Regulatory Comments

ICLE Comments Re: Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband

I. Introduction

We thank the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or “the Commission”) for the opportunity to comment on this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband.”[1] The NPRM’s central proposal is to conduct a comprehensive review and modernization of the spectrum-sharing regime for non-geostationary (NGSO) and geostationary (GSO) satellite systems operating in the 10.7-12.7 GHz, 17.3-18.6 GHz, and 19.7-20.2 GHz frequency bands. The Commission’s overarching objectives are clear: to ensure “highly efficient and effective use of the shared spectrum,”[2] to support “a more competitive market for satellite broadband,”[3] and to “uncap[] the potential of satellite constellations.”[4]

A primary focus of this review is the set of equivalent power-flux density (EPFD) limits, which the NPRM identifies as potentially the “the single most constraining regulatory requirement on NGSO satellite systems.”[5] These limits—adopted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2000 and subsequently incorporated into FCC rules—were designed to protect GSO networks from harmful interference from NGSO systems.[6] The NPRM questions whether these limits—based on technological assumptions from the 1990s—remain appropriate, given the evolution of both NGSO and GSO technologies. The document notes claim the current rules may be predicated on “flawed and outdated assumptions” that lead to “inefficient spectrum sharing.”[7]

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center whose core mission is to promote the application of law & economics methodologies to inform public-policy discussion. Our work focuses on developing intellectually rigorous, data-driven analyses to foster efficient policy solutions that enhance consumer welfare and global economic growth. In our comments to the FCC in the “Delete, Delete, Delete” proceeding, we recommended:

A top-to-bottom review of FCC space and satellite policies is warranted to identify and eliminate regulatory asymmetries disadvantaging U.S.-licensed providers. Disparate treatment—such as more onerous licensing timelines, excessive equipment pre-certification requirements, and redundant importation rules—can generate substantial uncertainty and delays. These regulatory burdens impose direct costs on companies and broader costs on U.S. consumers and national interests—deterring innovation, discouraging capital investment, and reducing America’s global market share.

A particularly urgent area for reform concerns the equivalent power flux-density (EPFD) limits that govern the signal strength permitted for non-geostationary (NGSO) satellite transmissions. These limits—established by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the late 1990s—were designed to prevent harmful interference with geostationary (GSO) satellites, but they reflect technological assumptions from a much earlier era. Modern NGSO systems—equipped with steerable beams, advanced signal processing, and adaptive interference mitigation—are artificially constrained by these outdated rules. As a result, current EPFD limits are a tremendous regulatory restriction on the ability of NGSO systems to serve consumers efficiently and cost-effectively.

The FCC has already recognized this issue by initiating an NPRM (SB Docket No. 25-157) to study the NGSO-GSO sharing regime in the 10.7–12.7 GHz, 17.3–18.6 GHz, and 19.7–20.2 GHz bands. The Commission should exploit the existing NPRM process to fully evaluate modernized EPFD methodologies and accelerate a transition toward a more efficient and evidence-based spectrum-sharing framework that maintains GSO protections while enabling the full potential of NGSO constellations. Ensuring that NGSO providers can deliver affordable high-capacity broadband to unserved and underserved populations is a national imperative, and the FCC must not allow regulatory inertia to serve as a barrier to this goal.[8]

Applying a law & economics framework can inform the FCC’s review by focusing on how differing regulatory approaches affect spectrum efficiency, incentives for investment and innovation, transaction costs in sharing and coordination, and overall consumer welfare. Specifically, the current reliance on potentially outdated technical assumptions may lead to an inefficient allocation of spectrum by overly restricting NGSO operations, thereby limiting the provision of high-speed, low-latency broadband services. While existing rules were designed to protect GSO systems from harmful interference, modern NGSO technology and market demands suggest a need to reexamine the balance between protecting incumbents and enabling new services. The NPRM appropriately seeks a robust technical record to assess these issues, explicitly requesting comment on the costs and benefits of alternative sharing frameworks.

