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Showing 9 of 40 Results in International Antitrust
Presentations & Interviews ICLE Academic Affiliate Christopher Yoo participated in the FTC’s Hearing #11: The FTC’s Role in a Changing World on the panel, Implications of Different Legal . . .
ICLE Academic Affiliate Christopher Yoo participated in the FTC’s Hearing #11: The FTC’s Role in a Changing World on the panel, Implications of Different Legal Traditions and Regimes for International Cooperation. Read the full transcript here. Video of the event is embedded below
Scholarship Abstract We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase . . .
We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase e?iciency and the associated distributional implications. To estimate the model, we use unique data from international airline markets with flight-level variation in prices across time, cabins, and markets and information on passengers’ reasons for travel and time of purchase. The current pricing practice yields approximately 77% of the first-best welfare. The source of this ine?iciency arises primarily from private information about passenger valuations, not dynamic uncertainty about demand. We also find that if airlines could discriminate between business and leisure passengers, total welfare would improve at the expense of business passenger surplus. Also, replacing the current pricing that involves screening passengers across cabin classes with offering a single cabin class has minimal effect on total welfare.
TOTM I recently published a piece in the Hill welcoming the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Google v. Equustek. In this post I expand (at length) . . .
I recently published a piece in the Hill welcoming the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Google v. Equustek. In this post I expand (at length) upon my assessment of the case.
In its decision, the Court upheld injunctive relief against Google, directing the company to avoid indexing websites offering the infringing goods in question, regardless of the location of the sites (and even though Google itself was not a party in the case nor in any way held liable for the infringement). As a result, the Court’s ruling would affect Google’s conduct outside of Canada as well as within it.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM It’s fitting that FCC Chairman Ajit Pai recently compared his predecessor’s jettisoning of the FCC’s light touch framework for Internet access regulation without hard evidence . . .
It’s fitting that FCC Chairman Ajit Pai recently compared his predecessor’s jettisoning of the FCC’s light touch framework for Internet access regulation without hard evidence to the Oklahoma City Thunder’s James Harden trade. That infamous deal broke up a young nucleus of three of the best players in the NBA in 2012 because keeping all three might someday create salary cap concerns. What few saw coming was a new TV deal in 2015 that sent the salary cap soaring.
TOTM In a recent article for the San Francisco Daily Journal I examine Google v. Equustek: a case currently before the Canadian Supreme Court involving the scope of . . .
In a recent article for the San Francisco Daily Journal I examine Google v. Equustek: a case currently before the Canadian Supreme Court involving the scope of jurisdiction of Canadian courts to enjoin conduct on the internet.
In the piece I argue that…
Regulatory Comments The Commission’s interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens is commendable.
The Commission’s interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens is commendable. This concern, however, should be well tempered by humility, and the Commission’s ultimate decision should be guided by the understanding that contemporary technology and market innovations have afforded consumers a degree of choice unparallelled in the history of the European Union. While some firms may build their products with the requirement that consumers allow them to use personal information, others will not. And when consumers defect from products that do not meet their individual mix of privacy, price, and other preferences, firms will take notice and change their behavior accordingly.
This leads to another related point: innovation moves so quickly today that uniform prescriptive regulation intended to govern the behavior of many thousands of firms and millions of consumers is doomed to frustration if not outright failure. Moreover, broad regulations meant to bring industry to heel frequently work to the benefit of incumbents, driving out smaller competitors or making entry nearly impossible, only further narrowing consumer choices and guaranteeing less than optimal results for all of society.
With that said, there are certainly actions for the Commission to take that ensure a competitive environment in which consumer interests are adequately protected. Chief among these areas would be to enact regulations that control the damaging effects of costly data localization rules. Overall, however, the Commission would do best to leave much of the implementation of privacy regulations to the individual EU members who are most in touch with the challenges and desires of their own constituents.
TOTM Today’s Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) Google decision marks yet another regulator joining the chorus of competition agencies around the world that have already dismissed similar . . .
Today’s Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) Google decision marks yet another regulator joining the chorus of competition agencies around the world that have already dismissed similar complaints relating to Google’s Search or Android businesses (including the US FTC, the Korea FTC, the Taiwan FTC, and AG offices in Texas and Ohio).
A number of courts around the world have also rejected competition complaints against the company, including courts in the US, France, the UK, Germany, and Brazil.
Regulatory Comments "The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”)’s tradition of regulatory humility — the “forbearance and flexibility” that has characterized its approach to telecommunications services regulation — has enabled the explosive growth of internet usage throughout India..."
“The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”)’s tradition of regulatory humility — the “forbearance and flexibility” that has characterized its approach to telecommunications services regulation — has enabled the explosive growth of internet usage throughout India, including an over 50% surge in the number of users of mobile internet in rural areas since 2001. But as the Authority considers regulations and rules to “ensure orderly growth… and protection of consumer interest,” it is important to keep in mind the fundamental lesson taught by decades of technology regulation throughout the world: where entrepreneurial companies are left relatively free to experiment with innovative new methods of developing and deploying technologies — particularly telecommunications technologies — consumers enjoy the largest increases in their standard of living.
The importance of humility in regulating highly innovative industries cannot be overstated. Even after decades of research, there is still much that economists cannot predict about the broad economic effects of technological innovation on economic growth and development. The unintended and unanticipated costs of preventing new methods of reaching underserved consumers can be substantial, and the consequences enormous to those in greatest need…”
“India is on the cusp of providing an economically and socially transformative service: near-ubiquitous, low-cost, high-value internet access that has the potential to create unprecedented opportunity and advantage for its citizens. The nation stands poised to increase the welfare of its poorest citizens with a rapidity seldom witnessed in human history. We strongly encourage TRAI to chart a wise course that allows for differentiated tariffs and the expanded internet access they can bring to India’s citizens.”
Written Testimonies & Filings "The Digital Single Market Strategy (“DSMS”) initiative represents a unique opportunity to unify regulation across the EU’s member states around policies that promote transparency, stability, free trade, innovation and global economic growth..."
“The Digital Single Market Strategy (“DSMS”) initiative represents a unique opportunity to unify regulation across the EU’s member states around policies that promote transparency, stability, free trade, innovation and global economic growth. As the Commission undertakes to integrate the digital economy into the EU’s single market strategy, however, care should be taken to assure that the principles driving the explosive growth of the Internet are encouraged and not suppressed.
As companies contemplate new business models, new content distribution services, new uses for data and new opportunities for valuable data exchange, it is important that regulation not create a legal environment in which valuable products are inefficiently delayed, degraded or abandoned. Effective and efficient policies flow from basic, well-established economic and legal principles that maximize welfare by, among other things, minimizing error costs, promoting innovation, encouraging voluntary and self-help remedies, prioritizing self-regulation, minimizing institutional and bureaucratic costs, and capitalizing on the incentives and informational advantages of market participants…”
“Importantly, the decision with respect to a new regulatory regime for online platforms is not made in a vacuum; rather, it is a choice between existing rules and the proposed alternatives. Justifying new rules demands a comparison to existing rules, meaning rigorous evidence not only that there is a problem, but also that any problems will be better addressed by new rules than current rules. No regulatory regime is perfect. Even if there are some identifiable problems with the current rules, that alone does not mean that any particular proposed new rules are preferable. The Commission should carefully consider existing law (like competition and consumer protection laws at both the EU and member-state levels) and whether new rules will bring the overall regulatory scheme closer to the optimal level.”