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The unraveling of the rule of law in finance is inherent in the system’s discretionary process of regulation. Each financial crisis begets new regulations and new regulatory agencies with more expansive and discretionary powers. The general entanglement of finance, leftist interest groups, and the federal regulatory apparatus has created a threat to freedom that is almost unique in history. Leftist activists, “woke” corporations, and regulators and politicians have recognized and acted on the opportunity to use the financial regulatory system both to enact preferred policies through anti-democratic means and to silence their ideological opponents. As governmental power grows, the threat of its misuse grows concomitantly.

ICLE Academic Affiliate Todd Zywicki joined Southwest Public Policy Institute President Patrick M. Brenner on SPPI’s SPPI-TV podcast to discuss interest rate caps and the role of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Video of the full episode is embedded below.

Before writing this commentary, I checked trending searches on Google over the last quarter. Among Singapore’s favourite three-letter acronyms, the top was HDB, followed by CPF and COE. That is until May 4, when the Certificate of Entitlement (COE) trumped Housing and Development Board (HDB) and Central Provident Fund (CPF).

It’s worth stressing that COEs are not the top concern of all Singaporeans. They are the top concern of a relatively vocal segment – especially recently, with COE prices crossing S$100,000 (US$75,000) and continuing to trend upwards.

Read the full piece here.

Abstract

The notion of “junk” fees is a fine piece of rhetoric, but useless as an analytical tool. Many fees identified as junk impose costs on consumers who generate those costs – rather than forcing others to subsidize their behavior. For example, credit card late fees deter late payments and their associated costs while only world travelers pay foreign currency transaction fees. There is no reason for ordinary consumers to subsidize either group. Because information is costly, consumers rationally focus on the elements of price that are most important in their own circumstances. Requirements to disclose everything everywhere will only interfere with this process. Both the structure of pricing, and the level of prices, should be determined by competition in the marketplace. As we observe, the result is detailed fee structures for some products and services, and bundled pricing for others. Attempts to regulate pricing structures by requiring itemized prices increased the costs of real estate settlements. Regulating components of credit card pricing structures led to increases in other fees and reductions in credit availability. Competition over pricing structures is far more likely to satisfy consumer preferences than an inevitably overbroad set of regulatory requirements

A relatively minor bureaucratic change proposed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency stirred up a viral storm in right-leaning news media recently, with outlets like the Washington Times, New York Post, National Review and Fox News all reporting some variant of the sentiment expressed in the Times headline: “Biden to hike payments for good-credit homebuyers to subsidize high-risk mortgages.”

Read the full piece here.

Introduction

Chair Klobuchar, Ranking Member Lee, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on Competition in the Digital Advertising Ecosystem.

My name is Todd Henderson. I am the Michael J. Marks Professor of Law at the Chicago Law School. I am also a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and an Academic Affiliate of the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE). My testimony today is drawn largely from a paper I recently published with ICLE which examines the Advertising Middlemen Endangering Rigorous Internet Competition Accountability (AMERICA) Act,^[1] as well as other recent scholarship my ICLE colleagues have produced looking at the law & economics of the digital advertising market.^[2]

There are three primary points I want to share with the Subcommittee:

1. While monopolistic markets are associated with rising prices and restricted output, digital advertising has in recent years demonstrated the opposite, with ads becoming cheaper and more effective. Ranking Member Lee has said that the “big is bad philosophy is… part of a broader effort to overturn the consumer welfare standard,” and that “the purpose of antitrust is to advance the economic welfare of consumers.”^[3] The online display ad market is currently serving consumer welfare.
2. Ads are not stocks, and any claim that they should be regulated as stocks is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how securities regulation works and why it exists.
3. The divestiture portion of the AMERICA Act may have perverse effects on competition and innovation. Congress should carefully consider what the open-display advertising market is likely to look like if the bill is adopted.

The State of the Digital Advertising Market

There are many kinds of digital advertising, but for our purposes today, the market that has drawn the most criticism and controversy is the open-display digital advertising business. Open display ads are also the only part of the market that the AMERICA Act would regulate.

Most display ads appear on heavily trafficked, owned-and-operated sites like TikTok, Instagram, Amazon, or YouTube, in which the company providing the advertising space is the same company that operates the platforms that place the ads. In contrast, open-display space is supplied by independent publishers and is usually facilitated by intermediaries that match advertisers and websites automatically, displaying ads to users for whom they are most relevant.

