Spotlight

The Role of Antitrust and Pole-Attachment Oversight in TVA Broadband Deployment

Ben Sperry, Geoffrey A. Manne, & Kristian Stout • August 2, 2023

I. Introduction As part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), signed by President Joe Biden in November 2021, Congress provided $42.5 billion for . . .

I. Introduction

As part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), signed by President Joe Biden in November 2021, Congress provided $42.5 billion for broadband deployment, mapping, and adoption projects through the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program, with the stated goal of directing the funds to close the so-called “digital divide.”[1] But actions by pole owners—such as refusing to allow broadband companies to attach their lines on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms—threaten to slow broadband deployment significantly.

In a recent letter to Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter, Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) put forth the argument that the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) should take action to address abuses of the pole-attachment process by local power companies (LPCs) regulated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).[2] His concern is that such abuses threaten to slow broadband deployment, especially to rural areas served by the TVA and the LPCs.[3] Among the abuses he details are:

Delaying or refusing to negotiate pole-attachment agreements with competitive broadband-service providers, including when the TVA LPC provides broadband service (itself or through a joint venture agreement) or is interested in doing so;
Initially refusing to negotiate pole-attachment agreements that would enable competitive broadband-service providers to obtain permits in sufficient time to meet federal grant deadlines;
Refusing to review pole-attachment applications on a scale or at the pace necessary to complete broadband projects in a timeframe required by federal grant programs;
Refusing to follow the standard industry practice of approving a contractor to process pole-access applications in a timely manner when the utility’s staff is insufficient to do the work, even when the broadband-service provider is willing to pay the entire bill for the contractor; and
Refusing to process pole-attachment applications at all, and failing to respond to provider outreach regarding the processing of applications for months on end.[4]

Section 224 of the Communications Act exempts municipal and electric-cooperative (“coop”) pole owners, such as the LPCs, from oversight by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).[5] At the same time, the TVA’s authority over pole attachments is not subject to oversight by state governments.[6] This loophole means that it is the TVA, not the FCC, that sets the rates for pole attachments. The TVA’s rates are significantly higher than those of the FCC, [7] and the TVA’s LPCs often are able to avoid the access requirements that states and the FCC typically require.[8]

But avoiding state and FCC regulatory oversight is not the only loophole that the TVA and its LPCs can exploit: the TVA and the government-owned LPCs also may not be subject to antitrust law. These entities hold a resource critical for broadband deployment, while it is essentially impossible for private providers to build competing pole infrastructure. In situations like this, government entities that participate as firms in the marketplace—known in the literature as “state-owned enterprises” (SOEs)—should be subject to antitrust law in order to ensure access by private competitors.

Sen. Lee is correct that the DOJ should examine the practices of the TVA and its LPCs under antitrust law. Antitrust clearly applies to those LPCs that are private coops, which have no immunities. But Congress should clarify that the TVA and government-owned LPCs are likewise subject to antitrust law when they act according to their “commercial functions” or as “market participants.” They should also consider bringing the TVA and all of its LPCs under the purview of the FCC’s Section 224 authority over pole attachments.

II. The Law & Economics of State-Owned LPCs and Rural Electrical Cooperatives (RECs)

A. The Competition Economics of State-Owned Enterprises

SOEs’ incentives differ from those of privately owned businesses. Most notably, while a private business must pass the profit-and-loss test, SOEs often are not subject to the same constraints. This difference may manifest through setting up legal SOE monopolies against which no other firm can compete; exempting SOEs from otherwise generally applicable laws; extending explicit subsidies to SOEs, whether in the form of taxpayer-financed appropriations or government-backed bonds (which the government explicitly or implicitly promises to repay, if necessary); or cross-subsidies from other government-owned monopoly businesses.

As a result, SOEs do not need to maximize profits (with Armen Alchian’s caveat that private market participants may be modeled as profit maximizers even if that isn’t their true motivation[9]) and can pursue other goals. In fact, this is exactly why some supporters of SOEs like them so much: they can pursue the so-called “public interest” by providing ostensibly high-quality products and services at what are often below-market prices.[10]

But this freedom comes at a cost: not only can SOEs inefficiently allocate societal resources away from their highest-valued uses, but they may actually have greater incentive to abuse their positions in the marketplace than private entities. As David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak put it:

[W]hen an SOE values an expanded scale of operation in addition to profit, it will be less concerned than its private, profit-maximizing counterpart with the extra costs associated with increased output. Consequently, even though an SOE may value the profit that its anticompetitive activities can generate less highly than does a private profit-maximizing firm, the SOE may still find it optimal to pursue aggressively anticompetitive activities that expand its own output and revenue. To illustrate, the SOE might set the price it charges for a product below its marginal cost of production, particularly if the product is one for which demand increases substantially as price declines. If prohibitions on below-cost pricing are in effect, an SOE may have a strong incentive to understate its marginal cost of production or to over-invest in fixed operating costs so as to reduce variable operating costs. A public enterprise may also often have stronger incentives than a private, profit-maximizing firm to raise its rivals’ cost and to undertake activities designed to exclude competitors from the market because these activities can expand the scale and scope of the SOE’s operations.[11]

Here, entities like the TVA and many of the government-owned LPCs that sell the electricity it produces are simply not subject to the same profit-and-loss test that a private power company would be. But even more importantly for the discussion of broadband buildout, many of these government-owned LPCs also provide broadband services (or intend to), effectively using their position as a monopoly provider of electricity to cross-subsidize their entry into the broadband marketplace. Moreover, LPCs often own the electric poles and control decisions about whether and at what rates to rent them to third parties (subject to TVA rate regulations), including to private broadband providers that may compete with the LPCs’ municipal-broadband offerings.

This raises two significant issues for competition policy:

Because government-owned municipal-broadband providers focus on speed and price, rather than profitability, they can sometimes offer greater speeds at lower prices than private providers, deterring private buildout and competition using what, in other contexts, would be referred to as “predatory pricing” (e., the government can use its unique monopoly advantages to indefinitely set prices too low)[12]; and
LPCs that offer municipal-broadband services can raise rivals’ costs by refusing to deal with private broadband providers that want to attach equipment to their poles (an “essential facility” or “critical input”) or by offering access only on unreasonable and discriminatory terms.

In Verizon Communication Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP,[13] the U.S. Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind a very limited duty to deal under antitrust law:

Compelling… firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.[14]

In sum, a private market participant is constantly looking to acquire monopoly power by innovating and better serving customers, and temporary monopolies—acquired through a legitimate competitive process—are not unlawful. If successful, this process provides incentive for more innovation and competition, including incentives for competitors to build their own infrastructure.

But this is not so when it comes to SOEs, which can prevent competition in a way that private market participants cannot, due to their special access to legal mechanisms like eminent domain, taxes, below-market-rate loans, government grants of indefinite monopolies, and cross-subsidies from their own monopolies in adjacent markets. As a result, SOEs possess both special ability and incentive to raise rivals’ costs through refusals to deal or predatory pricing.

Ironically, the lack of a profit motive may make SOEs uniquely positioned to harm competition. Thus, it may make sense to impose on SOEs a duty to deal on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms when it comes to pole attachments.

B. The Economics of Co-Ops[15]

According to the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the trade association for rural electricity co-ops (RECs):

Co-ops serve 56% of the U.S. landmass and 88% of the nation’s counties, including 93% of the 353 persistent poverty counties.
They account for roughly 13% of all electricity sold in the United States.
More than 90% of electric co-ops serve territories where the average household income is below the national average. One in six co-op consumer-members live at or below the poverty line.
Cooperatives serve an average of eight consumer-members per-mile of electric line, but this average masks the extremely low-density population of many co-ops. If the handful of large co-ops near cities were removed, the average would be lower.
More than 100 electric cooperatives provide broadband service and more than 200 co-ops are exploring the option and conducting feasibility studies to do so.[16]

There are some important differences between electric co-ops and investor-owned power companies. Most importantly, co-ops are owned by their consumers. Economics helps explain why this form of organization could be pro-competitive in some situations, but the history of RECs suggests that government support and corporate rules particular to co-ops are the main reasons that we continue to rely on co-ops to distribute electricity in rural areas of the United States. As a result, RECs—especially those that distribute electricity generated and transmitted by the TVA—have incentives more like those of state-owned enterprises (SEOs) than private firms.

In other words, RECs also have the incentive and ability to act anticompetitively—e.g., by refusing to deal with private broadband providers who wish to attach to the poles they own.

1. Why Do We Have So Many RECs?

The classic law & economics examination of firms’ choice of business organization comes from Henry Hansmann, in his book The Ownership of Enterprise.[17] He explained that the choice of ownership for any firm is driven by costs. The form that is chosen by a particular firm is that which “minimizes the total costs of transactions between the firm and all of its patrons.”[18] These costs include both transaction costs with those patrons who are not owners, and the costs of ownership, such as monitoring and controlling the firm.

