limits to downlinks in the 19.7-20.2 GHz band yield an I/N limit of -30.41 dB, 276 times more restrictive than the S.1432 standard.”)

[38] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 25.

[39] Amazon Degraded Throughput Ex Parte Letter Final, Kuiper Systems LLC (Sep. 23, 2022), available at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10923537518950/1.

[40] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 26.

[41] Viasat, supra note 34 at 8-9.

[42] Kuiper Comments, supra note 16.

[43] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 28.

[44] Id.

[45] Amazon, supra note 39 (“an overly protective I/N metric… disincentivizes coordination by providing the incumbent undue leverage over the new entrant”).

[46] Id. (“It is true that additional, non-public information can enable even more efficient spectrum sharing by making this analysis more precise. While such information is not necessary to perform the degraded throughput analysis, the ability for operators to share additional non-public information and conduct this analysis with even greater precision is yet another reason that this methodology is well-suited to a regulatory framework aimed at coordination. That a degraded throughput methodology encourages information sharing in pursuit of spectral efficiency is a feature—not a flaw—that is entirely consistent with the Commission’s policy goals in this proceeding. As the Commission noted in this proceeding, ‘information sharing among NGSO FSS operators is essential to their efficient use of spectrum.’ What is more, the Commission’s rules already require NGSO FSS operators to coordinate in good faith, and these discussions often involve sharing far more information than required to conduct a degraded throughput analysis.”)

[47] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 30.

[48] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 3; Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27 at 2 (“Updating 25-year-old epfd rules would provide tens of billions of dollars of benefits to customers around the world, particularly to the 2 billion people not yet connected to the Internet.”)

[49] Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27 at 8 (“Updating 25-year-old epfd rules would provide tens of billions of dollars of benefits to customers around the world, particularly to the 2 billion people not yet connected to the Internet.”)

[50] Statement of Brendan Carr, NPRM, supra note 1; Kuiper Comments, supra note 16 (“In short, initiating a rulemaking to reevaluate NGSO-GSO spectrum sharing would provide significant benefits—increased spectral efficiency, higher-quality service, more capacity for remote and rural operations, more efficient spectrum use, more innovation and competition, and more investment in next-generation technologies—while still protecting GSO operations from unacceptable interference.”)

[51] Id.

[52] Bazelon & Sanyal, supra note 23, A-4; Viasat, supra note 34 at 8.

ICLE Comments to Missouri Attorney General on Moderator Choice Rule

Executive Summary The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) respectfully submits these comments in opposition to proposed rule 15 CSR 60-19.020, which would mandate . . .

Executive Summary

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) respectfully submits these comments in opposition to proposed rule 15 CSR 60-19.020, which would mandate “choice screens” for content moderators on social media platforms. This rule is economically inefficient, technically unworkable, and legally vulnerable, representing a regulatory solution that is demonstrably worse than the problems it purports to address.

The proposed rule rests on four fundamentally flawed premises that render it unsuitable for implementation. First, the rule creates systematic privacy and security vulnerabilities by mandating an architecture functionally identical to systems that enabled major data breaches, including Cambridge Analytica. The requirement for broad API access to third-party moderators multiplies attack surfaces, ignores the “other people’s data” problem where individual user choices expose non-consenting network connections to unknown third parties, and dangerously fragments responsibility for protecting vulnerable populations across an ecosystem of unvetted entities.

Second, the rule’s central mechanism—the choice screen—ignores over a decade of documented failures from European Union regulatory experiments. Browser choice screens and search engine choice screens have consistently failed to alter market dynamics, with research demonstrating that users reveal preferences for streamlined, familiar experiences over additional complexity.

Third, the rule reflects a profound misunderstanding of content moderation as a technical system. Content moderation is not a simple “plug-and-play” module but rather a deeply integrated, multi-layered system inseparable from platform architecture and business models. The mandate for “interoperable access to data” would fragment conversational context, create unresolvable conflicts between competing moderation systems, and erect prohibitive barriers to entry that would likely recreate the same market concentration the rule seeks to address.

Fourth, the rule faces serious constitutional and federal-preemption challenges. The mandate likely violates the First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine by forcing platforms to carry content against their editorial judgment, contradicting the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Moody v. NetChoice that content moderation decisions are protected “expressive products.” The rule also conflicts with Section 230’s federal protections for content moderation.

The Missouri Attorney General should withdraw this proposed rule entirely. If regulation of social media platforms is desired, policymakers should focus on transparency requirements and user control mechanisms rather than mandating technically unworkable architectures that compromise user privacy and security while failing to achieve their stated objectives.

I. Privacy and Security Risks

The most dangerous aspect of the proposed rule is not its economic inefficiency or technical infeasibility, but its disregard for the privacy and security of Missouri’s citizens. The mandate for “interoperable access to data” creates a blueprint for privacy and security incidents by forcing platforms to construct an architecture that is inherently insecure.

The technology industry has learned important lessons about API security and data access from past incidents, most notably the Cambridge Analytica episode. That incident involved data from over 50 million Facebook profiles being accessed through Facebook’s Graph API v1.0, which allowed third-party applications to access not only data from users who installed apps, but also data from their entire network of friends without those friends’ knowledge or consent.[1]

The Missouri rule’s requirement for “interoperable access to data…for the purpose of moderating what content is viewed by the user” presents similar architectural challenges. For a third-party service to moderate content in a user’s feed, that service would necessarily need access to content posted by the user’s friends, connections, and followed accounts. There is likely no technical way to provide the content moderation service required by the rule without also providing access to this network-level data.

The proposed rule appears to disregard these lessons by requiring platforms to create similar broad data access mechanisms for third-party moderators. Rather than building on the industry’s improved understanding of API security risks, the rule would require platforms to recreate data access patterns that have proven problematic in the past.

The risk of creating powerful APIs for third-party access is not restricted to just a few high-profile incidents—it is documented by a consistent pattern of major data breaches caused by insecure API implementation or malicious abuse. Parler had its entire database of user posts and information exposed because its public-facing API lacked proper authentication.[2] Clubhouse suffered a similar breach exposing data from 1.3 million users due to the same vulnerability.[3] A flaw in Twitter’s API allowed attackers to link email addresses and phone numbers to 5.4 million user accounts, which were then sold online.[4]

These incidents demonstrate that forcing the creation of broad API access for multiple third parties exponentially increases the “attack surface” of platforms, making data breaches not just possible but inevitable. Each additional third-party moderator represents another potential point of failure, another set of credentials that could be compromised, and another organization with varying levels of security sophistication in handling sensitive user data.

Further, the rule is built on a fundamental fallacy—the idea that consent in choosing a moderator is purely individual. It ignores the reality of networked privacy, where one person’s choice has direct consequences for many others’ data. When User A chooses a third-party moderator, they are not just consenting for themselves—they are unilaterally granting an unknown entity access to posts, photos, and personal information shared by Users B, C, and D, none of whom consented to this new party accessing their data.

The proposed rule multiplies attack surfaces by requiring platforms to expose sensitive data to multiple third-party moderators of varying security sophistication. While major platforms invest heavily in cybersecurity, third-party moderators may lack comparable resources or expertise, creating weak links in the data security chain. Each additional moderator represents not just another potential breach point, but another organization that could be targeted by sophisticated attackers seeking access to platform data.

Thus, the proposed rule transforms what should be a controlled, secure environment into a distributed system with multiple points of failure, making large-scale privacy breaches not just likely but inevitable. The state would bear responsibility for bringing these vulnerabilities into existence, putting Missouri citizens’ personal data at systematic risk through regulatory mandate.

Beyond the direct privacy and security vulnerabilities, the proposed rule creates a dangerous diffusion of responsibility for protecting vulnerable populations, particularly children and victims of violence. Currently, platforms maintain centralized systems for identifying and responding to serious threats like child sexual abuse material (CSAM), terrorism, and imminent violence. These systems include mandatory reporting channels to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, direct collaboration with law enforcement agencies, and escalation procedures for time-sensitive threats.[5]

The proposed rule could fragment these critical safety functions across an ecosystem of third-party moderators with varying levels of expertise, resources, and commitment to user safety. Most concerning, the rule contains no requirements that third-party moderators maintain the same reporting obligations, technical capabilities, or law enforcement coordination that major platforms currently provide. A permissive third-party moderator chosen by a user could lack the sophisticated detection systems, trained personnel, and established protocols necessary to identify CSAM or credible threats of violence.

This creates a digital version of the bystander effect, where responsibility for protecting vulnerable users becomes so diffused across multiple parties that critical threats fall through the cracks.[6] When a concerning post could theoretically be handled by the platform, a third-party moderator, or neither (depending on user choices and system conflicts), the likelihood of appropriate intervention is likely to decrease because of ambiguity in control over the situation. Unlike individual bystander scenarios, this regulatory structure institutionalizes diffused responsibility at scale, potentially affecting millions of users.

The rule provides no mechanism to ensure that third-party moderators possess the technical infrastructure to detect sophisticated threats, the trained personnel to evaluate context-dependent dangers, or the established relationships with law enforcement necessary for rapid response. By mandating that platforms “must not override the content moderation decisions of competing content moderators,” the rule could actively prevent platforms from protecting users when third-party moderators fail to identify serious threats.

II. Choice Screens Have Been Shown Not to Work and to Frustrate Users

The proposed rule’s central mechanism—the “choice screen”—rests on a fundamentally flawed assumption that simply presenting users with options will meaningfully alter market dynamics. Over a decade of regulatory experiments in the European Union have demonstrated that this assumption is wrong.

A. The Reality of User Preferences and Behavior

A fundamental problem with choice screens lies in their failure to account for revealed consumer preferences. Research conducted by Mozilla into browser choice interventions confirms that users consistently demonstrate through their actions that they prefer streamlined, frictionless experiences over additional decision-making burdens, with consumers regularly ignoring or dismissing pop-ups and banners that interrupt their intended workflow.[7]

When users are focused on tasks like setting up new accounts, their revealed preferences consistently show they want to complete these tasks efficiently (or not at all).[8] Prompts to make complex decisions about “content moderators”—a concept most users neither understand nor actively seek—will be met with the rational consumer response of dismissal in favor of proceeding with their primary objective. Users’ consistent selection of pre-installed, familiar defaults reveals their preference for systems that work without requiring additional cognitive effort or technical understanding.

Further, this pattern of user behavior reflects rational consumer choice rather than psychological bias. Users demonstrate through their actions that they value convenience, familiarity, and reduced complexity. The widespread persistence of default settings across technology platforms reflects genuine consumer preferences for systems that function without requiring additional decisions from non-expert users who lack both the technical knowledge and the incentive to research content moderation alternatives.

B. EU Evidence: A History of Ineffectiveness

The most telling evidence against choice screens comes from the European Union’s repeated failures to achieve meaningful market changes despite multiple iterations and refinements.[9] The browser choice screen imposed on Microsoft following antitrust enforcement had such negligible impact that the screen was defunct for months due to a software bug—a lapse that went unnoticed by both regulators and the market, demonstrating the profound lack of user engagement with the remedy.[10]

More recently, the EU’s mandate for an Android search engine choice screen has proven similarly ineffective.[11] Research shows that the mandate had no lasting effect, with the few users who selected alternatives often reverting to the default search engine after a short period.[12]

Even where modest gains have been reported under the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) framework, these cannot be attributed to choice screens alone. The DMA imposes a complex web of obligations including interoperability mandates, prohibitions on self-preferencing, and detailed compliance reporting—a far more complex regulatory regime than the proposed singular rule. To suggest that the proposed rule could replicate the contested and at best limited success of the EU’s comprehensive framework is illogical.

III. Integration Reality: The ‘Plug-and-Play’ Fallacy

The proposed rule is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of how content moderation actually works within modern digital platforms. The proposed rule treats moderation as a simple, detachable “plug-and-play” module that users can swap out like changing a phone case. This view is not only technically incorrect but reveals a profound misunderstanding of the integrated, complex nature of content moderation systems that has developed over decades of platform evolution.[13]

Content moderation is not a simple filter applied at the end of a content pipeline—it is a deeply integrated, multi-layered system inseparable from a platform’s core architecture and business model.[14] Effective moderation relies on a complex “stack” of technologies and human processes working in concert: proactive AI-driven systems that scan vast volumes of content in real-time; reactive systems that process and prioritize user reports; detailed decision trees and guidelines for human reviewers; multi-tiered escalation paths for nuanced cases; and extensive quality assurance loops to ensure consistency.[15]

This entire apparatus is woven into the fabric of how content is ingested, analyzed, ranked, and displayed. The platform’s economic incentives—whether advertising-based models that prioritize engagement or subscription models focused on user utility—directly shape investment in and strategy for content moderation. A platform’s recommendation algorithms, user interface design, and data collection practices are all interconnected with its moderation systems.[16]

To mandate that this intricate, integrated system be opened to external third-party providers fundamentally misunderstands how content moderation actually works. It would be like requiring an airport to allow third parties to take over air traffic control for individual flights while expecting the same level of safety and coordination—the real-time, interconnected nature of the system makes such fragmented control impossible.

Further, the proposed rule’s demand for “interoperable access to data”[17] would force platforms to create systems analogous to decentralized social networks like Mastodon, where independent servers attempt to moderate fragmented conversations. Research into moderation in decentralized environments reveals a critical flaw: fragmented conversational context.[18]

In the proposed rule’s envisioned system, a single conversation could be fragmented across multiple moderation services. Depending on implementation, a third-party moderator might have only partial visibility into interactions—seeing a reply without the original post, or a comment without the full thread of preceding remarks. Crucially, third-party moderators would likely lack access to the full network graph, user history, and behavioral signals essential for interpreting meaning and context.

Without this context, accurate moderation decisions about nuanced forms of speech—sarcasm, inside jokes, political satire, or coded harassment—become impossible. A third-party moderator operating under this rule would be making decisions on isolated content fragments, stripped of the context necessary for accurate interpretation. This would inevitably lead to both false positives (censorship of benign speech) and false negatives (failure to remove genuinely harmful content).

Moreover, the proposed rule creates an unworkable conflict between platform moderation and third-party decisions that has no technical or legal resolution mechanism. Paragraph (6) of the rule allows platforms to moderate certain content categories like child sexual abuse material or incitement to violence, irrespective of third-party moderator choices. But the rule provides no framework for resolving conflicts when these two systems reach different conclusions about the same content.

If a user selects a permissive third-party moderator, but the platform’s systems flag content under its “good-faith judgment” as inciting violence, which decision prevails? The rule is silent on this critical question, guaranteeing legal uncertainty and technical chaos as two separate moderation systems attempt to operate simultaneously on the same content stream. This creates an impossible situation where platforms must simultaneously comply with conflicting mandates—allowing content per the third-party moderator while removing it per their own safety obligations.