It has become common for lawmakers, regulators, and competition watchdogs to raise concerns about the open-display digital advertising market on grounds that it is dominated by a handful of firms like Google and Facebook. The claim—raised not only by the AMERICA Act but also by antitrust litigation brought against Google, both by the U.S. Justice Department and separately by the State of Texas and 14 other U.S. states—is that this dominance allows these firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct to extend their market power and to earn excess profits at the expense of advertisers, publishers, and consumers.

In determining whether the market conduct of advertising intermediaries is anticompetitive, it is important to consider that these firms are vertically integrated and operate in two-sided markets. Their overarching goal in pricing the various advertising services they provide is therefore to optimize the overall use of the platform. Indeed, pricing on one side of the platform is often used to subsidize participation on another side, increasing the value to all sides combined.

It is indeed true that, when viewed in isolation, pricing and other terms of exchange on one side of the market may appear to diverge from competitive levels. One side of the market may pay superficially higher fees, but that is offset by the benefits from increased participation on the other side of the market. In this way, using subsidies to increase participation on another side of the market creates valuable network effects for the side of the market facing the higher fees.

To determine whether a vertically integrated entity in a multi-sided market is behaving in a way that harms consumers or competition, you need to look at the net effects on all sides of the market. Here, the evidence is clear: the price of digital advertising has fallen steadily, while output has risen. From 2010 to 2021, U.S. digital-ad spending grew from $26 billion to $189 billion, or 20% a year on average.^[4] Over the same period, the Producer Price Index for digital advertising fell by an average of 4% a year.^[5] The combination of this rising spending with falling prices means that, rather than constrained output, the number of ads bought and sold has increased by about 25% annually over the last decade.

Even in the digital advertising space, competition abounds. Over the past decade, Amazon has grown from a bit player in digital advertising to one of the biggest, last year earning $38 billion in ad revenue. TikTok, which is a little more than six years old, saw its digital advertising revenues last year surpass Twitter and Snapchat combined, and is on track to generate over $18 billion in ad revenue this year. Walmart had $2.7 billion of ad revenue last year. At the same time, adtech competitors continue to expand and invest in competing technologies. Microsoft, for example, acquired the Xandr (formerly AppNexus) digital advertising platform from AT&T last year for $1 billion. Even if Google and Facebook were trying to block competition, they are failing.^[6]

These figures are consistent with a growing and increasingly competitive market. This is important context for Congress to bear in mind as it considers imposing regulatory requirements on digital advertising firms.

Considering the AMERICA Act: Ads Are Not Stocks

Like the earlier proposed Competition and Transparency in Digital Advertising Act (CTDA), the AMERICA Act would amend the Clayton Act as it applies to online advertising. The legislation proposes two major changes.

First, companies with more than $20 billion in digital advertising revenue would be barred from owning a digital advertising exchange where online ads are bought and sold, if it also provides services to buyers and sellers of ads, or if it sells advertising space itself.

Second, companies with more than $5 billion in digital advertising revenue that provide services to buyers and sellers of digital advertising would have a legal duty to act in a customer’s “best interest” and would have to comply with various transparency requirements.

Several proponents of the legislation—both within Congress and in academic and advocacy circles—have argued for these changes on grounds that they mimic longstanding rules based in securities regulation. But if one understands the mechanics of stock markets and the reasons they are regulated as they are, the analogy completely falls apart.

Defenders of the AMERICA Act argue that Google should be barred from acting as a broker on its own ad exchange, just as Goldman Sachs is prohibited from owning the exchange on which stocks are traded.^[7] But this is factually incorrect. It is true that Goldman Sachs does not own the New York Stock Exchange, but it does own a different stock exchange, called SigmaX2, where the same stocks are bought and sold. In fact, about half of all stock trades occur on trading venues owned by brokers.^[8] The bill’s insistence on the centrality of physical separation is not supported by the facts of how markets work.

There is, in fact, a “best interests” rule in securities regulation, and it appears to be the inspiration for the fiduciary duty part of the AMERICA Act. But it exists precisely because brokers may own exchanges and otherwise act on behalf of clients when there are real or potential conflicts of interest.

Even when dealing with stocks—where value is an inherent and definable thing and price is the same for everyone at a given moment—the complexity of multiple venues and individuals pursuing their own self-interest nonetheless makes enforcing a “best interests” standard extraordinarily complex. In online display-ad auctions, prices exist for a particular viewer for a particular location at a particular time. These multiple factors and the lack of an objective valuation make determining the “best” price, or even a reasonable price, nearly impossible.

