Summary

Today, following a six year investigation into Google’s business practices in India, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) issued its ruling.

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Summary

This paper looks at whether the standard unilateral effects model can be applied to non-price competition parameters such as innovation. This question arises because competition authorities are intervening in horizontal mergers that are found to give rise to a “significant impediment to effective innovation competition” (“SIEIC”) as a result of a reduction in post-merger R&D efforts (including lower expenditure). SIEIC is distinct from the mainstream unilateral effects theory of harm that predicts a “significant impediment to effective competition” (“SIEC”) as a result of increased prices. Most recently, the European Commission (“Commission”) used its powers under the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”) to impose remedies in the Dow/DuPont merger. This was in part because of concerns that that the transaction “would be likely to significantly impede effective competition as regards innovation both in innovation spaces where the Parties’ lines of research and early pipeline products overlap and overall in innovation in the crop protection industry.” At the heart of the development of SIEIC analysis lies a fundamental question of competition theory: under what conditions can variations of existing economic models be applied in merger cases?

This paper is divided into three sections. In Section I, the SIEIC theory of harm is described and put into perspective against past competition policy on innovation competition. Section I concludes that SIEIC constitutes a small but significant change in merger policy. In Section II, the economics of SIEIC are discussed. In particular, it will be seen that SIEIC is an application of the standard unilateral effects analysis where the focus is shifted from price to innovation effects. Section II demonstrates that this variant of the model can only deliver sound and robust empirical predictions if three critical innovation-specific questions are addressed. Section III discusses the economic methodology of merger control policy. This Section shows that agencies should remain free to rely on new or adapted pre-existing economic models in merger control reviews, provided they are able to discharge the “burden of persuasion”. With this, the paper hopes to contribute to the ongoing development of optimal merger control policy in innovative and R&D-driven markets.

A panelist brought up an interesting tongue-in-cheek observation about the rising populist antitrust movement at a Heritage antitrust event this week. To the extent that the new populist antitrust movement is broadly concerned about effects on labor and wage depression, then, in principle, it should also be friendly to cartels. Although counterintuitive, employees have long supported and benefited from cartels, because cartels generally afford both job security and higher wages than competitive firms. And, of course, labor itself has long sought the protection of cartels – in the form of unions – to secure the same benefits.   

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Summary

While the three-step burden-shifting framework for evaluating antitrust cases under the rule of reason is conceptually well-accepted and understood, case law remains unclear regarding what suffices to satisfy each party’s burden at each of the three stages. This case offers the Court an opportunity both to clarify what constitutes harm to competition and to explain the nature of the shifting burdens in rule of reason analysis.

In their merits briefing, rather than offer tools for providing structure to the rule of reason, Petitioners urge the Court to adopt an amorphous standard that would permit plaintiffs to satisfy their burden without evidence of durable market power— and even without direct proof of anticompetitive effects as the term is traditionally and properly understood in Section 1 jurisprudence. Acquiescing to Petitioners’ vague conception of a plaintiff’s prima facie burden would untether antitrust law from rigorous economic analysis and harm consumers by increasing significantly the risk of error in lower courts. This would leave litigants with little to no certainty regarding what evidence they should introduce, let alone what evidence a court would find persuasive in any given case, and no clarity as to what businesses can and cannot do.

Without an approach to establishing plaintiff’s burden disciplined by economic analysis and proof, the balance of false positive (Type I) and false negative (Type II) errors—which is critical to proper adjudication of the antitrust laws—would be thrown off keel. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to foster consumer welfare by enhancing or increasing output in a relevant market. Output is the touchstone of antitrust analysis because a dominant firm’s ability to constrain market-wide output is what allows it to anticompetitively raise prices and harm consumers. Petitioners’ approach, however, would flip this analysis on its head and allow price effects to dictate results, thereby permitting courts to ignore output effects—the sine qua non of antitrust analysis—in ascertaining whether a plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden.

Such a result is contrary to this Court’s precedent and particularly problematic here. This Court has recognized that vertical restraints might “[increase prices] in the course of promoting procompetitive effects.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 (2007) (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988)). And modern economics provides no basis for assuming that a demonstration of price effects on only one side of a two-sided market accurately represents the market-wide effects of a course of conduct. Rather, economics predicts that market-wide welfare might increase, decrease, or remain neutral given price effects on a single side. Only an analysis of the market as a whole can illuminate the true competitive implications.

This brief explains amici’s understanding of the relevant economic analysis. It explains why basic economic principles underlying the analysis of multi-sided markets lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff should be required to demonstrate, at a minimum, that: (1) the allegedly unlawful restraint caused anticompetitive effects in the form of actual or probable restricted output market-wide—a showing that logically requires analyzing both sides of a two-sided market; and (2) the defendant had sufficient market power to restrict output in a properly defined market. These two requirements align with sound economics and would also provide clear guidance for courts in applying the rule of reason.

When President Trump was first voted into office, there was significant speculation as to what changes we could expect to see within antitrust enforcement. The Obama administration had for eight years led an aggressive antitrust campaign, and the incoming Republican administration was viewed with a mixture of anticipation and angst, depending upon whom you asked. Would we see a return of conservative antitrust principles, with strong criminal and civil enforcement where appropriate, policy tethered tightly to economic theory and evidence, and modesty born from both an understanding of the limits of antitrust and a recognition that intervention often makes consumers worse off? Or would populist sentiments — so prominent during the 2016 election cycle — percolate into antitrust enforcement as well? Would the Trump administration look more like the Reagan administration, the Obama administration, or something uniquely its own in this regard?

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Abstract

Voices along the whole of the political spectrum are calling for heightened scrutiny of American information-technology companies, especially the Big Five of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. One of the principal themes of this uprising is that present-day antitrust policy, forged in the rusty era of steel, oil, and cars, is now obsolete. We are in the age of information, which ipso facto calls for new rules. A second animating theme is that the antitrust thinking of the Chicago School, which came to prominence in the last quarter of the last century, must be completely overthrown. Proponents of this new antitrust ground their arguments by returning to the historical roots of American antitrust policy. My contention, however, is that the new antitrust gets this history wrong. It both misconceives the nature of the competitive process and deliberately refuses to confront the political economy of antitrust. In so doing, it adopts some of the worst traits of the Chicago School it criticizes while manifesting few of that school’s many virtues.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will soon vote on whether to repeal an Obama-era rule classifying Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as “common carriers.” That rule was put in place to achieve net neutrality, an attractive-sounding goal that many Americans—millennials especially—reflexively support.

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This week the FCC will vote on Chairman Ajit Pai’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order. Once implemented, the Order will rescind the 2015 Open Internet Order and return antitrust and consumer protection enforcement to primacy in Internet access regulation in the U.S.

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