IV. Constitutional and Legal Issues

Beyond its practical challenges, the Missouri rule faces fundamental constitutional and statutory conflicts that render it legally vulnerable. The rule’s mandates directly implicate platforms’ First Amendment rights and conflict with established federal protections for content moderation.

A. First Amendment: Compelled Speech Violations

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that content moderation constitutes protected editorial discretion under the First Amendment. In Moody v. NetChoice, the Court explicitly stated that when platforms use their standards to decide which content to display or how to organize it, “they are making expressive choices” that “receive First Amendment protection.”[19] This protection is rooted in the longstanding principle from Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo that the government cannot compel private actors to host or disseminate speech they would prefer to exclude.[20]

The proposed rule likely runs afoul of this established doctrine by mandating that platforms must not “override the content moderation decisions of competing content moderators.”[21] This forces platforms to carry and display content that may violate their own terms of service, community standards, and expressive goals. A platform prioritizing family-friendly content, for example, could be compelled to display graphic material if a user unintentionally selects a third-party moderator with more permissive standards. This represents classic compelled speech—forcing a private entity to serve as a conduit for messages it finds objectionable.

As the Supreme Court clarified in Moody, a state “may not interfere with private actors’ speech to advance its own vision of ideological balance.”[22] The proposed rule likely violates this principle by mandating the substitution of third-party editorial judgment for platforms’ own constitutionally protected right to exercise editorial discretion.

B. Section 230 Preemption: Federal Conflict

The proposed rule also risks conflicting with federal statutory law, specifically Section 230(c)(2)(A) of the Communications Decency Act. This “Good Samaritan” provision explicitly protects platforms from liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”[23]

The Missouri rule directly undermines this federal protection by seeking to impose state-law liability on platforms precisely for exercising their federally protected content moderation judgment when it conflicts with user-chosen third-party moderators. The rule effectively punishes platforms for actions that Section 230(c)(2)(A) is designed to immunize.

Federal law generally preempts conflicting state laws,[24] and Section 230(e)(3) explicitly codifies this principle: “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”[25] A platform cannot simultaneously comply with the proposed rule’s mandate to defer to third-party moderators and exercise it’s federally protected right to moderate content according to its own good-faith judgment. This direct conflict makes the rule likely preempted by federal law, creating additional legal uncertainty for any platform attempting compliance.

Conclusion

The proposed rule 15 CSR 60-19.020 fails any reasonable cost-benefit analysis. The overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the rule creates unacceptable privacy and security risks, choice screens do not work, the technical architecture mandated by the rule is unworkable, and the constitutional challenges are likely insurmountable. The rule would impose substantial costs on platforms and users while failing to achieve its stated objectives of promoting competition or consumer choice in content moderation.

The costs are clear and significant: systematic security vulnerabilities that put Missouri citizens’ personal data at risk and fragment protection for vulnerable populations; millions of dollars in API development expenses that favor large corporate moderators over innovative alternatives; degraded user experiences through fragmented moderation systems; and legal uncertainty from constitutional and federal preemption challenges. Against these substantial costs, the rule offers no credible benefits—choice screens have repeatedly failed in other contexts, and the technical requirements would likely recreate the same market concentration the rule purports to address.

The Missouri Attorney General should withdraw this proposed rule entirely. The rule represents an expensive regulatory intervention that would ultimately fail to achieve its objectives while imposing substantial costs and security risks on Missouri citizens, particularly the most vulnerable users who depend on effective content moderation systems for their protection.

If the Attorney General believes social media regulation is necessary, far better approaches exist that do not mandate unworkable technical architectures or compromise user security. Effective alternatives might include transparency requirements that allow users to understand how content moderation decisions are made, user control mechanisms that give individuals more granular choices about their own content consumption, or disclosure requirements that help users make informed decisions about platform use.

Such approaches would respect the technical realities of content moderation systems, avoid creating systematic security vulnerabilities, and preserve platforms’ constitutional rights while potentially achieving legitimate regulatory objectives. Most importantly, these alternatives would not require platforms to reconstruct their fundamental architectures in ways that have proven both ineffective and dangerous.

[1] See, e.g., Gus Hurwitz, Soylent Analytica: The Graph Is Too Damn Open, Truth on the Market (Mar. 21, 2018), https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/03/21/soylent-analytica-the-graph-is-too-damn-open; Nathaniel Fruchter, Michael Specter, & Ben Yuan, Facebook/Cambridge Analytica: Privacy Lessons and a Way Forward, Internet Pol’y Research Initiative (Mar. 20, 2018), https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/blog-2018-fb-cambridgeanalytica.

[2] See, e.g., Ran Ilany, 5 Real-World API Security Breaches from 2021, Outshift (last updated Jun. 17, 2025), https://outshift.cisco.com/blog/real-world-api-security.

[3] Id.

[4] See Jan Cornet, The True Cost of API Security Breaches: Examples, Consequences & Prevention, Seeburger blog (Mar. 6, 2025), https://blog.seeburger.com/the-true-cost-of-api-security-breaches-examples-consequences-prevention.

[5] See, e.g., Online Child Protection, Meta Safety Center (last accessed Jul. 7, 2025), https://about.meta.com/actions/safety/onlinechildprotection; Transparency Report: Jul. 1, 2024-Dec. 31, 2024, Snap Values (Jun. 20, 2025), https://values.snap.com/privacy/transparency.

[6] See, e.g., Ruud Hortensius & Beatrice de Gelder, From Empathy to Apathy: The Bystander Effect Revisited, 27 Curr. Dir. Psychological Sci. 249 (2018), available at https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6099971 (discussing the bystander effect and possible neural mechanisms for its occurrence).

[7] Gemma Petire, Beyond Choice Screens: Exploring browser choice design interventions, Mozilla Research (last accessed Jul. 7, 2025), https://research.mozilla.org/browser-competition/remedyconcepts (Notably, even Mozilla’s research, which advocates for choice screen interventions as part of its business interest, acknowledges that user behavior consistently demonstrates preferences for stable, familiar systems over additional complexity).

[8] Id.

[9] See Geoffrey Manne & Dirk Auer, Antitrust Dystopia and Antitrust Nostalgia: Alarmist Theories of Harm in Digital Markets and Their Origins, 28 George Mason L. Rev. 1279, 1385-89 (discussing the limitations and lack of success from the Microsoft remedies).

[10] Id.at 1385 (“[T]he browser choice screen remedy was so ineffective that, when Microsoft illegally stopped implementing it, it took authorities and consumers a full fourteen months to notice.”).

[11] See, e.g., Dirk Auer, The Future of the DMA: Judge Dredd or Juror 8?, Truth on the Market (Apr. 8, 2024), https://truthonthemarket.com/2024/04/08/the-future-of-the-dma-judge-dredd-or-juror-8.

[12] See Spence Purnell, One of the Flaws in DOJ’s Anti-Trust Case: People Overwhelmingly Choose Google, reason foundation (Oct. 4, 2023), https://reason.org/commentary/one-of-the-flaws-in-dojs-anti-trust-case-people-overwhelmingly-choose-google.

[13] See Giovanni Sartor & Andrea Loreggia, The Impact of Algorithms for Online Content Filtering or Moderation, at 20-23 (Study requested by the JURI committee of European Parliament), available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/657101/IPOL_STU(2020)657101_EN.pdf.

[14] Id. at 23 (noting that “[i]n big platforms filtering is entrusted to a complex socio-technical system, including a multi-stage combination of human and machines that interact in complex ways”).

[15] See id. at 36-44.

[16] To take one example, Meta maintains a closed advertising ecosystem across all of its products that allow it to tightly integrate ad experiences with the content a user interacts with and prefers. By design, it is a highly integrated experience, including the content moderation services it provides. See, e.g., Audience ad targeting, Meta (last accessed Jul. 7 2025), https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting. Changing one element of this formula by necessity affects all the other aspects of it – including the ability of Meta to offer the services to users at the current price and quality levels.

[17] 15 CSR 60-19.020(2)(C).

[18] Vibhor Agarwal et al., Decentralized Moderation for Interoperable Social Networks: A Conversation-Based Approach for Pleroma and the Fediverse, 18 Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web & Social Media 2, 3-4.

[19] Moody v. NetChoice LLC, 144 S.Ct. 2382, 2406 (2024).

[20] See id. at 2400 (“The seminal case is Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)… the cure proposed, it concluded, collided with the First Amendment’s antipathy to state manipulation of the speech market.”).

[21] 15 CSR 60-19.020(5).

[22] Moody, 144 S.Ct. at 2407.

[23] 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2)(A).

[24] See, generally, Bryan L. Adkins, Alexander H. Pepper, & Jay B. Sykes, Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer, CRS Report R45825 (May 18, 2023), available at https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45825.

[25] 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(3).

LONG FORM WRITING

The Impact of the Giga Initiative on Education Outcomes in Rwanda

This report evaluates the impact of Giga, a joint initiative of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and UNICEF, on educational outcomes in Rwanda. Giga . . .

Abstract

This report evaluates the impact of Giga, a joint initiative of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and UNICEF, on educational outcomes in Rwanda. Giga aims to connect every school worldwide to the Internet by 2030 and has already mapped schools in more than 136 countries. Rwanda, as a pilot country, implemented Giga in 63 schools, with plans to expand to over 1,700 schools nationwide. This study examined the effects of Giga on student engagement, teacher job satisfaction, and national exam scores by conducting mixed-methods research in 96 schools in Rwanda’s Bugesera district from April to May 2024. Data collection involved teacher surveys, administrative exam data, headteacher interviews, and focus group discussions with students, parents, and community members from both Giga and non-Giga schools.

Findings show that Internet connectivity alone did not improve educational outcomes. However, when combined with higher levels of teacher ICT training and effective integration of ICT into everyday teaching, Giga significantly correlated with higher student engagement and teacher job satisfaction compared to non-Giga schools. Among ICT resources used for education, computers showed the strongest association with positive outcomes. Additionally, ICT tools had significant positive effects when teachers used them to record student progress or present educational videos.

Despite these improvements, teachers identified several challenges slowing further ICT adoption, including poor Internet quality, unreliable electricity, limited ICT skills, and inadequate maintenance support. Female teachers reported lower outcomes compared to male teachers, and more experienced teachers achieved higher results. Private schools showed positive associations with student engagement, while larger class sizes slightly reduced both outcomes.

An important limitation of the study was the discovery that a substantial proportion (73%) of non-Giga schools already had some level of ICT access, complicating direct comparisons. Additionally, a longitudinal study of administrative exam records was not feasible due to incomplete data and inconsistent scoring mechanisms across years. Nevertheless, this baseline study provides clear initial insights into Giga’s potential, with evidence suggesting that teacher ICT training and effective curriculum integration strategies increase the impact of ICT on educational outcomes.

Read the full piece at SSRN.

Regulating State Interchange Fees: Evaluating the Likely Effects of the IFPA

Executive Summary The Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (IFPA) is a novel legislative measure that, if implemented, would prevent payment-card issuers, networks, and processors from . . .

Executive Summary

The Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (IFPA) is a novel legislative measure that, if implemented, would prevent payment-card issuers, networks, and processors from charging interchange fees on those portions of card transactions that represent gratuities or state or local sales taxes. While ostensibly aimed at protecting merchants from the burden of paying interchange fees on sales taxes and gratuities, the law would create a host of economic and legal problems that far outweigh its modest purported benefits.

The IFPA introduces a complex two-tier compliance mechanism, including a real-time exemption system that would require merchants to transmit detailed tax and gratuity data during payment authorization, and a rebate system that would allow merchants to retroactively recover interchange fees. Both pathways present substantial logistical and technological challenges for payment networks, processors, and merchants, with significant accompanying compliance costs and systemic inefficiencies.

Economically, interchange fees are not merely transaction costs; they are the mechanism by which payment networks balance the two-sided market of merchants and consumers, funding consumer rewards, insurance, fraud prevention, and card-system innovations. By prohibiting interchange fees on sales taxes and gratuities, the IFPA would disrupt the established economic balance of the payments ecosystem, imposing revenue losses on banks that would likely be offset through reduced consumer rewards, higher card fees, or increased borrowing costs. Historical precedents from interchange-fee regulations in the United States (the “Durbin amendment”), the EU, and Australia confirm that such interventions generally result in diminished consumer benefits without clear price reductions from merchants.

The IFPA would also have significant extraterritorial effects, imposing Illinois-specific standards on national payment systems, necessitating costly and inefficient operational adjustments nationwide. If other states were to follow suit, it would cause fragmentation of the national payments system, leading to higher transaction costs, reduced innovation, and decreased overall efficiency. The law also raises significant constitutional and legal questions, particularly concerning federal preemption. Banks and credit unions have challenged the act, arguing that it is preempted by the federal National Bank Act (NBA) and Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA). A federal court has preliminarily enjoined enforcement against nationally chartered banks and out-of-state banks. Originally scheduled to enter into force July 1, the preliminary injunction means the act’s implementation will be delayed, perhaps indefinitely.

Ultimately, the IFPA’s minimal and concentrated merchant benefits would be substantially outweighed by broader economic harms to consumers, banks, and the payments infrastructure. Given the preliminary legal injunctions and the significant practical challenges to implementation, the law’s long-term viability is questionable. If replicated elsewhere, it could severely disrupt the unified and efficient national payment systems integral to contemporary commerce.

I. Introduction

In June 2024, Illinois enacted the Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (“IFPA”), a first-of-its-kind law aimed at reshaping the economics of credit- and debit-card transactions in the state, but with implications far beyond.[1] The IFPA prohibits payment-card issuers, networks, and processors from charging or collecting interchange fees on those portions of a transaction that represent gratuities or state or local sales taxes.

If implemented, when a consumer pays by card at an Illinois merchant, that merchant would be able to deduct or recoup the interchange fee on the sales tax and tip component of the purchase. Proponents claim this will relieve merchants (and, ultimately, consumers) from paying fees on charges that do not constitute the merchant’s revenue (i.e., taxes passed through to the government, or tips passed through to employees). As we document in this white paper, however, the reality would be rather different.

Originally scheduled to take effect on July 1, the IFPA represents a novel intervention into the payment-card ecosystem; no other government anywhere in the world has attempted to prohibit the retention of only one part of the interchange fee. The act’s notional premise is to reallocate the costs of sales-tax collection from merchants and taxpayers to card-issuing banks.[2] As we have previously noted, however, these costs would be substantially passed on to consumers.[3] Moreover, the act would, if implemented, disrupt the intricate economic balance of the payment-card system and impose significant compliance burdens that would outweigh any putative benefits.

