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Nicolas Petit

Professor of Law
Liege University

Professor Nicolas Petit is a Research Professor at the School of Law in the UniSA Business School and Professor of Law at Liege University, Belgium.

Professor Nicolas Petit’s research focuses on antitrust law, intellectual property, and law in a context of technological change. His recent written works deal with the legal challenges created by the introduction of artificial intelligence and robotics in society. He is also working on a book on technology platforms’ competition.

Professor Petit holds a PhD from the University of Liege (Belgium), an LL.M from the College of Europe (Bruges), a Master’s degree from the University of Paris II and an LLB from the University of Paris V. He practiced law with a leading US law firm in Brussels and he also served as a Clerk at the Commercial Chamber of the French Supreme Court. In 2005 he attended Harvard Law School’s Visiting Researchers Programme.

Professor Petit is the co-author of EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford University Press, 2012) and the author of Droit européen de la concurrence (Domat Montchrestien, 2013), a monograph which was awarded the prize for the best law book of the year at the Constitutional Court in France. In 2017, he received the GCR award for academic excellence.

Scholarship

February 7, 2018

Innovation Competition, Unilateral Effects and Merger Control Policy

Nicolas Petit
This paper looks at whether the standard unilateral effects model can be applied to non-price competition parameters such as innovation. This question arises because competition authorities are intervening in horizontal mergers that are found to give rise to a “significant impediment to effective innovation competition” (“SIEIC”) as a result of a reduction in post-merger R&D efforts (including lower expenditure).
Antitrust & Consumer Protection
February 6, 2017

Significant Impediment to Industry Innovation:A NovelTheory of Harm in EU Merger Control?

Nicolas Petit
Summary A novel theory of harm is crystalising in European Union (“EU”) merger control. Under this theory, the EU Commission (“Commission”) can intervene in mergers that it considers generally reduce…
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Other Resources

July 31, 2018

EU engaged in antitrust gerrymandering against Google

February 7, 2018

Innovation Competition, Unilateral Effects and Merger Control Policy

June 30, 2017

A few thoughts on the European Commission decision against Google

March 31, 2017

Antitrust review of ag-biotech mergers: Appropriability versus cannibalization [Ag-Biotech Symposium]

March 21, 2017

Significant Impediment To Industry Innovation: A novel theory of harm in EU merger policy?

More Resources
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