Economic analysis can provide valuable insights into the questions the NPRM raises, such as determining appropriate protection criteria for modern GSO systems that avoid economically costly overprotection, evaluating alternative methodologies (like throughput-based criteria for systems with adaptive coding and modulation (ACM)), and assessing how information-sharing requirements and compliance mechanisms affect transaction costs and incentives Thorough consideration of transitional measures—including potentially sunsetting protections based on outdated technologies—is also critical to avoid perpetuating inefficient entitlements.

Ultimately, a law & economics approach supports the FCC’s goal to ensure highly efficient and effective use of shared spectrum and to promote a more competitive market for satellite broadband. By analyzing the incentives created by regulatory rules and evaluating the costs and benefits of various sharing frameworks, the Commission can adopt rules that maximize the welfare benefits of this spectrum for American consumers and foster continued U.S. leadership in the space economy.

II. The Economic Foundation: Spectrum as a Scarce Resource and the Goal of Efficient Allocation

The radiofrequency spectrum is a finite and incredibly valuable resource, serving as the invisible infrastructure for modern communications from television broadcasting to high-speed internet. Regulatory bodies like the FCC aim to ensure this limited resource is used to maximize its overall social value—promoting efficiency, competition, and consumer welfare.[9] Historical regulatory frameworks, such as those established by the Communications Act of 1934, often reflect outdated technological distinctions that no longer align with current market realities.[10] Therefore, modernizing these frameworks to be technology-neutral is essential to unlock the full potential of communications markets and prevent U.S. firms from seeking more permissive foreign regulatory environments.

One of the primary challenges to managing shared spectrum is dealing with interference, which functions as a negative externality.[11] If operators were not compelled to avoid causing unacceptable interference, they would have an incentive to exploit shared spectrum to the fullest, potentially imposing significant costs on others and society at-large. This scenario mirrors the “tragedy of the commons,” in which a shared resource is depleted when individuals act in their own self-interest without clear boundaries.[12] Clear rules and defined property rights allow satellite operators to use spectrum resources effectively and constrain the overexploitation of these common resources. As the late economist Ronald Coase concluded, the goal of regulation should not be to eliminate all interference, but rather to maximize overall output by ensuring the benefits gained from any interference outweigh the harms it causes.[13]

In the satellite-communications sector, the EPFD limits established by the ITU serve as a primary regulatory mechanism to manage this potential for interference.[14] These limits define the amount of interference a GSO network must tolerate from any given NGSO system, as well as from all NGSO systems combined. By adhering to these limits, NGSO systems are considered to have fulfilled their obligation to prevent unacceptable interference with GSO networks. For decades, these EPFD limits have successfully allowed both GSO and NGSO operators to share radiofrequency spectrum, fostering the growth of fixed and mobile broadband and broadcast services globally.

There is, however, a growing consensus that, given significant technological advancements, the effectiveness and efficiency of current EPFD limits need to be reevaluated.[15] The existing rules, provisionally adopted in 1997 and formally in 2000, were developed based on 1990s technology and assumptions, such as a hypothetical 80-satellite system.[16] Modern NGSO constellations, which deploy at a rapid pace, bear little resemblance to these older theoretical systems.

For example, many NGSO and GSO links now use ACM technology, which improves spectrum-sharing capabilities significantly but was not fully considered in the original EPFD framework.[17] Critics argue that the outdated EPFD limits provide more protection than is needed for GSO networks to function.[18] They are therefore spectrally inefficient, unnecessarily constraining NGSO operations and their ability to provide high-speed, low-latency broadband.[19] These constraints can limit radiated power levels, reduce coverage through wide “avoidance angles,” restrict the number of simultaneous satellite beams, and impact coordination options, ultimately hindering the full potential of next-generation satellite systems.[20]

The FCC has recognized that these limits “significantly penalize[]” NGSOs[21] and “directly degrade the efficiency of spectrum use.”[22] While some, such as Viasat, argue that NGSO systems thrive under the current framework and that degrading the limits would impose high costs on GSO networks,[23] others, including Amazon and SpaceX, contend that revising these limits is urgently needed to promote innovation and competition.[24]

The FCC has acknowledged this debate with this NPRM, which seeks to take a “fresh look” at the decades-old spectrum-sharing regime in specific frequency bands and to develop a substantial technical record to ensure efficient spectrum use and a competitive market. This domestic review aims to allow American consumers and industries to benefit from modernized GSO/NGSO sharing as soon as possible, even as international discussions continue.