For good reason, the law currently faces serious legal challenges. Specifically, in August 2024, the Illinois Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, America’s Credit Unions, the Illinois Credit Union League, and the Illinois Retail Merchants Association brought a motion for pre-enforcement injunctive relief from the IFPA.[4] As of this writing, the judge had issued a temporary injunction barring Illinois’ attorney general from enforcing the legislation against federally chartered banks and out-of-state banks.[5]

This paper extends our previous analysis, offering more detailed examination of the IFPA from a law & economics perspective. It situates the act within broader debates on the cost of tax compliance, the regulation of interchange fees, and the question of who should bear the cost of compliance.[6] It also delves more deeply into the extraterritorial implications of the IFPA, as well as its constitutionality.

A. The Benefits of Electronic Payments and the Role of Interchange Fees

Electronic payments have become indispensable in modern commerce. Studies show that payment cards (whether a physical card or a phone app) are, for most purposes, superior to cash transactions.[7] For consumers, they enable greater convenience (there is less need to obtain and carry cash) and security (they come with sophisticated fraud protections). Credit cards also offer the benefit of a line of credit that is interest-free if the previous month’s balance is paid in full by the due date. Many cards also come with other benefits, including purchase-protection insurance, travel insurance, and cashback or other rewards (such as airline miles or hotel points). These considerable benefits explain why most consumers prefer to pay using a payment card (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1: Payment-Instrument Share as Proportion of Number of Payments

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board [8]

For merchants, cards also offer significant benefits relative to cash, including faster check-outs, increased sales, and protection against fraud and theft.[9] When Chicago quick-serve restaurant chain Epic Burger went cashless in 2017, founder David Friedman explained that he did so to increase speed and safety, and to reduce counting errors.[10] When the Mercedes-Benz Stadium in Atlanta went cashless in 2018, it reported significantly faster transaction times, an increase in per-capita spending, and substantial reductions in total costs, underscoring the benefits to merchants of electronic payments.[11] Sports stadiums and restaurants both in Illinois and across the country have followed suit. [12]

Payment systems can only function with participation by both buyers (consumers) and sellers (merchants). Trust is fundamental to that participation, and the willingness of merchants and consumers to trust payment cards is underpinned by the billions of dollars of investments in innovation made by payment networks, by the banks that issue cards (issuers) and the banks and other payment-service providers that process payments on behalf of merchants (acquirers) in secure systems, as well as in ongoing maintenance of those systems.[13] Meanwhile, consumers will only be motivated to use cards if they perceive substantial benefits, which in many cases includes the aforementioned insurance and rewards. These costs are in large part recouped by issuing banks through the retention of an “interchange fee.”[14]

Despite the enormous benefits generated by payment cards for merchants, consumers, and society as a whole, the role of interchange fees remains poorly understood by the public. Indeed, even relatively knowledgeable commentators repeatedly assert that interchange fees are a “transaction cost.”[15] From an economic perspective, this is not correct. While the interchange fee does cover certain transaction costs, such as fraud detection and prevention and the system’s overall maintenance, a large proportion of the fee is, in fact, a transfer from merchants to consumers, covering various consumer benefits, such as purchase-protection insurance and rewards.

Economists call such transfer payments “cross-side subsidies,” as they go from one side of the market (in this case, merchants) to the other (consumers).[16] Such payments are more-or-less ubiquitous in two-sided markets. For example, merchants (advertisers) subsidize readers of newspapers and users of search engines and smartphone apps. The importance and value of such cross-side subsidies has long been established in the economics literature and was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Sometimes indirect network effects require two-sided platforms to charge one side much more than the other. For two-sided platforms, “’the [relative] price structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board.’” The optimal price might require charging the side with more elastic demand a below-cost (or even negative) price. With credit cards, for example, networks often charge cardholders a lower fee than merchants because cardholders are more price sensitive. In fact, the network might well lose money on the cardholder side by offering rewards such as cash back, airline miles, or gift cards. The network can do this because increasing the number of cardholders increases the value of accepting the card to merchants and, thus, increases the number of merchants who accept it. Networks can then charge those merchants a fee for every transaction (typically a percentage of the purchase price). Striking the optimal balance of the prices charged on each side of the platform is essential for two-sided platforms to maximize the value of their services and to compete with their rivals.[17]

B. Interchange-Fee Regulation and the IFPA

The public’s general lack of understanding of the role of interchange fees has contributed to a situation in which many larger merchants have been able to claim—often unchallenged in the media—that prevailing fees are “excessive.” Some of these merchants appear to want consumers to continue to use payment cards but don’t want to contribute to the cross-side-subsidy component of interchange fees that enhances consumers’ incentives to use their cards. Others may have a more nefarious motive: they understand that the introduction of price controls on payment cards would reduce card use overall, but believe they would gain: their larger scale and scope enables them to offer other inducements, such as merchant-specific loyalty rewards, so they could gain business away from smaller merchants for whom the loss of interchange-fee-funded incentives would be more detrimental.

Though largely driven by these larger merchants’ interests, the IFPA is couched in language that would make it appear to be motivated by a desire to help smaller merchants and consumers. As we show in this paper, the IFPA would disrupt a nationally integrated payment system, imposing costly compliance burdens on out-of-state issuers, and cause economic harm through adjustments in card rewards and card or bank-account fees. Moreover, the IFPA raises serious constitutional questions under the Dormant Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrines.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the IFPA’s provisions and contextualizes them within Illinois’s longstanding and generous sales-tax-collection allowance. Section III examines the “sales tax exception” by comparing sales-tax collection with other business-tax obligations and evaluating the justifications for merchant compensation. Section IV explores the IFPA’s extraterritorial effects, including its impact on out-of-state issuers, as well as anticipated responses like adjustments in rewards and fees, and expected legal challenges. Section V draws together the economic distortions, legal vulnerabilities, and broader implications of the act, ultimately concluding that the IFPA is both economically unsound and likely preempted by federal law.

II. Explaining the IFPA

For decades, Illinois has distinguished itself by allowing merchants to retain a significant portion of the sales tax they collect from consumers as compensation for the administrative burden of tax remittance. Prior to recent reforms, Illinois law permitted retailers to deduct 1.75% of the sales tax collected with no cap. This is a practice that, in aggregate, the Illinois Policy Institute estimates cost the state approximately $186 million annually.[18]

Until recently, many states permitted merchants to apply a “retailer’s discount,” presumably to offset the costs of manually recording and remitting sales taxes. In some cases, it was also used to encourage electronic reporting. Over time, however, as electronic filing became ubiquitous and administrative costs diminished, many states capped or eliminated such allowances.[19] In contrast, Illinois’s uncapped policy came to be viewed as a windfall for high-volume merchants, particularly large chains that could capture six- or seven-figure annual sums from the discount.[20]

Facing fiscal pressures, Gov. J.B. Pritzker in 2019 proposed capping the retailer discount at $1,000 per month, which was estimated to generate an additional $75 million in state revenue and $58 million in revenue to local governments, while only affecting around 2,400 of the largest merchants, according to the governor’s budget office.[21] But the move was resisted by the Illinois Taxpayers Federation and merchant groups.[22]

Pritzker tried again in subsequent years but was repeatedly rebuffed.[23] In 2024, his budget office claimed the measure would result in $101 million in additional revenue to the state and $85 million to local governments.[24] Again, the measure faced opposition, mainly from large retailers. While the effective $12,000 annual cap was generous compared to the caps imposed in other states, it represented a significant reduction from the six- or seven-figures many larger stores were previously able to reap. Indeed, Illinois Department of Revenue Director David Harris noted that, while only 2-3% of retailers would be affected by the cap, it would have “a significant impact on very large retailers.”[25] Walmart alone was estimated to pocket more than $70 million annually nationwide from various states’ sales-tax allowances, with Illinois’ policy contributing significantly to that sum.[26]

A. Legislative Quid Pro Quo: Large Merchant Interests and the IFPA

In the context of this friction, the IFPA was conceived as a compromise: a legislative bargain between Illinois lawmakers and the interests of large merchants. By capping the longstanding sales-tax allowance, Illinois lawmakers effectively recouped revenue that had previously been retained by merchants. In exchange, the General Assembly offered merchants a prohibition on interchange fees applied to sales taxes and gratuities.

At one level, the IFPA appears to shift the burden of collecting sales taxes from the government to the banking sector. Legislators could thus present it as a win for Illinois taxpayers, who would no longer subsidize merchants via an uncapped collection allowance. Instead, the banks would pay. Legislators could claim to be championing small businesses against big banks and “unfair fees,” while also plugging budget holes.

In reality, IFPA is a blatant sop to the interests of large merchants, who have been pushing for interchange-fee price controls for years. On a webpage devoted to “swipe fees,” the Illinois Retail Merchants Association (IRMA) states that it “has led the way in limiting these fees, working with Gov. JB Pritzker, Senate President Don Harmon, House Speaker Emanuel ‘Chris’ Welch and members of the General Assembly to pass the Interchange Fee Prohibition Act.”[27]

While IRMA contends that “eliminating interchange fees on taxes and tips will save businesses and consumers millions of dollars a year,”[28] the major beneficiaries would be high-volume merchants. A significant share of the savings from eliminating interchange on taxes and tips (more than one-fifth of the total) would accrue to just 10 of the nation’s biggest retailers.[29] Meanwhile, the costs, as will be discussed below, would fall mainly on consumers.

B. Key Provisions of the IFPA

The IFPA seeks to ensure that, if a purchase includes Illinois state or local sales tax, or if a customer adds a tip on a card payment, the portion of the transaction corresponding to the tax or tip would not incur interchange fees.[30]

The core operative provision of the IFPA provides that no person or entity involved in processing an electronic payment may “receive or charge” any interchange fee on the portion of the transaction that represents sales tax or gratuity. In practice, this means that, for a given credit- or debit-card sale in Illinois, the merchant would not have to pay interchange fees on the dollars that would be remitted as sales tax, nor on any tip amount added by the customer. To effectuate this rule, the act creates two compliance pathways: a real-time exemption and a rebate.

1. Real-time exemption

§ 150-10(a) outlines the primary means by which merchants would exclude the tax and tip portions from interchange:

An issuer, a payment card network, an acquirer bank, or a processor may not receive or charge a merchant any interchange fee on the tax amount or gratuity of an electronic payment transaction if the merchant in-forms the acquirer bank or its designee of the tax or gratuity amount as part of the authorization or settlement process for the electronic payment transaction.[31]

In order to avail itself of this option, the “merchant must transmit the tax or gratuity amount data as part of the authorization or settlement process to avoid being charged interchange fees on the tax or gratuity amount of an electronic payment transaction.”[32] In practical terms, this means merchants’ point-of-sale systems would have to distinguish the sales-tax and gratuity portions of the transaction, and include that information in the electronic message sent to the network for authorization/clearing. If the merchant does so, the issuer and network are on notice to exclude that portion from any interchange calculation.

2. Rebate

§ 150-10(b) offers an alternate method by which merchants could recoup interchange fees already paid:

A merchant that does not transmit the tax or gratuity amount data in accordance with this Section may submit tax documentation for the electronic payment transaction to the acquirer bank or its designee no later than 180 days after the date of the electronic payment transaction, and, within 30 days after the merchant submits the necessary tax documentation, the issuer must credit to the merchant the amount of interchange fees charged on the tax or gratuity amount of the electronic payment transaction.[33]

In other words, if the tax or tip data isn’t transmitted during authorization, the merchant could later submit documentation of the tax/tip amounts to be reimbursed or credited for any interchange fees charged on those amounts. This two-track approach was likely included to accommodate smaller merchants for whom the costs of upgrading payment systems would be large relative to the deduction or rebate of interchange fees.

3. Anti-circumvention and penalty provisions

To reinforce the law’s intent, §150-10(d) prohibits circumvention. It states it is “unlawful for an issuer, payment card network, acquirer bank, or processor to alter or manipulate the computation and imposition of interchange fees” in a way that would effectively negate the fee exemption on taxes and tips.[34] This anti-circumvention clause aims to prevent creative adjustments, such as increasing the interchange rate on the non-tax portion of the sale to compensate for the forbidden portion, or imposing equivalent fees under a different label. For example, an issuer could otherwise attempt to charge a higher percentage on the taxable base amount of the sale to end up with the same total fee as before; §150-10(d) seeks to bar that tactic.

The law also includes penalty provisions for violations; specifically, each violation of the IFPA is “subject to a civil penalty of $1,000 per electronic payment transaction.”[35]

4. Breadth

In practice, interchange fees are set by networks and collected by issuers; acquirers pass the fees through to issuers; processors facilitate the transaction messaging. The IFPA covers both credit and debit cards, including general-use prepaid cards. It also applies to any “issuer” of such cards, any “payment card network,” any “acquirer bank” (the merchant’s bank), and any “processor” involved in the transaction chain. Thus, every link in the payment chain is prohibited from “charging or receiving” interchange fees on the specified amounts.

The title and some of the act’s wording refer to concepts that apply only to four-party cards (i.e., cards that are issued by banks and operate over independent payment-card networks such as Visa and Mastercard), since technically only such cards entail the retention of an “interchange fee” by issuing banks. It is possible that the act was intended to also cover payments made using three-party cards (such as American Express and Discover), but national legislation currently in place to regulate interchange fees on debit cards applies only to four-party cards.[36]

It’s worth noting that the IFPA was passed not as standalone legislation vetted in subject-matter committees, but as a rider within a larger state budget bill in 2024.[37] This procedural move expedited its passage, arguably without extensive deliberation of its complex implications.

C. A Gratuitous Anomaly

The IFPA excludes from interchange fees not only any sales taxes, but also gratuities. While the nominal argument for exempting sales tax is that such funds are remitted to the government, no such argument can be made for tips, which are voluntary payments that are generally passed on directly to service employees. Their processing cost is arguably comparable to that of the underlying sale. By extending the fee exemption to gratuities, Illinois is adopting a broader anti-fee stance than might be justified by the original policy rationale. Tips, unlike sales taxes, are not mandated by law or remitted to the government; they are voluntary payments from customers to service employees (or pooled by the merchant to distribute to staff).

Merchants were not previously able to recover the cost of collecting tips for staff. So, the exclusion of tips from interchange fees under the IFPA was clearly unrelated to the effect of Gov. Pritzker’s proposed cap on the “retailer’s discount.” Rather, it seems to have been driven mainly by a desire to give restaurateurs an additional reason to support the legislation.

Proponents of the gratuity exclusion claim that merchants should not pay swipe fees on amounts they do not ultimately keep as profit: tips are passed through to employees. This, they argued, makes them similar to sales taxes.[38] From a legal perspective, however, collecting a tip is entirely optional and not a statutory duty (unlike collection of sales tax). A merchant could choose to accept only cash tips or refuse to accept tips entirely.

