Comments of ICLE and New America on Space Modernization for the 21st Century
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the space industry has evolved at warp speed. Access to orbits and resources beyond the Karman Line has become more available, cost-effective, and competitive than ever before. New products and industries are rapidly emerging. And critically, satellite connectivity that can meet the needs of modern Internet applications and users is being realized in low-Earth orbit. This progress has emerged despite a licensing regime that is precisely the opposite: anachronistic and incompatible with modern realities. As the Commission acknowledges, its current licensing process is a remnant of a bygone era, and “a modern, efficient space licensing system that enables innovation and exploration” is overdue.[1]
The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) and New America’s Open Technology Institute (“OTI”) applaud the Commission’s comprehensive proposal for space licensing reform. The Commission’s proposals align with many of the insights and recommendations offered in a recent report by the bipartisan LEO Policy Working Group co-chaired by our two organizations. The report, Low Earth Satellites: Policies to Promote Spectrum Sharing, Foster Competition, and Close Digital Divides, was the culmination of a nearly year-long process of research and discourse by a diverse group of individuals with industry, public policy, academic, and regulatory experience with the shared goal of “explor[ing] the challenges facing the development and deployment of LEO satellites for universal connectivity.”[2]
The report is attached to these comments as an Exhibit. Chapter 1 of the report focuses on spectrum policy and the discusses policy considerations and tradeoffs related to the imperative to streamline satellite licensing and modifications. Excerpts of the report and accompanying commentary are provided below as a brief summary in response to the proposals and questions raised by the Commission.
1. A Modernized Space Licensing Process Is Necessary
The NPRM’s ultimate aim is “to align our rules with the pace, growth, and innovation in the space economy[.]”[3] Doing so will require extensive reform that gets to the core of the licensing process rather than merely creating change at the margins. As our report recognizes, “[t]he FCC’s current framework for spectrum allocation and licensing was not designed for this emerging dense and dynamic LEO environment.”[4] Instead, LEO operators must weather a process mired in delay, inflexibility, and uncertainty by requiring “[h]ighly customized application requirements, duplicate processes between the FCC and ITU filings, and the combination of technical, spectrum, and orbital debris reviews [that] lead to a long process and restrictive, sometimes inconsistent licensing conditions.”[5]
The NPRM’s “three pivots” for modernizing the licensing process are a necessary first step toward meeting many of the report’s suggested proposals for reform. Specifically:
Presumed Acceptable Criteria. The NPRM asks whether the licensing process should shift to bright-line performance metrics the Commission presumes to be acceptable, rather than prescriptive rules and individualized assessments.[6] The answer is unequivocally yes. As the report proposes:[7]
One overarching reform would be adoption of the presumption that NGSO applications that comply with existing FCC rules, especially those related to technical and sustainability standards, are in the public interest. This would reduce the need for case-by-case bespoke reviews and conditions. . . . Instead of tailoring conditions to each operator, standardized operational rules—including for space sustainability—could provide clarity and predictability. Applicants seeking deviations from the rules would be required to seek waivers, creating a more rule-bound and transparent system.
The Commission’s suggested presumption of acceptability and reliance on objective metrics matches this recommendation to the letter.
Enhanced Application Design. With streamlining and automation in mind, the NPRM asks whether a more standardized process with modular features would be more responsive to operator needs.[8] As the report notes, “[r]eforms that seek to better standardize and streamline authorizations through clear, uniform ex-ante rules and conditions, while shifting to target ex post enforcement as needed”[9] remove the common constraints of “overly slow, bespoke, and burdensome”[10] review. In enacting such reforms, the Commission “would promote a more streamlined and consistent process, similar to how terrestrial wireless services are licensed.”[11]
Increased Freedom. The NPRM notes the prior practice of “over-prescrib[ing]” system design features and the imposition of bespoke conditions on individual system approvals.[12] A byproduct of this failure, as recognized in the report, is that licenses cannot be altered or modified without losing their priority status[.]”[13] Operators’ ability to nimbly respond to system needs or consumer demands without regulatory delay is paramount.
2. Processing Timelines Should Be Tightened and Standardized
The Commission notes that the time required for full action on a satellite operator’s application has varied from one day to six years.[14] This degree of uncertainty surrounding application processing is untenable. To address this problem, the report supports a the adoption of a shot clock with limited exceptions. “A ‘shot clock’ for application review should provide operators with more certainty about licensing timelines.”[15] A definitive and uniform timeline, such as the Commission’s proposed 60-day framework, accomplishes that. At the same time, “[f]lexibility mechanisms could be included, such as pausing the clock in unusual review cases or if applicants fail to provide necessary information[,]” as offered in the report.