III. Economic Costs of Current Rules

The current EPFD limits established in the 1990s represent what the FCC has identified as the “single most constraining regulatory requirement” on modern NGSO-satellite systems. These constraints create substantial economic costs that manifest across multiple dimensions of satellite operations and broader market dynamics. The economic burden extends beyond direct compliance costs to encompass opportunity costs, efficiency losses, and reduced incentives for innovation, which together serve ultimately to harm consumer welfare and economic growth.

The current EPFD rules represent a classic example of regulatory failure. While the regulations may have been efficient at the time they were put in place, they have simply not kept pace with economic and technological developments. Over time, they have contributed to significant market distortions, creating deadweight losses that harm overall economic welfare. The current EPFD limits force NGSO systems to operate with artificially constrained power levels, reduced coverage areas, and limited satellite density. These constraints prevent mutually beneficial exchanges between satellite operators and consumers, representing a textbook case of regulatory-induced market failure.

A. Property Rights and the Coase Theorem

The current regulatory framework fails to establish clear and transferable property rights in spectrum use, creating the conditions for inefficient resource allocation. Coase’s seminal work on spectrum allocation demonstrates that, with well-defined property rights and low transaction costs, private parties can negotiate efficient solutions to interference problems.[25] As noted by Doug Brake, writing about terrestrial spectrum:

What we care about are markets driving efficient use of spectrum, not simply efficient allocation of spectrum in the abstract. The initial allocation of rights, however defined, has a profound effect on the structure of and architecture of a particular radio service.

However, the “theorem” formulation—low transaction costs plus well-defined rights equals efficient outcomes—clarifies the two general approaches for policymakers to attack negative externality problems. One can economize on transaction costs and/or clarify the definition of rights. Obviously, work in both areas is good, but there is no reason to think that one single rights definition or level of transaction costs that is ideal for all situations.[26]

By imposing rigid technical constraints that cannot be adjusted through market mechanisms, however, the current EPFD rules prevent negotiations that would lead to efficient solutions that balance interference protection with spectrum utilization. This represents a fundamental misalignment between regulatory structure and the principles of economic efficiency.

B. Opportunity Cost and Resource Misallocation

The current EPFD rules’ full cost is found not only in their direct effects on NGSO operations, but in the opportunity costs they generate—that is, the foregone benefits from more efficient spectrum use. When regulations force NGSO systems to operate inefficiently, they foreclose realization of consumer surplus that would result from more efficient provision of services.

Current EPFD limits force NGSO systems to operate with artificially constrained power levels, creating significant spectrum inefficiencies. Economic research by Harold Furchtgott-Roth demonstrates that these power limitations reduce spectral efficiency by substantial margins, with potential capacity increases of 74% to 180% in different frequency bands under updated rules.[27] These efficiency losses translate directly into higher costs per unit of capacity delivered to consumers, as operators must deploy more satellites and infrastructure to achieve the same service levels. The economic waste inherent in this inefficient spectrum use represents a classic case of regulatory-induced resource misallocation.

The coverage restrictions imposed by current EPFD rules create additional economic costs through reduced service availability and quality. NGSO operators must implement wide “avoidance angles” of the geostationary arc, which reduces system coverage and requires other satellites to compensate for gaps in service.[28] This operational constraint forces operators to maintain larger constellation sizes than would be economically optimal, increasing both capital expenditures and ongoing operational costs. The economic impact extends to consumers who receive degraded service quality or pay higher prices to compensate for these artificial constraints.