In practice, of course, most customers expect to be able to charge tips to their payment cards, and it is efficient to do so. The IFPA’s extension of the fee prohibition to gratuities thus suggests that, in order to assuage an important interest group, the Illinois General Assembly was willing to go beyond the narrow “tax collection cost” justification and simply maximize merchant savings on any portion of a transaction that the merchant does not retain.

Allowing an interchange exemption for tips creates anomalies. For one, Illinois law continues to allow merchants to deduct the sales-tax collection allowance (albeit now capped) for remitting taxes, but there is no analogous state allowance or credit for processing tips. Nor would it make sense, as tips are not a government levy. By lumping gratuities into the IFPA, the General Assembly signaled that the true aim was broader price controls on processing fees, not merely aligning fees with governmental functions. This casts doubt on the purported “principled fairness” argument, since the inclusion of tips makes the IFPA even more of a straightforward transfer from issuing banks (and, as discussed below, ultimately their customers) to merchants.

As noted, tip amounts should logically be treated as part of the service transaction with the customer. Paying interchange fees on tips that are included as part of a card transaction is thus part of the cost of doing business in a card-based economy, no different than paying interchange fees on the meal price itself. The IFPA’s contrary approach suggests a slippery slope: if taxes and tips merit special treatment because the merchant doesn’t keep them, one might ask, what about other pass-through charges?

For instance, if a merchant sells on consignment (not owning the goods), or collects government fees (like an auto-bureau fee), should those be interchange-fee exempt as well? Going further, merchants might argue that they should only pay interchange fees on the markup—the difference between the price for which goods are bought and the price at which they are sold—on grounds that they are merely acting as intermediaries between the producer or wholesaler and the consumer. That would, obviously, be ridiculous.

D. Is the IFPA a Trojan Horse?

On the aforementioned IRMA webpage titled “Swipe Fees,” the association states:

At the federal level, IRMA has partnered with U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin to advocate for passage of the Credit Card Competition Act. This bipartisan legislation would enhance competition and choice in the credit card network market, pushing fees down and providing relief for consumers and retailers alike.[39]

U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) filed an amicus brief supporting Illinois in the ensuing litigation, claiming that the eponymous federal provision (the “Durbin amendment”) did not preempt states from going further to protect local merchants and consumers. Durbin and others argue that, if Congress won’t tackle credit-card fees (Durbin’s attempts to expand fee regulation have stalled in Congress), states should step in. The IFPA has therefore taken on a symbolic importance in the larger debate over interchange fees, raising the question: will this state-level innovation bring relief or chaos? For all the hubris about “fairness,” the more plausible explanation for the IFPA is that it is being used as a tool to attempt to force the payments industry to accept federal regulation.

E. Explaining the IFPA Conclusion

At one level, the IFPA represents a transfer of cost from Illinois taxpayers to card-issuing banks, which may no longer retain interchange fees on the tax and tip portions of a payment. Issuing banks must either absorb the processing cost for that portion without compensation or attempt to recoup it elsewhere. In effect, the IFPA would mandate a partial unbundling of the interchange fee: what was once a single percentage applied to the full transaction is now bifurcated, with the tax and gratuity portion carved out as fee-free, from the merchant’s perspective.

By eliminating interchange fees on taxes and tips, the IFPA effectively uses banks’ revenue to subsidize large merchants. Moreover, the redistribution effected by this subsidy could be larger than the de facto subsidy that Illinois previously provided from its tax coffers via the retailer allowance. As explored in Section IV, this mandatory redistribution is partly extraterritorial, as it would be funded by out-of-state entities (large card-issuing banks headquartered elsewhere) and their customers.

In sum, the IFPA’s design was driven by a mix of political compromise and merchant lobbying, rather than a coherent economic principle. Illinois’ unusually large tax-collection discount was curtailed, and the elimination of interchange fees on taxes and tips was offered as a substitute balm for merchants. The next section evaluates whether the underlying premise—that sales-tax collection costs uniquely justify such measures—holds water, especially when comparing sales-tax obligations to other tax and regulatory burdens that businesses routinely bear without special fee exemptions.

III. The Sales-Tax Exception

Merchant groups claim that the collection of sales tax creates a substantial administrative burden that justifies states permitting merchants to deduct a portion of the sales tax or be granted a rebate to compensate for this cost.[40] Until recently, many states permitted merchant deductions or rebates on sales taxes precisely for that reason,[41] but most states have since curtailed such practices.[42]

In contrast to sales tax, few if any states allow businesses to deduct or otherwise receive compensation for the administrative costs of collecting and remitting other taxes. Nor does the federal government. Notably:

  1. Payroll Taxes: Employers withhold and remit taxes on employee wages, but receive no direct subsidy or rebate for this service.[43]
  2. State Income Tax: Businesses and individuals pay state income taxes in full, with no discount or reimbursement for the administrative tasks involved.[44]
  3. Franchise Taxes: These are generally fixed charges for the privilege of doing business in a state, not subject to any compensatory allowances for collection costs.[45]
  4. Property Taxes: The responsibility for paying property taxes lies squarely on the property owner, without any offset for collection or reporting costs.[46]
  5. Excise Taxes: Similar to sales taxes, excise taxes are collected at the point of sale but generally without any special deductions for the business.[47]
  6. Business-License Taxes and Fees: Typically collected in a lump sum without any deduction for the collection process.[48]
  7. Federal Corporate-Income Taxes: No deduction or rebate is offered for the administrative burden of remitting federal taxes.[49]

Sales taxes are thus unique, in that many states historically provided a retailer a discount or rebate for collecting and remitting the tax.[50] Given that businesses are not now, nor have they ever been, permitted deductions or rebates from other taxes—including those collected and remitted by the business effectively on behalf of others, such as payroll taxes—it seems strange and even fundamentally unfair that businesses should be permitted to do so for sales tax.

Despite this anomaly, an argument in support of a specific deduction or rebate can be made from the perspective of administrative efficiency. Specifically, to the extent that the use of electronic (digital) systems to record and transmit sales taxes results in higher levels of compliance and reduces the costs of monitoring and enforcement by the state, it may be efficient to incentivize the use of such electronic systems.[51] A deduction or rebate provides just such an incentive.

Nonetheless, from an economic perspective, it is inefficient to offer the same incentive on every transaction because there are substantial economies of scale in operating electronic systems that record and remit transactions.[52] The amount therefore required to induce the use of electronic systems and maximize compliance likely falls rapidly as sales rise.

Studies that have looked at the costs of compliance support this conclusion. A 2006 study by PwC found that, across all retailers, the weighted average compliance cost of collecting and remitting sales tax was about 3% of the tax collected.[53] These costs were, however, disproportionately higher for small businesses than for larger firms: businesses with less than $1 million in annual sales incurred compliance costs averaging about 13.5% of the sales tax they collected, while those with $1–10 million in sales had average costs of about 5.2%, and those over $10 million faced average costs of about 2.2%.[54] In other words, the smallest merchants spent roughly six times more, relative to the amount of tax collected, than the largest retailers.

Over time, these administrative costs have fallen dramatically. Data from the Federal Reserve suggest that the overhead for electronic transactions is minimal compared to the manual-processing costs that dominated the mid-20th century.[55] Thus, while a modest retailer discount may have been justified decades ago, the much lower costs now attendant to collecting and remitting sales taxes—especially for larger, more technologically sophisticated retailers—call into question the basic premise of the IFPA.

Moreover, as the costs of administration have fallen, most states have since curtailed or capped this benefit.[56] In most states, the administrative burden of tax compliance is now integrated into the general cost of doing business, rather than subsidized through a dedicated allowance.[57]

While there are legitimate reasons to provide a small incentive for electronic collection and remittance of sales taxes, the magnitude of Illinois’ traditional uncapped retailer discount likely far exceeded any reasonable estimate of actual administrative cost for larger merchants. The IFPA does not contribute toward efficient tax compliance, since that is achieved by the remaining capped retailers’ discount. Instead, it primarily distorts the cost distribution within the payment system.

IV. Extraterritorial Effects of the IFPA

The IFPA’s reach extends well beyond Illinois’ borders. Since the vast majority of credit- and debit-card issuers are headquartered or chartered in other states—or even outside the United States—the act would compel these institutions to adjust their fee structures for transactions occurring in Illinois.[58] An Illinois merchant’s credit-card transaction processed by a national bank must now exclude interchange on the sales tax and gratuity portions, regardless where the issuer is based. Broadly, these effects can be divided into two classes: compliance costs and revenue reduction.

A. Compliance Costs

Issuers and card networks will face significant costs upgrading their information-technology systems and transaction-processing software to comply with the IFPA’s data requirements. This includes modifications to authorization systems to identify sales tax and tip components, and to implement new rebate or tracking mechanisms for post-transaction adjustments.[59]

Implementing the IFPA would not be as simple as flipping a switch to “no fees on taxes and tips.” It would require significant, system-wide changes to the nation’s electronic-payments infrastructure. Payment-card networks and processors would have to adjust the format of messages and the algorithms that calculate interchange fees for “Illinois” transactions. This entails, at minimum:

  • Reliably identifying when a transaction involves Illinois sales tax and/or gratuity, and the exact amounts thereof, many of which vary by type of good and/or location within the state;
  • Modifying authorization and settlement-message formats to carry this information;
  • Altering the clearing and settlement systems to ensure interchange fees are computed only on the permitted base amount and zeroed out on the tax/tip portions; and
  • For merchants relying on the ability to recoup the sales tax and tip component of interchange fees after the fact, maintaining records of transactions for the purposes of confirming or disputing the amounts claimed.

Each of these steps raises technical and coordination challenges:

1. Transaction-data requirements

As noted, merchants wishing to exclude interchange fees on taxes and tips at the source (rather than recouping them later) must send tax and gratuity data with the transaction. To our knowledge, no point-of-sale (POS) system is currently programmed to separate data in the authorization message precisely in the way that would be required by the IFPA. While many electronic cash registers can produce an itemized receipt, transmitting an itemization through the payment network is another matter.

Standard consumer-card transactions involve the transmission of “Level 1” data, which typically contain essential information required to authorize a payment, including:

  • Cardholder Data: PAN (primary account number), card expiration date.
  • Transaction Amount: The total amount requested for authorization.
  • Merchant Data: Basic merchant information, such as the identifier or name.
  • Authorization Request: Whether the transaction should be approved or denied based on available funds or credit limits.

Most payment networks also permit additional information to be sent via “Level 2” and “Level 3” data. Level 2 data provide information typically used in business-to-businesses (B2B) corporate-card transactions, primarily to help businesses better track and manage their expenses. This can include:

  • Invoice number;
  • Sales tax;
  • More detailed data about the merchant, such as location or merchant category code (MCC); and
  • Details regarding what the transaction was for (goods/services).

Level 3 data provide even more detailed information, also primarily for B2B corporate-card purchases, including:

  • Line-item details (g., description, quantity, unit price, and total price);
  • Freight or shipping costs;
  • Any discounts applied to the transaction;
  • Any other tax amounts that need to be itemized;
  • Shipping or delivery information for physical goods; and
  • Enhanced merchant details, such as DUNS (Data Universal Numbering System) numbers.

In principle, Level 2 and Level 3 data could be used to communicate sales tax (a Level 2 item), other taxes, such as excise, and other items, such as gratuities (both Level 3 items). This would, however, amount to a change in the way the messaging system functions. As such, it would entail considerable reprogramming by all parties in the payment stack (merchants, gateways, acquirers, other processors, networks, issuers). This would inevitably result in an increase in cost for those parties.

Visa and Mastercard standards do support some tax indicators in transaction data (as Level 2 or Level 3 data) on corporate-card transactions, but there is no standard for the separate recording of tips. Adding an indicator for tips and extending the recording of tax indicators to all consumer transactions at every Illinois merchant would require entirely reprogramming the systems.

Many small businesses would need to upgrade not only software but POS equipment. Payment processors would likely need to assist their merchant clients in this transition—an administrative burden that would be magnified to the extent that merchants are unfamiliar with how the technology works. Acquiring banks would also have to reprogram their systems to accommodate the new data in the messages.

Smaller merchants will almost certainly face disproportionate costs. A study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office has found that, following the Wayfair decision—which effectively required internet retailers to remit sales tax to the state in which a product is delivered—smaller businesses faced disproportionate costs of compliance.[60] Whereas large businesses only needed to adjust or slightly expand their systems for new jurisdictions, incurring minimal new setup costs, most small businesses were often starting from scratch.

For example, one medium-sized retailer with approximately $20 million in annual revenue told GAO it spent about $8,000 to purchase tax software and $43,000 to integrate it with existing systems.[61] Another business with $42 million in sales spent roughly $200,000 on software integration to comply with multi-state tax rules.[62] By contrast, one smaller business spent $1,500 per month on compliance services to remit only about $500 in tax, effectively triple the cost relative to the revenue collected for the state. Another small online seller calculated that it spent about $2.25 in compliance costs for every $1 in sales tax collected over a multi-year period, across dozens of states.

Large retailers do not face such lopsided ratios; their high sales volumes mean the taxes collected far exceed compliance expenditures.

2. Network and issuer-system modifications

On the receiving end, card issuers’ systems (and/or their processors) would have to be reconfigured to manage a new interchange-calculation rule specific to Illinois tax/tip amounts. The interchange fee has traditionally been a simple percentage applied to the total transaction amount (plus a fixed fee, in some cases). Under the IFPA, the issuer’s system would have to subtract certain components. To the extent that networks determine the amount of interchange fee to be deducted (based on the type of card, etc.), the networks must implement state-specific logic.

Because interchange fees are normally uniform nationwide for a given card product, adding a jurisdiction-specific rule increases complexity. Every transaction would need to be checked: Does it involve an Illinois tax or tip? If yes, apply different math. This adds processing overhead to every single transaction in the nation.

In 2024, Visa and Mastercard processed between 130 and 150 billion transactions in the United States.[63] If the IFPA were implemented, every one of these transactions would now be subject to an additional step in order to segment the 5-8 billion Illinois-related transactions. These costs are essentially fixed overhead, which, ultimately, will be borne by market participants broadly. They would likely be passed on in the form of slightly higher network fees or merchant-service fees and/or lower overall efficiencies. It is telling that the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in an amicus curiae brief opposing the IFPA, observed:

Credit and debit card transactions help to propel the Nation’s economy by facilitating commerce. The interchange fees that financial institutions collect to facilitate these transactions are a core feature of an intricately-designed Nation-wide payments system in which national banks and Federal savings associations play an essential role. The Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, H.B. 4951, Section 150 (“IFPA”) is an ill-conceived, highly unusual, and largely unworkable state law that threatens to fragment and disrupt this efficient and effective system. Although the IFPA’s requirements are vague and ambiguous in many respects, this much is clear: the IFPA prevents or significantly interferes with federally-authorized banking powers that are fundamental to safe and sound banking and disrupts core functionalities that drive the Nation’s economy. In short, the IFPA constitutes both bad policy and an unlawful interference with federally granted powers.[64]

To reiterate, the “global” nature of card networks means that even out-of-state issuers and many payment intermediaries would have to adjust their systems because of one state’s law, an inefficiency that multiplies costs across the economy. The IFPA would essentially compel the industry to build a new capability—parsing and zero-rating certain components. In a seamless national payments network, that is a non-trivial ask.