Hansmann argued that the form of consumer-owned co-ops predominates in the distribution of electricity in rural areas because it is a response to the threat of natural monopoly, where high barriers to entry and startup costs suggest that one firm is likely to dominate.[19] This is particularly true in geographic areas with low population density, because the costs of building out infrastructure is extremely high per individual consumer. As such, consumers would likely be subject “to serious price exploitation if they were to rely on market contracting with an investor-owned firm.”[20] Thus, the choice is among rate regulation of an investor-owned utility, municipal ownership, or consumer ownership through a co-op.

Hansmann argued that consumer co-ops best align “the firm’s interests with those of its consumers” because they have lower overall costs than other forms of ownership in rural areas.[21] This is because electricity is a “highly homogeneous [commodity] with few important quality variables that affect different users differently.”[22] Moreover, relatively stable farm and nonfarm residential households account for the overwhelming majority of the membership and demand for electricity in rural areas, “creating a dominant group of patrons with relatively homogenous interests.”[23]

As a result, the costs of monitoring and controlling these natural monopolies are relatively lower for the consumers as owners than they would be as citizens overseeing a public utility commission in charge of regulating an investor-owned utility, or a board in charge of a municipally owned utility.

On the other hand, the history of RECs suggests that their formation and persistence may be more due to government intervention than as a market response to consumer demand. As Hansmann himself recognized, RECs received significant public subsidies in the form of below-market loans from the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), though he argues that these loans were not significant subsidies for the first 15 years); exemption from federal corporate income tax; and preferential access to power generated by the TVA.[24] On top of that, the REA essentially organized many co-ops in their early days.[25]

Nonetheless, Hansmann argues:

These subsidies have undoubtedly been important in encouraging the formation and growth of cooperative utilities, and therefore the great proliferation of rural electric cooperatives does not provide an unbiased test of the viability of the cooperative form. Evidently, however, the federal subsidies have not been critical to the success of cooperatives in the electric power industry. Even before the federal programs were enacted, there already existed forty-six rural electric cooperatives operating in thirteen different states. Also, as already noted, there was no net interest subsidy to the cooperatives for the first fifteen years of the REA. And in its early years, the REA also offered low-interest loans to investor-owned utilities that wished to extend service into rural areas, but found little interest in these loans among the latter firms.[26]

In an excellent 2018 law-review article, however, Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas, & Harwell Wells systematically detail the great lengths to which the REA went to organize co-ops in rural areas.[27] The authors convincingly argue that the co-op model was not adopted as a market response, but primarily due to the REA’s organizational efforts and the subsidies bestowed upon them.

Even if RECs were a market response to natural monopoly in rural areas at the time of their adoption, that does not mean that they would necessarily continue to be the most economically efficient model. At a given point of time, economies of scale and high costs of entry may mean that the market can only support one firm (i.e., natural monopoly). But over the last 80-90 years, underlying conditions that may have made co-ops the most efficient model may have changed. As we argued in a 2021 white paper:

[I]n any given market at a given time, there is likely some optimal number of firms that maximizes social welfare. That optimal number—which is sometimes just one and is never the maximum possible—is subject to change, as technological shocks affect the dominant paradigms controlling the market. The optimal number of firms also varies with the strength of scale economies, such that consumers may benefit from an increase in concentration if economies of scale are strong enough… And it is important to remember that the market process itself is not static. When factors change—whether a change in demographics or population density, or other exogenous shocks that change the cost of deployment—there will be corresponding changes in available profit opportunities. Thus, while there is a hypothetical equilibrium for each market—the point at which the entry of a new competitor could reduce consumer welfare—it is best to leave entry determinations to the market process.[28]

In fact, as Jeter, Thomas, & Wells go on to argue, rules particular to the co-op model make it nearly impossible to change the form of ownership through merger or acquisition.[29] These rules—adopted as part of the model acts promoted by the REA—prevent what the great Henry Manne called “the market for corporate control” that would otherwise discipline co-op managers.[30]

As has been noted by even the strongest supporters of the co-op model[31]—and seemingly undermining Hansmann’s assessment that consumer-ownership is the most effective form of organization for these entities—RECs suffer from a lack of oversight by consumer-owners, with very few ever showing up to even vote for their board of directors:

[32]

This lack of oversight from the ownership means that the board of directors can engage in all kinds of abuses, as detailed extensively by Jeter, Thomas, & Wells.[33]

Without sufficient incentives for oversight by consumer-owners or a functioning market for corporate control, there is no basis to conclude that RECs remain the best business model for distributing electricity. Their ubiquity is more due to the REA’s organizational efforts and ongoing government benefits—in the form of subsidies, tax exemptions, and preferences from the TVA—than market demand.

2. The Competition Economics of RECs and Pole Attachments

Due to the privileged position enjoyed by RECs, particularly those that distribute electricity from the TVA, they have a unique ability and incentive to act anticompetitively toward broadband providers that want to attach to the poles they own.

Much like municipally owned electricity distributors, RECs are not motivated solely by profit maximization. RECs also have similar advantages, like access to eminent domain, below-market loans, tax exemptions, and the ability to cross-subsidize entry into a new market (like broadband) from its dominant position in electricity distribution.

On the other hand, unlike municipally owned electricity distributors, RECs can go out of business, and thus must earn sufficient revenues to remain a going concern. This means that the incentives for RECs to act anticompetitively are at least as strong as those of investor-owned firms, and may be even as strong as those of state-owned enterprises. This is especially notable, when so many RECs either have entered or are planning to enter the broadband market.

In such cases, there are strong incentives for RECs to refuse to deal with private broadband providers that are trying to deploy in—and introduce competition to—their rural areas, as Sen. Lee’s (R-Utah) recent letter to the U.S. Justice Department suggests, many of these co-ops have done exactly that.[34]

The economic logic that drives a limited duty to deal under antitrust law is that enforced sharing rarely makes sense because it reduces the incentives to build infrastructure. [35] But creating new rural infrastructure (like poles) is cost-prohibitive—at least, without the same subsidies, eminent-domain power, and other advantages that RECs have historically enjoyed. Thus, RECs may rightfully have a duty to deal with broadband providers on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis.

Moreover, many RECs receive little oversight from rate regulators when it comes to pole attachments. And when they do, like those RECs that distribute electricity from the TVA, the formula allows for much higher rates than the FCC would allow.[36] As a result, pole costs are much higher for broadband companies dealing with poles owned by co-ops and municipalities that are not subject to the FCC’s authority (see Figure II).[37]

III. The Complicated Nature of Antitrust Immunities

There is, however, a complication. In his letter to the DOJ, Sen. Lee rightly complains that:

TVA’s regulatory practices enable such behavior: there is no reason why TVA’s regulation of the pole rental rates charged by its LPCs requires TVA to somehow exempt those LPCs from generally-applicable rules that protect competition by requiring pole owners to provide pole access to third parties on reasonable terms. TVA should be using its authority over LPC distribution contracts to require LPCs to offer reasonable, non-discriminatory, and prompt pole access to third-party broadband providers (particularly recipients of taxpayer-funded broadband grants) in unserved areas, rather than giving its LPCs a free pass from those requirements.[38]

Unfortunately, while Lee’s letter is addressed to the DOJ’s antitrust chief, it isn’t clear whether antitrust laws even apply to the behavior he observes. This is primarily because of two legal doctrines: federal sovereign immunity from lawsuit and state-action immunity from antitrust.

A. Federal Sovereign Immunity and the TVA

Normally, the federal government is immune from lawsuit under the ancient (and deeply flawed[39]) doctrine of sovereign immunity, except where explicitly waived by statute. The TVA is a wholly owned corporate agency and instrumentality of the federal government. Thus, federal courts have typically found that the TVA and other federal entities operating in the marketplace are exempt from antitrust.[40] This is despite the fact that the TVA’s enabling statute states:

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, the Corporation… may sue and be sued in its corporate name.[41]

There is, needless to say, nothing in the chapter that actually says the agency can’t be sued for antitrust violations. The older cases finding the TVA to be exempt from antitrust are likely to be found wrongly decided under the logic of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent case dealing with TVA’s immunity from suit. In 2019, the Court took up Thacker v. TVA,[42] which asked whether the TVA was immune from lawsuits for negligence. The Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning that the TVA was immune for torts arising from its “discretionary functions,” substituting a new test as to whether the TVA was acting pursuant to its governmental function or a commercial function. As the Court stated:

Under the clause—and consistent with our precedents construing similar ones—the TVA is subject to suits challenging any of its commercial activities. The law thus places the TVA in the same position as a private corporation supplying electricity. But the TVA might have immunity from suits contesting one of its governmental activities, of a kind not typically carried out by private parties.[43]

The Court also gave examples to help distinguish the two:

When the TVA exercises the power of eminent domain, taking landowners’ property for public purposes, no one would confuse it for a private company. So too when the TVA exercises its law enforcement powers to arrest individuals. But in other operations—and over the years, a growing number—the TVA acts like any other company producing and supplying electric power. It is an accident of history, not a difference in function, that explains why most Tennesseans get their electricity from a public enterprise and most Virginians get theirs from a private one. Whatever their ownership structures, the two companies do basically the same things to deliver power to customers.[44]

The test to be applied, therefore, is “whether the conduct alleged to be negligent is governmental or commercial in nature… if the conduct is commercial—the kind of thing any power company might do—the TVA cannot invoke sovereign immunity.”[45] Here, that arguably means that, when the TVA is acting pursuant to its commercial function, it should not receive immunity from antitrust suit.

