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ICLE Executive Director Geoffrey Manne appointed to FCC Consumer Advisory Committee PDF Print E-mail

The International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) is pleased to announce that its founder and Executive Director, Geoffrey A. Manne, has been appointed by Federal Communications Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler to serve on the FCC's Consumer Advisory Committee.

The appointment is for a term of two years, and the Committee will meet a few times a year in Washington, DC. ICLE, and Mr. Manne's role at ICLE, will be unaffected by his participation on the Committee.

The Consumer Advisory Committee's mission is:

[T]o make recommendations to the Commission regarding consumer issues within the jurisdiction of the Commission and to facilitate the participation of consumers...

The Committee may consider issues including, but not limited to, the following topics:

  • Consumer protection and education
  • Implementation of Commission rules and consumer participation in the FCC rulemaking process; and,
  • The impact of new and emerging communication technologies...

In particular, as directed by the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order, the CAC will “formulate and submit to the Commission a proposed Open Internet enhanced transparency rule disclosure format.”

A nationally recognized expert in the law and economics of telecommunications, antitrust, consumer protection, intellectual property, and international economic regulation, Geoffrey Manne is the editor, with FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright, of Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation, a volume from Cambridge University Press. His other publications have appeared in the Journal of Competition Law and Economics, the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy and the Columbia Business Law Journal, among many other law reviews and popular media outlets.

Mr. Manne has written extensively on consumer protection issues, including the regulation of corporate disclosures, privacy and data security. He is regularly invited to speak on the economic impacts of public policy issues and to provide oral and written testimony on these issues to the United States Congress. Mr. Manne recently participated in the FCC's Open Internet Roundtable on transparency, and he has filed numerous comments before the FCC and the FTC, as well as amicus briefs in the Supreme Court and several federal appeals courts.

Prior to founding ICLE, Geoffrey Manne was a law professor specializing in antitrust law and economics, intellectual property, corporate governance and international economic regulation at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, OR. From 2006-2008, while on leave from teaching, he directed Microsoft’s law and economics academic outreach program.

Mr. Manne practiced antitrust and appellate law at Latham & Watkins LLP, and served as a lecturer in law at the University of Chicago and the University of Virginia law schools. His father, Henry G. Manne, was Dean Emeritus at George Mason University and one of the four founders of the Law and Economics movement.

The FCC announcement can be found here.

New ICLE White Paper on the Dark Side of the FTC’s Latest Privacy Case PDF Print E-mail

Last week, the FTC announced its complaint and consent decree with Nomi Technologies for failing to allow consumers to opt-out of cell phone tracking while shopping in retail stores. Whatever one thinks about Nomi itself, the FTC’s enforcement action represents another step in the dubious application of its enforcement authority against deceptive statements.

In response, Geoffrey Manne, Ben Sperry, and Berin Szoka have written a new ICLE White Paper, titled, In the Matter of Nomi, Technologies, Inc.: The Dark Side of the FTC’s Latest Feel-Good Case.

Nomi Technologies offers retailers an innovative way to observe how customers move through their stores, how often they return, what products they browse and for how long (among other things) by tracking the Wi-Fi addresses broadcast by customers’ mobile phones. This allows stores to do what websites do all the time: tweak their configuration, pricing, purchasing and the like in response to real-time analytics — instead of just eyeballing what works. Nomi anonymized the data it collected so that retailers couldn’t track specific individuals. Recognizing that some customers might still object, even to “anonymized” tracking, Nomi allowed anyone to opt-out of all Nomi tracking on its website.

The FTC, though, seized upon a promise made within Nomi’s privacy policy to provide an additional, in-store opt out and argued that Nomi’s failure to make good on this promise — and/or notify customers of which stores used the technology — made its privacy policy deceptive. Commissioner Wright dissented, noting that the majority failed to consider evidence that showed the promise was not material, arguing that the inaccurate statement was not important enough to actually affect consumers’ behavior because they could opt-out on the website anyway. Both Commissioners Wright’s and Commissioner Ohlhausen’s dissents argued that the FTC majority’s enforcement decision in Nomi amounted to prosecutorial overreach, imposing an overly stringent standard of review without any actual indication of consumer harm.

The FTC’s deception authority is supposed to provide the agency with the authority to remedy consumer harms not effectively handled by common law torts and contracts — but it’s not a blank check. The 1983 Deception Policy Statement requires the FTC to demonstrate:

  1. There is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer;
  2. A consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is considered reasonable under the circumstances; and
  3. The misleading representation, omission, or practice is material (meaning the inaccurate statement was important enough to actually affect consumers’ behavior).

Under the DPS, certain types of claims are treated as presumptively material, although the FTC is always supposed to “consider relevant and competent evidence offered to rebut presumptions of materiality.” The Nomi majority failed to do exactly that in its analysis of the company’s claims, as Commissioner Wright noted in his dissent:

the Commission failed to discharge its commitment to duly consider relevant and competent evidence that squarely rebuts the presumption that Nomi’s failure to implement an additional, retail-level opt out was material to consumers. In other words, the Commission neglects to take into account evidence demonstrating consumers would not “have chosen differently” but for the allegedly deceptive representation.

As we discuss in detail in the white paper, we believe that the Commission committed several additional legal errors in its application of the Deception Policy Statement in Nomi, over and above its failure to adequately weigh exculpatory evidence. Exceeding the legal constraints of the DPS isn’t just a legal problem: in this case, it’s led the FTC to bring an enforcement action that will likely have the very opposite of its intended result, discouraging rather than encouraging further disclosure.

Moreover, as we write in the white paper:

Nomi is the latest in a long string of recent cases in which the FTC has pushed back against both legislative and self-imposed constraints on its discretion. By small increments (unadjudicated consent decrees), but consistently and with apparent purpose, the FTC seems to be reverting to the sweeping conception of its power to police deception and unfairness that led the FTC to a titanic clash with Congress back in 1980.

The Nomi case presents yet another example of the need for FTC process reforms. Those reforms could ensure the FTC focuses on cases that actually make consumers better off. But given the FTC majority’s unwavering dedication to maximizing its discretion, such reforms will likely have to come from Congress.

Find the full white paper here.

The FAA's Proposed Drone Rules Fail under Both Economic and First Amendment Scrutiny PDF Print E-mail

Last week the International Center for Law & Economics, joined by TechFreedom, filed comments with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in its Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS” — i.e, drones) proceeding to establish rules for the operation of small drones in the National Airspace System.

We believe that the FAA has failed to appropriately weigh the costs and benefits, as well as the First Amendment implications, of its proposed rules.

The FAA’s proposed drones rules fail to meet (or even undertake) adequate cost/benefit analysis

FAA regulations are subject to Executive Order 12866, which, among other things, requires that agencies:

  1. “consider incentives for innovation,”
  2. “propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs”;
  3. “base [their] decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information”; and
  4. “tailor [their} regulations to impose the least burden on society,”

The FAA’s proposed drone rules fail to meet these requirements.

An important, and fundamental, problem is that the proposed rules often seem to import “scientific, technical, economic, and other information” regarding traditional manned aircraft, rather than such knowledge specifically applicable to drones and their uses — what FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen has dubbed “The Procrustean Problem with Prescriptive Regulation.”

As such, not only do the rules often not make sense as a practical matter, they also seek to simply adapt existing standards, rules and understandings promulgated for manned aircraft to regulate drones — insufficiently tailoring the rules to “impose the least burden on society.”

In some cases the rules would effectively ban obviously valuable uses outright, disregarding the rules’ effect on innovation (to say nothing of their effect on current uses of drones) without adequately defending such prohibitions as necessary to protect public safety.

Importantly, the proposed rules would effectively prohibit the use of commercial drones for long-distance services (like package delivery and scouting large agricultural plots) and for uses in populated areas — undermining what may well be drones' most economically valuable uses.

As our comments note:

By prohibiting UAS operation over people who are not directly involved in the drone’s operation, the rules dramatically limit the geographic scope in which UAS may operate, essentially limiting commercial drone operations to unpopulated or extremely sparsely populated areas. While that may be sufficient for important agricultural and forestry uses, for example, it effectively precludes all possible uses in more urban areas, including journalism, broadcasting, surveying, package delivery and the like. Even in nonurban areas, such a restriction imposes potentially insurmountable costs.

Mandating that operators not fly over other individuals not involved in the UAS operation is, in fact, the nail in the coffin of drone deliveries, an industry that is likely to offer a significant fraction of this technology’s potential economic benefit. Imposing such a blanket ban thus improperly ignores the important “incentives for innovation” suggested by Executive Order 12866 without apparent corresponding benefit.

The FAA’s proposed drone rules fail under First Amendment scrutiny

The FAA’s failure to tailor the rules according to an appropriate analysis of their costs and benefits also causes them to violate the First Amendment. Without proper tailoring based on the unique technological characteristics of drones and a careful assessment of their likely uses, the rules are considerably more broad than the Supreme Court’s “time, place and manner” standard would allow.

Several of the rules constitute a de facto ban on most — indeed, nearly all — of the potential uses of drones that most clearly involve the collection of information and/or the expression of speech protected by the First Amendment. As we note in our comments:

While the FAA’s proposed rules appear to be content-neutral, and will thus avoid the most-exacting Constitutional scrutiny, the FAA will nevertheless have a difficult time demonstrating that some of them are narrowly drawn and adequately tailored time, place, and manner restrictions.

Indeed, many of the rules likely amount to a prior restraint on protected commercial and non-commercial activity, both for obvious existing applications like news gathering and for currently unanticipated future uses.

Our friends Eli Dourado, Adam Thierer and Ryan Hagemann at Mercatus also filed comments in the proceeding, raising similar and analogous concerns:

As far as possible, we advocate an environment of “permissionless innovation” to reap the greatest benefit from our airspace. The FAA’s rules do not foster this environment. In addition, we believe the FAA has fallen short of its obligations under Executive Order 12866 to provide thorough benefit-cost analysis.

The full Mercatus comments, available here, are also recommended reading.

Read our full comments here.

The Ninth Circuit botched its efficiencies analysis in the FTC v St Lukes antitrust case PDF Print E-mail

Earlier this week ICLE, along with a group of prominent professors and scholars of law and economics, filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit seeking rehearing en banc of the court's FTC, et al. v. St Luke's case.

ICLE, joined by the Medicaid Defense Fund, also filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit panel that originally heard the case.

The case involves the purchase by St. Luke's Hospital of the Saltzer Medical Group, a multi-specialty physician group in Nampa, Idaho. The FTC and the State of Idaho sought to permanently enjoin the transaction under the Clayton Act, arguing that

[T]he combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give it the market power to demand higher rates for health care services provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) in Nampa, Idaho and surrounding areas, ultimately leading to higher costs for health care consumers.  

The district court agreed and its decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit panel.

Unfortunately, in affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit made several errors in its treatment of the efficiencies offered by St. Luke's in defense of the merger. Most importantly:

  • The court refused to recognize St. Luke's proffered quality efficiencies, stating that “[i]t is not enough to show that the merger would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients.”
  • The panel also applied the "less restrictive alternative" analysis in such a way that any theoretically possible alternative to a merger would discount those claimed efficiencies.
  • Finally, the Ninth Circuit panel imposed a much higher burden of proof for St. Luke's to prove efficiencies than it did for the FTC to make out its prima facie case.

As we note in our brief:

If permitted to stand, the Panel’s decision will signal to market participants that the efficiencies defense is essentially unavailable in the Ninth Circuit, especially if those efficiencies go towards improving quality. Companies contemplating a merger designed to make each party more efficient will be unable to rely on an efficiencies defense and will therefore abandon transactions that promote consumer welfare lest they fall victim to the sort of reasoning employed by the panel in this case.

The following excerpts from the brief elaborate on the errors committed by the court and highlight their significance, particularly in the health care context:

The Panel implied that only price effects can be cognizable efficiencies, noting that the District Court “did not find that the merger would increase competition or decrease prices.” But price divorced from product characteristics is an irrelevant concept. The relevant concept is quality-adjusted price, and a showing that a merger would result in higher product quality at the same price would certainly establish cognizable efficiencies.

* * *

By placing the ultimate burden of proving efficiencies on the defendants and by applying a narrow, impractical view of merger specificity, the Panel has wrongfully denied application of known procompetitive efficiencies. In fact, under the Panel’s ruling, it will be nearly impossible for merging parties to disprove all alternatives when the burden is on the merging party to address any and every untested, theoretical less-restrictive structural alternative.

* * *

Significantly, the Panel failed to consider the proffered significant advantages that health care acquisitions may have over contractual alternatives or how these advantages impact the feasibility of contracting as a less restrictive alternative. In a complex integration of assets, “the costs of contracting will generally increase more than the costs of vertical integration.” (Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978)). In health care in particular, complexity is a given. Health care is characterized by dramatically imperfect information, and myriad specialized and differentiated products whose attributes are often difficult to measure. Realigning incentives through contract is imperfect and often unsuccessful. Moreover, the health care market is one of the most fickle, plagued by constantly changing market conditions arising from technological evolution, ever-changing regulations, and heterogeneous (and shifting) consumer demand. Such uncertainty frequently creates too many contingencies for parties to address in either writing or enforcing contracts, making acquisition a more appropriate substitute.