3. Rebate trouble

As noted above, merchants who are unable to report the amount of taxes and tips related to a transaction in real-time—e.g., because their existing POS system is incapable of reporting Level 2/3 transactions and they choose not to incur the substantial cost of upgrading their system—may avail themselves of §150-10(b) of the IFPA.

But therein lies a paradox: if the merchants are not reporting the tax and tip amount, there will be no record of those amounts in the electronic-payments system. Neither the processor, nor the acquirer, nor the network, nor the issuer will know what those excluded amounts should have been. As such, issuers will presumably have to set aside some arbitrary amount for up to 210 days following a transaction to cover rebate requests.

Meanwhile, to address potential disputes (see below), acquirers and issuers will also need to retain data on every transaction from every merchant not reporting tax and tip amounts through the new automated-reporting mechanism for at least 210 days. They will also have to implement regular audits to ensure that amounts classified as “gratuities” are, indeed, gratuities. This alone would be enormously costly.

4. Error-handling and dispute process

With new data and complex rules, errors are inevitable. Suppose a merchant forgets to flag the tax amount; the issuer retains interchange on the full amount; and the merchant later submits documentation under §150-10(b) to reclaim that fee. That introduces a new quasi-dispute process: merchants claiming back improper fees. Networks or acquirers will have to manage these claims, verify documents, and arrange reimbursements—a process akin to handling chargebacks or billing disputes. This is an additional transaction cost injected into the system. For busy merchants, the administrative hassle might not be worth a small refund, meaning that some may not bother (leading to uneven implementation).

B. Reduced Revenue and Responses by Issuers

While compliance costs will likely be significant, much more significant will be the effects on revenue to issuing banks from interchange fees, which in turn funds consumer rewards and supports the overall cost structure of card issuance. Removing interchange fees on the sales tax and gratuity portions means that, on average, banks could lose about 0.1% of the revenue on each transaction involving Illinois merchants.[65] For large issuers, that could translate into tens of millions of dollars annually.[66] Issuers, both in-state and out-of-state, are likely to respond to these revenue losses in one or more of several ways.

1. Reducing cardholder rewards and benefits

Credit-card issuers fund rewards primarily with interchange fees. If interchange-fee revenue from Illinois transactions falls by 10% or more, banks will be less able to cover extant rewards commitments. Wherever governments have imposed price controls on interchange fees—including in the United States following the Durbin amendment; in Australia following the Reserve Bank of Australia’s price controls on interchange fees; and in the EU following the Interchange Fee Regulation—at least some issuers (and, in many cases, the vast majority) have responded by reducing the generosity of rewards programs.[67]

Banks may also cut other cardholder benefits that are currently funded by interchange fees, such as travel insurance and purchase protections, to make up some of the lost revenue, as was done in Australia and Europe following the interchange-fee price controls in those jurisdictions.[68] As with rewards, such an approach is less likely if Illinois remains the only state to impose differential interchange-fee price controls (except perhaps for local banks and credit unions, whose customers are predominantly or exclusively Illinois residents). In that case, as with rewards, out-of-state cardholders of national banks would be subsidizing the Illinois operations of big-box merchants.

In principle, issuers could offset these losses by creating state-specific Illinois rewards policies, but this would entail amending nearly every cardholder agreement, as well as agreements with rewards partners (e.g., airlines and hotels). It could also create communications challenges for issuers and add to the complexity of the transaction process.

Alternatively, issuers could offset the lost revenue by adjusting their overall rewards programs to be slightly less generous across the board. A bank might drop a cashback rate from 2% to 1.95%, for example, or devalue points by a similar proportion for all cardholders. This would also entail amendments to most cardholder and many partner agreements. But by spreading the pain more widely, it might be less challenging to communicate.

Meanwhile, widespread application would make administration more straightforward. If this option were chosen, however, Illinois’ policy would have imposed a negative externality on cardholders across the nation, with out-of-state cardholders effectively being forced to subsidize the Illinois operations of big-box merchants even if they make no purchases in Illinois.

The likelihood of issuers adjusting rewards would increase if multiple states were to pass similar legislation. Even if Illinois remains unique, issuers still may scale back benefits offered to Illinois-based customers or for transaction categories heavily composed of tax (e.g., gas purchases that include fuel excise taxes).

2. Introducing or increasing annual fees

In some cases, issuers have responded to price controls on interchange fees by introducing or increasing annual fees on credit cards. Most notably, Australian banks increased average annual fees by around 50%.[69] It seems likely that some banks would do the same for Illinois cardholders, who might find previously no-fee credit cards now carry a $20 annual fee, for instance. Meanwhile, Illinois residents with more generous rewards cards might see their annual fees rise by $50.

Debit cards, or the current accounts with which they are associated, could also see new or increased fees. This was precisely what happened following the Durbin amendment. Initially, some covered banks threatened to introduce monthly debit-card usage fees in response to the price controls on interchange fees. But following a public outcry, they sought to recoup lost revenue in other ways, with many banks increasing monthly fees and raising the minimum deposits required for free checking accounts.[70]

Given the large proportion of debit and credit cards issued by nationally chartered banks and non-Illinois based banks and credit unions, it seems likely that such an approach to the recoupment of losses resulting from the IFPA’s price controls on interchange fees in Illinois would represent a significant extraterritorial effect. This would be magnified to the extent that banks and credit unions apply these changes to non-Illinois-based customers.

3. Higher interest rates

Credit issuers might also look to the credit-term side, possibly raising their annual percentage rates (APRs). Following the introduction of the IFR, the delta between the European Central Bank’s base rate and the APR on credit cards rose.[71]

While the IFPA by itself might not cause a measurable APR hike, the cumulative pressure of any revenue loss could contribute to upward pressure on interest rates, especially for riskier borrowers. Any such changes would, again, mean that consumers pay more. And to the extent that such changes are applied to customers outside Illinois, the effect would be extraterritorial.

4. Fragmentation of the multilateral interchange-fee system

Card networks currently operate under a uniform multilateral interchange-fee schedule that applies nationwide. If other states copy Illinois and introduce their own state-specific mandates, carving out interchange fees for sales tax (and possibly other elements, such as gratuities), networks would likely be forced to develop multiple fee regimes, thereby increasing complexity, compliance costs, and operational inefficiencies. The larger the number of states that follow this approach, the more fragmented the interchange system would become, potentially making it unworkable.

5. Inequitable competitive effects

The preliminary injunction in Illinois Bankers Ass’n v. Raoul applies to national banks regulated under the National Bank Act (NBA) and the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA) due to federal preemption.[72] The court later extended the preliminary injunction to out-of-state state banks, as well, under similar preemption principles.[73] Despite this, banks chartered in Illinois (as well as federal credit unions) remain subject to the IFPA. If this is upheld, an uneven playing field will develop, distorting competition unnaturally in favor of national and out-of-state banks.

6. Adjusting default multilateral interchange fees

Finally, card networks might attempt to compensate for the revenue loss in Illinois by adjusting the default multilateral interchange-fee schedules that apply across the United States. Such adjustments, which would likely be across-the-board increases, would represent a transfer from out-of-state merchants and consumers to Illinois-based merchants.

C. Extraterritorial Effects Conclusion

The Illinois Bankers Association argues that the compliance costs for reprogramming systems to accommodate the IFPA could run into hundreds of millions of dollars for banks and networks alone.[74] Meanwhile, issuing banks would experience shortfalls in interchange-fee revenue from transactions in Illinois. In response, banks would likely be forced to compensate either by reducing cardholder benefits or increasing fees.

These compensatory actions would likely affect all cardholders, with the result that most of those affected would be cardholders living outside Illinois. Reduced rewards and increased fees would diminish the attractiveness of card use, leading to lower consumer spending and therefore harming merchants, as well.[75] There would thus be harmful extraterritorial effects across the value chain. While banks, payment processors, and networks would suffer concentrated costs and losses, these would be passed on to consumers and merchants.

If the courts deem that the IFPA does not apply to nationally chartered banks (per the preliminary injunction), then these extraterritorial effects would be muted, but the resultant competitive distortions would be significant.

V. Legal Arguments Against the IFPA

In light of the effects of the IFPA on banks, savings institutions, credit unions, and card networks, it is no surprise that the law has been challenged in court. In August 2024, the Illinois Bankers Association, along with several other bank and credit-union groups, brought a constitutional challenge against the IFPA, alleging the statute is preempted by various federal laws.[76]

Each set of plaintiffs in the case was able to assert a relevant federal law or constitutional principle the IFPA violated. Nationally chartered banks pointed to the National Banking Act (NBA) and various federal regulations that apply specifically to them. Federal savings associations looked to the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), which similarly empowers and regulates them. Federal credit unions asserted preemption under the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), because it gives the National Credit Union Administration the exclusive authority to regulate them. State banks chartered in Illinois pointed to state laws that give banks the same powers as nationally chartered banks. Out-of-state banks brought both Dormant Commerce Clause and federal law claims that they have the right to be treated similarly to in-state banks and nationally chartered banks, respectively.

In an amicus brief, one of the card networks (Mastercard) argued that the law would be unworkable in practice, not least due to the “extraordinary limitations” it places on processing card-transaction data:[77]

Specifically, the Act makes it unlawful for “[a]n entity, other than the merchant” involved in a transaction to “distribute, exchange, transfer, disseminate, or use” the associated data “except to facilitate or process the electronic payment transaction or as required by law” (the “Data Usage Limitation”). 815 ILCS 151/150-15(b). Under the statute’s plain terms, for example, participants in the system could not use aggregated transaction data to detect fraud or administer rewards programs.[78]

And concluding that:

The Data Usage Limitation would impose similarly overwhelming operational challenges. Banks and other financial institutions use transaction data for an array of key purposes including— but far from limited to—preventing fraud, administering rewards programs, and determining credit limits. Arbitrarily restricting such data’s use will make many of these activities economically or operationally infeasible, to the detriment of consumers, merchants, and financial institutions alike.[79]

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered these claims in a motion for preliminary injunction. On Dec. 20, 2024, the court granted the preliminary injunction in part against the IFPA, finding there was a likelihood the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits as to the NBA and HOLA claims,[80] but dismissed the state-law claims due to sovereign immunity not being waived by Illinois.[81] The court did not accept that any federal law preempted the IFPA as to credit-card networks. This effectively meant that IFPA could not be enforced against nationally chartered banks or savings associations, but could be enforced against state-chartered banks and credit-card networks. After more briefing, the court decided Feb. 2 that the federal-credit-union plaintiffs did not establish that the FCUA preempted the IFPA, but that 12 U.S.C. §1831a(j) did preempt the IFPA as to out-of-state state banks.[82]

Below, we will consider these arguments in more detail and consider the likely effects if the court’s preliminary-injunction analysis holds as to the underlying merits.

A. Federal Preemption: The National Bank Act and Other Federal Laws

The IFPA faces a direct federal preemption challenge due to the national laws that establish federal banks, savings institutions, and credit unions. The crux is whether Illinois’ attempt to regulate interchange fees is preempted by federal banking laws that grant national banks (and other federally chartered institutions) certain powers free from state interference. This subsection analyzes the preemption argument, focusing on the NBA and related regulatory doctrine, as well as considering whether any provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act or other federal statutes explicitly or implicitly preclude state-level interchange regulation.

1. NBA and HOLA preemption principles

The NBA, originally enacted in 1864 and now codified in Title 12 of the U.S. Code, provides that national banks (those chartered under federal law) have authority to exercise “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.”[83] Over many decades, courts have interpreted this provision to mean that national banks have broad discretion in conducting banking activities (such as lending, taking deposits, and charging fees) and that state laws may not significantly impair or interfere with those authorized powers. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that state laws are preempted if they “prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.” [84] This “significant interference” test remains the benchmark for NBA preemption, reaffirmed by the Court as recently as 2024’s Cantero v. Bank of America.[85]

This is different than normal conflict preemption, which requires a showing that an entity can’t comply with both sets of laws. Instead, it only requires a showing of significant interference with their ability to exercise their powers under national law.

Credit-card issuance and processing is unquestionably part of the “business of banking”; it involves lending (extending credit), payment services, and charging fees for those services. National banks engage in issuing credit and debit cards under their incidental powers, and they earn revenue through interest and fees (including interchange fees on card transactions). The OCC, which administers the NBA, has long promulgated regulations clarifying that national banks may charge non-interest fees, and that state attempts to regulate such fees are generally preempted.[86]

For example, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 explicitly addresses “National bank charges” (such as service fees) and indicates that banks may set those charges per their business judgment, subject to safety and soundness, not state-law limitations.[87] Likewise, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 deals with lending by national banks and preempts state laws that obstruct or condition federally authorized lending powers—specifically listing state restrictions on terms of credit, including loan-related fees, as usually preempted.[88]

While interchange fees are paid by merchants, rather than borrowers, interchange can be seen as part of the overall “terms of credit card services” offered by banks. Indeed, the OCC’s “Handbook on Credit Card Lending” explicitly lists interchange fees as part of the revenue structure of card programs,[89] signaling the OCC’s view that interchange is within the realm of bank charges protected by federal authority.

Against this backdrop, the IFPA’s interference is clear: it forbids national banks from collecting a category of fees they would otherwise collect in the normal course of offering card services. This is arguably a direct interference with a national bank’s power to set fees for its services. Just as states cannot cap the interest rate or annual fee a national bank charges on a credit card (national banks famously can “export” their home-state interest rates to other states, immune from those other states’ usury laws, per Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha[90]), likewise a state should not be able to cap the interchange fees a national bank earns through its card-network participation.

While interchange fees are not charged to the bank’s customer, they are income arising from the bank’s service—functionally, a part of the pricing of the payment service the bank provides. By stripping out a portion of that pricing (on taxes/tips), Illinois is “preventing or significantly interfering” with the bank’s revenue model in the card business.

The banks challenging the IFPA have made this case, and early indications are that courts find it persuasive. In October 2024, Judge Virginia Kendall granted a preliminary injunction preventing Illinois from enforcing the IFPA against national banks and federal savings associations, on the basis that those plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the law is preempted by federal law (the NBA in the case of national banks, and HOLA in the case of federal savings associations).[91] The court noted that federally chartered banks’ ability to charge and receive interchange fees is an aspect of their federally authorized powers, and Illinois’ law stands as an obstacle to the exercise of those powers.[92] This is a straightforward application of the Barnett Bank standard; the IFPA substantially interferes by banning a category of fees that form a not-insignificant part of the banks’ compensation for card services.

