Abstract

Highly influential recent work by Benartzi et al. (2017) argues—based on comparisons of the respective effectiveness and costs of behavioral interventions (or nudges) versus traditional instruments—that nudges offer more cost-effective means than traditional interventions for changing individual behavior to achieve desirable policy goals. These authors further argue that nudges’ cost-effectiveness advantage means that governments and other organizations should increase their investments in such instruments to supplement traditional interventions. Yet a closer look at Benartzi et al.’s (2017) own data and analysis reveals that they variously exclude and include key cost elements to the benefit of behavioral instruments over traditional ones and overstate the utility of cost-effectiveness analysis for policy selection. Once these methodological shortcomings are corrected, a reassessment of key policies evaluated by the authors reveals that nudges do not consistently outperform traditional interventions, neither under cost-effectiveness analysis nor under the methodologically required cost-benefit analysis. These illustrative findings demonstrate that governments should strive to conduct cost-benefit analyses of competing interventions, including nudges, to implement the most efficient of the available instruments.

Introduction

Imagine you are at the grocery-store checkout line and it is to pay. You enter your credit card in the terminal, assuming that your payment will be routed over the network operated by the brand on your card (typically Visa or Mastercard). But you learn after the fact that the grocery store has chosen instead to route it over China Union Pay.

Most of us would be uncomfortable ceding to the merchant the authority to route transactions over the cheapest network, without considering our concerns about security, reliability, and other card features (including rewards). Yet that is already the case for many point-of-sale transactions made with debit cards—the result of a 2011 regulation implemented by the Federal Reserve. Consumers can, however, often still force the transaction to run over their preferred network by pushing the “credit” button.

But new rules under consideration by the Federal Reserve would extend merchants’ ability to determine how debit transactions are routed to online transactions, while also making it more difficult for consumers to control who gets to handle their personal data and process their transactions.[1] Perhaps more worryingly, a new bill (the “Credit Card Competition Act”) introduced by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) would, in the name of “competition,” impose similar routing requirements on credit cards, while ignoring important differences in the competitive framework of debit and credit cards.[2]

Since they emerged more than 50 years ago, payment-card networks have come to play an increasingly important role in our lives, both directly and indirectly. Directly, they facilitate hundreds of billions of transactions every year, representing tens of trillions of dollars in value.[3] Indirectly, they have contributed to a near-complete shift from paper-based to electronic value exchange and accounting in the United States and many other countries. This has, in turn, resulted in enormous efficiency improvements and wider social benefits, such as the development of online commerce, greater ease of travel, and reduced tax avoidance.[4]

The shift from paper to electronic value exchange has been driven almost entirely by voluntary decisions made by businesses and consumers. Despite such clear evidence of market success, over the past three decades, governments have increasingly sought to correct alleged “market failures” in payment-card markets. The main tool governments have used is price controls on interchange-fee rates. More recently, however, several governments—including the United States, the European Union, and Australia—have sought to reduce rates further still by regulating the manner in which payments are “routed” (i.e., the way that messages pertaining to a transaction are sent between the merchant and the issuing bank). This has important implications for consumer protection, fraud prevention, and financial inclusion.

In previous studies, we have shown that regulation of interchange fees typically has slowed the shift to more innovative, quicker, more convenient payment systems, while also reducing other benefits and particularly harming poorer consumers and smaller merchants.^[5]

Prohibitions on exclusivity in routing have similar effects as direct price controls. But imposed routing requirements will have additional effects that go beyond those of price controls and would result in various harms to consumers and the economy. This study seeks to delve deeper into the problem, focusing primarily on the justifications for and effects of regulations that affect the way in which transactions are routed. While “routing” may seem arcane, it is fundamental to the effectiveness of payment networks. Understanding the likely consequences of such regulation is thus important. That is the purpose of this paper.

We begin, in Section II, by describing the technological and economic elements of payment-card routing. Supporters of forced routing requirements contend that they will promote more efficient competition in consumers’ payment-card usage. But we show that this superficial argument ignores the basic economic realities of payment-card networks, as well as the fundamentally different nature of consumer competitive choice, both in debit-card markets (where routing requirements currently exist) and in credit-card markets (the intended target of Sen. Durbin’s proposed law). Section III reviews the evidence regarding the effects of regulating payment networks. We summarize the pernicious effects of price controls and then explain how the routing mandate created by the 2011 Federal Reserve regulation, known as Regulation II, has had similar effects. Section IV considers the proposed changes to Regulation II and the new Durbin proposal to regulate credit-card routing, with a particular focus on the likely harmful effects of the changes on the incidence of fraud and the knock-on effects on issuers, cardholders, and merchants. Section V concludes.

