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Presentations & Interviews ICLE Academic Affiliate Giuseppe Colangelo joined Concurrences‘ Antitrust Code podcast to discuss how fairness is defined in competition law. The full episode is embedded below.
ICLE Academic Affiliate Giuseppe Colangelo joined Concurrences‘ Antitrust Code podcast to discuss how fairness is defined in competition law. The full episode is embedded below.
TOTM The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Aug. 22 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security (ANPRM) is breathtaking in its scope. For an overview . . .
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Aug. 22 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security (ANPRM) is breathtaking in its scope. For an overview summary, see this Aug. 11 FTC press release.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) wants to review in advance all future acquisitions by Facebook parent Meta Platforms. According to a Sept. 2 Bloomberg report, in connection with . . .
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) wants to review in advance all future acquisitions by Facebook parent Meta Platforms. According to a Sept. 2 Bloomberg report, in connection with its challenge to Meta’s acquisition of fitness-app maker Within Unlimited, the commission “has asked its in-house court to force both Meta and [Meta CEO Mark] Zuckerberg to seek approval from the FTC before engaging in any future deals.”
Popular Media The Dodd-Frank Act’s so-called “Durbin amendment,” passed more than a decade ago in 2010, was supposed to reduce the cost of consumer goods by regulating . . .
The Dodd-Frank Act’s so-called “Durbin amendment,” passed more than a decade ago in 2010, was supposed to reduce the cost of consumer goods by regulating the price and processing of debit-card transactions.
TL;DR In recent years, a set of politicians, academics, regulators, and activists have called for more stringent antitrust scrutiny of companies perceived to be threats to democracy simply by virtue of their size. Today, the brunt of these criticisms target so-called “big tech” companies.
In recent years, a set of politicians, academics, regulators, and activists have called for more stringent antitrust scrutiny of companies perceived to be threats to democracy simply by virtue of their size. Today, the brunt of these criticisms target so-called “big tech” companies (see here, here, and here).
There is little evidence to support the contention that more concentrated markets lead to less democratic outcomes. Furthermore, the fears of private economic power expressed by advocates for more forceful antitrust tend to elide the genuine threat of state coercion. This is at odds with key principles of liberal democracy, such as the rule of law and freedom from arbitrary state interference.
Read the full explainer here.
Scholarship Abstract Policymakers, commentators, and academics have called for a Great Reset, a deepseated overhaul of the organization of the global economy. Some suggest that management . . .
Policymakers, commentators, and academics have called for a Great Reset, a deepseated overhaul of the organization of the global economy. Some suggest that management theory needs a reset of its own. We argue that Great Reset proponents fail to appreciate the power of markets to bring about desirable social outcomes and are overly sanguine about what governments can do to alleviate alleged market failures. These views also drive the increasing enthusiasm for stakeholder governance, an increased government role in innovation, and the call for new metrics for assessing outcomes, all part of the Great Reset narrative. And yet, concentrating more decision power in the hands of governments, implementing diffuse metrics, and diluting effective ownership can hamper the functioning of markets, encourage crony capitalism, and reduce the resources that are available for dealing with grand challenges. Existing management theory provides powerful tools for understanding the benefits and costs of alternative institutional arrangements; abandoning these tools will push management theory to the sideline in policy debates.
TOTM A recent viral video captures a prevailing sentiment in certain corners of social media, and among some competition scholars, about how mergers supposedly work in . . .
A recent viral video captures a prevailing sentiment in certain corners of social media, and among some competition scholars, about how mergers supposedly work in the real world: firms start competing on price, one firm loses out, that firm agrees to sell itself to the other firm and, finally, prices are jacked up. (Warning: Keep the video muted. The voice-over is painful.)
Scholarship Abstract In the United States, once people have been convicted of a crime—or, in many cases, even arrested for a crime—those people are marked for . . .
In the United States, once people have been convicted of a crime—or, in many cases, even arrested for a crime—those people are marked for life in a way that allows states to deny them the right to earn a living in the profession of their choosing. In this short brief, we discuss the US incarceration rate, the collateral consequences to economic freedom as a result of conviction and arrest, and potential avenues for reform.
Scholarship Abstract Academic investigators have used behavioural economics, a method developed originally to study consumers and their sentiments towards products, to study matters of public policy. . . .
Academic investigators have used behavioural economics, a method developed originally to study consumers and their sentiments towards products, to study matters of public policy. A recent article in the European Journal of International Law – ‘What Is Wrong with Investment Arbitration? Evidence from a Set of Behavioural Experiments’ – gives a detailed summary of a series of experiments performed in order to study public sentiment towards investment arbitration. The investigators, Maria Laura Marceddu and Pietro Ortolani observe that public sentiment improves towards the outcome of a dispute settlement procedure when survey respondents are told that the procedure was a ‘court’ with tenured judges, and it worsens when they are told that it was ‘arbitration’ with temporary appointees. From their observations, Marceddu and Ortolani conclude that an international investment court, such as that which the European Union promotes, is a good idea. We suggest, however, that a further inquiry should investigate in greater detail public understanding of what qualities the individuals who serve as judges or arbitrators ought to display, as distinct from the institutional format in which dispute settlement takes place.