Illinois,[93] backed by Sen. Durbin in his amicus brief, [94] countered that the Durbin amendment’s silence on credit-card fees implies no federal occupation of the field, and that states have historically been allowed to protect consumers and businesses via consumer-protection regulations, absent a direct conflict with federal law. They emphasized that preemption is only appropriate when a state law interferes with a national bank’s exercise of its power to an “extreme degree.”[95] Illinois argued that the “meager limitation” on interchange fees posed by the IFPA were simply not sufficient to significantly interfere with the national banks’ powers to collect interchange fees in general.[96]

But given the evidence that compliance with the IFPA will require significant operational changes and will cost banks revenue (harming their card programs), the “significance” threshold seems crossed. It’s comparable to a state law that would say, for instance: “Banks may not charge late payment fees on credit cards for customers within our state.” That would clearly cut off a source of revenue and alter a term of credit. Such a law would almost certainly be preempted by the NBA, especially after Smiley v. Citibank, where the Supreme Court upheld the OCC’s view that late fees counted as “interest” and thus states couldn’t cap them for national bank cards.[97] IFPA might not regulate “interest,” but from the perspective of bank operations, it is regulating a fee related to extending credit.

Furthermore, the OCC itself took the unusual step of submitting an amicus brief on behalf of the nationally chartered banks in this case.[98] The OCC’s involvement signals that the chief regulator of national banks sees a serious preemption issue; the OCC described the IFPA as conflicting with federal policy and burdening national banks.

The district court also found that the same preemption analysis from the NBA applies to federal savings associations under HOLA, as HOLA directs courts to apply “the laws and legal standards applicable to national banks” in determining whether federal law preempts state regulation of federal savings associations.[99] Federal savings associations are established under HOLA and regulated by federal law much like nationally chartered banks are established under NBA and regulated by federal law.

2. The Durbin amendment

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) creates a federal framework for electronic funds transfers, including those undertaken using debit cards.[100] Under the Durbin amendment, the EFTA regulates debit-card interchange fees and routing, which implies that Congress intended for a uniform national standard, at least with respect to debit cards.[101] While the specific standard promulgated under the Durbin amendment almost certainly caused more harm than good, the basic idea of a uniform federal framework is not itself inherently bad (and, indeed, even the Durbin amendment would have been less harmful under different interpretations by the Federal Reserve).[102]

Another argument made by the plaintiffs is that the IFPA, by imposing a state-specific mandate that sets interchange fees at $0 for a component of debit transactions undertaken in Illinois, conflicts with this uniform federal mandate. This arguably affects all parties to such transactions, including the card networks. It is noteworthy that, while the Federal Reserve has, under the auspices of the Durbin amendment, imposed aggressive and harmful restrictions on the debit-card interchange fees that covered banks are permitted to retain, at no time has it publicly contemplated introducing restrictions that would carve out certain portions of transactions and subject them to even lower interchange-fee price controls.

One wrinkle is that Sen. Durbin and Illinois have argued that nothing in Durbin amendment explicitly preempts states from going further on interchange-fee regulation.[103] That’s true; the Durbin amendment was silent on credit-card fees and did not expressly preempt state laws on debit fees (if any state had wanted to set even lower caps for smaller banks or such, arguably they could try).

The lack of express preemption in Dodd-Frank does not, however, mean that states have carte blanche. State laws still must not conflict with or frustrate the purposes of federal laws. The IFPA deals with both debit and credit. For debit cards, one could argue there’s at least an argument that Congress, by regulating debit interchange fees, left some room for states to add protections, or conversely that Congress occupied the field of setting reasonable debit fees by delegating to the Fed. That debate aside, for credit cards (which are the majority of interchange dollars at stake in IFPA), there is no federal statute directly on point; it’s purely the NBA and general banking law that govern.

The district court found that, unlike the NBA (and HOLA), the Durbin amendment is analyzed under more traditional conflict principles.[104] As a result, they agreed with Illinois and Durbin that the Durbin amendment only set a ceiling on interchange fees for debit cards.[105] Moreover, the court found that a Dodd-Frank revision[106] limited the preemptive effect of the NBA, finding it did “not extend to other, non-national bank or savings associations participants in credit and debit card transactions, including Card Networks like Visa or Mastercard.”[107]

B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Discrimination Against Out-of-State Banks

State banks from outside of Illinois argued that the IFPA was unlawful as applied to them because it would set up a form of discrimination if national banks are protected from the IFPA’s mandates, but they would not. They argued both on the grounds of the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause and a provision of federal law that protects out-of-state state banks.[108]

Here, the IFPA dictates the permissible fee structure for a contract (the card transaction) that is not confined within Illinois. The fee arrangement is part of interstate commerce: funds flow from an out-of-state issuing bank to an Illinois merchant’s bank, coordinated by a network often headquartered elsewhere. By setting a fee component to $0, Illinois is effectively controlling the price of an element of an interstate service (card-payment processing) beyond its borders. If another state were to require a different fee structure (say, entirely hypothetically, if some state required a minimum interchange fee on taxes to ensure banks cover tax-handling risk), compliance would be impossible; issuers and networks cannot simultaneously obey conflicting state commands in a unified system. Arguably, this would lead to the type of impermissible extraterritorial regulation by a state that the Dormant Commerce Clause is supposed to prevent.

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority[109] is instructive: New York’s law made distillers affirm that their New York prices were no higher than prices in other states; the Supreme Court struck it down because it effectively controlled the distiller’s out-of-state pricing (the distiller had to change out-of-state prices to avoid New York penalties).[110] Similarly, IFPA pressures networks/issuers to adjust their conduct everywhere to avoid Illinois penalties (the simplest compliance is to program systems never to charge on any state’s taxes, but that then imposes Illinois’s rule nationally—a classic extraterritorial effect). In essence, Illinois is leveraging its market power (access to Illinois merchants/customers) to dictate fee terms nationwide for transactions involving Illinois components. Courts frown on such state overreach.

It’s notable that the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Illinois, has itself invalidated a state law on extraterritoriality grounds. In Legato Vapors v. Cook,[111] Indiana imposed strict regulations on out-of-state manufacturers of vaping liquid if their products were sold in Indiana. The 7th Circuit held the law unconstitutional, describing the act as written: “so as to have extraterritorial reach that is unprecedented, imposing detailed requirements of Indiana law on out-of-state manufacturing operations.”[112]

The IFPA likewise could be described as imposing Illinois’ economic regulation on out-of-state banks and networks. The parallel is not perfect (Legato involved physical manufacturing standards), but the principle is analogous: one state dictating operational requirements to producers in other states.

Nonetheless, the district court did not see it this way. The court found that the IFPA does not explicitly discriminate against out-of-state interests. It instead applies equally to all issuers and merchants regardless of domicile.[113] The out-of-state banks tried to argue the Dormant Commerce Clause would be violated because in-state banks would not be subject to the rules, due to Illinois state law. But this argument that in-state interests benefit at the expense of out-of-state interests was severely undercut by the fact that the court dismissed the challenge by the Illinois banks due to Illinois having sovereign immunity for state-law claims in federal courts.[114] The court found that since in-state banks are subject to the mandates of the IFPA, out-of-state banks would not be treated differently.

The court did, however, allow for more briefing on the question of whether federal law protects out-of-state banks by extending the preemption of state law to the same extent as national banks.[115] After more briefing, the court found that federal law did, in fact, demand similar treatment for out-of-state banks as national banks. And “because the Court granted the preliminary injunction with respect to nationally chartered banks, forcing out-of-state state banks to comply with the IFPA would run afoul” of the law.[116]

C. Field Preemption vs Conflict Preemption

Some commenters have suggested an alternate framing: that federal law (NBA and HOLA) so comprehensively covers bank charges that there is field preemption—i.e., states have no role at all in regulating the rates/fees charged by national banks. While the Supreme Court has more often used conflict-preemption language (“significant interference”), the effect is nearly field-like in areas like interest rates and fees. The IFPA could be seen as conflicting with the full purposes of federal banking regulation by disrupting a uniform nationwide system of charges.

Additionally, one could argue the law conflicts with specific provisions of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (for debit) or the Truth in Lending Act (for credit) if any such provisions implied no state additions. The Durbin amendment, for example, implicitly suggested that large issuers’ fees should be reasonable and proportional, but it did not set an exact amount for credit cards. It’s arguable (though not particularly strong) that Congress choosing not to regulate credit interchange might imply intent that it be left to the market (and thus, that state intervention undermines that intent). But courts typically hesitate to find “implied preemption” from congressional silence, especially given that the NBA covers the ground.

This, however, cuts the other way as well. Even after further briefing, the district court found that the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) is subject to more traditional conflict-preemption analysis.[117] Instead of the Barnett Bank “significant interference” standard, the law was subject to whether it would be “’impossible’… to comply with both state and federal law or… [when] state law… constitutes an ‘obstacle’ to satisfying the purposes and objectives of Congress.”[118]

The federal credit unions pointed to the statutory language that states FCUA gives the NCUA exclusive power to regulate them. But the court found that NCUA regulations do not preempt all state laws regulating credit cards.[119] As a result, the FCUA’s preemption clause does not appear to implicate the substance of what the IFPA is regulating.[120] Therefore, federal credit unions continue to be subject to IFPA at this point.

In conclusion, federal preemption—especially via the NBA and HOLA—poses a formidable obstacle to the IFPA. The early court rulings vindicate that view, carving out national banks and savings associations from the law’s reach. If the trend holds, Illinois’ experiment may only fully bind those institutions least involved in card issuance, raising the question of whether the law can achieve any meaningful effect at all. When state law collides with the entrenched powers of national banks in the domain of fees and lending terms, historically, the state law has given way. The IFPA appears destined for the same fate, unless higher courts carve out a novel exception.

D. Severability and Practical Effect

If a court definitively rules that the IFPA is preempted for all federally chartered banks and savings associations (which include most major credit-card issuers—e.g., Chase, Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, Discover Bank, and Capital One are all national banks or federal thrifts), as well as out-of-state state banks, then the law would only effectively apply to Illinois-chartered banks and state and federal credit unions.

That outcome would be somewhat perverse: Illinois’ own community banks (if state-chartered) would be subject to the fee ban, while larger national competitors would not. The competitive imbalance and reduced scope of coverage (a large majority of card volume is from federally chartered issuers) would severely undermine the law’s intent. Indeed, merchants would still pay interchange fees on taxes for most cards (since most cards are from national banks), undercutting the law’s efficacy.

The state-chartered institutions would suffer competitive harm or feel pressure to reorganize under a federal charter to escape the rule. Moreover, it is completely unclear where this would leave the card networks, who are presumably still under the law but aren’t normally in charge of collecting the interchange fees, rather than just processing payments. Given such an outcome, Illinois might abandon the law, or a court might find that the IFPA, in its entirety, is preempted due to the dominance of federal issuers in the market.

The IFPA does have a severability clause, although the courts have not yet reached the question of how that would work. It is clear, however, that the practicality of the law only applying to a few institutions is questionable.

E. Legal Arguments Against the IFPA Conclusion

Legally, the IFPA is on shaky ground. It is likely preempted by the NBA and HOLA and impermissibly harms out-of-state banks. As such, the temporary injunction is likely to be made permanent. If state-chartered banks and credit unions, federally chartered credit unions, payment networks, and other non-bank payment-service providers remain bound by the act, the consequences would be so absurd as to be almost comical. One imagines the General Assembly would likely rescind the remnants of the act.

If, on the other hand, the court finds for Illinois at the merits stage, the harms would not be merely absurd, but catastrophic. Most likely, other states would follow suit, resulting in a patchwork of interchange regulations that would fracture the seamless national payments system, ultimately harming both consumers and merchants through reduced rewards, higher banking fees, and diminished innovation in payment technologies.

VI. Conclusion

Illinois’ Interchange Fee Prohibition Act represents an unprecedented state-level effort to impose price controls on certain components of merchant transactions. While ostensibly aimed at protecting merchants from the burden of paying interchange fees on sales taxes and gratuities, it would create a host of economic and legal problems that far outweigh its modest purported benefits.

The law’s enactment was essentially a political quid pro quo, whereby Gov. Pritzker sought to shift the cost burden associated with the state’s previously over-generous sales-tax discount from taxpayers to issuing banks. But doing so would undermine the longstanding two-sided market equilibrium of the payments ecosystem. As this white paper has shown, the cost of electronic sales-tax collection does not scale in proportion to sales, so it would be inefficient and inappropriate to remove interchange fees from sales tax. Removing interchange fees from gratuities would add insult to injury.

Payment-card networks form a nationwide (indeed, global) ecosystem where uniform rules, scale efficiencies, and cross-side subsidies have achieved near-universal card acceptance and very widespread consumer adoption. The IFPA’s attempt to carve out a special rule for Illinois disrupts this uniformity and would yield, at best, modest gains to big-box retailers at significant cost to banks and consumers, both locally and nationwide.

The IFPA’s benefits would be concentrated and visible (Illinois merchants keep or are rebated the portion of each card sale related to tax and tips), while its costs are diffuse and largely hidden (consumers facing higher banking costs or fewer perks; banks and processors spending additional resources on compliance; and the system overall becoming marginally less efficient).

Empirical evidence from analogous regulatory interventions (the Durbin amendment, the EU’s Interchange Fee Regulation, Australia’s interchange-fee price controls) casts doubt on the notion that consumers will see tangible benefits through lower prices. Instead, those consumers may effectively subsidize merchants through higher bank fees or lost rewards—an outcome at odds with the populist rationale often given for such regulations.

In short, the IFPA risks distorting the balance of the two-sided card market in ways that ultimately harm one side (cardholders) more than they help the other (merchants). If laws similar to the IFPA were replicated in other states, the result would be a patchwork of varying state interchange-fee rules that would produce chaos and more widespread harm.

Legally, the IFPA appears on a collision course with well-established principles of federal supremacy in banking regulation. The potential for conflicting state policies, should others emulate or vary the Illinois approach, underscores why the Commerce Clause entrusts Congress (not individual states) with the power to regulate national economic networks.

Moreover, the overlay of federal banking law—particularly for nationally chartered card issuers—provides robust independent grounds to nullify the IFPA with respect to most major market participants. The NBA preemption doctrine, as reinforced by Barnett Bank and related OCC regulations, makes clear that states cannot dictate the fees or charges earned by national banks in providing their services, if such dictates meaningfully interfere with bank operations. Interchange fees, being a core part of credit-card operations, fall within that protected sphere. The early court injunction shielding national banks from the IFPA foreshadows a likely permanent preemption ruling. In effect, even if Illinois’ law were constitutionally permissible in theory, it might largely be inapplicable to the predominant actors in practice, due to federal preemption.