The report also raises a complementary proposal for accelerating applications that do not satisfy its certification requirements, but nonetheless warrant rapid response. As the report suggests, “some systems could seek a waiver of shot-clock rules to allow more time-sensitive applications to be addressed first.”[16]
3. Processing-Round Reform Will Require More Work
The NPRM proposes restructuring the processing round structure so that rounds are initiated automatically and for a set duration each calendar year. This reform remedies one glaring shortcoming of the processing round regime. As the Working Group Report explains:[17]
Applicants may face significant delays if they are forced to wait for a new round to open after a lead applicant files, or risk missing a narrow filing window if they are not prepared. These dynamics, while intended to ensure fairness and spectrum sharing among competitors, are frequently cited as a primary source of delay for NGSO licensing.
A consistent processing round window avoids many of these problems. Still, larger issues remain embedded within the processing round regime, as the report notes:[18]
[T]he framework fails to provide security of expectations to existing systems. For example, aggregate interference limits cannot be defined because there is no telling how many lower-priority systems may contribute to interference, or how many processing rounds may occur within a given satellite band. It leads to the inevitable question: What happens to the spectrum sharing framework when a third processing round emerges in the Ka-band? A fourth? It seems foolish to presume that the framework’s sunsetting of priority system protections will take hold before these realities emerge.
While the industry consensus has been that aggregate interference limits are premature and the Commission’s dual-protection criteria are enough,[19] that sentiment may be quickly waning as the initial assumptions underlying the processing round framework begin to unravel.[20]
4. Milestone Requirements Should be More Incremental
For NGSO systems, the Commission proposes mirroring the ITU’s bring-into-use (“BIU”) benchmarks.[21] As the report acknowledges, “[a] key concern is whether these milestone requirements strike the right balance between facilitating market entry and deterring frivolous or infeasible applications,”[22] and “[t]he primary issue is how the FCC should distinguish systems that are legitimately trying to meet buildout requirements versus purely speculative or frivolous applications.”[23] It is unclear how the BIU benchmark strikes this balance or if it does so effectively.
Another option, and one that the report recommends, is that “[d]eployment requirements could also be restructured into more graduated, measurable steps.” At the same time, the Commission could require that larger “performance bonds [be] structured to release funds as verified buildout milestones are met [to] reinforce deployment incentives.”[24] If necessary, “[e]xtensions would only be granted for deployment requirements in extenuating circumstances.”[25]
5. Earth Station Light-Licensing and Database Coordination Will Accelerate Deployments
The NPRM proposes shifting to a nationwide, non-site licensing of fixed earth stations.[26] This is a welcome reform. As the report recognizes, “[a]s LEO constellations scale, gateway siting and authorization have become a key bottleneck. . . . through the FCC’s traditional process.”[27] In alignment with the NPRM’s view, the report notes that “[i]ntegrating satellite [earth stations] into [a] database-coordination could streamline the process, enabling faster, scalable NGSO-gateway deployments; reduce the burden of application development and processing on satellite operators and FCC staff; and help facilitate coexistence between terrestrial and satellite systems.”[28]
A reference framework is already available. As the report offers:
[The Commission] could also leverage the FCC’s existing 70/80/90 GHz lightweight coordination database, which for many years has successfully coordinated terrestrial fixed links (and, now, high-altitude platform links) operating in the 71–76, 81–86, and 92–95 GHz bands. This existing model allows for rapid, relatively easy registration and interference checking through third-party coordination without a full Part 25 review. This model is well-suited for sharing between satellite and terrestrial users, such as in the lower 37 GHz band, where the FCC has already requested comment on moving to a “lightly licensed” and automated coordination of terrestrial fixed and mobile network siting.
[1] In re Space Modernization for the 21st Century, SB Docket No. 25-306, at ¶ 2 (rel. Oct. 29, 2025) (“NPRM”).
[2] Low Earth Orbit Satellites: Policies to Promote Spectrum Sharing, Foster Competition, and Close Digital Divides, LEO Policy Working Group, Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ. & New America, at 2 (Oct. 30, 2025) (“LEO Working Group Report”), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/wireless-future-project/reports/leo-satellites/.
[3] NPRM at ¶ 6.
[4] LEO Working Group Report at 20.
[5] Id. at 21.
[6] NPRM at ¶¶ 14-18.
[7] LEO Working Group Report at 25.
[8] NPRM at ¶¶ 19-23.
[9] LEO Working Group Report at 21.
[10] Id. at 8.
[11] LEO Working Group Report at 25.
[12] NPRM at ¶ 24.
[13] LEO Working Group Report at 28.
[14] Id. n 17.
[15] LEO Working Group Report at 25.
[16] Id. at 26.
[17] LEO Working Group Report at 25.
[18] Id. at 50.
[19] 47 C.F.R. § 25.261.
[20] See In re Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, SB Docket No. 21-456, at ¶¶ 51-61 (rel Nov. 15, 2024).
[21] NPRM at ¶¶ 169-74.
[22] LEO Working Group Report at 24.
[23] Id.
[24] LEO Working Group Report at 26.
[25] Id.
[26] NPRM at ¶ 90.
[27] LEO Working Group Report at 27.
[28] Id.