* * *

Sound antitrust policy and law do not permit the theoretical to triumph over the practical. One can always envision ways that firms could function to achieve potential efficiencies.... But this approach would harm consumers and fail to further the aims of the antitrust laws.

* * *

The Panel’s approach to efficiencies in this case demonstrates a problematic asymmetry in merger analysis. As FTC Commissioner Wright has cautioned:

Merger analysis is by its nature a predictive enterprise. Thinking rigorously about probabilistic assessment of competitive harms is an appropriate approach from an economic perspective. However, there is some reason for concern that the approach applied to efficiencies is deterministic in practice. In other words, there is a potentially dangerous asymmetry from a consumer welfare perspective of an approach that embraces probabilistic prediction, estimation, presumption, and simulation of anticompetitive effects on the one hand but requires efficiencies to be proven on the other. (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright at 5, In the Matter of Ardagh Group S.A., and Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain)

* * *

In this case, the Panel effectively presumed competitive harm and then imposed unduly high evidentiary burdens on the merging parties to demonstrate actual procompetitive effects. The differential treatment and evidentiary burdens placed on St. Luke’s to prove competitive benefits is “unjustified and counterproductive.” (Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 390 (2011)). Such asymmetry between the government’s and St. Luke’s burdens is “inconsistent with a merger policy designed to promote consumer welfare.” (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright at 7, In the Matter of Ardagh Group S.A., and Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain).

* * *

In reaching its decision, the Panel dismissed these very sorts of procompetitive and quality-enhancing efficiencies associated with the merger that were recognized by the district court. Instead, the Panel simply decided that it would not consider the “laudable goal” of improving health care as a procompetitive efficiency in the St. Luke’s case – or in any other health care provider merger moving forward. The Panel stated that “[i]t is not enough to show that the merger would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients.” Such a broad, blanket conclusion can serve only to harm consumers.

* * *

By creating a barrier to considering quality-enhancing efficiencies associated with better care, the approach taken by the Panel will deter future provider realignment and create a "chilling" effect on vital provider integration and collaboration. If the Panel’s decision is upheld, providers will be considerably less likely to engage in realignment aimed at improving care and lowering long-term costs. As a result, both patients and payors will suffer in the form of higher costs and lower quality of care. This can’t be – and isn’t – the outcome to which appropriate antitrust law and policy aspires.

The scholars joining ICLE on the brief are:

  • George Bittlingmayer, Wagnon Distinguished Professor of Finance and Otto Distinguished Professor of Austrian Economics, University of Kansas
  • Henry Butler, George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Law & Economics Center, George Mason University
  • Daniel A. Crane, Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Professor of Law, University of Michigan
  • Harold Demsetz, UCLA Emeritus Chair Professor of Business Economics, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Bernard Ganglmair, Assistant Professor, University of Texas at Dallas
  • Gus Hurwitz, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
  • Keith Hylton, William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, Boston University
  • Thom Lambert, Wall Chair in Corporate Law and Governance, University of Missouri
  • John Lopatka, A. Robert Noll Distinguished Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University
  • Geoffrey Manne, Founder and Executive Director of the International Center for Law and Economics and Senior Fellow at TechFreedom
  • Stephen Margolis, Alumni Distinguished Undergraduate Professor, North Carolina State University
  • Fred McChesney, de la Cruz-Mentschikoff Endowed Chair in Law and Economics, University of Miami
  • Tom Morgan, Oppenheim Professor Emeritus of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, George Washington University
  • David Olson, Associate Professor of Law, Boston College
  • Paul H. Rubin, Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Economics, Emory University
  • D. Daniel Sokol, Professor of Law, University of Florida
  • Mike Sykuta, Associate Professor and Director of the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, University of Missouri

The amicus brief is available here.

The FCC is Illegally Rewriting the Communications Act PDF Print E-mail

Today, the Federal Communications Commission released new net neutrality rules in a 400-page order that prompted lengthy, detailed dissents from Commissioners Pai and O'Rielly. ICLE's Geoffrey Manne and TechFreedom's Berin Szoka respond:

This order represents the triumph of political forces over sound policymaking,” said TechFreedom President Berin Szoka. “It effectively destroys nearly 18 years of bipartisan consensus. It's a radical break even from the FCC’s proposed rules. In fact, the entire rulemaking may founder in court simply because Wheeler refused to issue a further NPRM to adequately develop the record. Politicization of the process may also cost the FCC the deference agencies usually enjoy when they’ve followed normal processes.”

Essentially, the FCC is saying, ‘just trust us,’” said ICLE Executive Director Geoffrey Manne. “But the Order is brimming with reasons not to. Perhaps the Order’s most astonishing admission is that the FCC intends to use its newly asserted authority under Title II not only to ensure, as it claims throughout in the Order, the ability to protect an open Internet, but also to saddle broadband providers and other services with whatever other regulations in Title II the FCC deems appropriate. This sly caveat, buried deep in the Order, nullifies the FCC’s fevered assurances that it will preserve the light touch approach begun under President Clinton.”

The FCC is effectively, and illegally, rewriting the Communications Act,” argued Szoka. The Order mentions ‘tailoring’ in one form or another 77 times, but doesn’t reference even once the Supreme Court’s decision last year holding that such radical tailoring is a job for Congress, not regulators. The Order allows the FCC to go much, much further than it has gone today — but also to do the opposite. We’re now just one presidential election away from Republicans using the FCC’s new standard of ‘forbearance without evidence’ to gut not just net neutrality rules, but the entire Act. To say that opening the door to such political ping-pong brings ‘certainty' makes a mockery of the word. The only way to restore sanity at the FCC is for Congress to finally update the Communications Act.”

“The FCC has never gotten far enough in court to face the significant Constitutional arguments against its power grab,” concluded Manne. “But the Order reveals the weakness of the FCC’s First Amendment arguments. The FCC justifies its expansive interpretation of Sections 201 and 202 by claiming that broader rules will ‘remove ambiguity.’ But such an approach is decidedly not ‘no more burdensome than necessary,’ as First Amendment review requires. In fact, the FCC admits that its claimed authority grants the agency the nearly unfettered discretion to issue future rules. That is does so while disclaiming any need to justify such future rules under Title II today portends a dire future for free expression on the Internet as the FCC embarks on this regulatory slippery slope.”

We can be reached for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it . See more of our work on net neutrality and Title II, including:

About The International Center for Law and Economics:

The International Center for Law and Economics is a non-profit, non-partisan research center aimed at fostering rigorous policy analysis and evidence-based regulation.

About TechFreedom:

TechFreedom is a non-profit, non-partisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.

Broad Fair Use Exceptions Could Discourage Innovation Worldwide PDF Print E-mail

Today, the International Center for Law & Economics released a white paper, co-authored by Executive Director Geoffrey Manne and Senior Fellow Julian Morris, entitled Dangerous Exception: The detrimental effects of including “fair use” copyright exceptions in free trade agreements.

Dangerous Exception explores the relationship between copyright, creativity and economic development in a networked global marketplace. In particular, it examines the evidence for and against mandating a U.S.-style fair use exception to copyright via free trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and through “fast-track” trade promotion authority (TPA).

In the context of these ongoing trade negotiations, some organizations have been advocating for the inclusion of dramatically expanded copyright exceptions in place of more limited language requiring that such exceptions conform to the “three-step test” implemented by the 1994 TRIPs Agreement.

The paper argues that if broad fair use exceptions are infused into trade agreements they could increase piracy and discourage artistic creation and innovation — especially in nations without a strong legal tradition implementing such provisions.

The expansion of digital networks across borders, combined with historically weak copyright enforcement in many nations, poses a major challenge to a broadened fair use exception. The modern digital economy calls for appropriate, but limited, copyright exceptions — not their expansion.

The white paper is available here. For some of our previous work on related issues, see:

Academics Urge FTC to Endorse Case-by-Case Approach on Net Neutrality Concerns PDF Print E-mail

The FCC is considering a new Open Internet Order that could harm consumers by invoking Title II and banning paid prioritization. While the vast majority of  business arrangements between Internet and edge providers are pro-consumer, it is possible that a few harmful agreements may arise. But these cases should be judged on their merits. Instead, the FCC stands ready to adopt a proposal that would ban paid priority altogether, even though many such agreements would benefit consumers.

Today, 32 academics and scholars with expertise in law, business, economics, and public policy sent a letter to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) — the nation’s chief agency for competition advocacy — urging it to caution the FCC against Title II and a blanket ban on paid prioritization.

“It’s sadly ironic that those advocating rigid net neutrality rules talk about permissionless innovation, yet want to ban paid prioritization — a type of commercial agreement that essentially doesn’t even exist yet,”  said Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, which organized the letter. “What has really kept the Internet ‘free’ and ‘open’ has been focusing government on demonstrated problems, while remaining humble enough to admit that regulators don’t know what the future might, or should, look like. Net neutrality concerns over paid prioritization arrangements should be addressed if and when such deals actually occur—and only if they result in actual harm. The FTC should urge the FCC to adopt a case-by-case approach (like antitrust’s rule of reason) guided by economics, not hysterics and political pressure.”

The letter calls on the FTC to endorse such an approach and to urge the FCC to adopt it in any Open Internet rules the Commission may issue. The FTC regularly files comments with other government bodies as part of its competition advocacy program, and we believe this contentious issue begs for its expert guidance.

Read the full letter here.

About ICLE PDF Print E-mail

ICLE is a global think tank aimed at building an international network of scholars and institutions devoted to methodologies and research agendas supportive of the regulatory underpinnings that enable businesses to flourish. We develop intellectual work in specific policy areas to build a strong, international foundation for rigorous policy work in the long run.

The overarching objective of our center is to create the academic underpinnings for a regulatory environment that ensures the protection of property rights from inefficient interference by government agencies and private parties in high priority markets. The protection of property rights provides the basis for a competitive and innovative market environment in which business and society more generally can thrive. Optimal protection of property rights entails far more than sound intellectual property protection (although it certainly entails that); it also forms the basis for restrained government intervention into business practices, including through antitrust enforcement, consumer protection regulation, trade restrictions, government procurement policies and communications regulations, among many others.

The central activity of the center is to facilitate and organize the creation of a new network, international in scope, of economically-oriented research and outreach centers that may be able to move the academic and policy debates forward significantly in the years ahead. The ICLE's work is centered around the following principles:

  • A commitment to the application of economic theory, particularly price theory, law and economics and new institutional economics, to regulatory problems

  • A commitment to empirical scholarship and applications of economic theory with real world relevance

  • The use of formal mathematical modeling exclusively as a means to furthering our knowledge about the world, rather than an ends in its own right

  • A dedication to understanding both the role of the law and institutions in facilitating competition as well as the consequences of legal rules

  • A commitment to promoting an international discourse on issues of regulatory policy in the increasingly global regulatory environment

The core mission of the ICLE is the creation, support and development of policy-relevant law and economics research around the world. The ICLE will:

  • Build an integrated international network of scholars and institutions working on a range of issues in law and economics in an effort to expand the academic influence of the existing, mainly-US-based, community

  • Establish and deepen the ties between these institutions and the policy community through public outreach effort

  • Engage in specific efforts to expand the number of law and economics scholars in the academy

  • Engage in specific efforts to expand the scope of the issues influenced by the center’s methodologies

The Comcast-TWC Merger Is Not Anticompetitive PDF Print E-mail

Yesterday the International Center for Law & Economics and eleven independent professors and scholars of law and economics filed Reply Comments to address concerns raised in the Comments and Petitions to Deny in the Comcast Time Warner merger proceeding at the FCC. We make the following key points:

The merger does not reduce competition in the relevant markets.

  • The FCC has found that the relevant market for analysis in similar mergers is local. In these cases, the FCC found that the broadband market is competitive, and when there is little or no geographic overlap among ISPs that seek to merge, then there is no reduction in competition.The FCC should continue this reasoned analysis and reject “national broadband share” as a meaningful metric: the relevant market is a local one.

The FCC must properly attribute and consider merger-specific benefits.

  • The transaction will bring significant scale efficiencies in a marketplace that requires large, fixed-cost investments in network infrastructure and technology. Before anyone even considered using the Internet to distribute Netflix videos, Comcast invested in the technology and infrastructure that ultimately enabled the Netflix of today. It did so at enormous cost (tens of billions of dollars over the last 20 years) and risk. Absent Comcast’s broadband infrastructure investments, we would still be waiting for our Netflix DVDs to be delivered by snail mail, and Netflix would still be spending three-quarters of a billion dollars a year on shipping.

Vertical issues (like limiting access to independent programming content) will be unaffected by the merger.

  • Vertical integration in the cable industry does not harm consumers, and, often, has substantial benefits. And the merger changes little overall in terms of incentives for vertical foreclosure: Comcast currently has no ownership interest in the vast majority of programming it distributes — and it eagerly distributes it and it makes its own content widely available for distribution by competitors. Nothing about the proposed merger will change any of that.