The current rules’ satellite-density limitations also impose significant infrastructure cost burdens on NGSO operators. The restrictions on the number of satellites that can simultaneously serve a particular location (Nco) directly limit system capacity and require operators to deploy more expensive solutions to meet demand.[29] Research indicates that one hypothetical NGSO system would require 462 satellites under current rules, compared to just 360 satellites under updated limits—a 28% reduction in required infrastructure.[30] These unnecessary infrastructure costs represent economic waste that ultimately increases consumer prices and reduces service accessibility.

The opportunity-cost framework reveals that current rules impose costs on society by preventing higher-valued uses of spectrum resources. Economic research on spectrum allocation demonstrates that administrative-allocation methods often fail to achieve the efficiency gains possible through market-based approaches. The current EPFD rules exemplify this problem by locking in allocations based on 1990s technology, rather than allowing market forces to determine optimal spectrum use.

C. Transaction Costs and Coordination Failures

Transaction costs are the expenses incurred in process of an economic exchange, including the costs of searching for information, bargaining, and enforcing agreements. With respect to spectrum management, these costs encompass the effort and resources spent on defining usage rights, monitoring compliance, and resolving disputes. The existing EPFD framework, despite its regulatory intent, generates such costs by forcing operators into inefficient practices and complex, often unproductive, interactions.[31]

A significant source of these transaction costs stems from the overprotection of GSO incumbents. As noted above, to comply with these overly restrictive EPFD limits, modern NGSO systems are compelled to operate inefficiently. This includes:

• Limiting their radiated power levels (EIRP), which can degrade signal quality and consistent service;
• Implementing wide “avoidance angles” around the geostationary arc, which force satellites to divert, thereby reducing overall system coverage and making valuable capacity unusable, even in areas where no harmful interference to GSO networks is likely; and
• Restricting the number of satellites that can simultaneously serve a particular ground location (Nco).

The conditions for effective Coasean bargaining are not met in the satellite industry. Satellite licensees generally do not possess the “full property rights” that would encourage efficient transfers or broad negotiations (e.g., they cannot easily benefit from transferring licenses).[32] Furthermore, the sheer number of parties involved in global satellite operations creates prohibitively high transaction costs for direct negotiation.

Scores of systems—including commercial, government, and military operators—are licensed in the EPFD bands. The cost would be “extraordinarily high” for an NGSO system to negotiate EPFD limits with every GSO-satellite owner globally.[33] The absence of widespread, successful negotiations for NGSO operators to compensate GSO operators for degraded EPFD limits suggests that the benefits under the current high-transaction-cost environment do not outweigh the costs.

Moreover, the complexity and opaqueness of the existing system can lead to regulatory gamesmanship. For example, Viasat alleges that some NGSO operators might artificially split systems or manipulate EPFD inputs to achieve “favorable findings” from the ITU that do not accurately reflecting the actual potential for interference.[34] This lack of transparency undermines trust and adds hidden costs to effective spectrum management. Indeed, actual interference may go unaddressed while theoretical compliance is maintained.

Ultimately, these accumulated transaction costs translate into reduced competition and lower consumer welfare. The current rules inhibit competition in the broadband market by limiting NGSO systems’ capabilities and increasing their costs.[35] This restricts the delivery of advanced services to consumers, particularly in unserved and underserved areas where NGSO systems could provide valuable and cost-effective broadband solutions. The economic benefits of updating these rules are estimated to be tens of billions of dollars annually, emphasizing the societal cost imposed by the current framework.[36]

IV. Applying a Law & Economics Framework

The NPRM asks many thoughtful, detailed questions, many of which require large amounts of data and technical analysis. But the core economic question is straightforward: What is the economically efficient level of protection for GSO systems today and in the near future?

