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TOTM Early Morning I wake up grudgingly to the loud ring of my phone’s preset alarm sound (I swear I gave third-party alarms a fair shot). . . .
I wake up grudgingly to the loud ring of my phone’s preset alarm sound (I swear I gave third-party alarms a fair shot). I slide my feet into the bedroom slippers and mechanically chaperone my body to the coffee machine in the living room.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM After engineering stints at Apple and Motorola, developing various handheld devices, Rubin had set up his own shop. The idea was bold: develop the first open mobile platform—based on Linux, nonetheless. Rubin had pitched the project to Google in 2005 but given the regulatory uncertainty over the future of antitrust—the same wave of populist sentiment that would carry Klobuchar to office one year later—Schmidt and his team had passed.
The California sun shone warmly on Eric Schmidt’s face as he stepped out of his car and made his way to have dinner at Madera, a chic Palo Alto restaurant.
TOTM Earlier this month, Professors Fiona Scott Morton, Steve Salop, and David Dinielli penned a letter expressing their “strong support” for the proposed American Innovation and Choice Online . . .
Earlier this month, Professors Fiona Scott Morton, Steve Salop, and David Dinielli penned a letter expressing their “strong support” for the proposed American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA). In the letter, the professors address criticisms of AICOA and urge its approval, despite possible imperfections.
TOTM Much ink has been spilled regarding the potential harm to the economy and to the rule of law that could stem from enactment of the . . .
Much ink has been spilled regarding the potential harm to the economy and to the rule of law that could stem from enactment of the primary federal antitrust legislative proposal, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) (see here). AICOA proponents, of course, would beg to differ, emphasizing the purported procompetitive benefits of limiting the business freedom of “Big Tech monopolists.”
TOTM If S.2992—the American Innovation and Choice Online Act or AICOA—were to become law, it would be, at the very least, an incomplete law. By design—and not for . . .
If S.2992—the American Innovation and Choice Online Act or AICOA—were to become law, it would be, at the very least, an incomplete law. By design—and not for good reason, but for political expediency—AICOA is riddled with intentional uncertainty. In theory, the law’s glaring definitional deficiencies are meant to be rectified by “expert” agencies (i.e., the DOJ and FTC) after passage. But in actuality, no such certainty would ever emerge, and the law would stand as a testament to the crass political machinations and absence of rigor that undergird it. Among many other troubling outcomes, this is what the future under AICOA would hold.
Popular Media With the clock ticking down on Congress’ legislative calendar before the midterm election season begins, sponsors of the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) . . .
With the clock ticking down on Congress’ legislative calendar before the midterm election season begins, sponsors of the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) are left with a problem. As leadership seeks to wrangle the needed 60 votes in the Senate, even the measure’s putative backers appear confused about precisely what it would, or would not, do.
Scholarship Abstract It is common to characterize patents as monopolies. This assumption, which underlies the standard dichotomy between intellectual property and antitrust law, is challenged by . . .
It is common to characterize patents as monopolies. This assumption, which underlies the standard dichotomy between intellectual property and antitrust law, is challenged by evidence that large companies in technology markets (outside biopharmaceuticals) tend to advocate for weaker patent protection or, in some cases, no patent protection at all. This revealed preference for weaker patent protection reflects the fact that large integrated firms can often capture returns on innovation through economies of scale and scope and other non-patent-dependent capacities that few other firms can match. Relatedly, a weak-patent environment can confer a competitive advantage on integrated firms against smaller and more innovative firms that rely on patents to capture value on innovation through licensing and other contract-based monetization strategies.
TOTM The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long steered the direction of competition law by engaging in case-by-case enforcement of the FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair . . .
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long steered the direction of competition law by engaging in case-by-case enforcement of the FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair methods of competition (UMC). Recently, some have argued that the FTC’s exclusive reliance on case-by-case adjudication is too long and arduous a route and have urged the commission to take a shortcut by invoking its purported authority to promulgate UMC rules under Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
TOTM Conventional wisdom is that monopsony power is simply the flip slide of monopoly power. The truth is much more complicated.
Slow wage growth and rising inequality over the past few decades have pushed economists more and more toward the study of monopsony power—particularly firms’ monopsony power over workers. Antitrust policy has taken notice. For example, when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) initiated the process of updating their merger guidelines, their request for information included questions about how they should respond to monopsony concerns, as distinct from monopoly concerns. ?
