Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal ran an article entitled McDonald’s May Drop Health Plan. The article reported that “McDonald’s Corp. has warned federal regulators that it could drop its health insurance plan for nearly 30,000 hourly restaurant workers unless regulators waive a new requirement of the U.S. health overhaul.” The insurance plan at issue is a so-called “mini-med” plan, which provides limited coverage but at low prices. The Journal reports, for example, that “[a] single worker can pay $14 a week for a plan that caps annual benefits at $2,000, or about $32 a week to get coverage up to $10,000 a year.”

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The Obama administration has promised that the Federal Reserve’s new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will be independent from politics, a model of regulatory expertise grounded in sound data and economics. Naming Harvard Law Prof. Elizabeth Warren as de facto agency head undermines both goals.

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We dole out at least our fair share of criticism for the Federal Trade Commission here.  Now its time for some credit where its due.  Historically, one of the consistent highlights of the Commission’s output has been its competition policy advocacy work.  In this case, the FTC (or at least the Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Economics, and the Office of Policy and Planning) provided comments on New Jersey Senate Bill 484.

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The political economy of alcohol regulation has always been fascinating.  But things took an interesting turn of late (HT: Marginal Revolution) when a beer industry trade group took a stand against a proposition that would legalize marijuana in California…

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Last Thursday and Friday, I attended a conference at Case Western Law School on the Roberts Court’s business law decisions. I presented a paper on the Court’s antitrust decisions. Adam Pritchard, Matt Bodie, and Brian Fitzpatrick presented papers considering the Court’s treatment of, respectively, securities law, labor and employment law, and pleading standards.

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Abstract

Antitrust is back in vogue at the U.S. Supreme Court. Whereas the Rehnquist Court decided few antitrust cases in its latter years (only one from 1993 to 1995, one each year from 1996 through 1999, and none from 2000 to 2003), the Roberts Court issued seven antitrust decisions in its first two years alone. Numerous commentators have characterized the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions as radical departures that betray a pro-business, anti-consumer bias. While some of the decisions do represent significant changes from past practice (see, e.g., Leegin, which overruled the 1911 Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality for minimum resale price maintenance, and Twombly, which abrogated the infamous “no set of facts” pleading standard set forth in the 1957 Conley v. Gibson decision), the “pro-business/anti-consumer” characterization of the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions is inaccurate. The characterization – caricature, really – fails to appreciate the fundamental limits of antitrust, a body of law that requires judges and juries to make fine distinctions between procompetitive and anticompetitive behaviors that frequently resemble each other. While false acquittals of anticompetitive conduct may harm consumers, so may false convictions of procompetitive actions. And efforts to eliminate errors in liability judgments are themselves costly. Optimal antitrust rules will therefore aim to minimize the sum of decision costs (the costs of reaching a liability decision) and expected error costs (the social losses from false convictions and false acquittals). Each of the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions can be defended in light of this “decision-theoretic” approach, an approach calculated to maximize the effectiveness of the antitrust enterprise, to the ultimate benefit of consumers. This Article first describes the fundamental limits of antitrust and the decision-theoretic approach such limits inspire. It then analyzes the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions, explaining how each coheres with the decision-theoretic model. Finally, it predicts how the Court will address three issues likely to come before it in the future: tying, loyalty rebates, and bundled discounts.

The WSJ recently published the next installment of the Microsoft-Google antitrust wars.  A Google representative argues “competition is one click away”; Charles (“Rick”) Rule, Microsoft’s antitrust attorney, argues that Google’s conduct might harm competition.  Rule’s main point is summed up in the first line of his piece: “what goes around comes around.”  The longer version of the argument is as follows: (1) Microsoft was faced with antitrust allegations instigated by rivals that its business practices harmed competition; (2) Microsoft defended on various grounds, including that there was ample competition in high-tech markets; (3) Microsoft lost and new law was made; (4) Google is now faced with similar allegations, brought on and/or instigated by similar rivals (including Microsoft), and involving similar defenses; (5) fair play and consistency dictates that the same standard be applied to Microsoft and Google; (6) thus, Google is an antitrust problem and should lose a suit brought against it.  I will refer to (1)-(6) as the “antitrust karma” argument.

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That’s the title of Steve Horwitz’s blog post reflecting on a recent celebration honoring the lifetime contributions of 1986 economics Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan. (HT: Art Cardin for pointing it out on FB) Horwitz describes Bachanan’s comments about how “the most basic insight of economics is fairly simple: the spontaneous order of  the market.” He goes on…

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