[1] Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, FR 26189 (2021), available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-13/pdf/2021-10013.pdf.

[2] Credit Card Competition Act of 2022, S. 4674, 117th Cong. § 2 (2022), available at: https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s4674/BILLS-117s4674is.pdf.

[3]  Global Network Card Results in 2021, Nilson Report Issue 1224, https://nilsonreport.com/mention/1672/1link.

[4] See the appendix to this paper and references therein.

[5] See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation, ICLE Financial Regulatory Program White Paper Series (Jun. 2, 2010), available at http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf; Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne, and Julian Morris, Unreasonable and Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small Businesses, International Center for Law and Economics (Apr. 25, 2017); Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne, and Julian Morris, Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-18, (Jun. 6, 2014).

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched one of the most ambitious rulemakings in agency history Aug. 11, with its 3-2 vote to initiate Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on commercial surveillance and data security. The divided vote, which broke down on partisan lines, stands in stark contrast to recent bipartisan efforts on Capitol Hill, particularly on the comprehensive American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA).

Read the full piece here.

In a recent op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, Svetlana Gans and Eugene Scalia look at three potential traps the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could trigger if it pursues the aggressive rulemaking agenda many have long been expecting.

Read the full piece here.

Abstract

The well-known economic principle that “there is no such thing as a free lunch” (NFLP) has enjoyed a recent revival in the assessment of digital markets in antitrust. There is a belief that NFLP implies zero-price platform services must somehow be “paid for” by consumers in some manner—such as the loss of privacy and valuable data. Others have gone further, asserting that consumers are not only made worse off by the data collection and use that attend zero-price platform services, but that this state of affairs necessarily points to a lack of competitive alternatives. Both assertions are invalid, pressing the NFLP beyond the limits of logical inference. Inferences about who pays resource costs, and whether those payments reflect market power, are empirical questions as illuminated by other economic principles. Answers to such critical questions cannot be plucked from an NFLP magic hat.

Is it illegal for a company to own two related virtual reality games? The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) thinks it is and is now suing Meta, Facebook’s parent company, for buying the VR studio Within, best known for the extremely niche game Supernatural. A closer look at the FTC’s challenge, however, suggests that the suit was more likely ginned up to get headlines than to foster competition in the rapidly growing VR business.

Read the full piece here.

Philip K Dick’s novella “The Minority Report” describes a futuristic world without crime. This state of the world is achieved thanks to the visions of three mutants—so-called “precogs”—who predict crimes before they occur, thereby enabling law enforcement to incarcerate people for crimes they were going to commit.

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Abstract

Cy près is a pivotal doctrine in estate law and indeed American jurisprudence. It places courts in the shoes of settlors of charitable trusts to discern not only their original intent but also affords the possibility of continuing the material purpose for which settlors created enduring legacies of philanthropy benefitting society. For this reason, it may well be that no other legal doctrine is as closely tied to the interests of the individual and the collective as cy près. And my first-of-its kind study puts the cy-près doctrine front and center, while providing three major contributions to the field.

First, through deliberative historical analysis, I offer an in-depth look at the types of cases American courts have heard involving the use of cy près. This historical categorization and explication is itself unique and provides significant insight into the controversies that allowed the doctrine to evolve. Second, the application of empirical methods to examine the doctrine is groundbreaking. By holistically examining the data I collected, I have been able to discern three major themes. The passage of time yields a gradual but greater adoption of the use of the cy-près doctrine. The presence of reversionary, gift-over, or private interests renders the use of the cy-près doctrine less practicable. And finally, courts are overwhelmingly more likely to apply cy près in cases involving public charitable trusts, educational purpose trusts, and medical purpose trusts, even when controlling for other independent variables and typologies of charitable trusts. Last, fifty-state surveys are commonplace; yet, none exists for the doctrine of cy près. I was able to assemble such a survey that not only assisted me in conducting this research but will undoubtedly aid other researchers for years to come, which I have addended to this Article in the Appendix.

Things are heating up in the antitrust world. There is considerable pressure to pass the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) before the congressional recess in August—a short legislative window before members of Congress shift their focus almost entirely to campaigning for the mid-term elections. While it would not be impossible to advance the bill after the August recess, it would be a steep uphill climb.

Read the full piece here.