On the other hand, Congress gave the TVA broad ratemaking authority and contractual powers. One federal court (previous to Thacker) rejected an antitrust challenge to the TVA’s ratemaking formula because it was a “valid governmental action and [therefore] exempt from the antitrust laws of the United States.”[46]

As noted above, some LPCs have entered into the municipal-broadband market and act as competitors to private broadband companies who want to attach to poles owned by LPCs. Thus, even though competition economics would suggest that LPCs would have a greater incentive to raise rivals’ costs by charging a monopoly price, the TVA would likely argue that it is acting in its government function when it sets those rates.[47] If courts agree, then antitrust law would not be able to reach that problem.

Consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Thacker, however, courts could find that antitrust law reaches agreements between wholesalers (like the TVA) and retailers (like the LPCs) to charge certain rates for pole attachments to competitors in an adjacent market. This would arguably be an example of the TVA acting as any other power generator would, pursuant to its commercial function, through some type of price-maintenance agreement. As it stands, it isn’t clear which way the courts would go.

Congress should strongly consider clarifying that the TVA is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny when it acts pursuant to a commercial function, including when it sets anticompetitive rates for pole attachments that would slow broadband buildout. This clearly affects the market for access to LPC-owned utility poles.

B. State Action Immunity and the LPCs

Even if the commercial versus government distinction is clarified with respect to the TVA, there is a further wrinkle as it relates to antitrust scrutiny of LPCs. This concerns how the TVA’s actions interact with state-action immunity in antitrust law.

Grounded in the 10th Amendment, the Supreme Court has found there is immunity from antitrust laws for conduct that is the result of “state action.”[48] This doctrine has been interpreted to immunize anticompetitive conduct pursuant to state and local government action from antitrust claims, so long as “the State has articulated a clear … policy to allow the anticompetitive conduct, and second, the State provides active supervision of [the] anticompetitive conduct.”[49] When it comes to municipalities, however, the Court has found that “[o]nce it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to require the State to supervise actively the municipality’s execution of what is a properly delegated function.”[50]

The Supreme Court has also left open the possibility of an exception to state-action immunity when government entities themselves are acting as market participants.[51] In one case dealing with a local municipally owned power plant in Louisiana, the Supreme Court did not grant broad immunity from antitrust laws, in part because:

Every business enterprise, public or private, operates its business in furtherance of its own goals. In the case of a municipally owned utility, that goal is likely to be, broadly speaking, the benefit of its citizens. But the economic choices made by public corporations in the conduct of their business affairs, designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader interest of national economic well-being than are those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders.[52]

While there are a few cases applying this distinction in lower federal courts,[53] there is no Supreme Court caselaw determining how to differentiate when, for the purposes of state-action immunity, municipal corporations act as market participants versus when they act as government entities. Jarod Bona and Luke Wake have proposed applying a test similar to the one the courts use in dormant Commerce Clause cases.[54] The distinction made by the Supreme Court in Thacker and discussed above may also be applicable.

Government-owned LPCs are creatures of states or municipalities. As such, they would certainly argue they are immune from antitrust scrutiny, even when they refuse to deal with private broadband providers with whom they compete while withholding a critical input (i.e., the ability to attach to their poles). But there are two problems with this argument.

First, it seems unlikely that the LPCs could argue that they are acting pursuant to a clearly articulated policy of displacing competition when they refuse to deal with broadband providers. As Sen. Lee pointed out in his letter, there are state laws that would impose a duty to deal on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, but for any exemptions to that authority due to the TVA.[55] For instance, North Carolina and Kentucky require all pole owners not subject to FCC Section 224 authority to offer nondiscriminatory pole access.[56]

On the other hand, they could appeal to the TVA’s contract authority,[57] in addition to the TVA’s stated policy that its purpose is “to provide for the … industrial development” of the Tennessee Valley.[58] But even if this grants the TVA authority to regulate rates for pole attachments, it doesn’t mean the TVA has enunciated an articulable policy of displacing competition in refusing to deal with broadband providers. It also would appear to be contrary to the purpose of promoting industrial development to forestall broadband deployment in the Tennessee Valley because LPCs that also have municipal-broadband systems don’t want that competition. In other words, their refusal to deal is not protected by an appeal to any articulable policy to displace competition, either by a state or the TVA.

Second, under the caselaw that does exist, government-owned LPCs are market participants that should not receive antitrust immunity. For instance, in one case, a private arena owner challenged under antitrust law an exclusive contract between a municipal-arena owner and LiveNation.[59] The court held that state-action immunity was “less justified” because the municipality’s “entertainment contracts” reflected “commercial market activity,” not “regulatory activity.”[60] Here, the LPCs’ actions as both power companies and municipal-broadband providers reflect commercial-market activity more than regulatory activity. They shouldn’t be able to claim immunity from antitrust for this refusal to deal, any more than a private broadband provider could.

In sum, the LPCs’ anticompetitive refusal to deal appears to be separate from the rates set by the TVA pursuant to its ratemaking authority or contractual powers. They should be subject to antitrust law. But due to uncertainty in this area, Congress should clarify that LPCs are not immune from antitrust scrutiny, and consider codifying the market-participant exception to state-action immunity in antitrust statutes.

IV. Section 224 of the FCC Act

In his letter, Sen. Lee noted that, under Section 224 of the Communications Act, “Congress determined that poles and conduits are essential facilities that lack a viable market-based alternative, which led it to require utilities to extend nondiscriminatory access to utility poles to cable operators and competitive telecommunications providers.”[61] While acknowledging that TVA distributors are not subject to Section 224, Lee argued that “the congressional conclusion that poles are essential facilities that lack a viable market-based alternative holds for all poles.”[62] Lee further noted that the “TVA’s regulation of its LPCs’ pole attachment rates also impedes competition by setting rates well above the rates set by the FCC and deemed compensatory by the U.S. Supreme Court, inflating the cost for competitive broadband providers unaffiliated with TVA LPCs to offer service.”[63]

Theoretically, government-owned LPCs and cooperative LPCs are subject to some oversight when they run services like municipal broadband, either from voters or member-owners. But it is implausible that such oversight can be truly effective, given that these pole owners are not subject to normal market incentives and have their own conflicts of interest that encourage hold-up problems. Combined with their ability to cross-subsidize operations in broadband from their electricity customers, it should be clear that these entities pose a host of potential public-choice problems.[64]

Indeed, as FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr has noted:

I continue to hear concerns from broadband builders about unnecessary delays and costs when they seek to attach to poles that are owned by municipal and cooperative utilities. Unlike what we are doing in today’s item, there is a strong argument that Section 224 does not give us authority to address issues specific to those types of poles. Therefore, I encourage states and Congress to take a closer look at these issues—and revisit the exemption that exists in Section 224—so that we can ensure deployment is streamlined, regardless of the type of pole you are attaching to.[65]

We echo both Sen. Lee’s and Commissioner Carr’s sentiments here. The FCC’s important work on this matter stands to benefit millions of Americans trapped on the wrong side of the digital divide. The co-op and municipal loophole poses a major obstacle to achieving these ends. Insofar as Congress prioritizes quick and efficient broadband buildout, the TVA and its LPCs should not be able to thwart these goals through anticompetitive rates and refusals to deal. Congress should revisit this issue and grant the FCC jurisdiction over these types of pole owners.

V. Conclusion

Sen. Lee’s letter to the DOJ highlights issues that are extremely important to closing the digital divide. Broadband deployment could be harmed as a result of the practices by the TVA and the LPCs. If DOJ Antitrust Division chief Jonathan Kanter is serious about taking on gatekeeper power,[66] he should start here: with public entities granted a truly unassailable gatekeeper position over private markets. But even more importantly, Sen. Lee’s letter highlights the need to reform antitrust immunities that apply to SOEs. Economics suggests government monopolies are a greater harm to competition than private ones. Antitrust law should reflect that reality.

