Section 2 Symposium: Bill Page on Microsoft’s "Forward-Looking" Monopolization Remedy

The DOJ’s Section 2 Report speaks in general terms about the costs and benefits of various remedies for monopolization. It prefers “prohibitory” remedies, but holds open the possibility of “additional relief,” including “affirmative-obligation remedies. The Report specifically mentions the protocol-licensing requirement of the Microsoft final judgments (§ III.E, entered in November 2002) as an example of a challenging and controversial affirmative-obligation remedy. In this post, I’d like to comment on the protocol-licensing program and its implementation. In doing so, I draw on my previous work with Jeff Childers, particularly Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, and Measuring Compliance with Compulsory Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case.

Read the full piece here.