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ICLE Issue Brief PPI Director of Technology Policy, Alec Stapp reviews the antitrust cases against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft and discusses what we can learn from them today. He explains the relevant concepts necessary for understanding the history of market competition in the tech industry.
Alec Stapp, current Director of Technology Policy at Progressive Policy Institute, and former Research Fellow, Law & Economics at International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), reviews the antitrust cases against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft and discusses what we can learn from them today. He explains the relevant concepts necessary for understanding the history of market competition in the tech industry.
Big Tech continues to be mired in “a very antitrust situation,” as President Trump so eloquently put it in 2018. Advocates for more aggressive antitrust enforcement in the tech industry often justify their proposals by pointing to the cases against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft. In announcing her plan to break up the tech giants, Elizabeth Warren highlighted the case against Microsoft in particular:
The government’s antitrust case against Microsoft helped clear a path for Internet companies like Google and Facebook to emerge. The story demonstrates why promoting competition is so important: it allows new, groundbreaking companies to grow and thrive — which pushes everyone in the marketplace to offer better products.
Tim Wu, a law professor at Columbia University, summarized the overarching narrative recently (emphasis added):
If there is one thing I’d like the tech world to understand better, it is that the trilogy of antitrust suits against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft played a major role in making the United States the world’s preeminent tech economy. The IBM-AT&T-Microsoft trilogy of antitrust cases each helped prevent major monopolists from killing small firms and asserting control of the future (of the 80s, 90s, and 00s, respectively). A list of products and firms that owe at least something to the IBM-AT&T-Microsoft trilogy. (1) IBM: software as product, Apple, Microsoft, Intel, Seagate, Sun, Dell, Compaq (2) AT&T: Modems, ISPs, AOL, the Internet and Web industries (3) Microsoft: Google, Facebook, Amazon
If there is one thing I’d like the tech world to understand better, it is that the trilogy of antitrust suits against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft played a major role in making the United States the world’s preeminent tech economy.
The IBM-AT&T-Microsoft trilogy of antitrust cases each helped prevent major monopolists from killing small firms and asserting control of the future (of the 80s, 90s, and 00s, respectively).
A list of products and firms that owe at least something to the IBM-AT&T-Microsoft trilogy.
(1) IBM: software as product, Apple, Microsoft, Intel, Seagate, Sun, Dell, Compaq (2) AT&T: Modems, ISPs, AOL, the Internet and Web industries (3) Microsoft: Google, Facebook, Amazon
In other words, by breaking up the current crop of dominant tech companies, we can sow the seeds for the next one. But this reasoning depends on an incorrect — albeit increasingly popular — reading of the history of the tech industry.
Click here to read the full issue brief.
Regulatory Comments The purpose of this submission is to highlight some of the findings of the relevant scholarship to help to inform the ACCC’s work, and to highlight some of the problems that may arise during the course of the study, given the misconceptions about competition between advertising-funded digital platforms that are common in the media and popular debate today.
The International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) Digital Advertising Services Inquiry. As a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center, ICLE works with academics around the world to promote scholarship into the intersection of law and economics.
The purpose of this submission is to highlight some of the findings of the relevant scholarship to help to inform the ACCC’s work, and to highlight some of the problems that may arise during the course of the study, given the misconceptions about competition between advertising-funded digital platforms that are common in the media and popular debate today.
This submission will focus on three areas raised by the Issues Paper: concentration of market power in digital advertising, unequal access to data acting as a potentially anti-competitive barrier to entry, and the effect of vertical integration on competition and innovation.
Click here to read the submission.
Written Testimonies & Filings On Friday, April 17, 2020, ICLE President and Founder, Geoffrey A. Manne, submitted written testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.
On Friday, April 17, 2020, ICLE President and Founder, Geoffrey A. Manne, submitted written testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law. Mr. Manne contends that underlying much of the contemporary antitrust debate are two visions of how an economy should work.
One vision, which tends to favor more intervention and regulation than the status quo, sees the economy and society as being constructed from above by laws and courts. In this view, suspect business behavior must be justified to be permitted, and . . . the optimal composition of markets can be known and can be designed by well-intentioned judges and legislators. On the other hand, there is the view of individual and company behavior as emerging from each person’s actions within a framework of property rights and the rule of law. This view sees the economy as a messy discovery process, with business behavior often being experimental in nature. This second conception often sees government intervention as risky, because it assumes a level of knowledge about the dynamics of markets that is impossible to obtain.
