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TOTM Well, he warned us. But now that it’s here it sounds so incredible. Read the full piece here.
Well, he warned us. But now that it’s here it sounds so incredible.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Steve’s post responding to me and Josh on antitrust exemptions and buyer cartels raised a number of interesting issues. A few points in response… Read . . .
Steve’s post responding to me and Josh on antitrust exemptions and buyer cartels raised a number of interesting issues. A few points in response…
TOTM My co-author on this paper on The Effect of the CFPA Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, David Evans, has a great post over at . . .
My co-author on this paper on The Effect of the CFPA Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, David Evans, has a great post over at Catalyst Code on the importance of access to consumer credit during tough financial times. Here’s the key paragraph…
TOTM Speaking of Josh’s co-author, David Evans, David just testified the other day before the House Financial Services Committee on a bill, the Welch Bill, HR . . .
Speaking of Josh’s co-author, David Evans, David just testified the other day before the House Financial Services Committee on a bill, the Welch Bill, HR 2382, that would regulate the fees banks charge to each other to process credit card payments. The Welch Bill is actually only one of three pending bills that would regulate interchange fees (the other two offer antitrust exemptions for merchants to negotiate these fees. Because we all know how good antitrust exemptions are).
Scholarship Abstract The U.S. Department of the Treasury has submitted the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 to Congress for the purpose of overhauling consumer . . .
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has submitted the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 to Congress for the purpose of overhauling consumer financial regulation. This study has examined the likely effect of the Act on the availability of credit to American consumers. To do so we have examined the legislation in detail to assess how it would alter current consumer protection regulation, reviewed the rationales provided for the new legislation by those who designed its key features, considered why consumers borrow money and benefit from doing so, and reviewed the factors behind the expansion of credit availability over the last thirty years. Based on our analysis we have concluded that the CFPA Act of 2009 would make it harder and more expensive for consumers to borrow. Under plausible yet conservative assumptions the CFPA would:
By reducing borrowing the Act would also reduce consumer spending that further drives job creation and economic growth. In addition to restricting the availability of credit over the long term, the CFPA Act of 2009 would also slow the recovery from the deep recession the economy is now in by reducing borrowing, spending, and business formation.
The financial crisis has surfaced a number of serious consumer financial protection problems that were not dealt with adequately by federal regulators. Rather than proposing expeditious and practical reforms that can deal with those problems, the Treasury Department has put forward a proposal that would disrupt current regulatory agency efforts to deal with these issues.
This paper focuses on the CFPA Act that the Administration introduced in July 2009. House Finance Committee Chairman Frank has proposed changes to this Act which the Treasury Secretary Geithner appears to be willing to accept. However, given that these changes could be reversed or other changes could be made as the legislation works its way through Congress, we focus on the Administration’s original bill rather than a moving target. Chairman Frank’s proposed changes do not significantly alter any of our conclusions.
TOTM Between the various power grabs and dubious regulatory proposals (each more dubious than the last!) from the likes of Geithner, Bernanke, Frank (.pdf), Dodd, etc., . . .
Between the various power grabs and dubious regulatory proposals (each more dubious than the last!) from the likes of Geithner, Bernanke, Frank (.pdf), Dodd, etc., etc. you’d be excused for thinking the financial news from Washington (remember when financial news used to come from New York?) was all bad and growing only worse.
Scholarship Abstract The creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”) is a very bad idea and should be rejected. The proposal is not salvageable . . .
The creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”) is a very bad idea and should be rejected. The proposal is not salvageable and cannot be improved in substance or in form. The foundational premise of the CFPA is that a failure of consumer protection, and specifically irrational consumer behavior in lending markets, was a meaningful cause of the financial crisis and that the CFPA would have or could have averted the crisis or lessened its effects. To the contrary, there is no evidence that consumer ignorance or irrationality was a substantial cause of the crisis or that the existence of a CFPA could have prevented the problems that occurred. The CFPA is likely to do more harm than good for consumers. In this article, we highlight three fundamentally problematic truths about the CFPA: (1) The CFPA is premised on a flawed understanding of the financial crisis, (2) the CFPA will have significant unintended consequences, including but not limited to reducing competition, consumer choice, and availability of credit to consumers for productive uses; and (3) the CFPA creates a powerful bureaucracy with undefined scope, risking expensive and wasteful regulatory overlap at both the federal and state levels without any evidence of its own expertise in the core areas it is designed to regulate.
TOTM Professor Birdthistle has a very thoughtful reply to my earlier post over at the Conglomerate on Jones v. Harris and behavioral economics. I thank Professor . . .
Professor Birdthistle has a very thoughtful reply to my earlier post over at the Conglomerate on Jones v. Harris and behavioral economics. I thank Professor Birdthistle for his reply. I’ve learned a great deal about Jones v. Harris from reading his posts at the Conglomerate and have no doubt that I’ll learn more from this exchange. The thrust of my original post was that, in general, my view was that behavioral law and economics has been too quick to rely on findings in the behavioral/ experimental literature demonstrating systematic deviations from rationality to justify paternalistic regulation.
TOTM Much has been made about the importance of Jones v. Harris as a battle in the ongoing war between behavioral economics and rational choice/neoclassical framework . . .
Much has been made about the importance of Jones v. Harris as a battle in the ongoing war between behavioral economics and rational choice/neoclassical framework (see, e.g. the NYT). If the case if to be about the appropriate economic methodology or model for assessing legal questions, it is definitely an interesting turn to have Judge Easterbrook representing the rational choice economists while Judge Posner (who is simultaneously taking some flack for fast and loose and incorrect uses of macroeconomics) defends the behavioral view, considering that the latter wrote an important critique of the behavioral law and economics literature (here is an excellent summary of Posner’s opinion from Professor Birdthistle). Professor Ribstein frames the issue of Jones v. Harris and the New Paternalism nicely with a prediction…