Concerns about Comcast’s interconnection agreement with Netflix are completely misplaced.

  • The availability of multiple alternative avenues to deliver traffic to Comcast, and the ready availability of access to a transit market where prices have been falling precipitously, firmly constrain Comcast’s ability to set prices for direct connections. It is also important to appreciate that the bargaining power of Internet edge providers is not nearly as insignificant as some critics would claim.
  • Post-merger, the bargaining power of smaller edge providers will not be affected at all.  Small edge providers (who happen also to be the vast majority of participants in the Internet edge ecosystem) will be able to choose from a multitude of interconnection paths in a highly competitive market to deliver their Internet content to Comcast.
  • Meanwhile, post-merger, the bargaining power of the few edge providers that generate vast amounts of traffic will not be affected either. In addition to the existence of the multitude of alternative highly competitive paths to deliver traffic to Comcast, these large edge providers will also be able to leverage the high demand for their Internet content among Comcast’s broadband subscribers.

An Appendix to the filing included the summary results of a recent MIT study, Measuring Internet Congestion. The clear implication of the study is that, despite Netflix’s claims that Comcast acts as an insurmountable bottleneck, Netflix has — and uses — considerable power in its transactions with Comcast. In particular, as our Reply Comments discuss:

  • Large Internet edge providers are able to route their enormous traffic in ways to exert commercial pressure on ISPs, and large edge content providers are able to both determine, as well as avoid (or exploit) congestion at a moment’s notice.

The scholars signing on to the Reply Comment were:

  • David Balto, Former Policy Director of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission
  • Babette E. Boliek, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
  • Donald J. Boudreaux, Professor of Economics, George Mason University
  • Henry N. Butler, Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University
  • Richard A. Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University
  • Thomas A. Lambert, Wall Chair in Corporate Law and Governance, University of Missouri
  • Roslyn Layton, Fellow, Center for Communication, Media and Information Technologies, Aalborg University
  • Geoffrey A. Manne, Executive Director, International Center for Law & Economics
  • Scott E. Masten, Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, University of Michigan
  • Paul H. Rubin, Dobbs Professor of Economics, Emory University
  • Michael E. Sykuta, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Missouri

Read the full comments here, and see our other work on the Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger, especially:

The FCC Should not Block or Condition the Comcast-TWC Merger PDF Print E-mail

Today, the International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) filed comments in response to the FCC’s public notice requesting public comments on the proposed merger of Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable, Inc. The comments focus on analyzing the merger under the consumer welfare standard of antitrust law.

"The most obvious outward effect of this merger will be to change the logo on the side of cable service vans,” said Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of ICLE. “That’s a terrible reason for challenging this merger, but most of the criticism amounts to little more than an objection to Comcast taking over Time Warner Cable’s operations in cities where the two companies don’t compete.”

“Opposition to the merger rests largely on the unsubstantiated belief that ‘big is bad,’ and the highly politicized and emotional belief that the government should ‘do something about Comcast,’” adds Ben Sperry, Associate Director of ICLE. “Neither of these concerns has any grounding in fact or in rigorous competition analysis, and we urge the Commission to reject them as grounds for stopping or conditioning this merger.”

“Foreclosure simply isn’t a problem here,” adds Manne. “Comcast currently has no ownership interest in the vast majority of programming it distributes — and yet it eagerly distributes it. And it makes its own content widely available for distribution by competitors. Nothing about the proposed merger will change any of that.”

In its merger review, the FCC should consider that:

  1. Increased concentration is not, in itself, evidence of anticompetitive effect, as President Obama's Department of Justice has noted.
  2. Product markets should include all the reasonable substitutes to cable, like fiber, wireless, DSL, and satellite.
  3. Generally, mergers, like this one, that combine to meet only a 30% threshold (or less, if the market is properly defined) cannot be presumed to enable enough foreclosure to result in consumer harm.
  4. Mergers like this one, offer many efficiencies, from increasing shared knowhow among vertical steps in the production chain and increasing bargaining power against strong inputs, to improving governance, reducing transaction costs, and increasing economies of scale that can lead to benefits for consumers.

Read the full comments here. For some of our previous work on the Comcast-TWC merger, see:

ICLE and TechFreedom File Joint Comments in Defense of a Free Internet PDF Print E-mail

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) and TechFreedom filed two joint comments with the FCC today, explaining why the FCC has no sound legal basis for micromanaging the Internet and why “net neutrality” regulation would actually prove counter-productive for consumers.

The Policy Comments are available here, and the Legal Comments are here. See the Truth on the Market blog post, Net Neutrality Regulation Is Bad for Consumers and Probably Illegal, for a distillation of many of the key points made in the comments.

New regulation is unnecessary. “An open Internet and the idea that companies can make special deals for faster access are not mutually exclusive,” said Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of ICLE. “If the Internet really is ‘open,’ shouldn’t all companies be free to experiment with new technologies, business models and partnerships?”

“The media frenzy around this issue assumes that no one, apart from broadband companies, could possibly question the need for more regulation,” said Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom. “In fact, increased regulation of the Internet will incite endless litigation, which will slow both investment and innovation, thus harming consumers and edge providers.”

Title II would be a disaster. The FCC has proposed re-interpreting the Communications Act to classify broadband ISPs under Title II as common carriers. But reinterpretation might unintentionally ensnare edge providers, weighing them down with onerous regulations. “So-called reclassification risks catching other Internet services in the crossfire,” explained Szoka. “The FCC can’t easily forbear from Title II’s most onerous rules because the agency has set a high bar for justifying forbearance. Rationalizing a changed approach would be legally and politically difficult. The FCC would have to simultaneously find the broadband market competitive enough to forbear, yet fragile enough to require net neutrality rules. It would take years to sort out this mess — essentially hitting the pause button on better broadband.”

Section 706 is not a viable option. In 2010, the FCC claimed Section 706 as an independent grant of authority to regulate any form of "communications" not directly barred by the Act, provided only that the Commission assert that regulation would somehow promote broadband. “This is an absurd interpretation,” said Szoka. “This could allow the FCC to essentially invent a new Communications Act as it goes, regulating not just broadband, but edge companies like Google and Facebook, too, and not just neutrality but copyright, cybersecurity and more. The courts will eventually strike down this theory.”

A better approach. “The best policy would be to maintain the ‘Hands off the Net’ approach that has otherwise prevailed for 20 years,” said Manne. “That means a general presumption that innovative business models and other forms of ‘prioritization’ are legal. Innovation could thrive, and regulators could still keep a watchful eye, intervening only where there is clear evidence of actual harm, not just abstract fears.” “If the FCC thinks it can justify regulating the Internet, it should ask Congress to grant such authority through legislation,” added Szoka. “A new communications act is long overdue anyway. The FCC could also convene a multistakeholder process to produce a code enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission,” he continued, noting that the White House has endorsed such processes for setting Internet policy in general.

Manne concluded: “The FCC should focus on doing what Section 706 actually commands: clearing barriers to broadband deployment. Unleashing more investment and competition, not writing more regulation, is the best way to keep the Internet open, innovative and free.”

For some of our other work on net neutrality, see:

“Understanding Net(flix) Neutrality,” an op-ed by Geoffrey Manne in the Detroit News on Netflix’s strategy to confuse interconnection costs with neutrality issues.

“The Feds Lost on Net Neutrality, But Won Control of the Internet,” an op-ed by Berin Szoka and Geoffrey Manne in

“That startup investors’ letter on net neutrality is a revealing look at what the debate is really about,” a post by Geoffrey Manne in Truth on the Market.

Bipartisan Consensus: Rewrite of ‘96 Telecom Act is Long Overdue,” a post on TF’s blog highlighting the key points from TechFreedom and ICLE’s joint comments on updating the Communications Act.

The Net Neutrality Comments are available here:

ICLE/TF Net Neutrality Policy Comments

TF/ICLE Net Neutrality Legal Comments

ICLE & TechFreedom Joint Comments on Competition Policy and the Role of the FCC PDF Print E-mail

ICLE and TechFreedom filed joint comments in response to questions from the House Committee on Energy and Commerce relating to its third white paper, "Competition Policy and the Role of the Federal Communications Commission," in its series of white papers addressing the need for a rewrite of the Communications Act to address modern communications markets.

Our comments focus on the disconnect between the formalism of the current Telecommunications Act and the sort of effects-based analysis that modern competition policy demands:

There is, however, a fairly simple (philosophically, at least) solution: Adopt effects- based competition principles from antitrust to adjudicate disputes arising within the purview of the FCC, and reject the formalistic presumptions and resulting regulatory apparatus of the Communications Act. Such a framework is the best way, perhaps the only way, for Congress to give the FCC both the flexibility needed to keep up with technological change and the analytical rigor needed to ensure that the FCC’s interventions actually do more to help consumers than to harm them.

Whereas the 1996 Act, particularly in Title II, adopts formalistic presumptions and imposes specific regulatory outcomes, even in the face of ever-increasing uncertainty and technological change, an effects-based approach would generally employ ex post analysis of conduct and a broad assessment of its economic consequences to determine the propriety of various actions. Instead of foreclosing or mandating specific conduct, it allows innovation, technological development and changes in consumer preferences to guide conduct, intervening only where actual competitive harms develop (or, in a few cases, are substantially likely to develop in the future).

Such an approach stands in stark contrast to the 1996 Act, which, as Bob Crandall has described it,

is not deregulation but a vast new regulatory program designed to mold and shape competition through mandatory wholesale leasing of pieces of an incredibly complicated network at prices that are based on regulators' imperfect understanding of costs.

We also address the problem that Net Neutrality presents for sensible competition policy reform at the FCC:

Net Neutrality is, in some ways, borne out of the same realization that animates our comments here: The rise of broadband and the delivery of “Everything over IP” have so disrupted the existing regulatory regime that competition concerns can no longer be adequately addressed by the existing regulations. But where Net Neutrality falters is in its embrace of both the vertical structural assumptions of the Act, as well as its affinity for the Act’s outdated, ex ante, prescriptive approach. Moreover, Net Neutrality is itself inherently non-neutral, in that it begins with the assumption (discussed above and enshrined in the Act) that innovation and competition in complementary markets should always trump network innovation and competition. As a result, instead of arguing for an ex post assessment of competitive effects arising out of the uncertain and always-evolving relationship between broadband networks and edge providers, Net Neutrality advocates essentially adopt the apparatus of Title II as their competition policy lodestar.

The Comments are available here:

ICLE/TechFreedom Comments on Competition Policy and the Role of the FCC

ICLE White Paper - Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The US Experience PDF Print E-mail

ICLE has released a new study on the effect of payment card interchange fees on consumers, retailers and banks by Todd Zywicki, Geoffrey Manne and Julian Morris, titled: Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The US Experience

Payment cards are frequently safer, quicker, and more convenient than cash or checks. But, according to the new study, interchange fee caps under the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reforms have made electronic payments more expensive for consumers. While debit interchange fees charged by regulated banks (those with assets of over $10 billion) in the US fell by about 50% following the regulation, consumers, as well as smaller retailers, have not benefited from the cost reductions -- and poorer consumers, especially, have been significantly harmed.

Interchange fee price control proponents claim that reducing these fees reduces costs paid by merchants, who pass the savings on to consumers. But the US experience detailed in the study suggests that, while most large retailers have experienced savings, to date there is no evidence that those savings have been passed-through to consumers.. Meanwhile, smaller merchants haven't seen any appreciable savings to begin with, and both small and large merchants alike that engage in small-ticket transactions have actually seen costs go up.

At the same time, the costs of operating the payment system have to be recovered somehow – which has meant an increase in other bank and card charges. In order to make up the estimated $8 billion per year lost as a result of the price controls, regulated banks:

  • Reduced the availability of fee-free checking accounts by 50% between 2009 and 2013.
  • More than doubled the minimum monthly holding required on fee-free checking accounts.
  • Doubled average monthly fees on (non-free) checking accounts.

These changes contributed to a 10% increase in the number of "unbanked" -- people without bank accounts.

Thus, while consumers have seen large and immediate increases in the cost of bank accounts, to date there is no evidence of reduced prices at the pump or checkout. The study estimates that as a result of the Durbin Amendment, there will be a net transfer of between $1 billion and $3 billion annually from consumers -- especially in low-income households -- to large retailers and their shareholders, who have thus far been the primary beneficiaries of the Durbin Amendment.

As the EU considers its own interchange regulation, the US experience should stand as a cautionary tale.

The study is available here:

Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The US Experience by Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris & Todd J. Zywicki [updated 5 June 2014 to include abstract]

Open Letter to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie on the Direct Automobile Distribution Ban Against Tesla PDF Print E-mail

Earlier this month New Jersey became the most recent (but likely not the last) state to ban direct sales of automobiles. Although the rule nominally applies more broadly, it is directly aimed at keeping Tesla Motors (or at least its business model) out of New Jersey. Automobile dealers have offered several arguments why the rule is in the public interest, but a little basic economics reveals that these arguments are meritless.