Answering this question requires evaluating modern GSO links’ actual capabilities and economic value, rather than relying on outdated assumptions. The NPRM asks crucial questions about how current GSO networks’ ability to share spectrum has changed and what levels of protection they reasonably require, particularly in light of modern technologies like ACM. Overprotection of incumbent GSO systems can impose significant opportunity costs by stifling the growth and innovation of NGSO systems that offer high-speed, low-latency broadband.

As noted above, current EPFD limits are criticized as “overprotective” and that they “unnecessarily limit” NGSO operations, forcing them to adopt strategies like reducing power levels, implementing wide avoidance angles, and restricting the number of simultaneous beams, all of which degrade service quality and capacity. Kuiper, for instance, highlights that current EPFD limits can be hundreds of times more restrictive than interference-to-noise (I/N) ratios recommended by ITU for acceptable interference.[37] This indicates the potential for substantial spectral inefficiency, where valuable spectrum resources are underutilized due to overly conservative rules.

From an economic standpoint, the choice of short-term and long-term protection criteria is critical to balance GSO protection with NGSO innovation and competition. The NPRM’s tentative conclusion that a degraded throughput methodology is more appropriate for GSO operations that use ACM is economically sound.[38] This methodology, already used in NGSO-NGSO sharing and supported by Amazon,[39] accounts for modern system capabilities like ACM, which allows systems to maintain connection—even with signal degradation—by adjusting data rates. Such a performance-based approach, rather than rigid power limits, can foster greater efficiency by protecting actual service quality without unduly constraining the design of NGSO systems.

For GSO links that do not use ACM, the NPRM explores an I/N threshold as an alternative long-term protection criterion.[40] The choice of specific thresholds for both short-term and long-term criteria, whether for degraded throughput or I/N, must be carefully considered to balance incumbent protection with maximizing benefits from NGSO systems. Setting these criteria too restrictively can lead to significant economic costs by limiting NGSO capacity and innovation, while insufficient protection could harm GSO service reliability and revenue streams.

Although some incumbents argue that relaxing EPFD limits would degrade GSO service,[41] the record lacks evidence that current levels of protection are economically justified or proportionate to modern GSO-system resilience. Indeed, ITU recommendations themselves suggest less conservative thresholds (e.g., I/N ratios) than are currently mandated,[42] indicating a disconnect between legacy policy and technical necessity. The important metric, from an economic perspective, is not whether changes to the EPFD limits would cause harm to GSO operators, but whether net consumer welfare is enhanced by the tradeoffs entailed in such a change.

The goal should be to create a more technology-neutral regulatory environment focused on competitive outcomes, rather than outdated technological distinctions. The NPRM suggests, for instance, that allowing NGSO systems to operate at a minimum avoidance angle (e.g., four degrees) from the GSO arc could serve as a reasonable backstop, potentially providing flexibility without requiring highly detailed GSO reference-link evaluations.[43] This type of specific, empirically derived parameter can yield significantly more efficient spectrum use than broad, overly restrictive limits.

Different sharing models create distinct economic incentives. The NPRM asks whether the Commission should require good-faith coordination between GSO and NGSO operators.[44] While some argue that overly protective metrics discourage coordination by giving incumbents undue leverage,[45] a framework that encourages decentralized negotiation and information sharing is often more efficient. Amazon points out that a degraded throughput methodology inherently encourages information sharing, aligning with the Commission’s policy goals.[46] Clear “rules of the road” that define spectrum-usage rights are crucial to prevent a “tragedy of the commons,” where common resources are overexploited without accountability.

Addressing aggregate interference from multiple NGSO systems is a significant economic challenge. If not effectively managed, there is a risk that each individual NGSO system’s emissions, while within single-entry limits, cumulatively cause unacceptable interference to GSO networks. The NPRM questions if an aggregate limit is even necessary, or if its costs might outweigh its benefits, suggesting reliance on coordination.[47] Designing rules that manage aggregate interference efficiently, without unduly restricting individual NGSO operators, is key. This could involve, for example, a framework that facilitates coordination and allows operators to adjust their operations dynamically, rather than imposing rigid, one-size-fits-all limits that might stifle innovation and competition for new entrants.