But more importantly, we must remember why the stock market is regulated as it is. It is because of the profound social importance of accurate stock prices. Stocks are the largest source of savings and investment for individual Americans. They serve an essential function in funding projects that provide most goods and services in the economy, as well as directing almost all economic activity.

Stock markets are engaged in the constant evaluation of the intrinsic value of a single thing, which has the same value for every holder, more or less. Finding that intrinsic value is the stock market’s purpose, and the regulation of disclosure and trading activity is centrally about that purpose.

Ad markets, on the other hand, are not about finding the intrinsic value of information conveyed on a website to a particular individual, but rather just what someone is willing to pay for it in that instant. For small businesses, something less than 10% of all sales are devoted to marketing of all kinds, making it an insubstantial business expense.

One also must ask why divestiture of ad exchanges would even be necessary once a best interests standard of this type is imposed. The AMERICA Act takes a belt-and-suspenders approach that offers more extensive protection for advertisers and ad buyers than stock traders, even though the potential mischief and consequences are greater in the securities world. Ordinary Americans have their savings and their futures bet in the stock markets, not in ad markets, which are merely places where business-to-business services are bought and sold. There is no investment or speculation in ad markets.

In short, stocks are regulated as they are because they are stocks. Ads are not stocks, and regulating them as if they were makes no sense.

Predictions Are Difficult, Especially About the Future

There are real dangers that accompany any intervention in complex markets. The history of digital advertising is one of dynamic changes to satisfy the demands of advertisers, publishers, and consumers. It would be a mistake to conclude that the days before vertically integrated digital advertising stacks were a golden age.

Early digital ads were poorly targeted and carried high fixed costs, much like conventional print and broadcast advertising. Over time, technological progress enabled this process to become far more automated, including the emergence of ad exchanges that sell ad space using real-time auctions. These innovations made digital advertising profitable for smaller publishers, who would otherwise be unable to attract direct deals to sell ad space.

Bearing this in mind, Congress should carefully consider what the open-display ad tech market is likely to look like if the AMERICA Act is adopted.

Many of the competitors in open-display advertising—including some of the most important, like Amazon—started out by offering advertising on their own sites to their existing business customers. When some of these customers expressed interest in using the data and infrastructure developed on-site to advertise elsewhere, Amazon developed that capacity, leveraging its on-site advertising expertise to provide ads for Amazon merchants elsewhere on the Internet. That business then expanded further to connect other, non-Amazon-merchant advertisers to publishers on the Internet.

This has been one of the most significant sources of competition to Google and Meta in the open-display ad tech market. Indeed, in 2018, Amazon stopped buying product listings from Google, and soon rolled out its own competing product. Just a few days ago, Amazon entered into a deal with Pinterest to provide third-party ads on the platform for its almost 500 million users, enabling Pinterest users to readily convert their interests into purchases.^[9]

The AMERICA Act would prohibit Amazon from offering these third-party advertising products, presumably forcing Amazon and all its independent sellers to revert to paying Google for off-site advertising. Other companies with advertising inventory that have developed their own third-party advertising networks, such as Walmart and Target, would also likely stop investing in them. It is hard to see how this result benefits advertisers, publishers, or users.

And while Google would be forced to divest its open-display advertising operations, those operations would remain intact and likely, to the extent allowed under the law, still vertically integrated. The net effect, as emerging and innovative competitors exit the market, would arguably be worse than the status quo. The vertical divestiture portion of the bill, in other words, may have perverse effects on competition and innovation.

[1] M. Todd Henderson, Ads Aren’t Stocks, or How Bad Analogies Make Bad Law, International Center for Law & Economics (Apr. 12, 2023), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/ads-arent-stocks-or-how-bad-analogies-make-bad-law.

[2] Geoffrey A. Manne & Eric Fruits, The Antitrust Assault on Ad Tech: A Law & Economics Critique, International Center for Law & Economics (Nov. 3, 2022), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-antitrust-assault-on-ad-tech-a-law-economics-critique; Eric Fruits, Geoffrey A. Manne & Lazar Radic, Relevant Market in the Google Ad Tech Case, International Center for Law & Economics (June 1, 2022), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/relevant-market-in-the-google-adtech-case/.

[3] Sen. Mike Lee, The TEAM Act, Mike Lee U.S. Senator for Utah (June 14, 2021), https://www.lee.senate.gov/2021/6/the-team-act.

[4] Megan Graham, Digital Ad Revenue Jumped 35% in the U.S. Last Year, Biggest Gain Since 2006, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/digital-ad-revenue-jumped-35-in-the-u-s-last-year-biggest-gain-since-2006-11649759401.