Today ICLE sent an open letter to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, urging reconsideration of the regulation and explaining why the rule is unjustified -- except as rent-seeking protectionism by independent auto dealers.

The letter, which was principally written by University of Michigan law professor, Dan Crane, and based in large part on his blog posts at Truth on the Market (see here and here), was signed by more than 70 economists and law professors.

As the letter notes:

The Motor Vehicle Commission’s regulation was aimed specifically at stopping one company, Tesla Motors, from directly distributing its electric cars. But the regulation would apply equally to any other innovative manufacturer trying to bring a new automobile to market, as well. There is no justification on any rational economic or public policy grounds for such a restraint of commerce. Rather, the upshot of the regulation is to reduce competition in New Jersey’s automobile market for the benefit of its auto dealers and to the detriment of its consumers. It is protectionism for auto dealers, pure and simple.

The letter explains at length the economics of retail distribution and the misguided, anti-consumer logic of the regulation.

The letter concludes:

In sum, we have not heard a single argument for a direct distribution ban that makes any sense. To the contrary, these arguments simply bolster our belief that the regulations in question are motivated by economic protectionism that favors dealers at the expense of consumers and innovative technologies. It is discouraging to see this ban being used to block a company that is bringing dynamic and environmentally friendly products to market. We strongly encourage you to repeal it, by new legislation if necessary.

Among the letter’s signatories are some of the country’s most prominent legal scholars and economists from across the political spectrum.

Read the letter here:

Open Letter to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie on the Direct Automobile Distribution Ban

ICLE and CEI File Amicus Brief in Aereo Supreme Court Case PDF Print E-mail

supreme court

Today the International Center for Law & Economics and the Competitive Enterprise Institute filed an amicus brief in support of Petitioners in the Supreme Court's Aereo case.

The brief, which was authored by ICLE's Geoffrey Manne and Ben Sperry and CEI's Ryan Radia, argues that Aereo's unlicensed transmission of copyrighted broadcast programming violates the Copyright Act:

In concluding that Aereo does not publicly perform broadcast television programs, the Second Circuit relied upon its 2008 Cablevision decision holding that a cable company’s remote RS-DVR was similarly non-infringing. Importantly, however, the individual cable subscribers to whom Cablevision transmitted copies of plaintiff Cartoon Network’s television programming were already paying for lawful access to it. . . . The dispute in Cablevision thus involved a copyright holder and a licensee with a preexisting contractual relationship; the parties simply disagreed on the terms by which Cablevision was permitted to transmit Cartoon Network’s content. 

* * *

Unlike the cable company in Cablevision, Aereo and its ilk have neither sought nor received permission from any holders of copyrights in broadcast television programming before retransmitting their works to paying subscribers. The “safety valve” enjoyed by Cartoon Network and other cable channels—a cable company’s need to obtain copyright licenses to access each channel owner’s content—is unavailable to owners of broadcast television programming whose works are transmitted over the airwaves. To effectuate the purpose of the Copyright Act, therefore, it is essential that this Court interpret the law to preserve the rights of copyright holders whose content Aereo usurps by allowing them to enjoin Aereo’s unlicensed retransmissions of their creative works."

Read the whole thing here:

ICLE and CEI Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitions in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et al. v. Aereo, Inc.

We'l have more to say about the issues in the case leading up to the oral argument on April 22.

Professor Manne to Lead Federalist Society Conference Call Following Network Neutrality Arguments PDF Print E-mail

Monday is a big day for advocates of Network Neutrality, as the DC District Court will finally hear oral arguments in Verizon v. FCC. Later that afternoon, Professor Manne, the Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, will lead a conference call hosted by the Federalist Society on the case. Much like the joint ICLE and TechFreedom event earlier in the day, Prof. Manne will recap that morning’s D.C. Circuit arguments, assess how the court might decide the case, and discuss what options might be available to the FCC as well as antitrust agencies to address net neutrality concerns.

To sign up for the call or learn more visit the Federalist Society.

FTC Commissioner Wright Proposes Long Overdue Standards for Prosecuting Unfair Methods of Competition PDF Print E-mail

Today, Federal Trade Commissioner Josh Wright released a draft Policy Statement on Unfair Methods of Competition in a speech to the New York State Bar Association's Antitrust Section. Wright had announced  plans for such a statement in March.

"This statement is long overdue," said TechFreedom President Berin Szoka. "After nearly a century, the FTC has never clearly defined what its authority over unfair methods of competition covers that the antitrust laws don't. The last time the Supreme Court addressed the FTC's core Section 5 authority was 1972."

"Ultimately, Commissioner Wright's proposal boils down to minimizing error costs," said Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, Lecturer in Law at Lewis & Clark Law School and TechFreedom Senior Fellow. "Regulators always have to weigh the costs of over- and under-enforcing. The last forty years of antitrust scholarship have concluded that, as Judge Easterbrook put it in his seminal 1984 article on the 'Limits of Antitrust,' our 'economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors.' So antitrust regulators should err on the side of allowing competition to play out in all its messiness—and intervene only where they can show that real harm will occur."

Commissioner Wright's draft statement provides that "an unfair method of competition is an act or practice that (1) harms or is likely to harm competition significantly and (2) lacks cognizable efficiencies"—a term of art used in the FTC and DOJ's Horizontal Merger Guidelines since 1997, and defined as "those that have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service." Wright's draft statement notes that "Where conduct plausibly produces both costs and benefits for consumers it is fundamentally difficult to identify the net competitive consequences associated with the conduct. This is particularly true if business conduct is novel or takes place within an emerging or rapidly changing industry, and thus where there is little empirical evidence about the conduct’s potential competitive effects."

"Wright's Statement recognizes that the costs of getting it wrong increase as technology accelerates," Szoka noted "That doesn't mean there's no role for antitrust law, but it does demand regulatory humility about deeming innovative modes of competition that are legal under antitrust to be unfair under Section 5. Commissioner Wright is fond of quoting the Nobel Prize winning economist Ronald Coase: 'If an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of understandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.' Coase would have been the first to applaud Wright today."

Manne concluded: "Ironically, this is former Chairman Leibowitz’s true legacy. His efforts to expand Section 5 to challenge novel conduct without proof of anticompetitive harm brought into stark relief the costs of unfettered Section 5 enforcement. Commissioner Wright’s statement can be seen as the unintended culmination of—and backlash against—Leibowitz’s Section 5 campaign. The FTC should adopt Wright’s proposed statement, it would also do well to flesh out its existing policy statements on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices through guidelines—as happens in antitrust law. But in the end, policy statements alone don't bind agencies—courts do. If agencies consistently settle out of court, they can avoid building real law for years, even decades."

Szoka and Manne are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it . They have previously explained the problems with the FTC's use of Section 5 in numerous writings, including this short primer. ICLE and TechFreedom recently filed an amicus brief in FTC v. Wyndham arguing that the FTC needs to do more to explain how its existing authority applies in data security and other consumer protection cases.  

Manne to Testify at House Hearing on State of Video Competition PDF Print E-mail

On Wednesday, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, Geoffrey Manne, will present testimony at the US House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Communications and Technology Subcommittee’s hearing on the reauthorization of the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act (STELA) and the state of video competition, entitled “ The Satellite Television Law: Repeal, Reauthorize, or Revise? ” The hearing takes place in Rayburn 2123 at 10:30 am EDT tomorrow, Wednesday, June 12 and will be livestreamed here . The following statement can be attributed to Prof. Manne:

Today’s video marketplace is shaped by a byzantine set of rules from a bygone era. In 1992, cable had unique gatekeeper power over video programming. But today, cable is simply one of several competing conduits for video programming distribution. Today's legacy regulations were intended to prevent cable from thwarting the rise of satellite DBS service. They have succeeded: Nearly all Americans have access to the two primary DBS providers in addition to a cable provider. One third also have access to a telco provider, and consumers are increasingly switching to online video distributors. Netflix alone already has more subscribers than Comcast. In other words, competition is thriving – and not just in the dimensions Congress conceived of a generation ago.

This should cause legislators to revisit the fundamental, if implicit, assumption on which most video regulation currently rests: that antitrust law is insufficient to protect consumers, and must be supplemented with industry-specific regulations.

Concerns over monopoly power and vertical integration are vastly exaggerated. In 1992 over half of all networks were affiliated with a distribution network; today the number is closer to 12%. Antitrust law can police the market for carrying content far more effectively than can special copyright limitations and telecom rules enforced by the FCC with little economic rigor.

Today's legacy regulations do far more to hinder investment and innovation in content creation and distribution than they do to help. There are smarter ways to promote localism and access to content than by propping up the technologically outdated model of over-the-air broadcasting with needlessly complex regulations. The broadcasting system may well be reborn in new, more efficient distribution models over the Internet or using spectrum currently underutilized by broadcasters. But the future of video programming should be decided by what consumers demand, not the regulatory paradigm of the 1990s.

Read Manne’s full written remarks here and watch his oral testimony here at 10:30 am EDT on Wednesday, June 11. Follow the conversation on the #StateOfVideo hashtag.

Manne is available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

FTC Must Provide More Guidance for Unfairness Argues ICLE/TechFreedom Amicus Brief in Wyndham Case PDF Print E-mail

Today, the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) and TechFreedom filed an amici curiae brief in the federal District Court of New Jersey arguing that the FTC’s unfairness claim against Wyndham Hotels is unconstitutionally vague and inadequately pleaded, and, as such, should be dismissed by the Court. TechFreedom and ICLE were joined by a distinguished group of consumer protection scholars including Todd Zywicki, who previously served as Director of the Office of Policy & Planning at the FTC and Paul Rubin, who previously served as Assistant Director for Consumer Protection of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics.

The FTC alleges that Wyndham's failure to have “reasonable” data security was an unfair trade practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act, and that consumers were harmed when their credit card numbers were obtained by hackers who breached the reservation systems of Wyndham Hotels. The following comment can be attributed to ICLE Executive Director Geoffrey Manne and TechFreedom President Berin Szoka:

Over the last nine years, the FTC has charged seventeen companies with engaging in unfair trade practices for failing to have “reasonable” data security. But the Commission has never established what that means nor exactly how its broad power to prohibit “unfair” practices applies in these cases. Until now, each case has been settled out of court, with almost no public analysis. The FTC has chosen not to use its existing rulemaking powers and has issued no further guidance. Instead, the FTC has built what amounts to "non-law law": vague, unpredictable standards built on an infinite regress of unadjudicated assertions.

The FTC claims its past complaints provide ample guidance on data security, but it hasn’t developed the limiting principles for unfairness required by Congress. The Commission’s complaints don’t even meet minimum pleading standards. Precisely because unfairness is such an amorphous concept, the Commission bears a heavy burden of establishing the elements required by Section 5: substantial injury that consumers cannot reasonably avoid and without countervailing benefits. It hasn’t done so. Dismissing the FTC's complaint against Wyndham would be a catalyst for long-overdue changes in the FTC's approach, and courts can help protect consumers by clearly stating that it’s up to Congress to decide how to protect consumers against harms that the agency’s unfairness authority can’t properly reach.

Whatever the court decides, the Wyndham case could finally force Congress to decide how data security should be regulated. But we hope lawmakers will consider the more fundamental question of how the FTC operates. If neither the courts nor Congress disciplines the FTC's use of unfairness authority, the FTC will continue to use unfairness as a blank check to regulate data security and other aspects of the Internet and new technologies more generally.

Manne and Szoka are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

Humility Should Be Chief Virtue of FCC & FTC Commissioners, Urges Coalition Letter PDF Print E-mail

Today, the International Center for Law & Economics joined a coalition of think tanks, academics and commentators on technology policy in a letter urging the President, Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats to "look foremost for humility as both a guiding principle and a personal characteristic of the candidates" considered for the new Democratic Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Republican FCC Commissioner and Democratic Commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission. The full text of the letter follows below:

To: The President, Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats
Date: April 23, 2013

As you consider whom to appoint and confirm to lead the Federal Trade Commission and Federal Communications Commission — two of the principal agencies that regulate the Internet, telecommunications and emerging digital technologies — we urge you to look foremost for humility as both a guiding principle and a personal characteristic of the candidates you consider.

Many of those who follow Internet policy assume simply that we need more tech-savvy regulators — in other words, better technocrats . Tech-savvy is important, but not as important as appreciating that even the smartest among us don't know what the future will look like or how to get there — as if "there" were a single place. Beware those who talk about "steering" technological change, "comprehensive" approaches, or "pulling policy levers." These technocratic buzzwords reveal a fundamental misconception: that a better future can be engineered from the top down.

Instead, the first rule for policymakers should be: First, do no harm . We need regulators who can resist the frequent urge to "do something" about problems that are rapidly mooted by technological change anyway. Often, government’s best response is to do nothing. Competition, innovation and criticism from civil society tend to resolve problems better, and faster, than government can and the best kind of law evolves from the bottom up — through the messy "multi-stakeholder" interaction among civil society groups, media watchdogs, companies and consumers themselves. Holding companies to the promises that emerge from that ongoing process should be government's primary role.

