Section 2 Symposium: Bill Kolasky on Proving Market Power
The market power section of the Department’s Single Firm Conduct report is one of the strongest sections of the report. It provides an exceptionally clear discussion of . . .
The market power section of the Department’s Single Firm Conduct report is one of the strongest sections of the report. It provides an exceptionally clear discussion of . . .
As evidenced by this on-line symposium, the handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,” “single firm conduct”, or “abuse of dominance” continues to be debated . . .
Exclusive dealing prevents the bait-and-switch behavior by dealers who convert customers drawn by one brand to the products of its rivals. Despite the red flag . . .
Bundled discounts have been one of the hottest monopolization topics of the last decade. Much of the trouble began with the Third Circuit’s en banc . . .
The baseline for testing predatory pricing in the Section 2 Report is average avoidable cost (AAC), together with recoupment as a structural test (Report, p. . . .
Dimming the Court’s Brooke Group Bright Line Administrable Rule? As noted in my earlier post, the Supreme Court’s Brooke Group rule is held out as the primary example of an . . .
There’s a fundamental problem with Section 2 of the Sherman Act: nobody really knows what it means. More specifically, we don’t have a very precise . . .
The “error cost” or “decision theory” approach to Section 2 legal standards emphasizes the probabilities and costs of errors in monopolization decisions. Two types of . . .
One of the most important changes in the antitrust laws over the past 40 years has been the diminished reliance of rules of per se . . .