One vision, which tends to favor more intervention and regulation than the status quo, sees the economy and society as being constructed from above by laws and courts. In this view, suspect business behavior must be justified to be permitted, and . . . the optimal composition of markets can be known and can be designed by well-intentioned judges and legislators.
On the other hand, there is the view of individual and company behavior as emerging from each person’s actions within a framework of property rights and the rule of law. This view sees the economy as a messy discovery process, with business behavior often being experimental in nature. This second conception often sees government intervention as risky, because it assumes a level of knowledge about the dynamics of markets that is impossible to obtain.
In Manne’s view,
Antitrust law and enforcement policy should, above all, continue to adhere to the error-cost framework, which informs antitrust decision-making by considering the relative costs of mistaken intervention compared with mistaken non-intervention. Specific cases should be addressed as they come, with an implicit understanding that, especially in digital markets, precious few generalizable presumptions can be inferred from the previous case. The overall stance should be one of restraint, reflecting the state of our knowledge. We may well be able to identify anticompetitive harm in certain cases, and when we do, we should enforce the current laws. But dramatic new statutes that undo decades of antitrust jurisprudence or reallocate burdens of proof with the stroke of a pen are unjustified.
Manne goes on to address several of the most important and common misperceptions that seem to be fueling the current drive for new and invigorated antitrust laws. These misperceptions are that:
See his full testimony, here.
TOTM The pandemic is serious. COVID-19 will overwhelm our hospitals. It might break our entire healthcare system. To keep the number of deaths in the low . . .
The pandemic is serious. COVID-19 will overwhelm our hospitals. It might break our entire healthcare system. To keep the number of deaths in the low hundreds of thousands, a study from Imperial College London finds, we will have to shutter much of our economy for months. Small wonder the markets have lost a third of their value in a relentless three-week plunge. Grievous and cruel will be the struggle to come.
Read the full piece here.
ICLE White Paper The European Commission’s recent Google Android decision will go down as one of the most important competition proceedings of the past decade. Yet, in-depth reading . . .
The European Commission’s recent Google Android decision will go down as one of the most important competition proceedings of the past decade. Yet, in-depth reading of the 328-page decision leaves attentive readers with a bitter taste. The problem is simple: while the facts adduced by the Commission are arguably true, the normative implications it draws—and thus the bases for its action—are largely conjecture.
This paper argues that the Commission’s decision is undermined by unsubstantiated claims and non sequiturs, the upshot of which is that the Commission did not establish that Google had a “dominant position” in an accurately defined market, or that it infringed competition and harmed consumers. The paper analyzes the Commission’s reasoning on questions of market definition, barriers to entry, dominance, theories of harm, and the economic evidence adduced to support the decision.
Section I discusses the Commission’s market definition It argues that the Commission produced insufficient evidence to support its conclusion that Google’s products were in a different market than Apple’s alternatives.
Section II looks at the competitive constraints that Google faced. It finds that the Commission wrongly ignored the strong competitive pressure that rivals, particularly Apple, exerted on Google. As a result, it failed to adequately establish that Google was dominant – a precondition for competition liability under article 102 TFEU.
Section III focuses on Google’s purported infringements. It argues that Commission failed to convincingly establish that Google’s behavior prevented its rivals from effectively reaching users of Android smartphones. This is all the more troubling when one acknowledges that Google’s contested behavior essentially sought to transpose features of its rivals’ closed platforms within the more open Android ecosystem.
Section IV reviews the main economic arguments that underpin the Commission’s decision. It finds that the economic models cited by the Commission poorly matched the underlying fact patterns. Moreover, the Commission’s arguments on innovation harms were out of touch with the empirical literature on the topic.
In short, the Commission failed to adequately prove that Google infringed European competition law. Its decision thus sets a bad precedent for future competition intervention in the digital sphere.
Regulatory Comments Although it is doubtless correct that the 1984 Nonhorizontal Merger Guidelines require updates in light of the last three decades of legal and economic developments, . . .
Although it is doubtless correct that the 1984 Nonhorizontal Merger Guidelines require updates in light of the last three decades of legal and economic developments, it is by no means clear that errors in judicial decisions or enforcement practices have led to widespread problems that are ad- dressed by the proposed changes. Indeed, harms could actually arise because there is ambiguity in the proposed guidelines that may lead either to uncertainty as to how the agencies will exercise their discretion, or, more troublingly, could lead courts to take seriously speculative theories of harm.
The purpose of this comment is to draw attention to an implicit underpinning of the draft guidelines that we believe the agencies should clearly disavow (or at least explain more clearly the complexity surrounding): the extent and implications of the presumed functional equivalence of vertical integration by contract and by merger.