The NPRM’s request for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is critically important. A thorough economic assessment must quantify both the benefits of less restrictive limits on NGSO operations, as well as the costs potentially imposed on GSO services or terrestrial services. This would align with ICLE’s broader advocacy for deregulation guided by a clear demonstration of net positive value.

Key benefits to quantify include:

• Increased consumer access to broadband: Particularly for unserved and underserved populations in rural areas,[48] modernizing EPFD rules could expand NGSO capacity, enabling more extensive and reliable service coverage.
• Lower service costs and prices: Updating EPFD rules can significantly reduce NGSO system costs by increasing spectral efficiency and potentially reducing constellation sizes. In a competitive market, these cost reductions would be expected to translate to lower prices for consumers.[49]
• Value of innovation and competition: Reducing regulatory burdens and fostering a more dynamic environment would encourage investment in new technologies and services, leading to greater competition in the space sector.[50]
• S. economic growth and leadership in the space sector: Promoting a favorable regulatory environment can enhance the United States’ position as a global leader in space innovation and attract investment.[51]

Key costs to quantify include:

• Potential degradation of GSO services: This encompasses losses in capacity, disruptions to service levels, and the potential to forestall continued technological innovation by GSO networks if interference is not adequately managed.[52] The NPRM asks about expected loss in throughput or increase in unavailability for GSO links.
• Compliance costs: This includes the administrative burdens and financial outlays associated with adhering to any new or modified rules.
• Transition costs: The economic impacts of moving from the current regulatory framework to a new one, including the reevaluation of existing licenses and potential adjustments for operators.
• Administrative costs: This involves the resources the Commission would need to monitor and enforce any new sharing framework effectively, as well as the potential for increased compliance and monitoring costs near international borders.

By thoroughly examining these economic dimensions, the Commission can ensure that its revised rules for satellite spectrum sharing are not only technically sound, but also optimally designed to foster innovation, competition, and widespread consumer benefits, while effectively managing potential harms.

V. Conclusion

The FCC’s efforts to modernize its satellite spectrum-sharing rules come at a pivotal moment for broadband competition and space-based connectivity. The current EPFD framework imposes substantial economic costs, inhibits efficient spectrum use, and constrains the deployment of next-generation NGSO systems. By adopting a more flexible, performance-based regime—one that reflects actual system capabilities and minimizes unnecessary regulatory burdens—the Commission can unlock greater innovation, investment, and consumer benefits. We urge the FCC to act decisively to realign its rules with technological and economic realities, ensuring the continued growth and competitiveness of the U.S. satellite-broadband sector.

[1] In the Matter of Modernizing Spectrum Sharing for Satellite Broadband, SB Docket No. 25-157; Revision of the Commission’s Rules to Establish More Efficient Spectrum Sharing between NGSO and GSO Satellite Systems, RM-11990 (Terminated) (Apr. 28, 2025), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-23A1.pdf.

[2] Id., ¶ 2.

[3] Id., ¶ 1.

[4] Id., ¶ 2.

[5] Id., ¶ 2.

[6] Id., ¶ 5.

[7] Id., ¶ 8.

[8] Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics, In Re: Delete, Delete, Delete, GN Docket No. 25-133 (Apr. 11, 2025), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Delete-Delete-Delete-Comments-r3.pdf.

[9] See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (The FCC was established to help “make available, so far as possible, … a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”); id., § 157(a) (“It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public.”); id., § 303(g) (The Commission shall “[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”); id., § 1302(a) (The Commission is exhorted to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, preamble (The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted “[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”).

[10] ICLE, supra note 8 (“As private enterprises drive innovation in satellite technology and low-earth-orbit (LEO) deployments, overly restrictive or outdated domestic regulations risk ceding American leadership to foreign competitors operating under less burdensome oversight frameworks. Indeed, establishing a regulatory regime that encourages innovation, investment, and competition is critical to ensure continued U.S. dominance in the sector.”).