Appendix A: Sen Mike Lee Letter to DOJ

[1] 47 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2018).

[2] See, infra, Appendix A [hereinafter “Lee Letter”].

[3] Broadband Assessment Report, Tennessee Valley Authority (Dec. 2022), https://www.tva.com/energy/technology-innovation/connected-communities/broadband-assessment-report.

[4] See Lee Letter, supra note 2, at 1-2.

[5] See 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1) (2018) (“The term ‘utility’ means any person who is a local exchange carrier or an electric, gas, water, steam, or other public utility, and who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications. Such term does not include any railroad, any person who is cooperatively organized, or any person owned by the Federal Government or any State.”).

[6] See Lee Letter, supra note 2, at n.2.

[7] Pole Attachment Fee Formulas Adopted by TVA and the FCC, Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Jan. 2017), available at https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tacir/commission-meetings/january-2017/2017January_BroadbandAppL.pdf.

[8] See Lee Letter, supra note 2, at n.4.

[9] See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 211 (1950).

[10] See, e.g., Jonathan Sallet, Broadband for America’s Future: A Vision for the 2020s, at 50-51 (Oct. 2019), available at https://www.benton.org/sites/default/files/BBA_full_F5_10.30.pdf.

[11] David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises, 71 Antitrust L.J. 479, 499 (2003).

[12] See Ben Sperry, Islands of Chaos: The Economic Calculation Problem Inherent in Municipal Broadband, Truth on the Market (Sept. 3, 2020), https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/09/03/islands-of-chaos-the-economic-calculation-problem-inherent-in-municipal-broadband.

[13] 540 U.S. 398 (2004).

[14] Id. at 408-09.

[15] This section is adapted from Ben Sperry, Broadband Deployment, Pole Attachments, & the Competition Economics of Rural-Electric Co-ops, Truth on the Market (Aug. 16, 2023), https://truthonthemarket.com/2023/08/16/broadband-deployment-pole-attachments-the-competition-economics-of-rural-electric-co-ops.

[16] See Brian O’Hara, Rural Electrical Cooperatives: Pole Attachment Policies and Issues, at 2, NRECA (Jun. 2019), available at https://www.cooperative.com/programs-services/government-relations/regulatory-issues/documents/2019.06.05%20nreca%20pole%20attachment%20white%20paper_final.pdf.

[17] Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (2000).

[18] Id. at 21.

[19] See id. at 169.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 170.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] See id. at 173

[25] See id.

[26] Id.

[27] See Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas, & Harwell Wells, Democracy and Dysfunction: Rural Electrical Cooperatives and the Surprising Persistence of the Separation of Ownership and Control, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 316, 372-395 (2018).

[28] Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout, & Ben Sperry, A Dynamic Analysis of Broadband Competition: What Concentration Numbers Fail to Capture, at 28, 32 (ICLE White Paper – June 2021), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/A-Dynamic-Analysis-of-Broadband-Competition.pdf.

[29] Jeter et al., supra note 27, at 419-39.

[30] See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965).

[31] See John Farrell, Matt Grimley, & Nick Stumo-Langer, Report: Re-Member-ing the Electric Cooperative, Inst. For Local Self-Reliance (Mar. 29, 2016), https://ilsr.org/report-remembering-the-electric-cooperative/#Missing%20Members (“More than 70 percent of cooperatives have voter turnouts of less than 10 percent [] including Wilson’s Jackson Energy Cooperatives, which averages just under 3 percent turnout.”).

[32] Id.

[33] Jeter et al., supra note 27, at 397-400.

[34] See Lee Letter, supra note 2, at 1-2.

[35] See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09.

[36] See Pole Attachment Fee Formulas Adopted by TVA and the FCC, supra note 7.

[37] See NCTA, Pole Attachments, https://www.ncta.com/positions/rural-broadband/pole-attachments (last accessed Sept. 4, 2023).

[38] Lee Letter, supra note 2, at 2.

[39] See Ben Sperry, When Violations of the Law Have No Remedy: The Case of Warrantless Wiretapping, Competitive Enterprise Institute (Aug. 8, 2012), https://cei.org/blog/when-violations-of-the-law-have-no-remedy-the-case-of-warrantless-wiretapping.

[40] See, e.g., Webster Cty. Coal v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 476 F.Supp. 529 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (finding the TVA is exempt from antitrust law); Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) (finding the Alaska Railroad exempt from antitrust law).

[41] 16 U.S.C. §831c(b) (2018).

[42] 139 S. Ct. 1435 (2019).

[43] Id. at 1439.

[44] Id. at 1443-44.

[45] Id. at 1444.

[46] City of Loudon v. TVA, 585 F.Supp. 83, 87 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 1984).

[47] The TVA could also argue that the rate formula for pole attachments that it sets is subject to the filed rate doctrine and thus exempted from antitrust scrutiny. The filed rate doctrine does not allow courts to second-guess agency determinations of rates. See Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). While the original case on the filed rate doctrine dealt with the literal situation of regulated entities filing rates which were approved by a regulator, courts have extended the doctrine to other situations where a regulator uses its authority to set rates. Cf. Wortman v. All Nippon Airways, 854 F.3d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 2017) (“While the filed rate doctrine initially grew out of circumstances in which common carriers filed rates that a federal agency then directly approved, we have applied the doctrine in contexts beyond this paradigmatic scheme.”) The unique situation with the TVA is that there is no clear statutory ratemaking authority over pole attachments, but they have asserted the ability to do so under their contract powers, raising the same issue of whether this is a governmental function or market function. See TVA Determination of Regulation on Pole Attachments 2 (Jan. 22, 2016), available at https://tva-azr-eastus-cdn-ep-tvawcm-prd.azureedge.net/cdn-tvawcma/docs/default-source/about-tva/guidelines-reports/determination-on-regulation-of-pole-attachments-7-12-2023.pdf. Even if the filed rate doctrine applies, though, it would not stop an enforcement action aimed at an injunction or declaratory relief by the DOJ, just treble damages sought by a private litigant. See Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162 (“[T]he fact that these rates had been approved by the Commission would not, it seems, bar proceedings by the Government.”).

[48] See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) and its progeny.

[49] North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 506 (2015) (internal citations omitted).

[50] Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).

[51] See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991) (“We reiterate that, with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state action is ‘ipso facto… exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws…’”); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4 (“An amicus curiae contends that we should recognize and apply a ‘market participant’ exception to state-action immunity because Georgia’s hospital authorities engage in proprietary activities… Because this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the lower courts, we do not consider it.”).

[52] City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 403 (1978).

[53] See, e.g., Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 2017); VIBO Corp. v. Conway, 669 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2012); Freedom Holdings Inc. v. Cuomo, 624 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2010); Hedgecock v. Blackwell Land Co., 52 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1995).

[54] See Jarod M. Bona & Luke A. Wake, The Market-Participant Exception to State-Action Immunity from Antitrust Liability, 23 J. Antitrust & Unfair Comp. L. Section of the State Bar of Ca., Vol. 1 (Spring 2014), available at https://www.theantitrustattorney.com/files/2014/05/Market-Participant-Exception-Article.pdf.

[55] See Lee Letter, supra note 2, at 2.

[56] Id. at n.4; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-350(a) (requiring all pole owners to offer non-discriminatory pole access); 807 Ky. Admin. Regs. 5:015 § 2(1) (same).

[57] 16 U.S.C. § 831i (2018) (“Board is authorized to include in any contract for the sale of power such terms and conditions, including resale rate schedules, and to provide for such rules and regulations as in its judgment may be necessary or desirable for carrying out the purposes of this Act”).

[58] 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2018).

[59] See Delta Turner Ltd. v. Grand Rapids-Kent County Convention/Arena Authority, 600 F.Supp.2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 2009).

[60] Id. at 929.

[61] Lee Letter, supra note 2, at n.5.

[62] Id.

[63] Id. at n.3.

[64] See Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices, in Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance (1979) (“[I]nstitutions designed to overcome problems of market failure often manifest serious deficiencies of their own. Market failures are not necessarily corrected by recourse to public sector solutions.”).

[65] Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, WC Docket No. 17-84, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (March 16, 2022) (Statement of Commissioner Brendan Carr), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-20A3.pdf.

[66] See, Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter Delivers Opening Remarks at the Second Annual Spring Enforcers Summit, U.S. Justice Department (Mar. 27, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/assistant-attorney-general-jonathan-kanter-delivers-opening-remarks-second-annual-spring (“Gatekeeper power has become the most pressing competitive problem of our generation at a time when many of the previous generations’ tools to assess and address gatekeeper power have become outmoded.”).

