Abstract

The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Commission alleges that, through the use of loyalty discounts offered to microprocessor purchasers, Intel unlawfully excluded rivals and harmed consumers in the microprocessor and graphics processor markets. This article analyzes the Commission’s claims. The Commission’s reliance on Section 5 should be viewed with suspicion because it allows the Commission to evade the more stringent standards of proof that have been emerged in the Supreme Court’s Section 2 jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Commission’s actions surrounding its prosecution of Intel reflect an adversarial attitude that undermines the Commission’s stated comparative advantages over private litigants. Moreover, the Commission’s allegations form a weak case when evaluated under the conventional Section 2 standard. Unlike many Section 2 cases alleging speculative future consumer harm, the disputed conduct in this case has been in the marketplace for nearly a decade, and its competitive footprint is readily observable. The available data do not support the Commission’s theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers. To the contrary, it is almost certain that Intel’s distribution contracts led to tangible, demonstrable consumer welfare gains in the form of lower prices. Accordingly, the Commission’s complaint against Intel threatens to harm consumers directly in the computer industry as well as indirectly by undermining the stability and certainly which longstanding Section 2 jurisprudence has afforded the business community by requiring the plaintiffs offer rigorous proof of competitive harm.

As regular readers know, interchange fees are a frequent topic of conversation around the blog.  Taking the conversation from the ether to the real world, ICLE has funded a white paper and is putting on a conference next week on the topic.  The conference, in fact, grows out of the successful online symposium we held here at Truth on the Market a few months ago.  An e-book/pdf version of the posts and comments from that sympoisum can be downloaded here, by the way.  A few of the participants from the symposium will be participating in the conference, as well (more below).

Read the full piece here. 

We are a group of economists (listed at the end of this letter) with extensive experience working on antitrust issues, including horizontal mergers. We applaud the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice for inviting comments from the public on the proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMGs). The proposed HMGs represent a substantial advance over the existing guidelines by better explaining the methodologies actually employed at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in their evaluations of mergers. We are writing to comment on one specific aspect of the proposed HMGs: the use of price/cost margins in merger analysis.

Late in the Senate’s proceedings on the financial regulatory reform bill, the Senate adopted – with no hearings and minimal debate – a controversial provision proposed by Sen. Richard Durbin, Illinois Democrat, that imposes price controls on interchange fees for debit and prepaid cards. The amendment also allows merchants to override several rules of payment card networks that currently protect consumers from abusive practices by merchants. While big-box merchants and convenience stores are declaring this a victory against the financial services industry, if the amendment survives in conference committee, consumers and small banks will be the real losers.

Summary

Fresh off of the most substantial national liquidity crisis of the last generation and the enactment of sweeping credit card regulation in the form of the Credit CARD Act, Congress continues to deliberate, with a continuing drumbeat of support from lobbyists, a set of new regulations for credit card companies. These proposals, offered in the name of consumer protection, seek to constrain the setting of “interchange fees”— transaction charges integral to payment card systems—through a range of proposed political interventions. This article identifies both the theoretical and actual failings of such regulation. Payment cards are a secure, inexpensive, welfare-increasing payment mechanism largely unlike any other in history. Rather than increasing consumer welfare in any meaningful sense, interchange fee legislation represents an attempt by some merchants to shift costs away from their businesses and onto card issuing banks and cardholders. In particular, bank-issued credit cards offer a dramatic improvement in the efficiency and availability of consumer credit by shifting credit risk from merchants onto banks in exchange for the cost of the interchange fee—currently averaging less than 2% of purchase value. Merchants’ efforts to cabin these fees would harm not only consumers but also the merchants themselves as commerce would depend more heavily on less-efficient paperbased payment systems. The consequence of interchange fee legislation, as Australia’s experiment with such regulation demonstrates, would be reduced access to credit, higher interest rates for consumers, and the return of the much-loathed annual fee for credit cards. Interchange fee regulation threatens to constrain credit for consumers and small businesses as the American economy begins to convalesce from a serious “credit crunch,” and should be accordingly rejected.

One of my antitrust students recently pointed me to a television commercial that could inspire a great exam question. Unfortunately, I didn’t see the ad until I’d finished drafting this semester’s antitrust exam (which I’ve been grading…hence the absence from TOTM).

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I share Prof. Ribstein’s concerns about the federalization of corporate governance contained in the Dodd bill.  Though Senator Carper wasn’t able, in the end, to get the proxy access provisions out of the Dodd Bill, which I think were the most troubling, we did eliminate another of Senator Schumer’s ideas. (The corporate governance provisions of the Dodd bill were taken from Sen. Schumer’s “Shareholder Bill of Rights.”)  The initial draft of the Dodd Bill included a restriction prohibiting any publicly traded company from having a staggered board.  I suspect we have the good work of Senator Carper and Congressman Castle’s offices to thank for their continued work against that provision.  The option to have a staggered board is part of the Delaware brand’s advantage.  Nearly 80% of Boards and their shareholders used to embrace the staggered election approach, since then some (but not most) companies’ shareholders have pushed, and been successful, in changing to annual elections under existing rules, a development which Delaware’s freedom-of-contract philosophy embraces.  Now roughly 50% of publicly traded firms have staggered boards.  I should add…this, like most corporate governance changes, is not exclusively a Delaware issue…as Delaware is home to only 50% of publicly traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500.

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I purchased my copy of Peter Klein’s latest —  The Capitalist & The Entrepreneur: Essays on Organizations and Markets — today.  It is available for purchase here and here.  And if you wont to sneak a peak, you can see the full version here.  The role of the entrepreneur is one of the more under-theorized subjects in economics and, in turn, law and economics.  Peter is an insightful and thoughtful economist with the right toolkit to bring to bear on this project.  He is one of my favorite thinkers about these subjects (he is also my second favorite Klein, no small compliment in these quarters).   I’m greatly looking forward to the book.

Read the full piece here.

I’ve recently finished reading Jonathan Baker’s Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, forthcoming in the Antitrust Law Journal.

Baker’s central thesis in Preserving a Political Bargain builds on earlier work concerning competition policy as an implicit political bargain that was reached during the 1940s between the more extreme positions of laissez-faire on the one hand and regulation on the other.  The new piece tries to explain what Baker describes as the “non-interventionist” critique of monopolization enforcement within this framework.

Read the full piece here.