ICANN Should Leave Concerns about Closed gTLDs to Antitrust Regulators PDF Print E-mail

The International Center for Law & Economics and TechFreedom filed comments yesterday urging ICANN to approve applications for “closed” generic Top Level Domains (gTLD) like .BOOK and .BLOG. Closed gTLD registry operators would not be required to allow all applicants to register domain names within the TLD, as .COM is, but could instead manage the entire TLD as their own platforms. We urged ICANN to refer competition concerns to national antitrust authorities, consistent with ICANN's proper role as a global coordinator rather than a regulator. The following statement can be attributed to Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics and Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom:

Critics are decrying ICANN’s authorization of closed gTLDs, claiming they could be anticompetitive. But closed gTLDs would provide the most innovative alternatives — and strongest competition — to .COM and today's most popular domain names. Today's market leaders won’t be beat by simply copying them, no matter how much money is spent on ads. New entrants must offer consumers something new and different. Closing the TLD may sound nefarious, but it gives the registry operator the incentive to invest not only in marketing the TLD, but also in innovative new business models that may change the paradigm of how TLDs function. The operator of .HOTELS would no more "monopolize" the hotel booking market than the owner of does today. But it could turn the domain name system into a more useful and accessible form of navigation, while offering new features like added security or thematic consistency consistent across the TLD. That's just Marketing 101.

The future of the domain space will inevitably be messy and unpredictable in the best sense. But it is precisely that messiness — that unpredictability, that constant shifting of basic paradigms — that will most benefit consumers. Forcing new gTLDs to replicate the paradigm of .COM will not.

There may end up being legitimate concerns about a registry's abuse of market power, but such concerns should be handled by those best positioned to evaluate them: national competition authorities. ICANN should be a coordinator of the domain name space, not the global regulator of the Internet. 

Manne and Szoka are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

CNET Op-ed Details Silliness of Fine Levied by European Commission Against Microsoft PDF Print E-mail

International Center for Law & Economics Executive Director Geoffrey Manne has penned an op-ed in CNET with Berin Szoka of TechFreedom in response to the European Commission's recent fine of Microsoft. The Commission fined the company $732 million for failing to show its "browser ballot" when users installed one of its Windows 7 updates, which is required by a 2009 deal. As they point out, 

However far behind IE has fallen, focusing on the browser market makes less and less sense. The original concern about Microsoft's alleged monopolization of the browser market was that the browser would be "middleware" for other content and services -- which the browser-maker could control. That paradigm has, in some ways, indeed come true with the rise of cloud-based services run inside the browser. But it may also have peaked, as such services are increasingly run in apps. That's clearly true in the mobile environment, where the apps store and the OS are the real "middleware" -- not the browser. The same trend seems to be starting with desktops and laptops, too, especially as touch screens increase the usability advantage of apps over browser-based services. Indeed, the lines between mobile devices, laptops, and desktops are quickly blurring. Microsoft has bet the company on making Windows 8 and Windows Phone successful apps platforms -- but lags far behind Apple and Google, just as it does in the cloud computing market (think Skydrive versus Google Docs).

Read the full op-ed at CNET.

Criticizing the FTC’s Proposed Order in the Google Patent Antitrust Case PDF Print E-mail

I filed comments today on the FTC’s proposed Settlement Order in the Google standards-essential patents (SEPs) antitrust case. The Order imposes limits on the allowable process for enforcing FRAND licensing of SEPs, an area of great complexity and vigorous debate among industry, patent experts and global standards bodies. The most notable aspect of the order is its treatment of the process by which Google and, if extended, patent holders generally may attempt to enforce their FRAND-obligated SEPs through injunctions.

Unfortunately, the FTC’s enforcement action in this matter had no proper grounding in antitrust law. Under Supreme Court doctrine there is no basis for liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act because the exercise of lawfully acquired monopoly power is not actionable under the antitrust laws. Apparently recognizing this, the Commission instead brought this action under Section 5 of the FTC Act. But Section 5 provides no basis for liability either, where, as here, there is no evidence of consumer harm. The Commission’s Order continues its recent trend of expanding its Section 5 authority without judicial oversight, charting a dangerously unprincipled course.

The standard-setting organizations (SSOs) that govern the SEPs in this case have no policies prohibiting the use of injunctions. Even if an SSO agreement (or a specific license) did disallow them, seeking an injunction would be a simple breach of contract. Reading a limitation on injunctions into the SSO agreement is in severe tension with the normal rules of contract interpretation. To turn Motorola’s effort to receive a reasonable royalty for its patents by means of an injunction into an antitrust problem seems directly to undermine the standard-setting process. It also seems to have no basis in law.

My comments rely heavily on Bruce Kobayashi and Josh Wright’s article, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, published in Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation (Manne & Wright, eds.).

For previous posts on the topic see, e.g.:

The price of closing the Google search antitrust case: questionable precedent on patents PDF Print E-mail

The Federal Trade Commission yesterday closed its investigation of Google’s search business (see my comment here) without taking action. The FTC did, however, enter into a settlement with Google over the licensing of Motorola Mobility’s standards-essential patents (SEPs). The FTC intends that agreement to impose some limits on an area of great complexity and vigorous debate among industry, patent experts and global standards bodies: The allowable process for enforcing FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing of SEPs, particularly the use of injunctions by patent holders to do so. According to Chairman Leibowitz, “[t]oday’s landmark enforcement action will set a template for resolution of SEP licensing disputes across many industries.” That effort may or may not be successful. It also may be misguided.

In general, a FRAND commitment incentivizes innovation by allowing a SEP owner to recoup its investments and the value of its technology through licensing, while, at the same, promoting competition and avoiding patent holdup by ensuring that licensing agreements are reasonable. When the process works, and patent holders negotiate licensing rights in good faith, patents are licensed, industries advance and consumers benefit.

FRAND terms are inherently indeterminate and flexible—indeed, they often apply precisely in situations where licensors and licensees need flexibility because each licensing circumstance is nuanced and a one-size-fits-all approach isn’t workable. Superimposing process restraints from above isn’t necessarily the best thing in dealing with what amounts to a contract dispute. But few can doubt the benefits of greater clarity in this process; the question is whether the FTC’s particular approach to the problem sacrifices too much in exchange for such clarity.

The Senate Confirms Josh Wright as the FTC's Next Commissioner PDF Print E-mail

The International Center for Law & Economics is delighted to announce that the Senate today confirmed Joshua Wright to be the next Commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission.

As we wrote upon Josh’s nomination by President Obama:

Josh is widely regarded as the top antitrust scholar of his generation. He is the author of more than 50 scholarly articles and book chapters, including several that were released as ICLE White Papers. He is a co-author of the most widely-used antitrust casebook, and co-editor of three books on topics ranging from Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law to the Intellectual History of Law and Economics. And he is the most prolific blogger on the preeminent antitrust and corporate law and economics blog, Truth on the Market.

The FTC will benefit enormously from Josh’s expertise and his economic approach. ICLE Executive Director, Geoffrey Manne, had this to say about Josh’s confirmation:

I am delighted that the Senate has confirmed Josh to be the FTC’s next commissioner. Josh’s “error cost” approach to antitrust and consumer protection law will be a tremendous asset to the Commission — particularly as it delves further into the regulation of data and privacy . His work is rigorous, empirically grounded, and ever-mindful of the complexities of both business and regulation. I am honored to have co-authored several articles with Josh, and I have learned an incredible amount about antitrust law and economics from him. The Commissioners and staff at the FTC will surely similarly profit from his time there.

Manne is available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

Manne Signs onto Brief Asking Court to not Create a New Brand of “Judicial Hostility to Arbitration Agreements" PDF Print E-mail

Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law and Economics, along with ICLE Board Member Richard Epstein and ICLE Affiliates M. Todd Henderson and Todd Zywicki have signed onto an brief for American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant, et al


The case arises from a putative class action antitrust challenge to American Express’s “Honor All Cards” policy, which requires merchants that wish to accept American Express cards to accept charge cards as well as credit cards. In district court, American Express won a motion to compel arbitration, which it brought to enforce an arbitration clause in its Card Acceptance Agreement. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding a class action waiver provision in the agreement was invalid. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Second Circuit’s decision, and remanded for further consideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen. On remand, the Second Circuit still refused to enforce the arbitration agreement. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Concepcion, and the Second Circuit sua sponte considered rehearing.

Manne Files Comments Urging FCC to Revamp Its Spectrum Transfer Review Process PDF Print E-mail

In comments on the FCC's Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings Notice of Proposed Rulemaking , the International Center for Law & Economics' Executive Director Geoffrey Manne urged the FCC to facilitate transfers of spectrum by eliminating the spectrum screen and replacing it with an analysis that better suits the realities of today’s wireless market and consumers’ growing demand for wireless data. The comments were co-authored by Matthew Starr, TechFreedom Legal Fellow; Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, Lecturer in Law at Lewis & Clark Law School & TechFreedom Senior Fellow; and TechFreedom President, Berin Szoka .

The following comment may be attributed to Geoffrey Manne:

There is no reliable evidence that a carrier’s control of more than a third of the usable spectrum in a market has the power to harm consumers — and still less evidence that prohibiting spectrum transfers that exceed this threshold serves the forces of dynamic efficiency. This arbitrary threshold doesn’t further what should be the FCC’s overriding objective: ensuring that sufficient spectrum and the investment necessary to deploy it are available for consumer use. Instead of merely citing market concentration as the basis for rejecting a transaction, we need an analysis of why a proposed transaction would actually make consumers worse off — the lodestar of antitrust law.

Starr and Manne are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

The Market Realities That Undermine the Antitrust Case Against Google PDF Print E-mail

As the Google antitrust discussion heats up on its way toward some culmination at the FTC, I thought it would be helpful to address some of the major issues raised in the case by taking a look at what’s going on in the market(s) in which Google operates. While not dispositive, these “realities on the ground” do strongly challenge the logic and thus the relevance of many of the claims put forth by Google’s critics.

The case against Google rests on certain assumptions about how the markets in which it operates function. But these are tech markets, constantly evolving and complex; most assumptions (and even “conclusions” based on data) are imperfect at best. In this case, the conventional wisdom with respect to Google’s alleged exclusionary conduct, the market in which it operates (and allegedly monopolizes), and the claimed market characteristics that operate to protect its position (among other things) should be questioned.

The public claims by Google’s critics and the best information we have on the thinking of the regulators investigating the company reflect an over-simplified and inaccurate conception of the competitive conditions facing Google and its competitors. The reality is far more complex, and, properly understood, paints a picture that undermines the basic, essential elements of an antitrust case against the company.

Forget remedies - FairSearch doesn't even have a valid statement of harm in its Google antitrust criticism PDF Print E-mail

After more than a year of complaining about Google and being met with responses from me (see also here, here, here, here, and here, among others) and many others that these complaints have yet to offer up a rigorous theory of antitrust injury — let alone any evidence — FairSearch yesterday offered up its preferred remedies aimed at addressing, in its own words, “the fundamental conflict of interest driving Google’s incentive and ability to engage in anti-competitive conduct. . . . [by putting an] end [to] Google’s preferencing of its own products ahead of natural search results.”  Nothing in the post addresses the weakness of the organization’s underlying claims, and its proposed remedies would be damaging to consumers.

FairSearch’s first and core “abuse” is “[d]iscriminatory treatment favoring Google’s own vertical products in a manner that may harm competing vertical products.”  To address this it proposes prohibiting Google from preferencing its own content in search results and suggests as additional, “structural remedies” “[r]equiring Google to license data” and “[r]equiring Google to divest its vertical products that have benefited from Google’s abuses.”

Tom Barnett, former AAG for antitrust, counsel to FairSearch member Expedia, and FairSearch’s de facto spokesman should be ashamed to be associated with claims and proposals like these.  He better than many others knows that harm to competitors is not the issue under US antitrust laws.  Rather, US antitrust law requires a demonstration that consumers — not just rivals — will be harmed by a challenged practice.  He also knows (as economists have known for a long time) that favoring one’s own content — i.e., “vertically integrating” to produce both inputs as well as finished products — is generally procompetitive.

The Myriad Problems with FCC's Spectrum Transaction Policy PDF Print E-mail

International Center for Law and Economics Executive Director Geoffrey Manne just published an article with coauthor Larry Downes in the Competition Policy International's Antitrust Chronicle on the problems with the FCC's current approach to spectrum transactions. As they note in the abstract,  

Some of the most significant transactions singled out recently for intensive federal review involve the communications industry. Unfortunately, communications providers face serious and potentially fatal problems of supply. Radio spectrum -- the chief input and most severe constraint on the ability of carriers to support more users and more data -- is essentially unavailable at any price. That's because the Federal Communications Commission has run out of usable, unassigned spectrum to license. As consumers pull orders of magnitude more data to their smartphones, tablets, and notebook computers, carriers are becoming desperate. Network operators, already experiencing what the FCC warned in 2010 as an imminent "spectrum crunch," have little choice but to acquire spectrum assets from other mobile operators, whose licenses can be put to immediate use once the agency approves the transfer. They have been doing so as quickly as possible, attempting or completing over a dozen major transactions since 2007. But as the urgency of spectrum-related transactions has increased, the FCC has come to play an increasingly problematic -- and largely unstructured -- role in the government's review of transactions in the communications industry. This brief essay discusses the key problems with the FCC's current approach to transactions involving spectrum license transfers.