SHORT FORM WRITTEN OUTPUT

When Greg Werden Talks, the Courts May Be Expected to Listen

Alden Abbott • August 29, 2023

Among the many public-interest comments submitted on the draft merger guidelines proposed by the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were those . . .

Among the many public-interest comments submitted on the draft merger guidelines proposed by the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were those of Gregory Werden, who has been a visiting scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University since late 2022.

Why is Greg’s filing special? Simply put, he is the leading expert on the history and technical analysis of modern merger guidelines, having worked on the 1982, 1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010 versions as a senior DOJ antitrust economist. He has authored numerous scholarly articles assessing the competitive analysis of mergers and explaining the content of prior guidelines.

Premerger Notification Proposal Faces a Rocky Path

Gus Hurwitz • August 28, 2023

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced proposed changes to Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification form. This proposal, alongside proposed changes to federal merger guidelines, is part of the Biden Administration’s more aggressive approach to U.S. merger law. Although the merger guideline revisions are receiving most of the attention, the proposed HSR premerger notification form revisions could well have the more substantial lasting impacts.

FDA Largely to Blame for Physicians’ Misperceptions on Nicotine

Roger Bate • August 21, 2023

Back in 2020, an academic paper suggested that over 80% of US physicians mistakenly thought that nicotine was a carcinogen. The implication of this finding was that . . .

Back in 2020, an academic paper suggested that over 80% of US physicians mistakenly thought that nicotine was a carcinogen. The implication of this finding was that perhaps physicians considered vaping (and even nicotine replacement therapy) almost as dangerous as smoking. But physicians are busy people, and I wondered if some, maybe most, might have misunderstood the question in the survey and assumed the researchers were asking about smoking.

Sen. Luján Relying on Flawed Study to Claim Broadband Discrimination

Eric Fruits & Ben Sperry • August 20, 2023

Mark Twain once said “there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” This has never been more true than in the debate . . .

Mark Twain once said “there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.”

This has never been more true than in the debate over whether there are disparities in access to broadband internet due to racial discrimination.

In a recent letter to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), U.S. Sen. Ben Ray Luján, D-N.M., chair of the U.S. Commerce Committee’s broadband subcommittee, urged the commission to move quickly to adopt new rules to prohibit such digital discrimination.

Antitrust at the Agencies Roundup: The Cat’s Tuches of Summer Edition

Daniel J. Gilman • August 18, 2023

I had thought we were in the dog days of summer, but the Farmer’s Almanac tells me that I was wrong about that. It turns out that . . .

I had thought we were in the dog days of summer, but the Farmer’s Almanac tells me that I was wrong about that. It turns out that the phrase refers to certain specific dates on the calendar, not just to the hot and steamy days that descend on the nation’s capital in . . . well, whenever they do (and not just before Labor Day, that’s for sure). The true dog days, it turns out, are July 3-Aug. 11, no matter the weather. So maybe this is just the cat’s tuches of summer, as if that makes it better.

Data Security & Privacy

States Must Overcome Numerous Hurdles Before BEAD Will Be Able to Succeed

Kristian Stout • August 18, 2023

As part of the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that President Joe Biden signed in November 2021, Congress allocated $42.45 billion to create the Broadband . . .

As part of the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that President Joe Biden signed in November 2021, Congress allocated $42.45 billion to create the Broadband Equity Access and Deployment program, a moonshot effort to close what has been called the “digital divide.” Alas, BEAD’s tumultuous kickoff is a vivid example of how federal plans can sometimes become a tangled web, impeding the very progress they set out to champion.

Red Tape and Headaches Plague BEAD Rollout

Eric Fruits • August 17, 2023

While the dog days of August have sent many people to the pool to cool off, the Telecom Hootenanny dance floor is heating up. We’ve . . .

While the dog days of August have sent many people to the pool to cool off, the Telecom Hootenanny dance floor is heating up. We’ve got hiccups in BEAD deployment, a former Federal Communications Commission (FCC) member urging the agency to free-up 12 GHz spectrum for fixed wireless, and another former FCC commissioner urging a rewrite of the rules governing low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites.

It’s been less than two months since the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced state funding under the Broadband Equity Access and Deployment (BEAD) program. Already, states are grumbling about implementation headaches.

A Comparison of US and UK Physicians Advice on Nicotine and Vaping

Roger Bate • August 17, 2023

In 2020, an academic paper suggested that more than 80% of U.S. physicians mistakenly thought that nicotine was a carcinogen. The implication of this finding was that . . .

In 2020, an academic paper suggested that more than 80% of U.S. physicians mistakenly thought that nicotine was a carcinogen. The implication of this finding was that perhaps physicians thought vaping (and even nicotine-replacement therapy) to be almost as dangerous as smoking. But physicians are busy people and I suggest that some, maybe most, might have misunderstood the question in the survey and assumed the researchers were asking about smoking.

To test this hypothesis, I surveyed physicians to learn more about their actual knowledge and opinion. Additionally, the UK government is more supportive of vaping and other nontraditional nicotine-replacement therapies than U.S. government, so a comparison of UK and U.S. physicians was undertaken to see if government policy and advice affects physician knowledge and opinion.

I find that most physicians correctly recognize that nicotine does not cause cancer, but that far more U.S. physicians than UK physicians still believe that it is carcinogenic. Additionally, vaping is viewed far more positively as a smoking-cessation tool by the surveyed UK physicians than surveyed U.S. physicians, and this is partly caused by the mistaken stance by U.S. health authorities.

Read the whole piece here.

Competition Increases Concentration

Brian Albrecht • August 16, 2023

A market with 1,000 tiny sellers is not some ideal market. Concentration can be extremely beneficial, leading to economies of scale and stiffer competition to . . .

A market with 1,000 tiny sellers is not some ideal market. Concentration can be extremely beneficial, leading to economies of scale and stiffer competition to win a big share of the market.

Yet the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) draft merger guidelines double down on the idea that concentration is inherently a problem. They add new structural presumptions against concentration, for both horizontal and vertical mergers. Even worse, the agencies won’t recognize any efficiencies “if they will accelerate a trend toward concentration.”

The problem? Concentration is not a good proxy for competition. This post will go through some of the empirical work that generally finds that competition increases concentration. The FTC/DOJ are completely at odds with the economic literature on this point.

Broadband Deployment, Pole Attachments, & the Competition Economics of Rural-Electric Co-ops

Ben Sperry • August 16, 2023

In our recent issue brief, Geoffrey Manne, Kristian Stout, and I considered the antitrust economics of state-owned enterprises—specifically the local power companies (LPCs) that are government-owned . . .

While we noted that electricity cooperatives (co-ops) do not receive antitrust immunities and could therefore be subject to antitrust enforcement, we didn’t spend much time considering the economics of co-ops. This is important, because electricity co-ops themselves own a large number of poles and attaching to those poles at reasonable rates will be important to effectuate congressional intent to deploy broadband quickly in the rural areas those co-ops generally serve.

The FT Misunderstands the Economics of Credit-Card Markets

Todd J. Zywicki & Julian Morris • August 15, 2023

In a recent piece for the Financial Times, Brendan Greeley argues that the misnamed Credit Card Competition Act would reduce inflation. In it, Greeley recycles numerous myths about the nature . . .

In a recent piece for the Financial Times, Brendan Greeley argues that the misnamed Credit Card Competition Act would reduce inflation. In it, Greeley recycles numerous myths about the nature of credit-card markets that have long been rebutted by serious economic research. Both theory and ample evidence from the United States and other countries shows that attempting artificially to force down interchange fees is bad for consumers—especially those with lower incomes and those who revolve their balances. Moreover, these interventions simply redistribute the costs of operating the payment-card system; they do not eliminate them. As a result, they won’t reduce inflation, as Greeley imagines.

FTC Should Allow Kroger-Albertsons Merger to Go Through

Eric Fruits & Geoffrey A. Manne • August 13, 2023

There has been growing speculation about whether the Federal Trade Commission will seek to challenge the $24.6 billion merger that Cincinnati-based Kroger and Idaho-based Albertsons announced in October 2022. The combined company would be the third-largest food and grocery retailer, behind Walmart and Amazon. Based on the draft merger guidelines the FTC recently announced jointly with the U.S. Justice Department, as well as recent comments from FTC Chair Lina Khan, those reading the tea leaves expect the agency will move to block the merger, even if the companies offer to spin off stores to competing chains.

Will the USF Survive the 5th Circuit?

Eric Fruits • August 11, 2023

The Telecom Hootenanny is back from a little summer break. As they say on AM radio: “If you miss a little, you miss a lot.” . . .