What remains, then, of the IFPA? If the preliminary injunction were to be overturned and the IFPA came into effect, it would impose great harm on the nation’s banks and their customers. If, ultimately, only state-chartered banks and credit unions must comply, the law’s impact dwindles and its distortions (penalizing local banks and their customers relative to bigger out-of-state banks and their customers) grow.

[1] Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 151/150-5 et seq.

[2] Infra Section 2.

[3] See Julian Morris, State Regulation of Interchange Fees, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Nov. 15, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/state-regulation-of-interchange-fees.

[4] See Illinois Bankers Association et al. v.  Kwame Raoul, 2024 WL 5186840 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 15, 2024) [hereinafter “IBA I”]

[5] See id.; Illinois Bankers Ass’n v. Kwame Raoul, 2025 WL 409060 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 6, 2025) [hereinafter “IBA II”].

[6] Morris, supra note 3.

[7] See Julian Morris & Ben Sperry, The Cost of Payments: A Review, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Aug. 28, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-cost-of-payments-a-review.

[8] Berhan Bayeh et al., 2024 Findings from the Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, Fed. Rsrv. (2024), available at https://www.frbservices.org/binaries/content/assets/crsocms/news/research/2024-diary-of-consumer-payment-choice.pdf.

[9] Morris, supra note 3; Claire Wang, Cash Me If You Can: The Impacts of Cashless Businesses on Retailers, Consumers, and Cash Use, Cash Prod. Off. Fed. Rsvr. Sys. (2019), available at https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/Cash-Me-If-You-Can-August2019.pdf.

[10] Daniel Gerzina, Epic Burger Is Now Cashless, Tamale Spaceship Closes Wicker Park Restaurant, More Intel, Eater Chi. (Jun. 21, 2017), https://chicago.eater.com/2017/6/21/15846364/epic-burger-cashless-tamale-spaceship-closed-wicker-park-restaurant-am-intel.

[11] Id.

[12] Morris, supra note 3.

[13] See Julian Morris, The Hidden Wealth of Payment Cards: How Innovations in Payments Transform Society, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Dec. 19, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-hidden-wealth-of-payment-cards-how-innovations-in-payments-transform-society.

[14] See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Jun. 2, 2010), available at https://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf.

[15] See Aaron Klein et al., How Better Payment Systems Can Improve Public Transportation, Brookings Ctr. Regul. Mkt. (2023), available at www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/20230109_CRM_Klein_TransitPayments_final1.pdf.

[16] Morris, supra note 3.

[17] Ohio v. American Express, 585 U.S. 529, (2018) (internal citations omitted).

[18] See Patrick Andreisen, Illinois Retailers Taxed $186M by Capping Sales Tax Credit, Ill. Pol’y (May 30, 2024), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-retailers-taxed-186m-by-capping-sales-tax-credit.

[19] See Sales and Use Tax, Wis. Dept. Revenue (Feb. 23, 2018), available at https://www.revenue.wi.gov/DORReports/salusetx.pdf (for example, neighboring Wisconsin reduced its discount to 0.5% of the tax liability and, in 2009, it capped its discount at $1,000 per filing period); Sales Tax by State: How to Discount Your Sales Tax Bill, TaxJar (Dec. 19, 2024), https://www.taxjar.com/blog/file/state-sales-tax-discounts.

[20] Philip Mattera & Leigh McIlvaine, Skimming the Sales Tax: How Wal-Mart and Other Big Retailers (Legally) Keep a Cut of the Taxes We Pay on Everyday Purchases, Good Jobs First (2008), available at https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/docs/pdf/skimming.pdf.

[21] See Mary Hansen, Unpacking Pritzker’s Tax Proposals: Retail Discount, NPR Ill. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nprillinois.org/illinois-economy/2019-03-07/unpacking-pritzkers-tax-proposals-retail-discount.

[22] Id.

[23] Richard M. Silverman, Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker’s 2022 Budget Proposes Numerous Business Tax Changes, Tax. Update (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2021/02/gov-jb-pritzkers-2022-budget-proposes-numerous-business-tax-changes.

[24] See Jerry Nowicki, Pritzker Agency Heads Questioned on $1.1 Billion Revenue Proposals, Cap. News Ill. (Mar. 14, 2024), https://capitolnewsillinois.com/news/pritzker-agency-heads-questioned-on-11-billion-revenue-proposals.

[25] Id.

[26]  Mattera & McIlvaine, supra note 20.

[27] Swipe Fees, Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, https://irma.org/government-affairs/policy-and-positions/swipe-fees (last visited Apr. 19, 2025).

[28] Id.

[29] New Illinois Law Creates Windfall for Largest Corporate Mega-Stores, Elec. Payments Coal. (2024), available at https://guardyourcard.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Illinois-State-Sales-Tax-Interchange-Report-9.24.24.pdf.

[30] Public Act 103-0027, 103rd Gen. Assemb., Regul. Sess. (Ill. 2024); Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 151/150-1 et seq.

[31] Illinois Interchange Fee Prohibition Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 151/150-5, -10(a) (2024).

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at §150-10(b).

[34] Id. at §150-10(d)

[35] Id. at §150-10(a).

[36] See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1075(a)(3) (2010), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173; Regulation II, Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,393, 43,475 (Jul. 20, 2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/frn-reg-ii-20231025.pdf; Darry E. Getter, Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees, Cong. Rsch. Servs. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41913; Stacie E. McGinn & Mark Chorazak, Debit Interchange Regulation: Another Battle or the End of the War?, 2 Harvard Business L. Online 47 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20250125015426/https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr/2011/07/debit-interchange-regulation-another-battle-or-the-end-of-the-war (last visited Apr. 19, 2025).

[37] See Bill Status of HB4951, 103rd Ill. Gen. Assembly, available at https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=4951&GAID=17&GA=103&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=152864&SessionID=112 (last visited Apr. 19, 2025).

[38] Howard W. Herndon, The Complexities and Costs of Eliminating Interchange Fees on Sales Tax Portions, Womble Bond Dick., (Jun. 14, 2024), https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/us/insights/alerts/complexities-and-costs-eliminating-interchange-fees-sales-tax-portions.

 

[39] Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, supra note 27.

[40] Herndon, supra note 41

[41] See Sales Tax Rebates by State, Davo by Avalara, https://www.davosalestax.com/sales-tax-rebates-by-states (last visited Apr. 4, 2025).

[42] Comparison of State Retail Sales Tax Administrative Provisions, Fed. Tax Adm., https://www.taxadmin.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2025); John Mikesell, Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector (Cengage Learning, 9th ed., 2013).

[43] The IRS’ guidance makes clear that, while an employer’s share of payroll taxes (such as FICA taxes) is deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense, no additional deduction or rebate is permitted for the expense of administering those payroll taxes. For example, IRS Publication 15 (Circular E, Employer’s Tax Guide) explains that payroll-tax liabilities must be paid in full and that the costs incurred in collecting, calculating, and remitting these taxes are not eligible for a separate tax deduction or rebate beyond what is already allowed for the employer’s tax expense. See Guide to Business Expense Resources, Intern. Revenue Serv., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/guide-to-business-expense-resources (last visited Apr. 4, 2025).

[44] In the United States, the costs a business incurs for administering its corporate-income tax are generally treated as ordinary and necessary business expenses. As such, the administrative costs associated with such taxes—such as fees paid for tax preparation, internal tax administration, or related professional services—are typically deductible. They reduce the taxable income reported on the corporation’s federal income-tax return, provided they meet the criteria under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code for ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, there is no separate mechanism to “rebate” these administrative costs. In other words, while a business can deduct them from its taxable income, it cannot claim them as a tax credit or receive a direct refund for them. (See IRS Publication 535, which outlines the rules for deducting business expenses, including those related to tax administration).

[45] Franchise Taxes: A Tax for the Privilege of Existing Within a State, LexisNexis (Feb. 18, 2025), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/b/practical-guidance/posts/franchise-taxes-a-tax-for-the-privilege-of-existing-within-a-state; Jerome R. Hellerstein et al., State Taxation § 7.01 (3rd ed. 1998), https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/books/126.

[46] See 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation §§ 684, 687, 693 (2023 update).

[47] Antonio Del Cueto, Do You Understand the Differences Between Sales Tax and Excise Tax?, TaxFyle (Mar. 5, 2025), https://www.taxfyle.com/blog/differences-between-sales-tax-and-excise-tax.

[48] See Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, at 9, §§ 26:29-26:36 (3d ed. & Supp.).

[49] See Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (7th ed. & updates) (In addition, an examination of the relevant provisions of the federal code that govern corporate-income tax (e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§?11, 6012–6151), there is no provision offering a “discount” or “rebate” for compliance costs. The prohibition on deducting federal income taxes themselves can be found in 26 U.S.C. §?275. While various credits exist for specific policy reasons (e.g., foreign tax credit, R&D credit, etc.), none is designed to compensate for the administrative burden of remitting corporate-income taxes.)

[50] See John L. Mikesell, Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector (9th ed.), https://www.amazon.com/Fiscal-administration-Analysis-applications-public/dp/0256024529.

[51] Morris, supra note 3, at 12-13

[52] Many compliance tasks—such as filing returns or keeping abreast of tax-law changes—have a fixed element that does not scale down with a company’s size or sales volume. As a result, smaller retailers spend a greater percentage of their resources to fulfill tax obligations.

[53] See Retail Sales Tax Compliance Costs: A National Estimate, Nat’l Econ. Consulting (Apr. 7, 2006), https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/cost-of-collection-study-sstp.pdf#:~:text=The%20top%20three%20sales%20tax,training%20of%20personnel%20on%20sales.

[54] Id. at E-2.

[55] See Bruce Donald et al., To Tax or not to Tax? The Case of Electronic Commerce, 21 (1) Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 25-40 (2003), https://www.proquest.com/docview/274262391; id.; Mikesell, supra note 52.

[56] Gail Cole, Vendor Discounts for Filing Sales Tax on Time, A State-by-State Guide, Avalara (Dec. 30, 2024), https://www.avalara.com/blog/en/north-america/2021/10/vendor-discounts-for-filing-sales-tax-on-time.html.

[57] Federation of Tax Administrators, supra note 43; Illinois General Assembly, supra note 37; David Brunori, State Tax Policy: A Political Perspective (5th ed.). https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538173312/State-Tax-Policy-A-Primer-Fifth-Edition.

[58] Large Commercial Banks, Fed. Reserve Stat. Release (Dec. 31, 2024), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current; Paul Calem & Benjamin Gross, The Credit Card Market Is Not Even Close to Being Overly Concentrated, Bank Pol’y Inst. (Apr. 18, 2024), available at https://bpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Credit-Card-Market-is-Not-Even-Close-to-Being-Overly-Concentrated.pdf (The largest of these is BMO Bank, a subsidiary of a Canadian bank, which has about 0.1% of U.S. market share in outstanding credit-card balances).

[59] Morris, supra note 3, at 19.

[60] See Remote Sales Tax: Federal Legislation Could Resolve Some Uncertainties and Improve Overall System, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. (GAO-23-105359, Nov. 14, 2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105359.pdf.

[61] Id. at 24.

[62] Id.

[63] See Visa Annual Report 2024, Visa (2024), available at https://s29.q4cdn.com/385744025/files/doc_downloads/2024/Visa-Fiscal-2024-Annual-Report.pdf.

[64] Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Comptroller in Support to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Illinois Bankers Association et al v. Kwame Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-07307 (Oct. 4, 2024), available at https://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-and-regulations/litigation/amicus-curiae-brief-illinois-bankers-assoc-v-raoul.pdf.

 

[65] See Taxes in Illinois, Tax. Found., https://taxfoundation.org/location/illinois (last visited Apr. 20, 2025) (The Tax Foundation estimates that the average sales tax in the state is 8.86%. If gratuities are made on about 7% of those sales at a rate of 15%, that takes the total up to about 10% of the sale, on average. Assuming interchange fees of 1%, the total loss is 0.1% of the sale amount).

[66] According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Illinois retail sales were around $244 billion in 2022. See QuickFacts: Illinois, U.S. Census Bur., https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/IL/PST045223 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Assuming modest growth gives at least $250 billion this year, interchange-fee revenue from sales tax and gratuities might account for about $250 million. For issuers with market share of 4% or more, that is at least $10 million.

[67] See Todd J. Zywicki et al., The Effects of Price Controls on Payment- Card Interchange Fees: A Review and Update, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Mar. 2, 2022), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-effects-of-price-controls-on-payment-card-interchange-fees-a-review-and-update.

[68] Id.; Iris Chan et al., The Personal Credit Card Market in Australia: Pricing Over the Past Decade, Rsrv. Bank of Austl. (2012), available at https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2012/mar/pdf/bu-0312-7.pdf.

[69] See GAO Suggests Federal Solution for Remote Sales Tax, supra note 64; Zywicki et al., supra note 70.

[70] Todd J. Zywicki et al., Unreasonable and Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small Businesses, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/unreasonable-and-disproportionate-how-the-durbin-amendment-harms-poorer-americans-and-small-businesses; Todd J. Zywicki et al., Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 14-18, 2014), https://www.law.gmu.edu/pubs/papers/14_18.

[71] See Julian Morris, The Credit Card Competition Act’s Potential Effects on Airline Co-Branded Cards, Airlines, and Consumers, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Nov. 17, 2023), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-credit-card-competition-acts-potential-effects-on-airline-co-branded-cards-airlines-and-consumers.

[72] IBA I.

[73] IBA II.

[74] IBA I, at 6 (“Illinois Bankers has presented sufficient evidence to establish irreparable harm. The alleged compliance would likely be more crippling for some Illinois financial institutions than the State claims. Illinois Bankers submitted declarations, in which financial institutions and business owners claim that the money they would have to spend to come into compliance with the IFPA would be so devastating to their business that it may drive them form the market altogether… Likewise, leadership from the American Bankers Association, which represents over 1,100 branches in Illinois, explained that some of their members would likely cease providing credit and debit card services and no longer be able to serve as Acquiring banks to merchants.”).

[75] Morris & Sperry, supra note 7 (This is because card use increases both spending and throughput).

[76] See IBA I.

[77] See IBA I.

[78] Id. at 2.

[79] Id. at 4.

[80] See Federal Court Partially Grants Preliminary Injunction in Illinois Interchange Fee Lawsuit, Am. Bankers Ass’n (Jan. 3, 2025), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2025/01/federal-court-partially-grants-preliminary-injunction-in-illinois-interchange-fee-lawsuit.