[11] Randall Berry, Pedro Bustamante, Dongning Guo, Thomas Hazlett, Michael Honig, Ilia Murtazashvili, Scott Palo, & Martin B. H. Weiss, Spectrum Rights in Outer Space: Interference Management for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Broadband Constellations, 14 J. Info. Pol’y 747, 767 (Dec. 2024) (“Of special note are mechanisms to address externalities. Uncompensated interference is an outcome that does not enter an operator’s decision process (much like pollution for power plants prior to emissions caps). This may allow a satellite operator to treat bandwidth as ‘free’ when it is, in fact, contentious (valuable at the margin to other parties), and effectively blocks rival wireless services that could use the bandwidth to produce more value. For social efficiency, rights and regulations should support mechanisms that internalize externalities, prompting actors to face prices that reflect true opportunity costs, or benefits, of given actions.”).

[12] Id., 779.

[13] Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. Econ. 1, 27 (“It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the radio industry should be to minimize interference. But this would be wrong. The aim should be to maximize output. All property rights interfere with the ability of people to use resources. What has to be insured is that the gain from interference more than offsets the harm it produces. There is no reason to suppose that the optimum situation is one in which there is no interference.”)

[14] Berry et al., supra note 11 at 750.

[15] NPRM, supra note 1 at note 44.

[16] Comments of Kuiper Systems LLC, In the Matter of Revision of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Sharing Spectrum Between NGSO and GSO Satellite Systems, Docket No. RM-11990 (Nov. 1, 2024), (“To develop these limits, the ITU studied a set of GSO reference links based on 1990s technology and services—focusing mostly on an 80-satellite NGSO system called Skybridge, initially proposed in 1997.” Skybridge was never deployed and its “technology was out-of-date by the time it was authorized”).

[17] Comments of Kuiper Systems LLC, In the Matter of Office of International Affairs Seeks Comments on Recommendations Approved by The World Radiocommunication Conference Advisory Committee, IB Docket No. 16-185 12 (Apr. 21, 2023).

[18] Id., 12 (“By failing to account for these technological advances, the existing EPFD framework is overly protective to GSO networks and spectrally inefficient, to the detriment of consumers of NGSO services with no added benefit to GSO.”).

[19] Id., 12 (“The current EPFD limits force NGSO systems to reduce power globally even where there are no GSO customers to protect, reducing the capacity available to offer NGSO services to customers in critical need of reliable, low-latency broadband connection that NGSO systems can provide.”).

[20] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 11.

[21] Id., at note 49.

[22] Id., ¶ 11.

[23] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 9; see also Coleman Bazelon & Paroma Sanyal, Unacceptable Interference: Economic Analysis Does Not Support Degrading Protections for GSO Networks, Brattle Group (Oct. 26, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4634764 (“NGSO operators are successfully deploying systems within the framework established by the existing EPFD limits, and NGSO deployment has thrived under the current EPFD limits.”).

[24] Kuiper Comments, supra note 16 6-9. NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 10.

[25] Coase, supra note 13; see also Berry et al., supra note 11 at 778 (“If transaction costs are low and access rights are clearly defined, regardless of their specific forms, the Coase Theorem suggests that rights will end up in their most socially beneficial configuration.”)

[26] Doug Brake, Coase and WiFi: The Law and Economics of Unlicensed Spectrum, Inf. Technol. Innov. Found. (Jan. 2015), available at https://www2.itif.org/2015-coase-wifi.pdf.

[27] Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The Economic Benefits of Updating Regulations that Unnecessarily Limit Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Systems, SSRN (Aug. 13, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4538619.

[28] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 11.

[29] Id.

[30] Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27, A-4 (“NGSO operators today are paying a 28% premium to fly additional satellites needed to offer 100 percent continuity of service while also meeting the conservative short-term protection objectives prescribed in the current epfd limits”).