The Telecom Hootenanny is back from a little summer break. As they say on AM radio: “If you miss a little, you miss a lot.” So rather than trying to catch up, let’s focus on some of the latest news from the telecom dancefloor. For this edition of the Hootenanny: we’ve got a big-time challenge to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) heating up in the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals; an upgrade to the rapidly running-out-of-money Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP); and some big contrasts in how states plan to use their Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program funds. Read the full piece here.

Antitrust at the Agencies Roundup: Kill All the Widgets Edition

Daniel J. Gilman • August 4, 2023

Over the river, into the woods, and down into the weeds we go. There’s a whole lot of drama going on at the Federal Trade . . .

Over the river, into the woods, and down into the weeds we go.

There’s a whole lot of drama going on at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), not least because of recent correspondence between the U.S. House Oversight Committee and FTC Chair Lina Khan that might politely—euphemistically, really—be termed “heated.” But I’m not gonna go there today. I had a bit to say about the new draft merger guidelines in my last roundup, but I barely scratched the surface. And I’m not going there either.

The FTC’s Gambit Against Amazon: Navigating a Multiverse of Blowback and Consumer Harm

Lazar Radic & Geoffrey A. Manne • August 3, 2023

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is reportedly poised some time within the next month to file a major antitrust lawsuit against Amazon—the biggest yet against . . .

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is reportedly poised some time within the next month to file a major antitrust lawsuit against Amazon—the biggest yet against the company and the latest in a long string of cases targeting U.S. tech firms (see, for example, here and here). While specific details of the suit remain largely unknown and subject to changes up to the 11th hour, according to Politico, the FTC’s multi-pronged case is likely to focus on three aspects… Read the full piece here.

Antitrust and FCC Oversight Are Needed to Promote Broadband Deployment in the Tennessee Valley

Ben Sperry • August 2, 2023

In late June, Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter arguing that the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) needs to investigate the . . .

In late June, Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter arguing that the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) needs to investigate the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and its local power companies (LPCs) on grounds that abuses of the pole-attachment process appear to be slowing broadband deployment.

Does ‘Open Finance’ Promote Competition or Facilitate Free Riding?

Mario A. Zúñiga • August 2, 2023

Financial technology, or so-called “fintech,” is disrupting the financial sector, and that’s a good thing. Fintech services are making finance more digital and more user-friendly. . . .

Financial technology, or so-called “fintech,” is disrupting the financial sector, and that’s a good thing. Fintech services are making finance more digital and more user-friendly. This, in turn, has led to reduced transactions costs and increased levels of competition, innovation, and financial inclusion.

Alas, the emergence of fintech has also been accompanied by a rising chorus of the usual “if it’s good, mandate it; if I don’t like it, forbid it” reasoning that has motivated so many prior waves of regulatory intervention. The resulting regulations may be well-intentioned, but they more often than not lead to unintended consequences.

Law and Political Economy

Thierry Kirat & Frédéric M. Marty • July 28, 2023

Definition Law and political economy (hereafter LPE) is a rapidly expanding field grounded on a critical discussion of law and economics (and its “market fundamentalism”) . . .

Definition

Law and political economy (hereafter LPE) is a rapidly expanding field grounded on a critical discussion of law and economics (and its “market fundamentalism”) within the legal community. According to Aber and Parker (2022), LPE “is a critical approach to law that is focused on the way that purportedly neutral legal rules shape economic power, disguise the political and ideological choices behind inequality, and insulate “the economy” from democratic control.”

TL;DR: SHORT FORM POLICY INSIGHTS

Competition in the Market for Groceries

Eric Fruits & Dirk Auer • August 15, 2023

Background: In October 2022, supermarkets Kroger and Albertsons announced their intent to merge in a $24.6 billion deal. The combined company would be the third-largest . . .

Background: In October 2022, supermarkets Kroger and Albertsons announced their intent to merge in a $24.6 billion deal. The combined company would be the third-largest food and grocery retailer, behind Walmart and Amazon, and would account for roughly 9% of nationwide sales. Based on the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) recently released draft merger guidelines and comments by FTC Chair Lina Khan, it appears likely that the agency will move to block the merger, even if the companies offer to divest stores to competing chains.

But… If the FTC does seek to block the deal, it will face an uphill battle. The retail industry has changed dramatically over the past few decades. Partly due to the tremendous growth of supercenters, club stores, and online retail, U.S. consumers are no longer “one-stop shoppers.” These market changes have placed tremendous competitive pressure on traditional retail.

Some of the deal’s critics have also raised concerns about the prospect of monopsony power in labor markets, but these claims are speculative at best and unlikely to hold up in court.

AMERICANS AREN’T ONE-STOP SHOPPERS

The FTC has for decades clung to a narrow definition of supermarkets that includes only those stores that allow consumers to buy nearly all of their weekly food and grocery needs in a single trip. This definition encompasses traditional food and grocery retailers, such as Kroger and Albertsons, as well as supercenters with grocery sections, such as some Walmart and Target stores. But critically, the FTC’s definition excludes warehouse clubs like Costco and e-commerce services like Amazon.

The FTC’s hypothetical customer is no longer typical. Grocery shopping has shifted toward more frequent shopping trips across various formats, including not only warehouse clubs and e-commerce services, but online-delivery platforms like Instacart; limited-assortment stores like Trader Joe’s and Aldi; natural and organic markets like Whole Foods; and ethnic-specialty stores like H Mart.

Due to these enormous changes, the market definition used in earlier FTC consent orders likely will be, and should be, challenged. This means there are fewer geographic areas where the deal would lead to problematic post-merger market positions.

COMPETITION FROM SUPERCENTERS, CLUB STORES, & ONLINE RETAIL

Over the past 25 years or so, warehouse clubs and supercenters like Walmart have doubled their share of retail sales, while supermarkets’ share has dropped by more than 25%. Indeed, according to data from the industry magazine Progressive Grocer, if the merger goes through, Kroger/Albertsons will still be about 50% smaller than Walmart.

Along similar lines, online shopping and home delivery have grown from niche services that served only 10,000 households nationwide a quarter century ago to a scenario in which 12.5% of U.S. consumers now purchase groceries mostly or exclusively online.

Amazon is now the second-largest food and grocery retailer in the United States. Meanwhile, millions of consumers use delivery services like Instacart to purchase food and groceries from supermarkets, supercenters, club stores, wholesalers, and ethnic markets.

These new businesses place significant competitive pressure on traditional retailers, making the prospect of post-merger market power even more unlikely.

MISPLACED LABOR-MARKET CONCERNS

Some opponents of the merger argue that it would lead to monopsony power in labor markets and depress supermarket employee wages. But these concerns are overblown and will be nearly impossible to demonstrate if the merger were to be litigated.

The market for labor in the retail sector is highly competitive, with workers having a wide range of alternative employment options. More importantly, both Kroger and Albertsons are highly unionized firms. Through their collective-bargaining agreements, these unions exert their own market power.

THE HAGGEN FIASCO: LESSONS LEARNED

Finally, some point to Haggen’s disastrous acquisition of stores spun-off from the Albertsons/Safeway merger as evidence that divestitures don’t work. But several factors idiosyncratic to Haggen and its acquisition strategy led to that failure, rather than the divestiture itself.

Before it acquired the stores, Haggen was a small regional chain with only 18 stores, mostly in Washington State. In addition, buying the stores left Haggen’s owners heavily in debt.

These issues could—and should—have been addressed when the FTC and the merging parties were negotiating their consent order. Today’s enforcers should thus learn from the Haggen experience—by devising workable remedies—rather than view it as a justification to reject reasonable divestiture options.

For more on this issue, see the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) issue brief “Five Problems with a Potential FTC Challenge to the Kroger/Albertsons Merger.”

Innovation & the New Economy

AI Regulation Needs a Light Touch

Eric Fruits • August 14, 2023

Background: Artificial intelligence—or “AI”—is everywhere these days. It powers our smartphones, cars, homes, and entertainment. It helps us diagnose diseases, teach children, and create art. . . .

Background: Artificial intelligence—or “AI”—is everywhere these days. It powers our smartphones, cars, homes, and entertainment. It helps us diagnose diseases, teach children, and create art. It promises to revolutionize every aspect of our lives, for better or worse.

But … How should public policy respond to this powerful and rapidly evolving force? How should we ensure that AI serves our interests and values, rather than undermining or subverting them?

Some observers and policymakers fear that AI could pose existential threats to humanity, such as unleashing rogue superintelligences, triggering mass job losses, or sparking global wars. They argue that governments should take a prescriptive approach to AI regulation to preempt speculated threats.

Some argue that we need to impose strict and specific rules on AI development and deployment, before it is too late. In a recent U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman suggested that the United States needs a central regulator for AI.