[81] Id. at 37 (dismissing the state-law claims of the Illinois state banks, arguing that state law gave them the same powers as nationally chartered banks).

[82] See IBA II.

[83] 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh).

[84] Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).

[85] Id. at 33 (“[T]he National Bank Act preempts a state law ‘only if’ the state law… ‘prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers’”); Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., 602 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2024).

[86] See IBA I at 18 (discussing OCC regulations and interpretive letters).

[87] 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2).

[88] 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008.

[89] Credit Card Lending, Off. Comptrol. Curr. (2021), at 59, available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-handbook/files/credit-card-lending/pub-ch-credit-card.pdf.

[90] Marquetta Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).

[91] IBA I at 8-12

[92] Id. at 9-10

[93] See Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Comptroller in Support to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Illinois Bankers Association et al v. Kwame Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-07307 (Oct. 4, 2024), available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.463030/gov.uscourts.ilnd.463030.76.0.pdf.

[94] See Amicus Curiae of Senator Richard J. Durbin’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Illinois Bankers Association et al v. Kwame Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-07307 (Oct. 4, 2024), available at https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/durbin_files_amicus_brief_in_support_of_illinois_interchange_fee_prohibition_act.pdf.

[95] OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at 23.

[96] Id. at 25-26.  

[97] See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).

[98] OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 67.

[99] IBA I, at 12 (“[T]he preemption standard governing the NBA and HOLA is the same.”); 12 U.S.C. § 1465(a).

[100] 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.

[101] 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2.

[102] See Julian Morris, ICLE Comments to Federal Reserve Board on Regulation II NPRM, Int’l Ctr. L. & Econ. (Apr. 23, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-comments-to-federal-reserve-board-on-regulation-ii-nprm.

[103] Durbin Amicus, supra note 99, at 11; Illinois Brief, supra note 98, at 26-29.

[104] IBA I, at 14.

[105] Id.

[106] 12 U.S.C. § 25b(h)(2).

[107] IBA I, at 13.

[108] See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1).

[109] See Brown-Forman v. N.Y. State Liq. Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).

[110]Id. at 582-84.

[111] See Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2017).

[112] Id. at 827.

[113] IBA I, at 31 (“[T]he wildcard laws apply to all entities doing business [in] Illinois.]]”).

[114] Id. at 6 (dismissing the state banks’ claims that state law was violated on sovereign immunity grounds).

[115] Id. at 30-31.

[116] IBA II, at 7-8.

[117] Id. at 4.

[118] Id. at 4 (quoting Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 629, 650 (7th Cir. 2019)).

[119] Id. at 3-5.

[120] Id.

Superior Bargaining Power, Antitrust, and Digital Markets: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective

The abuse of economic dependence is undergoing a revival, driven by the growing policy emphasis on restoring fairness in digital markets. Legal provisions originally . . .

Abstract

The abuse of economic dependence is undergoing a revival, driven by the growing policy emphasis on restoring fairness in digital markets. Legal provisions originally intended to address bargaining power imbalances in traditional, brick-and-mortar settings are now being repurposed as part of the digital enforcement toolkit. Yet the scope and antitrust character of these rules remain contested. Indeed, a central paradox persists. If antitrust law aims to protect competition rather than individual competitors, it is unclear why abuses of economic dependence belong under its purview rather than contract law. Conversely, if such abuses do affect market dynamics, the distinction from abuses of dominant position becomes blurred. Drawing on the insights of transaction cost economics, this paper offers a critical analysis of national provisions on the abuse of economic dependence and outlines a framework for defining the scope and criteria of such abuse as a standalone antitrust offence, with the aim of ensuring consistency between its application and the principles of transaction cost economics.

 

PRESENTATIONS & INTERVIEWS

Kristian Stout Testimony to the CRTC

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy Kristian Stout testified July 3 to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s hearing (CRTC) in Gatineau, Quebec, on working towards . . .

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy Kristian Stout testified July 3 to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s hearing (CRTC) in Gatineau, Quebec, on working towards a sustainable Canadian broadcasting system. Video of his full testimony is embedded below. 

IN THE MEDIA

Kristian Stout on AI Copyright

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, Kristian Stout, was quoted in O Globo, a Brazilian news outlet, discussing the balancing act between technological innovation and creator . . .

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, Kristian Stout, was quoted in O Globo, a Brazilian news outlet, discussing the balancing act between technological innovation and creator protection in the context of AI copyright.

The decision highlighted three aspects: the lack of evidence that full copies of the works were distributed to users; the existence of filters that prevent substantial reproduction; and a clear distinction between inputs (training data) and outputs (generated results). In the view of Kristian Stout, of the International Center for Law and Economics, “Judge Alsup charted a path that balances technological innovation and creator protection—a paradigm essential to the evolution of responsible AI.”

Read the whole piece here.

Kristian Stout on Trump’s Fossil-Fueled AI Action Plan

Kristian Stout, ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in TechTarget discussing the Trump administration’s AI Action Plan and its aim to compete with China’s . . .

Kristian Stout, ICLE Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in TechTarget discussing the Trump administration’s AI Action Plan and its aim to compete with China’s AI efforts, particularly concerning energy and infrastructure.

Kristian Stout, director of innovation policy at the International Center for Law and Economics, said the action plan is aimed squarely at competing with China’s AI efforts. China relies heavily on coal to power its electricity demands, while the U.S. leans on natural gas. The U.S. grid system is fragmented, while China has a national system. “The goal is to be able to do what China seems to be able to do, which is stand up energy quickly and stand up infrastructure for data centers quickly, which helps their companies get access to large data sets to spin up new startups quickly,” Stout said.

Read the full article here.

Kristian Stout on “Ideological Bias” Focus of Trump AI Plan

Kristian Stout, Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in FedScoop discussing the potential consequences of the new Trump AI Plan’s focus on “ideological bias” in . . .

Kristian Stout, Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in FedScoop discussing the potential consequences of the new Trump AI Plan’s focus on “ideological bias” in AI models, particularly concerning federal procurement.

Kristian Stout, Director of Innovation Policy at the International Center for Law and Economics, noted federal procurement can have “significant downstream pressure” on product design, especially for smaller firms more reliant on government buyers. “If objectivity becomes a procurement criterion, we should expect companies to be more explicit about how they audit or validate their models for neutrality,” Stout told FedScoop.

Read the whole article here.

ICLE’s DOJ/FTC Comments Highlighted in PYMNTS Column on Trump Antitrust Agenda

ICLE’s comments on the DOJ and FTC inquiry into anticompetitive regulatory barriers were featured in a recent Competition Policy International (CPI) column on the PYMNTS . . .

ICLE’s comments on the DOJ and FTC inquiry into anticompetitive regulatory barriers were featured in a recent Competition Policy International (CPI) column on the PYMNTS blog.

The ICLE submitted its comments to both the DOJ and FTC, supporting the agencies’ initiative to identify and eliminate anticompetitive regulatory barriers. ICLE argued that the regulatory landscape often entrenches monopoly power, not through private corporate abuse, but through government-granted privileges that restrict market entry and limit consumer choice. The organization called for a return to the “Anglo-American anti-monopoly tradition,” which historically opposed government-sanctioned monopolies and urged the agencies to prioritize regulatory reform that enhances consumer welfare and economic efficiency.

Read the full column here.

Ben Sperry and Daniel Gilman on DOJ’s Stance in News Antitrust Suit

Communications Daily quoted Ben Sperry and Dan Gilman’s perspectives on the DOJ’s statement of interest in the Children’s Health Defense lawsuit. DOJ’s statement of interest in . . .

Communications Daily quoted Ben Sperry and Dan Gilman’s perspectives on the DOJ’s statement of interest in the Children’s Health Defense lawsuit.

DOJ’s statement of interest in the Children’s Health Defense lawsuit against news outlets (see 2507110039) clearly supports the plaintiffs even while claiming neutrality, two International Center for Law & Economics scholars wrote Wednesday. The complaint alleges collusion by major news outlets and social media platforms, and “if there is a route for a successful antitrust case involving content moderation and sources of the news, this might well be it,” Ben Sperry and Daniel Gilman wrote. However, the statement of interest “avoids or even obscures” major issues, such as how the plaintiffs could establish antitrust standing to bring the complaint and how antitrust remedies might be subject to First Amendment limitations, they said. DOJ didn’t mention that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1945 Associated Press decision indicates antitrust remedies can’t compel social media platforms to publish material they don’t want to publish, Sperry and Gilman said.

Read the full article here.

Kristian Stout on Copper Retirement NPRM

Kristian Stout, ICLE’s Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in Communications Daily regarding the expected approval of the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) designed . . .

Kristian Stout, ICLE’s Director of Innovation Policy, was quoted in Communications Daily regarding the expected approval of the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) designed to help major providers more easily retire aging copper networks.

The proceeding has been “remarkably quiet,” noted Kristian Stout, Innovation Policy Director for the International Center for Law & Economics. “Barring any last-minute curveballs, I’d expect only cosmetic tweaks, tightening language around public-safety continuity and the streamlined 31-day window [for automatically granting applications], rather than substantive change.”

Read the whole piece here.

Kristian Stout Quoted in Communications Daily on T-Mobile/UScellular Asset Acquisition

Kristian Stout, ICLE’s Innovation Policy Director, was recently quoted in Communications Daily regarding the FCC’s approval and DOJ’s non-opposition to T-Mobile’s acquisition of UScellular wireless . . .

Kristian Stout, ICLE’s Innovation Policy Director, was recently quoted in Communications Daily regarding the FCC’s approval and DOJ’s non-opposition to T-Mobile’s acquisition of UScellular wireless assets.

“The analysis appears to be ‘a bit out of step with how competition actually plays out,’ emailed Kristian Stout, innovation policy director for the International Center for Law & Economics. For most consumers, wireless competition ‘is experienced at the local level, and the empirical work I’ve seen shows that three well-capitalized carriers can sustain healthy price and quality outcomes.’ Keeping the field at three players ‘can yield scale efficiencies — particularly in how spectrum is financed and deployed over a wide footprint — that ultimately benefit users.'”

Read Kristian’s perspective in Communications Daily: https://communicationsdaily.com/article/2025/07/14/fcc-approves-tmobile-buy-of-uscellular-wireless-assets-doj-wont-oppose-2507110045

Charter/Cox Seen Not Raising Anticompetitive Red Flags

Eric Fruits, ICLE Senior Scholar, was recently quoted in Communications Daily, providing an antitrust and competition perspective on the proposed Charter/Cox merger. Read the full . . .

Eric Fruits, ICLE Senior Scholar, was recently quoted in Communications Daily, providing an antitrust and competition perspective on the proposed Charter/Cox merger. Read the full article here

“‘On paper, this is kind of a no-brainer’ when it comes to antitrust and competition issues, Eric Fruits, International Center for Law & Economics senior scholar, told us. He said if there are bumps in the road, they would come from the FCC moving from a standard antitrust analysis to a more populist antitrust approach with concerns about consolidation and bigness.”

FCC Approves T-Mobile Buy of UScellular Wireless Assets, DOJ Won’t Oppose

Kristian Stout, ICLE’s Innovation Policy Director, was recently quoted in Communications Daily regarding the FCC’s approval and DOJ’s non-opposition to T-Mobile’s acquisition of UScellular wireless . . .

Kristian Stout, ICLE’s Innovation Policy Director, was recently quoted in Communications Daily regarding the FCC’s approval and DOJ’s non-opposition to T-Mobile’s acquisition of UScellular wireless assets. Read the full article here

“The analysis appears to be ‘a bit out of step with how competition actually plays out,’ emailed Kristian Stout, innovation policy director for the International Center for Law & Economics. For most consumers, wireless competition ‘is experienced at the local level, and the empirical work I’ve seen shows that three well-capitalized carriers can sustain healthy price and quality outcomes.’ Keeping the field at three players ‘can yield scale efficiencies — particularly in how spectrum is financed and deployed over a wide footprint — that ultimately benefit users.'”

 

As Congress Releases the AI Regulatory Hounds, a Reminder

ICLE President Geoffrey A. Manne is mentioned in this American Enterprise Institute article on the One Big Beautiful Bill and its temporary federal limit on . . .

ICLE President Geoffrey A. Manne is mentioned in this American Enterprise Institute article on the One Big Beautiful Bill and its temporary federal limit on state regulation of artificial intelligence. Read the full article here

But I’m ordinarily a stout defender of the decentralized system created by our Constitution. I believe it is politically unwise to move power to remote levels of government. With Geoff Manne, I’ve written about avoiding burdensome state regulation through contracts rather than preemption of state law.  So before the House AI Task Force’s meeting to consider federalism and preemption, I was in the “mushy middle.”

DOJ’s Proposed Antitrust Remedies Against Google Are a Bridge Too Far

ICLE President Geoffrey A. Manne is mentioned in this Competitive Enterprise Institute article on the DOJ’s proposed antitrust remedies against Google. Read the full article . . .

ICLE President Geoffrey A. Manne is mentioned in this Competitive Enterprise Institute article on the DOJ’s proposed antitrust remedies against Google. Read the full article here.

Applying the “but-for” causation standard used in Rambus Inc. v. FTC, plaintiffs must demonstrate that were it not for the disputed business conduct, the plaintiffs would not have suffered anticompetitive harm. This means of determining causation, however, was not applied in this case, and the “reasonably appear capable of” standard was used instead. As Geoffrey Manne, president of the International Center for Law and Economics, effectively stated, this standard is applied when exclusionary conduct allegedly stymies the emergence of a nascent competitive threat—as in the Microsoft case where it was unclear whether Netscape could have developed into a rival in the operating-system marketplace. However, with respect to United States v. Google, developed rivals that offer substitute search engine products (such as Bing) already exist. Adopting such a permissive standard regarding antitrust oversight of business dealings risks substantially increasing the government’s power to restrain business.

Apple Backers Raise Price, Privilege Concerns at 9th Circ.

ICLE’s recent amicus brief is mentioned in this Law360 article on concerns raised with the Ninth Circuit over a federal district court mandate blocking Apple from charging . . .

ICLE’s recent amicus brief is mentioned in this Law360 article on concerns raised with the Ninth Circuit over a federal district court mandate blocking Apple from charging commissions on iPhone app purchases made outside its system. Read the full article here.

Others like the International Center for Law & Economics and the Software & Information Industry Association argued that Judge Gonzalez Rogers went far beyond the bounds of her authority, including by effectively setting a price regulation without considering price and in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process safeguards, even as she noted that Apple generally gets to set its own prices.

ICLE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

July Threads 2025

Threads from ICLE scholars on trending issues for the month of July 2025. More and more, I’m seeing arguments that the EU’s Digital Services Act . . .

Threads from ICLE scholars on trending issues for the month of July 2025.