COMESA, WhatsApp Business, and Antitrust in Search of a Theory
Meta’s decision to limit third-party AI access to WhatsApp Business has quickly drawn antitrust scrutiny across multiple jurisdictions. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Competition and Consumer Commission (CCCC) is the latest authority to open an investigation. But before the case can answer whether Meta’s conduct harms competition, a more basic question arises: what theory of harm actually fits the facts?
The CCCC on Feb. 17 announced an investigation into Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd. for alleged abuse of dominance. The probe stems from Meta’s October 2025 amendment to its WhatsApp Business Solution Terms. Those changes prohibit providers of general-purpose artificial-intelligence (AI) services from accessing WhatsApp’s Business Application Programming Interface (API), while—according to the commission—“preserving and preferentially integrating Meta’s own AI service.”
The European Commission and Italy’s Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) had already opened proceedings on the same issue. COMESA’s notice followed, echoing those concerns.
Competition investigations of large technology platforms have become routine. Routine scrutiny does not, however, guarantee sound analysis or procompetitive outcomes. The COMESA notice appears to apply the wrong doctrinal standard—a mistake that could undermine the investigation’s aim of protecting competition and consumers.
Even setting that error aside, the available theories of harm face serious obstacles on the current facts. This post examines those difficulties and asks whether any coherent theory ultimately survives.