However … This approach is likely to be both misguided and counterproductive. Overregulation could stifle innovation and competition, depriving us of the benefits and opportunities that AI offers. It could put some countries at a disadvantage relative to those that pursue AI openly and aggressively. It could also stifle learning from AI and developing better AI.

ADOPT AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH

A more sensible and effective approach to oversight is to pursue an adaptive framework that relies on existing laws and institutions, rather than creating new regulations, agencies, and enforcement mechanisms.

There are already laws, policies, agencies, and courts in place to address actual harms and risks, rather than hypothetical or speculative ones. This is what we’ve done with earlier transformative technologies like biotech, nanotech, and the internet. Each has been regulated by applying existing laws and principles, such as antitrust, torts, contracts, and consumer protection.

In addition, an adaptive approach would foster international dialogue and cooperation, which have been essential for establishing norms and standards for emerging technologies.

AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH DOES NOT MEAN COMPLACENCY

Pursuing an adaptive approach does not mean that we should be complacent or naive about AI. Where the technology is misused or causes harm, there should be actionable legal consequences. For example, if a real-estate developer intentionally used AI tools to screen out individuals from purchasing homes on the basis of protected characteristics, that should be actionable. If a criminal found a novel way to use ChatGPT to commit fraud, that should be actionable. If generative AI is used to create “deep fakes” that amounts to libel, that should be actionable. But in each of these cases, it is not the AI itself that is the relevant unit of legal analysis, but the actions of criminals and the harms they cause.

Ultimately, it would be fruitless to try to build a regulatory framework that would make it impossible for bad actors to misuse AI. Bad actors will always find ways to misuse tools, and heavy-handed regulatory requirements would chill the development of the very AI tools that could combat misuse.

DON’T NEGLECT THE BENEFITS

If history is any guide, it is likely that AI tools will allow firms and individuals to do more with less, expanding their productivity and improving their incomes.

By freeing capital from easily automated tasks, existing firms and new entrepreneurs could better focus on their core business missions. For example, investments in marketing or HR could be redeployed to R&D. At this point, we have little idea how AI will be used by people and firms. And more importantly, neither do politicians, policymakers, or regulators.

OVER-REGULATION WOULD INCREASE MARKET POWER

Overly burdensome AI regulation would likely hinder the entry and growth of new AI firms. For example, as an established player in the AI market, it should be no surprise that OpenAI’s CEO would favor a strong central regulator that can impose entry barriers on newcomers. It is well-known in both law and economics that incumbent firms can profit from raising their rivals’ regulatory costs.

This dynamic can create strong strategic incentives for industry incumbents to promote regulation and can lead to a cozy relationship between agencies and incumbent firms in a process known as “regulatory capture.”

CONCLUSION

The key challenge confronting policymakers lies in navigating the dichotomy of mitigating actual risks posed by AI, while simultaneously fostering the substantial benefits it offers.

To be sure, AI will bring about disruption and may provide a conduit for bad actors, just as technologies like the printing press and the internet have done in the past. This does not, however, merit taking an overly cautious stance that would suppress many of the potential benefits of AI.

Policymakers must eschew dystopian science-fiction narratives and instead base policy on realistic scenarios. Moreover, they should recognize the laws, policies, and agencies that already have enormous authority and power to find and punish those who misuse AI.

For more on this issue, see the International Center for Law & Economics’ (ICLE) response to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s AI Accountability Policy, as well as ICLE’s response to the similar inquiry from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

AMICUS BRIEFS

ICLE and Antitrust Scholars Brief in FTC v Amgen

Alden Abbott, Brian Albrecht, Donald Boudreaux, Daniel J. Gilman, et al • August 24, 2023

Brief for Amici Curiae International Center For Law & Economics and 11 Scholars of Antitrust Law and Economics in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ . . .

Brief for Amici Curiae International Center For Law & Economics and 11 Scholars of Antitrust Law and Economics in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Amici Curiae respectfully submit this brief in support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 130).[1]

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. ICLE promotes the use of law and economics methodologies, and economic findings, to inform public policy. ICLE has longstanding expertise in antitrust law, and a strong interest in the proper development of antitrust jurisprudence. ICLE thus routinely files amicus briefs in cases, like this one, presenting important issues of antitrust law. ICLE is joined
by 11 scholars of antitrust law and economics (listed in the Appendix to this brief ).

INTRODUCTION

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. Congress used the word “may” to “indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). The government thus need not wait for anticompetitive conduct to occur before seeking relief. Id. at 317-18. Still, the government must show a “ ‘reasonable likelihood ’ of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market.” United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 622 (1974) (emphasis added).

But—as Yogi Berra might have paraphrased Nils Bohr—it can be “tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Enforcers and courts thus traditionally approach merger control with caution. Deciding whether to block a merger requires making predictions about its likely impact on competition and consumers. That requires evaluating both the likely future state of the market given the transaction and the “but for” world in which it does not take place, often with limited (but nonetheless sufficiently substantial) information and imperfect (but ideally well-tested) tools.

For decades, courts and enforcers have looked to economic principles to develop a set of considerations to inform and constrain such decision-making. Three of them are especially relevant here: the distinctions among horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers; the distinction between structural and behavioral threats to competition; and the distinction between structural and behavioral remedies. In challenging Amgen’s proposed acquisition of Horizon, the Federal Trade Commission elides all three established distinctions. It instead seeks to block a likely procompetitive conglomerate merger based on harms supposed to arise from a chain of conjectured post-transaction events, where each link in the chain is highly speculative. It is unlikely that they will all come to pass and cause the competitive harm the FTC posits. There is no sound economic basis for blocking the merger here and forfeiting its likely procompetitive benefits. Because the antitrust theory alleged in the complaint lacks merit, the FTC cannot establish the “likelihood of success” necessary for a preliminary injunction. FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1981).

[1] No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief, and no person other than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to fund its preparation or submission.

Amicus of Securities Law Scholars Supporting Summary Judgment in SEC v Coinbase

M. Todd Henderson & Stephen M. Bainbridge • August 11, 2023

INTRODUCTION To determine whether the tokens traded on Coinbase and through Prime constitute unregistered “securities,” this Court must determine whether these “unusual instruments not easily . . .

INTRODUCTION

To determine whether the tokens traded on Coinbase and through Prime constitute unregistered “securities,” this Court must determine whether these “unusual instruments not easily characterized as ‘securities,’” Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 690 (1985), are “investment contracts,” and, as such, are one of the enumerated types of “securities” covered by the Securities Act of 1933, see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Section 2(a)(1) of the “1933 Act”), and the Exchange Act of 1934, see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (Section 3(a)(10) of the “Exchange Act”).

The answer requires the application of the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), which held that an offering in a Florida citrus grove coupled with the right to receive a share of the grove’s profits constituted an “investment contract”—and hence a security—because it “involve[d] an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Howey, 328 U.S. at 301; see also Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). This test is meant to “embod[y] the essential attributes” of a “security.” United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).

In Howey, the Court held that by including “investment contract” in the federal securities statutes, Congress used a term with a well-settled meaning based on judicial interpretations of state blue-sky laws. As a result, to assist the Court in assessing how “investment contract” was understood by Howey and at the time of the federal securities statutes’ enactment, amici offer their analysis of how the term was interpreted in the state blue-sky laws. That analysis makes clear that an arrangement is an “investment contract” only if the investor receives, in exchange for an investment, a contractual undertaking or right to an enterprise’s income, profits, or assets. That core notion has carried through in the federal cases since Howey.

COMMENTS & STATEMENTS

Joint Letter to State Department, NTIA, & FCC Supporting Changes to Improve LEO Satellite Coexistence

ICLE • August 28, 2023

Dear Chairwoman Rosenworcel, Assistant Secretary Davidson, and Ambassador Fick: Through investment and advances in next-generation satellite technologies the American satellite industry is experiencing unprecedented growth. . . .

Dear Chairwoman Rosenworcel, Assistant Secretary Davidson, and Ambassador Fick:

Through investment and advances in next-generation satellite technologies the American satellite industry is experiencing unprecedented growth. Satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) are delivering high-speed broadband and offering connectivity solutions that address the long-standing digital divide in the U.S. and globally. Now more than ever, it is imperative for the federal government to promote this promising technology and continue to support the acceleration of a competitive satellite broadband industry that enables the U.S. to maintain its leadership in space and satellite technology.

Broadband connectivity, both at home and across the globe, is essential for including all communities in the modern digital economy. Millions of Americans continue to lack access to broadband at home. Globally, approximately 3 billion people do not have home internet access. The benefits of universal connectivity would not just be felt by those who lack access now – expanding connectivity creates a “rising tide” phenomenon in communities, encouraging improvement across industries. We believe that LEO satellite broadband offers great potential to help bridge the global digital divide.

