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TOTM Between the various power grabs and dubious regulatory proposals (each more dubious than the last!) from the likes of Geithner, Bernanke, Frank (.pdf), Dodd, etc., . . .
Between the various power grabs and dubious regulatory proposals (each more dubious than the last!) from the likes of Geithner, Bernanke, Frank (.pdf), Dodd, etc., etc. you’d be excused for thinking the financial news from Washington (remember when financial news used to come from New York?) was all bad and growing only worse.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Some serious reading first on American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, No. 08-661 (U.S. S. Ct.)… Read the full piece here.
Some serious reading first on American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, No. 08-661 (U.S. S. Ct.)…
Popular Media In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) nexus-of-contracts approach to the firm, bosses don’t necessarily hire workers; workers may just as easily hire bosses. Recall Cheung’s (1983, p. 8) famous illustration: . . .
In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) nexus-of-contracts approach to the firm, bosses don’t necessarily hire workers; workers may just as easily hire bosses. Recall Cheung’s (1983, p. 8) famous illustration: “My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along the shore towing a good-sized wooden boat. The unique interest of this example is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them.” In Alchian and Demsetz’s example, the employee can “fire” his employer by quitting, just as I can “fire” my grocer by shopping at a different store.
TOTM Volume 16, Issue 4 of the George Mason Law Review (which I received in my mailbox today) has a well timed issue from its antitrust . . .
Volume 16, Issue 4 of the George Mason Law Review (which I received in my mailbox today) has a well timed issue from its antitrust symposium featuring several articles on revisions to the Merger Guidelines. Especially recommended is DOJ economist Greg Werden’s article here, which usefully sets the stage for some of the important debates. Here is a key excerpt from Werden’s analysis, which I think can fairly be interpreted as coming out “against” revision…
TOTM As I skimmed through the White House White Paper on innovation (HT: Patently-O), I noticed that a repeated theme in the document is that US . . .
As I skimmed through the White House White Paper on innovation (HT: Patently-O), I noticed that a repeated theme in the document is that US innovation policy must “Promote Competitive Markets that Spur Productive Entrepreneurship” (e.g., p. 9). There is no real substantive discussion of antitrust issues in the White Paper, except for the following passage, suggesting that the key role for antitrust in promoting innovation is to…
TOTM The possibility of new Merger Guidelines has been much discussed in the antitrust community, particularly in light of appointment of the two new chief agency . . .
The possibility of new Merger Guidelines has been much discussed in the antitrust community, particularly in light of appointment of the two new chief agency economists, Carl Shapiro and Joe Farrell, who have done substantial work on the economics of horizontal mergers and market definition. Today, the FTC and DOJ announced a series of workshops and period for public comment to explore potential revision of the Guidelines…
TOTM Not very, according to the President in his recent health care speech, making the case that lack of competition and for-profit monopolists are what ails . . .
Not very, according to the President in his recent health care speech, making the case that lack of competition and for-profit monopolists are what ails the health care market…
Scholarship Abstract The creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”) is a very bad idea and should be rejected. The proposal is not salvageable . . .
The creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”) is a very bad idea and should be rejected. The proposal is not salvageable and cannot be improved in substance or in form. The foundational premise of the CFPA is that a failure of consumer protection, and specifically irrational consumer behavior in lending markets, was a meaningful cause of the financial crisis and that the CFPA would have or could have averted the crisis or lessened its effects. To the contrary, there is no evidence that consumer ignorance or irrationality was a substantial cause of the crisis or that the existence of a CFPA could have prevented the problems that occurred. The CFPA is likely to do more harm than good for consumers. In this article, we highlight three fundamentally problematic truths about the CFPA: (1) The CFPA is premised on a flawed understanding of the financial crisis, (2) the CFPA will have significant unintended consequences, including but not limited to reducing competition, consumer choice, and availability of credit to consumers for productive uses; and (3) the CFPA creates a powerful bureaucracy with undefined scope, risking expensive and wasteful regulatory overlap at both the federal and state levels without any evidence of its own expertise in the core areas it is designed to regulate.
Popular Media Today’s installment of our series featuring statements so self-evidently absurd you wonder how anyone could have made them with a straight face focuses on US . . .
Today’s installment of our series featuring statements so self-evidently absurd you wonder how anyone could have made them with a straight face focuses on US Trade Representative Ron Kirk. Here’s Captain Kirk failing Economics 101…