[31] See, e.g., Bazelon & Sanyal, supra note 23 at 7 (reporting that, while NGSO operators could offer to compensate GSO operators to accept higher levels of interference, they have not done so); see also Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The Economic Benefits of Updating Regulations That Unnecessarily Limit Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Systems: Part II, SSRN (Nov. 2023), at 9 https://ssrn.com/abstract=4649941 (“The Brattle Group Report does not cite an example of successful negotiation between an NGSO and all GSOs globally over epfd rules, and I am not aware of any.”).

[32] Furchtgott-Roth, id., 8.

[33] Id., 9.

[34] Ensuring Innovation and Growth Opportunities in the New Space Age, Viasat (Mar. 2024), 10, 34, available at https://www.viasat.com/content/dam/us-site/corporate/documents/Ensuring%20Innovation%20and%20New%20Opportunities%20in%20the%20New%20Space%20Age%20(Updated%20March%2013%202024)(A4).pdf.

[35] Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27 at 1 (“The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) equivalent power flux-density (epfd) rules crafted 25 years ago limit the capacity and effectiveness of NGSO fixed-satellite service (FSS) systems, reducing the availability and increasing the cost of services provided by NGSO FSS systems.”).

[36] Id., 2.

[37] Kuiper Comments, supra note 16 at 4 (“Recommendation ITU-R S.1432 states that NGSO system interference should be no more than 25% of the clear sky system noise. As the Petition for Rulemaking points out, that equates to a -6 dB interference-to-noise ratio (‘I/N’) limit, whereas applying the ITU’s EPFD limits to downlinks in the 10.7 GHz band yields limits that are 3.5 to 12 times more restrictive. Even worse, the ITU’s EPFD limits to downlinks in the 19.7-20.2 GHz band yield an I/N limit of -30.41 dB, 276 times more restrictive than the S.1432 standard.”)

[38] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 25.

[39] Amazon Degraded Throughput Ex Parte Letter Final, Kuiper Systems LLC (Sep. 23, 2022), available at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10923537518950/1.

[40] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 26.

[41] Viasat, supra note 34 at 8-9.

[42] Kuiper Comments, supra note 16.

[43] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 28.

[44] Id.

[45] Amazon, supra note 39 (“an overly protective I/N metric… disincentivizes coordination by providing the incumbent undue leverage over the new entrant”).

[46] Id. (“It is true that additional, non-public information can enable even more efficient spectrum sharing by making this analysis more precise. While such information is not necessary to perform the degraded throughput analysis, the ability for operators to share additional non-public information and conduct this analysis with even greater precision is yet another reason that this methodology is well-suited to a regulatory framework aimed at coordination. That a degraded throughput methodology encourages information sharing in pursuit of spectral efficiency is a feature—not a flaw—that is entirely consistent with the Commission’s policy goals in this proceeding. As the Commission noted in this proceeding, ‘information sharing among NGSO FSS operators is essential to their efficient use of spectrum.’ What is more, the Commission’s rules already require NGSO FSS operators to coordinate in good faith, and these discussions often involve sharing far more information than required to conduct a degraded throughput analysis.”)

[47] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 30.

[48] NPRM, supra note 1 ¶ 3; Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27 at 2 (“Updating 25-year-old epfd rules would provide tens of billions of dollars of benefits to customers around the world, particularly to the 2 billion people not yet connected to the Internet.”)

[49] Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 27 at 8 (“Updating 25-year-old epfd rules would provide tens of billions of dollars of benefits to customers around the world, particularly to the 2 billion people not yet connected to the Internet.”)

[50] Statement of Brendan Carr, NPRM, supra note 1; Kuiper Comments, supra note 16 (“In short, initiating a rulemaking to reevaluate NGSO-GSO spectrum sharing would provide significant benefits—increased spectral efficiency, higher-quality service, more capacity for remote and rural operations, more efficient spectrum use, more innovation and competition, and more investment in next-generation technologies—while still protecting GSO operations from unacceptable interference.”)

[51] Id.

[52] Bazelon & Sanyal, supra note 23, A-4; Viasat, supra note 34 at 8.