Satellite broadband offers particular promise in connecting the unconnected because it now offers high-capacity throughput and a quality user experience without the geographical barriers to deployment that can create high costs and long delays for wireline service. For geographically or topographically difficult-to-reach communities, LEO broadband offers a solution that requires only a customer terminal and access to sky. Additionally, U.S. research and development are leading the way in the advancement of the LEO industry. The U.S. has long been ahead of the curve on space development and exploration, and we are home to a robust private sector space industry.

With such rapid innovation and investment across the satellite space, it is important that the U.S. government continue to strengthen American leadership in this sector. The Federal Communications Commission and National Telecommunications and Information Administration should implement policies that foster competition and innovation that benefit both consumers and the U.S. economy more broadly. Although this technology and market has been pioneered by American companies, LEO constellations are inherently global, making U.S. leadership at bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL) vital to a thriving industry and U.S. interests.

Accordingly, we urge you to prioritize LEO NGSO systems and policies by expanding spectrum access and leveling the playing field between LEOs and incumbent technologies. For example, LEO systems rely entirely on shared spectrum, which makes it critical to modernize outdated ITU coexistence criteria to ensure more efficient and equitable access to shared spectrum resources for both LEO and GSO networks. Such a policy environment will give consumers more options, promote innovation, lower costs and, most importantly, enable many more people to connect to the internet both at home and globally.

LEO satellite broadband is revolutionizing connectivity and offering a solution for fast, reliable internet to every community. We believe your prioritization of LEO broadband, both at home and abroad, will help unleash a new wave of global connectivity. We look forward to partnering with you to support bridging the digital divide.

ICLE Statement on FTC-Amgen Settlement

R.J. Lehmann & Geoffrey A. Manne • September 1, 2023

PORTLAND, Ore. (Sept. 1, 2023) – In light of Amgen Inc.’s announced agreement with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and attorneys general from six U.S. states settling challenges . . .

PORTLAND, Ore. (Sept. 1, 2023) – In light of Amgen Inc.’s announced agreement with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and attorneys general from six U.S. states settling challenges to the company’s planned acquisition of Horizon Therapeutics, the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) offers the following statement from ICLE President Geoffrey A. Manne:

“This is the result that ICLE and 11 antitrust law and economics scholars recommended in our brief to the court. The FTC suit to stop the merger was clear overreach.

“The FTC had no chance to win. This is a clear admission of that fact. Every recent merger settlement with the FTC has included a provision requiring that all future mergers get prior approval from the FTC. In this settlement, prior approval is required only for those drugs that compete directly with the Horizon drugs. This would never have been allowed anyway, as those drugs have no competitors currently.”

ICLE’s amicus brief is available to download here. To schedule an interview with Geoff Manne or other ICLE scholars, contact R.J. Lehmann at [email protected] or (908) 265-5272.

The Law and Economics of Privacy

Daniel J. Gilman & Liad Wagman • August 27, 2023

Consumer welfare has been a north star of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), providing an organizing principle for diverse issues under the Commission’s dual . . .

Abstract

Consumer welfare has been a north star of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), providing an organizing principle for diverse issues under the Commission’s dual competition and consumer protection missions and, specifically, a uniform ground on which to examine the law and economics of privacy matters and the tradeoffs that privacy policies entail. This paper provides the first contemporary literature synthesis by former FTC staff that brings together the legal and economics literatures on privacy. Our observations are the following: (a) privacy is a complex subject, not a simple attribute of goods and services or a simple state of affairs; (b) privacy policies entail complex tradeoffs for and across individuals; (c) the economic literature finds diverse effects, both intended and unintended, of privacy policies, including on competition and innovation; (d) while there is diverse and growing evidence of the costs of privacy policies, countervailing benefits have been understudied and, as of yet, empirical evidence of such benefits remains slight; and (e) observed costs associated with omnibus policies suggest caution regarding one-size-fits-all regulation.

Data Security & Privacy

‘Killer Acquisitions’ Reexamined: Economic Hyperbole in the Age of Populist Antitrust

Jonathan Barnett • August 25, 2023

Abstract

Major competition regulators, and substantial portions of the scholarly community, have rapidly adopted the view that “killer acquisitions” and “kill zones” constitute significant sources of competitive risk arising from incumbent acquisitions of emerging firms in digital markets. Based on this view, policymakers in the United States, European Union, and other jurisdictions have advocated, and in some cases have taken, substantial changes to merger review policies that would erect significant obstacles to incumbent/startup acquisitions. A review of the relevant body of
evidence finds that these widely-held views concerning incumbent/startup acquisitions rest on meager support, confined to ambiguous evidence drawn from a small portion of the total universe of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical market and theoretical models of acquisition transactions in information technology markets. Moreover, the emergent regulatory and scholarly consensus fails to take into account the rich body of evidence showing the critical function played by incumbent/startup acquisitions in supplying a monetization mechanism that induces venture-capital investment and promotes startup entry in technology markets. The prospect of an acquisition transaction in the case of technical and commercial success generally promotes innovation and competition by providing a transactional device that expands startups’ access to the capital inputs required to undertake R&D and the commercialization services required to convert R&D outputs into commercially viable products. At the same time, these acquisitions enable incumbents to access the specialized innovation capacities of smaller firms. Proposed changes to merger review standards would disrupt these efficient transactional mechanisms and are likely to have counterproductive effects on competitive conditions in innovation markets.

Markups and Business Dynamism Across Industries

Brian Albrecht & Ryan A. Decker • August 22, 2023

Evidence of rising market power in the U.S. economy has received widespread attention in macroeconomics literature. Recent research has linked trends in measured market . . .

Abstract

Evidence of rising market power in the U.S. economy has received widespread attention in macroeconomics literature. Recent research has linked trends in measured market power to other secular trends in the U.S., including multi-decade trends of declining rates of job reallocation and business entry (or “business dynamism”). Intuitively, firms with more market power are less responsive to shocks, and industries characterized by market power may have (or create) significant barriers to entry. Both forces predict a negative correlation between market power and business dynamism. However, industry-level data shows zero, or often a positive, correlation between markups and business dynamism; industries that experienced larger increases in markups had smaller decreases in dynamism on average. Those few industries that saw both large declines in markups and large declines in dynamism do not account for a significant share of the aggregate trends in markups and dynamism. Our results suggest that market power does not explain the decline in dynamism.

Intellectual Property & Licensing

IP Rights Delayed are IP Rights Denied

Alexander Raskovich, Douglas Ginsburg, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Tad Lipsky, et al • August 16, 2023

The EC has proposed a regulatory framework for SEPs, the heart of which is the establishment of a regulatory authority—a “competence center”—charged with maintaining . . .

Abstract

The EC has proposed a regulatory framework for SEPs, the heart of which is the establishment of a regulatory authority—a “competence center”—charged with maintaining a registry of SEPs with detailed information drawn from required submissions by SEP holders and “administering a system for essentiality checks and processes for aggregate royalty determination and FRAND determination.” The proposal’s stated aim is to facilitate licensing negotiations between SEP holders and implementers, applying a balanced approach towards the bargaining parties. The approach is highly unbalanced, however. It would sharpen incentives for holdout by implementers and thereby substantially weaken SEP holders’ ability to appropriate the value of their IP. In particular, implementers would be empowered to substantially delay requests by SEP holders for injunctive relief against infringement in national courts of law. It is a truism that justice delayed is justice denied. Likewise, IP rights delayed are IP rights denied. Beyond delay, the Proposal would entirely bar the recovery of some losses from infringement in certain circumstances. As a result, the practical effect of the Proposal would be to induce licensing disputes where there would otherwise have been none, supplanting private bargaining with a less well-informed and inefficient administrative process that would materially depress incentives for innovation and standardization.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Without the Benefits or the Analysis: How Not to Draft Merger Guidelines

Luke M. Froeb, D. Daniel Sokol, & Liad Wagman • August 14, 2023

Previous iterations of the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines have articulated a clear, rigorous, and transparent methodology for balancing the pro-competitive benefits of mergers against their . . .

Abstract

Previous iterations of the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines have articulated a clear, rigorous, and transparent methodology for balancing the pro-competitive benefits of mergers against their anticompetitive costs. By describing agency practice, guidelines facilitate compliance, ensure consistent and reasonable enforcement, increase public understanding and confidence, and promote international cooperation.

But the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines do not. They go to great lengths to articulate the potential anticompetitive costs of mergers but with no way to gauge “substantiality.” Most significantly, they ignore potential benefits, which eliminates the need for balancing. In other words, the Draft Guidelines provide very little guidance about current practice which adds risk, which deters mergers, which seems to be the point. We offer specific recommendations for Horizontal, Vertical, and Tech Mergers that do a better job differentiating procompetitive mergers from anticompetitive ones.