Find the article at the Antitrust Chronicle or at SSRN.  

"Should the FTC Sue Google Over Search?" Event Video Now Available PDF Print E-mail

Video of TechFreedom’s event “Should the FTC Sue Google Over Search” is now available below. The September 28 event was moderated by James Cooper, Director of Research and Policy for the Law and Economics Center at George Mason School of Law. In support of the proposition that "Should the FTC Sue Google Over Search?" was Eric Clemons, Professor of Operations and Information Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and Allen Grunes, attorney at Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck. Arguing against the proposition were Glenn Manishin, Partner at Troutman Sanders, and Geoffrey Manne, Lecturer in Law at Lewis & Clark Law School and the Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics.

Please note that the audio cuts out from 53:21 to 58:21 because of technical issues.

ICLE Research Director Josh Wright Nominated to be FTC Commissioner PDF Print E-mail

The International Center for Law & Economics is pleased to announce that President Obama intends to nominate Joshua Wright, Research Director and Member of the Board of Directors of ICLE and Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, to be the next Commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission.

Josh is widely regarded as the top antitrust scholar of his generation. He is the author of more than 50 scholarly articles and book chapters, including several that were released as ICLE White Papers. He is a co-author of the most widely-used antitrust casebook, and co-editor of three books on topics ranging from Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law to the Intellectual History of Law and Economics. And he is the most prolific blogger on the preeminent antitrust and corporate law and economics blog, Truth on the Market.

Josh holds economics and law degrees from UCLA, and he is one of only a small handful of young antitrust scholars in the legal academy to hold both a PhD in economics as well as a JD. If confirmed, he will also be only the fourth economist to serve as FTC Commissioner (following Jim Miller, George Douglas and Dennis Yao) and the first JD/PhD.

Josh’s scholarship and approach to antitrust are firmly grounded in the UCLA economics tradition, exemplified by the members of Josh’s dissertation committee — Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz & Benjamin Klein. ICLE Executive Director, Geoffrey Manne, had this to say about Josh’s nomination:

I am delighted with Josh’s nomination. Josh’s “error cost” approach to antitrust and consumer protection law will be a tremendous asset to the Commission. His work is rigorous, empirically grounded, and ever-mindful of the complexities of the institutional settings in which businesses act and in which regulators enforce. I am honored to have co-authored several articles with Josh, and I have learned an incredible amount about antitrust law and economics from my interactions with him. The Commissioners and staff at the FTC will surely similarly profit from his time there.

Manne is available for comment at  This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

FCC Authority Questioned In Wake of Verizon Deal Approval PDF Print E-mail

“While the FCC didn't ask for any additional commitments in this case, beyond what the DOJ asked for, they've laid down the marker, and they can in the future,” said Geoffrey Manne, the executive director of the International Center for Law and Economics and lecturer at the Lewis and Clark Law School, to Bloomberg BNA Aug. 27. “Now they could potentially demand concessions or even stop the transaction on the basis of an ancillary commercial agreement. They are asserting that they have more control over the economic value of the deal.”

Find the entire article on BNA

The Ugly Truth Behind the FCC's Verizon Spectrum Approval PDF Print E-mail

The International Center for Law & Economics' Geoffrey Manne and TechFreedom's Berin Szoka andrecently penned an op-ed for CNET detailing some of the problems with the FCC's approval of the SpectrumCo deal. As they explain,

The FCC's decision seems measured, citing both benefits and risks of the deal to consumers and rejecting most of the claims of the deal's staunchest critics. But this apparent reasonableness masks the true, arbitrary nature of FCC review: a costly, unsupervised game of "Mother, May I?", requiring applicants to rearrange their businesses in ways the agency could neither require by regulation nor extract as concessions without exceeding the proper scope of its transaction review. Most troublingly, the FCC need not even make its extra-legal demands explicit. Because all future applicants know that the actual approval of this deal is far less significant to them than the process behind it, even yesterday's good news comes with an asterisk.

For the entire article go to CNET. ICLE and TechFreedom previously submitted joint comments to the FCC on the SpectrumCo deal.

FCC Approves Verizon/SpectrumCo Deal but Sets Dangerous Precedent for Future Deals PDF Print E-mail

Today, the Federal Communications Commission approved with conditions Verizon’s purchase of currently unused spectrum from cable companies, along with Verizon's sale of other spectrum to T-Mobile as a "voluntary" concession made to allay concerns about spectrum concentration. The order was approved on a 5-0 vote but with separate statements from Commissioners Robert McDowell and Ajit Pai. Last week, the Department of Justice approved a series of commercial agreements accompanying the license transfer, subject to conditions. The following statement may be attributed to Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law and Economics, and Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom:

This deal is great news for consumers facing a dire spectrum crunch. Yet the decision sets a dangerous precedent. The FCC has authority to review license transfers but not other "related" transactions. Nevertheless, it devotes fourteen pages of its order to just such a review of the commercial agreements.

The fact that the FCC ultimately approved the agreements is no defense of its lengthy and misplaced critique of them. By not leaving review of such provisions to the DOJ under its more rigorous antitrust analysis, the FCC may ensure that future transfers and mergers aren’t even contemplated, even if they would benefit consumers. This effectively grants the FCC the unchecked power to stop transactions it doesn't even have the authority to review.

All of this leaves companies playing a drawn-out game of "Mother, May I?", rearranging their businesses in ways the agency could neither require by regulation nor extract as concessions without exceeding the proper scope of its transaction review. Most troublingly, the Commission need not even make its extra-legal demands explicit.

That's almost certainly what happened here with Verizon's nominally voluntary concession on data roaming. This leaves Verizon (but not its competitors) subject, for five years, to obligations the D.C. Circuit may soon rule the FCC has no authority to to impose—much as Comcast “voluntarily” agreed to net neutrality conditions in its merger with NBCUniversal even stricter than those the D.C. Circuit seems likely to strike down for everyone else.

And one has to wonder: Did Verizon eventually agree to sell spectrum to T-Mobile because the agency made it clear, if not explicit, that it preferred T-Mobile over Verizon to buy cable's spectrum? In its order, the FCC notes that, while mollified by Verizon’s buildout and roaming commitments, “other providers” might have used some of the acquired spectrum in ways the agency preferred. That's a comparison explicitly barred by Section 310(d), but also one explicitly demanded by T-Mobile, regulatory advocates, and leading Members of Congress. It's far from clear the agency would have been so mollified if Verizon hadn’t also entered into the deal with T-Mobile.

Congress needs to rein in the FCC. The FCC Process Reform Act passed by the House in March is a good start, requiring that conditions be narrowly tailored to real harms the FCC has authority to regulate. But until Congress makes clear that the DOJ alone has authority to analyze a transaction's competitive effects and re-asserts the limits it explicitly imposed on the scope of the Commission’s reviewing authority, the FCC will continue playing games with our high tech economy.

ICLE and TechFreedom previously submitted joint comments to the FCC on the SpectrumCo deal.

Manne and Szoka are available for comment at  This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

DOJ Approves Verizon/SpectrumCo Deal, Yet Sets Dangerous Precedent for Deal Conditions PDF Print E-mail

Today, the Department of Justice approved Verizon's purchase of radio spectrum from cable companies that had considered using it to build their own wireless network but ultimately decided not to do so.  The deal went through only after the parties agreed to a number of conditions, including a restriction of several commercial agreements that accompanied the deal.

"This deal is great news for consumers," said Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom.  "The more spectrum is put to use, the more we'll ease the coming 'spectrum crunch.'  The DOJ seems to have agreed that, because of the under-utilization of the spectrum in its current hands, and, with its imposed conditions, the lack of incentive or ability of the parties to raise prices, consumers will benefit from this transfer.

"It seems," noted Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, "that the DOJ and FCC have appropriately divided their review of the deal, with the DOJ considering the competitive effects of the commercial agreements and the FCC assessing whether the spectrum license transfers are in the public interest.  Congressional leaders and many self-appointed consumer advocates had demanded that the FCC evaluate the commercial agreements.  But doing so would violate Section 310(d), which authorizes the agency to evaluate only license transfers."

TechFreedom and ICLE raised this concern about the FCC's authority in joint comments on the FCC's review in March.  The FCC was strongly and repeatedly pressured to violate Section 310(d)  by Verizon's competitors, most notably T-Mobile and Sprint, as well as by regulatory activist groups like Public Knowledge and Free Press.  In May, Sen. Herb Kohl sent a letter asking the FCC to evaluate the commercial agreements, and similar letters followed in July from Senator Franken and thirty-two Congressional Democrats.

Manne raised another concern: "I'm troubled by the DOJ's imposition of conditions on the merger based on speculative, future harms," referring to the DOJ's assertion that the "the Commercial Agreements also unreasonably restrain future competition for the sale of broadband, video, and wireless services to the extent that the availability of these services as part of a bundle, including a quad-play bundle, becomes more competitively significant.  The DOJ has ample authority to address such concerns if they ever become non-conjectural.  Merger review conditions should be narrowly targeted at real, identifiable problems.  Otherwise, government risks hamstringing companies today in ways that can unintentionally hamper future innovation and thus harm consumers."

Szoka and Manne are available for comment at  This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

FTC's Google Settlement a Pyrrhic Victory for Privacy and the Rule of Law PDF Print E-mail

The Federal Trade Commission today announced Google will pay an unprecedented $22.5 million fine for allegedly violating its 2011 consent decree over how Google handled users' information in launching its now-defunct Buzz social network.  Specifically, the FTC alleges Google misrepresented how users of Apple's Safari browser could control Google's collection of information about their browsing in a 2009 help page, as the Wall Street Journal first reported in February.  The following statement can be attributed to Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, and Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom:

The size of today's fine will make headlines but it is a distraction from the real story: The FTC holds Google liable for a statement in a help page that was true when made and became untrue only because Apple quietly changed how its Safari browser handles cookies.  Of course, companies do have a duty to ensure the accuracy of what they tell consumers about privacy as their own practices evolve.  But holding them responsible for monitoring everything their rivals do that might affect their own past privacy statements will only discourage them from explaining their privacy practices in the first place.  This is sadly ironic, as policymakers have spent years bemoaning the inadequacy of privacy policies and demanding companies do more to educate consumers.  This is, at best, a pyrrhic victory for privacy. 

The FTC now has Google, Facebook, Twitter and MySpace under under 20-year consent decrees and continues to add other companies to the list.  Each of these companies now risks incurring unpredictable fines and enormous reputational costs for conduct the FTC likely couldn’t punish under its general Section 5 powers—without any admission of guilt and without the FTC having to prove liability or justify the amount of the fine.  As the Commission boldly declares, a consent decree violation need not have "yielded significant revenue or endured for a significant period of time" to be punished with a huge fine.  Such arbitrary regulation-by-settlement undermines the rule of law and harms consumers by deterring privacy disclosures.

Szoka and Manne are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .  The FTC's settlement order is available here.  

Europe's Antitrust Charges Against Google Won't Stick PDF Print E-mail

In an article now online at Foreign Affairs, TechFreedom President Berin Szoka and International Center for Law and Economics Executive Director Geoffrey Manne explore the European Union's antitrust case against Google and place it in the global conflict of visions of Internet governance:

Regulators around the world have grown increasingly uncomfortable with the way business is being done on the Internet. From Brussels to Buenos Aires, they are most frustrated with Google, far and away the most popular search engine and advertising platform. As the company has evolved, expanding outward from its core search engine product, it has come to challenge a range of other firms and threaten their business models. This creative destruction has, in turn, caused antitrust regulators -- usually prodded by Google’s threatened competitors -- to investigate its conduct, essentially questioning whether Google’s very success obligates it to treat competitors neutrally...

The digital world may not be perfectly self-correcting; antitrust law may on occasion play a useful, if invisible, role in disciplining corporate behavior. But ultimately, the Internet is driven by disruption from technological change and shifting consumer demand. The wise regulator would exercise restraint.

UMG-EMI Deal Is No Threat To Innovation In Music Distribution PDF Print E-mail

By Geoffrey Manne and Berin Szoka

Everyone loves to hate record labels. For years, copyright-bashers have ranted about the “Big Labels” trying to thwart new models for distributing music in terms that would make JFK assassination conspiracy theorists blush. Now they’ve turned their sites on the pending merger between Universal Music Group and EMI, insisting the deal would be bad for consumers. There’s even a Senate Antitrust Subcommittee hearing tomorrow, led by Senator Herb “Big is Bad” Kohl.

But this is a merger users of Spotify, Apple’s iTunes and the wide range of other digital services ought to love. UMG has done more than any other label to support the growth of such services, cutting licensing deals with hundreds of distribution outlets—often well before other labels. Piracy has been a significant concern for the industry, and UMG seems to recognize that only “easy” can compete with “free.” The company has embraced the reality that music distribution paradigms are changing rapidly to keep up with consumer demand. So why are groups like Public Knowledge opposing the merger?