Despite the fact that, among law and economics scholars, it has long been an essentially settled matter that vertical integration — whether partial integration by contract or full integration by merger — is typically procompetitive (or, at the very least, competitively ambiguous, and problematic in only very limited, stylized, and theoretical circumstances), vertical conduct of all sorts has come under increased scrutiny. Much of the new opprobrium for vertical conduct has come from the likes of presidential hopefuls, journalists, political pundits, and activists. But, more concerning, a fair amount of the resurgence in opposition to vertical restraints and mergers has come from academic economic quarters. Surprisingly, this criticism of vertical conduct also misunderstands or ignores fundamental economic concepts.
One prominent line of criticism of vertical mergers, for example, equates vertical mergers with vertical contracts, and proposes to prohibit or significantly deter vertical integration by merger because it inherently leads to competitive problems that either don’t exist or can more easily be corrected in vertical contracts. But the choice between merger and contract for firms is not so simple, especially in highly dynamic industries in which effective competition often demands both process and product innovation. In particular, the management of intangible, information assets — often the crucial in- puts in dynamic, high-tech firms — may not be as readily (or at all) accomplished by contract as by internal coordination. In the face of extreme informational uncertainties and the need for the inherently uncertain exercise of entrepreneurial judgment and dynamic capabilities (which reside in a firm’s individual decisionmakers, corporate culture, and collective ability to implement novel business processes), contracts cannot always replicate the competitive advantages of integration through merger.
This narrow view of vertical integration thus ignores and threatens to undermine dynamic competition and innovation. Indeed, if we take the organization theory and business strategy literature on the organization of firms in dynamic industries seriously, the status quo might even be over-enforcing, and leading to the deterrence of innovative, procompetitive mergers. It is insufficient merely to advert to potential price effects or innovation effects on foreclosed competitors or input providers, and there truncate the analysis. A proper evaluation of the competitive effects of vertical conduct requires an assessment of industrywide increases in innovation and of quality improvements that may accompany superficial price increases or localized constraints on innovation. Without this it is impossible to conclude that such conduct is anticompetitive.
We recently contributed two pieces to a symposium on Truth on the Market that explore the position set out above. We have attached these pieces to this comment for your convenience. We also explore all of these and related points more fully in a forthcoming article that will be published this spring by the Kansas Law Review. A draft of that article has likewise been attached.
We thank the agencies for the opportunity to comment on this important set of guidelines. We certainly advocate for clarity in the agencies’ enforcement practice with respect to vertical integration, but caution that the agencies carefully consider whether the status quo — as out of date as it may be — is truly inferior to updates that introduce more ambiguity.
Regulatory Comments In response to the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines released by DOJ and the FTC on January 10, 2020,1 the International Center for Law & Economics . . .
In response to the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines released by DOJ and the FTC on January 10, 2020,1 the International Center for Law & Economics convened a blog symposium to discuss the legal and economic implications of the proposed changes. Published on Thursday, February 6, 2020 and Friday, February 7, 2020 on TruthOnTheMarket.com, that symposium included contributions from twenty-six well respected legal academics, economists, and seasoned practitioners. This Comment collects those posts together so that they can form part of the record as DOJ and the FTC consider the final form of the Vertical Merger Guidelines.
Please note, inclusion of the posts in this comment should not be interpreted as indicating that any particular author supports any post that is not his or her own — this was a broad effort that included many different viewpoints.
TOTM In an area where it may seem that agreement is rare, there is near universal agreement on the benefits of withdrawing the DOJ’s 1984 Non-Horizontal . . .
In an area where it may seem that agreement is rare, there is near universal agreement on the benefits of withdrawing the DOJ’s 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The 1984 Guidelines do not reflect current agency thinking on vertical mergers and are not relied upon by businesses or practitioners to anticipate how the agencies may review a vertical transaction. The more difficult question is whether the agencies should now replace the 1984 Guidelines and, if so, what the modern guidelines should say.
TOTM The proposed Vertical Merger Guidelines provide little practical guidance, especially on the key issue of what would lead one of the Agencies to determine that . . .
The proposed Vertical Merger Guidelines provide little practical guidance, especially on the key issue of what would lead one of the Agencies to determine that it will not challenge a vertical merger. Although they list the theories on which the Agencies focus and factors the Agencies “may consider,” the proposed Guidelines do not set out conditions necessary or sufficient for the Agencies to conclude that a merger likely would substantially lessen competition. Nor do the Guidelines communicate generally how the Agencies analyze the nature of a competitive process and how it is apt to change with a proposed merger.