Critics contend that the merger will elevate UMG’s already substantial market share and “give it the power to distort or even determine the fate of digital distribution models.” For these critics, the only record labels that matter are the four majors, and four is simply better than three. But this assessment hews to the outmoded, “big is bad” structural analysis that has been consistently demolished by economists since the 1970s. Instead, the relevant touchstone for all merger analysis is whether the merger would give the merged firm a new incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct. But there’s nothing UMG can do with EMI’s catalogue under its control that it can’t do now. If anything, UMG’s ownership of EMI should accelerate the availability of digitally distributed music.

To see why this is so, consider what digital distributors—whether of the pay-as-you-go, iTunes type, or the all-you-can-eat, Spotify type—most want: Access to as much music as possible on terms on par with those of other distribution channels. For the all-you-can-eat distributors this is a sine qua non: their business models depend on being able to distribute as close as possible to all the music every potential customer could want. But given UMG’s current catalogue, it already has the ability, if it wanted to exercise it, to extract monopoly profits from these distributors, as they simply can’t offer a viable product without UMG’s catalogue.

Antitrust Groundhog Day, Starring Senator Kohl PDF Print E-mail

Today, Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, TechFreedom Senior Adjunct Fellow, and Lecturer in Law at Lewis & Clark Law School, and Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom, issued this statement on Senator Kohl’s letter urging the DOJ and FCC to “carefully scrutinize” the pending wireless spectrum deal between Verizon Wireless and a consortium of cable companies:

It's groundhog day in antitrust-land.  Sen. Kohl's letter urges the DOJ and FCC to do what they are already doing: scrutinizing Verizon's purchase of spectrum the cable companies aren't using, along with related joint marketing agreements.

Sen. Kohl sent a similar letter to the FTC last fall seeking an immediate investigation into Google's business practices.  It's hard to see what such letters add, as we discussed at the time.  Antitrust law, at its best, rests on an economic analysis of consumer welfare.  It's something the politicians should leave to the expert economists and lawyers at the DOJ and FTC—and, ultimately, the courts.

Of greatest concern, Sen. Kohl asks the FCC to exceed clear limits on its legal authority where he urges the agency to “seriously consider taking action” to prohibit the joint agreements.  As we have detailed elsewhere, a competition review of the proposed transaction by the FCC is outside the scope of its mandate.  Section 310(d) of the Communications Act allows the agency to review only the transfer of licenses, not the overall transaction.  Even there, the FCC may not compare this transaction to some hypothetical alternative, as Sen. Kohl urges the agency to do.

Ranking Member Lee’s letter to the agencies, by contrast, is appropriately restrained—not urging a particular outcome on the agencies, but merely expressing his views and deferring to their expertise.  As Sen. Lee notes, “it is improper for government to pick winners and losers in the marketplace.”  Antitrust is a form of regulation, and like all regulation, it should be applied only with extreme caution under well-developed legal and economic doctrines, and never politicized.

Manne and Szoka are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .  Find/share this release on Facebook or Twitter.

Europe Doesn't Know What to Do with Google Antitrust “Concerns” PDF Print E-mail

Today, the European Union announced the "preliminary conclusions" of its antitrust investigation into Google, forbearing from filing an “official” complaint and giving the company an opportunity to offer remedies to address the Commission's “four concerns where Google business practices may be considered as abuses of dominance."  The following statement can be attributed to Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics and Lecturer in Law at Lewis & Clark Law School; Josh Wright, Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University School of Law, and ICLE Director of Research; and Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom:

While the Commission is right that these “fast-moving markets would particularly benefit from a quick resolution of the competition issues," it's not clear what to do about them—which might explain why the EC asked Google to suggest remedies, rather than simply suing.  A “concern” without a workable remedy that actually benefits consumers is properly no concern at all.  

The best remedy for digital competition issues may be time itself—and the technological change and unanticipated sources of competition that come with it.  Time and again innovation has mooted concerns like those raised by the EC, not perfectly, but better than any government-mediated remedy could have.

Each of the Commission’s four stated concerns is substantively problematic, as we have discussed at great length elsewhere.  But most of all, the Commission clearly conceives of search as ten blue links onto which other, supposedly separate services, may be added.  In fact, search is rapidly evolving to integrate rich results like images, maps, photos, reviews and prices, and their incorporation into search is a natural and beneficial product evolution. This may harm certain competitors that offer stand-alone services, but it's hard to see how it hurts consumers or competition generally, or what the remedy would be.  Google already provides extensive links to competing sites next to its results, but how could it ever integrate them in the same way it integrates its own new features?  It’s difficult to conceive of any remedy mandating such integration that wouldn’t do more harm than good.  

Manne, Szoka and Wright are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .  Find/share this release on Facebook and Twitter.

Manne, Szoka and Wright have written extensively on Google and online search antitrust issues generally, including:

Joshua Wright and Geoffrey Manne are the authors of two articles on the antitrust law & economics of Google and search engines more broadly, “Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google,” and “If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What’s the Question?

Manne is also the author of “The Problem of Search Engines as Essential Facilities: An Economic & Legal Assessment,” an essay debunking arguments for regulation of search engines to preserve so-called “search neutrality” in TechFreedom’s 2011 book, The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet.  

New White Paper Provides Further Evidence of Wireless Competition PDF Print E-mail

A new white paper entitled "Wireless Competition: An Update" has been released.

International Center for Law and Economics Academic Affiliates Hal Singer and Robert Hahn have just released a white paper exploring broader implications of recent FCC Wireless Competition Reports for spectrum policy. The paper serves as a complement to a recent article the two authors penned along with a former chief economist of the FCC in the Federal Communications Law Journal that critiques the way the FCC conducts competition analysis in the wireless industry.     

As the paper notes,

For over a decade, as wireless prices fell and industry concentration inched upward, the FCC concluded that the wireless market was competitive. Under new leadership but with the same fact pattern—prices continued to fall, concentration continued to rise—the Commission changed its tune. For the last two years, it retracted its stamp of competitiveness in favor of a “too-close-to-call” decision.

Ignoring politics, we can think of two plausible explanations for the agency’s change of heart. Under the first explanation, the FCC previously weighted direct evidence of competition such as falling prices more heavily than indirect evidence such as concentration, but it elected to place more weight on indirect evidence in the last two competition reports. Under the second explanation, the FCC did not change the weights, but it instead felt that concentration reached some critical threshold such that the societal loss associated with any more concentration was unacceptable. We don’t find either explanation persuasive.

As explained more thoroughly in the paper, the wireless market is dynamic, making typical static measures ill-suited to capture market power. Although there is much more in the actual report, for current policy discussions, the authors believe that the FCC should focus efforts on satisfying spectrum demand and worry less about structural competition,  

Given how competitive the wireless marketplace looks today, regulators should keep in mind that the benefits of injecting even more competition at the margin (by changing the auction rules) could be small, whereas the costs of failing to satisfy the spectrum demands of incumbent carriers and of inducing uneconomic entry (think NextWave) may be significant.

Manne Covers Recent Apple e-Book Suit on Brian Lehrer TV PDF Print E-mail

On Wednesday April 18 at 7:30 pm ET, Brian Lehrer TV, a companion television program to the award winning radio show, will broadcast an episode that features International Center for Law and Economics Executive Director, Geoffrey Manne. Manne discussed the recent e-book antitrust suit brought against Apple and several publishing houses and was followed on the program by a discussion with author James Gleick on the implications of the suit for authors and the changing technology of information distribution.

For those in the CUNY TV viewing area, the episode will air Wednesday at 7:30pm ET (on Time Warner Cable channel 75 in New York City). Otherwise, you can watch the episode here after the initial airing.

Henry Manne to Trace the Problems of Universities in Webinar Monday PDF Print E-mail

Who would have thought that Henry VIII’s divorce from Catherine of Aragon would have anything to do with the muddle that is the modern U.S. university? Ironically, that divorce led to the most distinctive aspect of modern not-for-profit schools – they are not owned by anyone. As religion lost its hold on the minds of trustees, and as an ill-conceived bit of federal legislation in 1861 led to numerous state schools (with the usual unforeseen consequences), control of these institutions ultimately went to their faculties. It was mostly downhill from there.

On Monday, April 9 at 8pm EST, International Center for Law and Economics Advisor Henry G. Manne will trace these problems and provide an analysis of property rights theory applied to non-profit organizations in this Students for Liberty webinar.

Follow this link to register for this webinar, or find the Facebook event here.

Manne to Participate Tomorrow on ‘This Week in Law’ Live Webcast PDF Print E-mail

International Center for Law and Economics Executive Director Geoffrey Manne will be a participant tomorrow, April 6, on the live webcast “This Week in Law” along with TechFreedom Senior Adjunct Fellow Larry Downes. Denise Howell will be hosting and they will also be joined by fellow participant Evan Brown. This week they will be discussing various topics in tech policy including Senator Al Franken’s lambast of Facebook and Google, the newly opened antitrust investigation of Motorola Mobility by the European Commission, and the continued problem of spectrum crunch.

This Week in Law is recorded live every Friday at 11:00am PT/2:00pm ET and covers topics primarily in law, technology, and public policy. You do not have to register, just follow this link at 11:00am PT/2:00pm ET to watch.

Blocking Verizon/SpectrumCo Deal Would Harm, not Help, Consumers PDF Print E-mail

Yesterday, the International Center for Law and Economics and TechFreedom jointly filed comments [pdf] with the FCC on the Verizon SpectrumCo deal.  In the comments, ICLE Executive Director Geoffrey Manne and TechFreedom President Berin Szoka counter the primary arguments against the deal:

Critics lament the concentration of spectrum in the hands of one of the industry’s biggest players, but the assumption that concentration will harm to consumers is unsupported and misplaced.  Concentration of spectrum has not slowed the growth of the market; rather, the problem is that growth in demand has dramatically outpaced capacity.  What's more: prices have plummeted even as the industry has become more concentrated. 

While the FCC undeniably has authority to review the license transfers, the argument that the separate but related commercial agreements would reduce competition is properly the province of the Department of Justice.  That argument is best measured under the antitrust laws, not by the FCC under its vague "public interest" standard.  Indeed, if the FCC can assert jurisdiction over the commercial agreements as part of its public interest review, its authority over license transfers will become a license to regulate all aspects of business.  This is a recipe for certain mischief.

The need for all competitors, including Verizon, to obtain sufficient spectrum to meet increasing demand demonstrates that the deal is in the public interest and should be approved.

The authors are available for comment at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

Further Empirical Evidence on Forum Shopping in Philadelphia Civil Courts PDF Print E-mail

Updated Report with Appendix
Appendix only

Late last year the International Center for Law and Economics published a study finding that Philadelphia civil courts, and the Philadelphia Complex Litigation Center (PCLC) in particular, are marked by structural biases that likely attract plaintiffs with little or no connection to the city, leading to relatively disproportionate litigation and verdicts. Today we release a supplemental appendix to the study, also authored by Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University School of Law, Joshua D. Wright, presenting further research demonstrating that, indeed, a substantial fraction of plaintiffs with cases pending at the Philadelphia Complex Litigation Center seem to have have no discernible or relevant connection to Philadelphia or to Pennsylvania.

Removing cases that were identified as lacking sufficient data, 1,370 cases were analyzed and coded. From this sample the plaintiff’s home address was identified in 1,355 cases. Of these, 638 cases had electronically filed complaints yielding the alleged location of injury in 369 cases.

In total, it was found that:

  • Of the 1,357 cases, 913 (67.2%) were brought by plaintiffs who live out-of-state without any apparent connection to Pennsylvania or Philadelphia. 
  • Only 180 cases (13.3%) reveal plaintiffs who live in or allege injury in Philadelphia. 
  • The most substantial case types where the plaintiffs were overwhelmingly out-of-state are hormone therapy, denture adhesive cream, and Paxil birth defect cases. 
  • Although most or all of the companies involved in these cases do business in Philadelphia and a few have some sort of administrative offices there, the vast majority of defendants do not have their principal place of business in Philadelphia or even in Pennsylvania. It is unlikely that venue was moved to the PCLC in most or any of the cases. 

This preliminary analysis supports the conclusion that Philadelphia courts demonstrate a meaningful preference for plaintiffs by coaxing “business” from other courts and providing a unique combination of advantages for plaintiffs.

Here is the full report with the new appendix attached; the Appendix by itself is available here. Please contact us if you are interested in speaking with Professor Wright about the report or would like a comment on the report or the pending legislation.

Larry Ribstein, RIP PDF Print E-mail

By Geoffrey Manne

This morning our dear colleague, Larry Ribstein, passed away. The intellectual life of everyone who knew him and of the legal academy at large is deeply diminished for his passing.

For me, as for many others, Larry was an important influence, not only intellectually but personally, as well. Larry was the godfather of Truth on the Market, which got its start when a few of us, including Bill Sjostrom, Josh, Thom and me, pinch hit for Larry at Ideoblog in November 2005. It took eight of us, including my dad, to fill his shoes, and still his traffic went down. More than anyone else, Larry was instrumental in my decision to leave law teaching to work at Microsoft. Completely unsure what to do and worried about how it would affect my ability to return to law teaching, I called Larry, who had no doubt. He sealed the deal by pointing out that a move like that one would open some completely unanticipated, and potentially great, career paths and telling me not to worry so much about getting back to law teaching. He was right, of course, and, thus also an important influence on the creation of the International Center for Law and Economics. And Larry was a friend, one of those I always looked forward to seeing at ALEA and other conferences, more than once providing the necessary marginal incentive to attend.

We grieve for Ann, Sarah and Susannah and mourn his passing.

The outpouring in the blogosphere from Larry’s friends, admirers, colleagues, and the like is, not surprisingly, moving. As they are found, remembrances will be posted here at Truth on the Market.


The ICLE website is undergoing a significant renovation. Basic information remains available on the current site, but expect much more to come. Please be sure to add your contact information to the form under the "contact" tab to be notified when the full site is up and running.

Geoffrey Manne Interviewed for Marketplace's Tech Report PDF Print E-mail

International Center for Law and Economics' Executive Director Geoffrey Manne was recently interviewed on Verizon's acquisition of spectrum from cable operators by Marketplace's Tech Report. The report, which aired Tuesday, December 28, explores Version's various deals with cable companies to route around political blockages and acquire much needed spectrum. However, the Department of Justice recently decided to launch an antitrust invesitgation into the deals just days after AT&T dropped its bid for T-Mobile.

Manne injected some reality into the discussion:

In a sort of perfect world, you hear people say well, the spectrum that the cable companies own that they're not using, smaller competitors should be buying that so they can compete with AT&T and Verizon and others. Well, that's a nice idea, I guess, but the smaller companies aren't buying it and Verizon snapped up that spectrum so that they could continue to provide the level of service that they'd like to.

Listen to the embedded player below or head to the web site to hear the entire segment.

Congressional Cowardice, Not Military Detentions, is the Real Threat to Civil Liberty PDF Print E-mail

In an Op-Ed in the Hill, International Center for Law and Economics' Executive Director Geoffrey Manne explains the real problem with the National Defense Authorization Act:

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is a bad piece of legislation, but not for the reason most people think. The NDAA has set the political world alight over fears that it allows the U.S. government to arrest American citizens inside the U.S. and then ship them off as terrorists into indefinite military detention without trial. Reasonable fears, to be sure – except they don’t arise from the NDAA; rather, the power to do just that likely already exists.

The real problem with the NDAA is that it does nothing to resolve the root, underlying threat to American civil liberties: Congress' abdication of its responsibility to define the standards that govern for whom and when military detention is appropriate.


Wall Street Journal Cites Philadelphia Courts Paper Authored by Professor Joshua Wright PDF Print E-mail

The Wall Street Journal is reporting on a bill before the Pennsylvania house Judiciary Committee that would offset the current advantage for plaintiffs by changing the courts' jurisdiction rules. While plaintiffs can currently parachute into Philadelphia from anywhere in the state, the new plan would allow Pennsylvania's local courts to hear personal injury cases only when the plaintiff is a resident, a corporation is locally headquartered, or the incident occurred in the district.

The piece cites a paper issued by the International Center for Law & Economics and authored by Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University School of Law, Joshua D. Wright. As the Wall Street Journal indicates,

Philadelphia plaintiffs are less likely to settle than plaintiffs elsewhere and show a marked preference for jury trials, according to a report for the International Center for Law and Economics by Joshua Wright based on data from Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. Philadelphia juries find in favor of plaintiffs more often than non-Philly juries—"by as much as 23.7% in absolute terms in 2005."

Geoffrey Manne To Speak on Privacy at Silicon Flatirons PDF Print E-mail

Information privacy represents one of the most exciting, rapidly growing areas of legal scholarship, yet information privacy law scholars rarely express any faith in market principles. Government regulators seem a bit more conflicted, with recent pronouncements from the Commerce Department, FTC, and Congress premised largely on market-based, notice-and-choice principles, but emphasizing the limits of markets.

This Friday, Silicon Flatirons Center for Law, Technology, and Entrepreneurship at the University of Colorado will host representatives from these three institutions to debate the Economics of Privacy. Joining them will be an interdisciplinary group of leading thinkers from other disciplines, such as economists studying the behavioral economics of privacy and computer scientists who specialize in human-computer interaction studying the limits of notice-and-choice. Executive Director Geoffrey Manne has been invited as one of these guests and will explore the markets of privacy, explaining the advantages of relying on market forces, self-regulation, and FTC’s existing enforcement mechanisms to protect privacy in the 21st century.

New Empirical Report Erodes Support for Claims of Google's Search Bias PDF Print E-mail

A new report titled "Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some Preliminary Evidence" has just been released.

Google has been the subject of persistent claims that its organic search results are improperly “biased” toward its own content. Among the most influential is an empirical study released earlier this year by Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin Lockwood, claiming that Google favors its own content “significantly more than others.” The authors conclude in their study that Google’s search results are problematic and deserving of antitrust scrutiny because of competitive harm.

A new report released by the International Center for Law & Economics and authored by Joshua Wright, Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University, critiques, replicates, and extends the study, finding Edelman & Lockwood’s claim of Google’s unique bias inaccurate and misleading. Although frequently cited for it, the Edelman & Lockwod study fails to support any claim of consumer harm -- or call for antitrust action -- arising from Google’s practices.

Prof. Wright’s analysis finds own-content bias is actually an infrequent phenomenon, and Google references its own content more favorably than other search engines far less frequently than does Bing:

New Report Shows Systemic Biases in Philadelphia Court System as Pennsylvania General Assembly Prepares to Vote on Venue Reform PDF Print E-mail

Philadelphia civil courts have come under fire for attracting and favoring plaintiffs from outside the city at the expense of its consumers and businesses. A new study, entitled "Are Plaintiffs Drawn to Philadelphia’s Civil Courts? An Empirical Examination," issued by the International Center for Law & Economics and authored by Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University School of Law, Joshua D. Wright, finds evidence that Philadelphia civil courts are indeed marked by structural biases that attract plaintiffs with little or no connection to the city, leading to disproportionate litigation and verdicts relative to other courts.

Using data from the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Professor Wright compares filing trends and case outcomes in Philadelphia to the rest of Pennsylvania and other representative state courts. As explained in greater depth in the paper, Philadelphia courts, when measured against non-Philadelphia Pennsylvania state courts and federal district courts, exhibit marked and significant dissimilarities supporting an inference that something intrinsically unusual is occurring in Philadelphia. Philadelphia courts host an especially large number of cases, Philadelphia courts have a larger docket than expected, Philadelphia plaintiffs are less likely to settle than other non-Philadelphia Pennsylvania plaintiffs, and Philadelphia plaintiffs are disproportionately likely to prefer jury trials. These findings are consistent with a conclusion that Philadelphia courts demonstrate a marked and meaningful preference for plaintiffs.

Here is the full report. Please This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it if you are interested in speaking with Professor Wright about the report or would like a comment on the report or the pending legislation.

Todd Zywicki to Speak on Canadian Payment Systems PDF Print E-mail

Tomorrow, Todd Zywicki, Academic Affiliate at the International Center for Law and Economics and a Foundation Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, will speak on payment systems with particular concern to the Canadian context at a conference sponsored by the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto. The conference is titled “The Canadian Payments System: Ensuring Competition, Innovation and Stability” and will feature Patricia Meredith, the Chair of the Task Force for the Payments System Review in Canada, and Steve Rauschenberger, President of Rauschenberger Partners LLC, among others.

As the organizers notes, “Getting [payment systems] right will be integral to building a competitive, functioning and efficient payment system, with important consequences for industry and the Canadian economy as a whole.”

This conference comes on the heels of a recently released paper on the subject and is a continuation of the research he has been conducting for the International Center for Law and Economics’ Financial Regulatory Program White Paper Series, including his previous paper “The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation

The Way We Should Pay: Comments on “The Way We Pay: Transforming the Canadian Payments System” PDF Print E-mail

We are pleased to announce the release of the second paper in the ICLE Financial Regulatory White Paper Series.  “The Way We Should Pay: Comments on The Way We Pay:Transforming the Canadian Payments System” was authored by Todd J. Zywicki, Academic Affiliate at the International Center for Law and Economics and Foundation Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, and Philippe Bergevin, a Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute.

As outlined in the Task Force for the Payment System Review report, Canada’s payments system is falling behind. The thirty-year-old Interac system has facilitated widespread adoption of debit cards in Canada, but it is proving increasingly antiquated to the needs of a modern global economy. This paper explores the current state of the payment system in Canada within a global context and discusses the strong economic principles that should guide the work of the Task Force. Building on a robust framework of innovation and competition, it aims to positively orient the Task Force’s future decisions, while continually reaffirming the negative impact that can result from misaligned institutional incentives.

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If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What's the Question? PDF Print E-mail

We are pleased to announce the first paper in our 2011 Antitrust and Consumer Protection White Paper Series, "If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What's the Question?" by Geoffrey A. Manne of Lewis & Clark Law School and ICLE, and Joshua D. Wright of George Mason Law School & Department of Economics and ICLE.

In this paper we evaluate both the economic and non-economic costs and benefits of search bias. In Part I we define search bias and search neutrality, terms that have taken on any number of meanings in the literature, and survey recent regulatory concerns surrounding search bias. In Part II we discuss the economics and technology of search. In Part III we evaluate the economic costs and benefits of search bias. We demonstrate that search bias is the product of the competitive process and link the search bias debate to the economic and empirical literature on vertical integration and the generally-efficient and pro-competitive incentives for a vertically integrated firm to discriminate in favor of its own content. Building upon this literature and its application to the search engine market, we conclude that neither an ex ante regulatory restriction on search engine bias nor the imposition of an antitrust duty to deal upon Google would benefit consumers. In Part V we evaluate the frequent claim that search engine bias causes other serious, though less tangible, social and cultural harms. As with the economic case for search neutrality, we find these non-economic justifications for restricting search engine bias unconvincing, and particularly susceptible to the well-known Nirvana Fallacy of comparing imperfect real world institutions with romanticized and unrealistic alternatives.

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The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation PDF Print E-mail

We are pleased to announce the release of the first paper (and related conference--please see the post below) in the ICLE Financial Regulatory Program White Paper Series.

The paper, by Todd J. Zywicki (ICLE Senior Fellow and Foundation Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law), is entitled, "The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation."

The timing of the paper's release couldn't be more fortuitous, as Congress reconvenes next week and begins to confer over the language of the Durbin Amendment to the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010."  The Durbin Amendment would impose price controls on debit card interchange fees and would restrict the use by credit and debit card networks of certain network rules.  As Todd described it recently in a Washington Times op-ed:

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Conference on the Economics and Regulation of Payment Card Interchange Fees PDF Print E-mail

Coinciding with the release of the paper, ICLE, in conjunction with George Mason University's Mercatus Center, will be hosting a conference in Washington, DC, next week on the interchange fee debate.  For more information on the conference and to register, please click here.  The conference, to be held on June 9th from 8:30 am to 1:00 pm at the Willard InterContinental Hotel, will cover both the politics and regulation of interchange fees, as well as the underlying economics of card networks and the place of the interchange fee in those networks.

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Interchange Fee Blog Symposium e-Book PDF Print E-mail

On December 8 and 9, 2009, ICLE sponsored a blog symposium at Truth on the Market on "The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees and Credit Card Markets."  We had an all-star roster of contributors and a set of provocative posts and lively comments.  While the "live" blog symposium can be found at the "credit card symposium" link at the blog (, we have produced a pdf e-book of the symposium including all of the posts and comments.  It is our hope that the e-book will be a valuable off-line resource for policy makers, academics, students and other interested folks alike.

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Comments Regarding Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement PDF Print E-mail


ICLE filed a comment with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on December 31, 2009 in response to the Division's request for public comments on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st Century Economy.  The authors of the essay are F. Scott Kieff, Geoffrey A. Manne, Michael E. Sykuta, and Joshua D. Wright.  The comment should be available for free download from the DOJ webpage when the public comments are posted and is available here (pdf).



ICLE is a global network of scholars and institutions devoted to methodologies and research agendas supportive of the regulatory underpinnings that enable businesses to flourish. ICLE develops intellectual work in specific policy areas, and builds an international foundation for rigorous policy work in the long run.

The overarching objective of our center is to create the academic underpinnings for a regulatory environment that ensures the protection of property rights from inefficient interference by government agencies and private parties in high priority markets. The protection of property rights provides the basis for a competitive and innovative market environment in which business and society more generally can thrive. Optimal protection of property rights entails far more than sound intellectual property protection (although it certainly entails that); it also forms the basis for restrained government intervention into business practices, including through antitrust enforcement, consumer protection regulation, trade restrictions, government procurement policies and communications regulations, among many others.

Read more about us and our mission.