[5] Producer Price Index by Commodity: Advertising Space and Time Sales: Internet Advertising Sales, Excluding Internet Advertising Sold by Print Publishers, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU365; Producer Price Index, December 2009—February 2021, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=vtTd.

[6] See generally Benedict Evans, Retail, search and Amazon’s $40bn ‘advertising’ business, Benedict Evans (March 6, 2023), https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2023/3/6/ways-to-think-about-amazon-advertising.

[7] Sen. Mike Lee, The AMERICA Act: Lee Introduces Bill to Protect Digital Advertising Competition, Mike Lee U.S. Senator for Utah (March 30, 2023), https://www.lee.senate.gov/2023/3/the-america-act (“The conflicts of interest are so glaring that one Google employee described Google’s ad business as being like ‘if Goldman or Citibank owned the NYSE.’”).

[8] US Equity Market Structure Analysis: Analyzing the Meaning Behind the Level of Off-Exchange Trading, SIFMA Insights (Sep. 2021), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SIFMA-Insights-Analyzing-Off-Exchange-Trading-09-2021.pdf (reporting 44% of trades in 2021 (through June 30) were “off-exchange”).

[9] Amazon to bring third-party ad demand to the platform, Pinterest (April 27, 2023), https://newsroom.pinterest.com/en/post/pinterest-announces-partnership-with-amazon-to-bring-third-party-ad-demand-to-the-platform.

Background: The Advertising Middlemen Endangering Rigorous Internet Competition Accountability (AMERICA) Act, recently introduced by Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), would bar companies that own a digital-advertising exchange with more than $20 billion in annual ad revenue from also providing services to buyers and sellers of ads, or from selling advertising space themselves. The bill also would impose fiduciary-like duties on those who buy and sell online ads for others

However… While advocates of the legislation claim the changes they seek are based on analogous rules used in the regulation of securities markets, such analogies are based on fundamental misunderstandings of how securities regulation works and why it exists. The requirement for “physical separation,” which could force the breakup of vertically integrated digital-advertising platforms like Google, does not exist in securities law; many stockbrokers also own exchanges where stocks are traded. Moreover, rules that stock trades be executed at the best-available price are imposed precisely because vertical integration is common. Ultimately, stocks are regulated in the way that they are because of the central role they play in the savings and investments of everyday Americans. Advertising, while important, does not serve that role.

No ‘Physical Separation’ Rule in Stocks

In a press release announcing the introduction of the AMERICA Act, Matt Stoller of the American Economic Liberties Project expressed a sentiment common among proponents of the legislation, that just as “no one would accept Goldman Sachs running the New York Stock Exchange,” Congress should not “let corporations run all sides of a transaction in online ad markets.”

Sen. Lee likewise has said of his bill that its “restrictions and requirements mirror those imposed on electronic trading in the financial sector.”

The problem with these analogies is that there actually is no requirement in securities law that prohibits brokers from owning exchanges on which stocks are traded. Goldman Sachs does not own the NYSE, but it does own a different stock exchange (called SigmaX2) where the same stocks are bought and sold. In fact, about half of all stock trades are made on trading venues (i.e., exchanges by a different name) owned by brokers.

Thus, while the AMERICA Act would ban Google from acting as a broker on its own ad exchange, securities law—on which the law is purportedly founded—permits exactly this same conduct.

The Best-Interests Standard May Be Impossible to Enforce in Ad Tech

The AMERICA Act would also create a legal duty to act in a client’s best interest when helping them buy or sell ads. This is similar to rules in securities law, but one of the reasons such duties exist in stock markets is precisely because brokers may own exchanges and otherwise act on behalf of clients when there are real or potential conflicts of interest. 

While stockbrokers do have a duty to execute trades at the best price, there is some discretion baked into the system, especially since price is not the only factor customers care about. A recent empirical study found that only about 43% of trades were made at the “best” price, because of the impact of various discounts and other factors paid by exchanges.

As difficult as it is to enforce a best-interests rule in stock markets, establishing something akin to it in online display advertising would be a monumental task. While a stock has one price for every potential investor at any time, and it has some intrinsic value, online advertisements have many more degrees of interest. In online display-ad auctions, the price is set for a particular viewer at a particular location at a particular time. These multiple factors, and the lack of any objective valuation, makes determining the “best” price, or even a reasonable price, far more complex.

The AMERICA ACT proposes that the best-interests rule would be enforced by the U.S. Justice Department and state attorneys general, but this is a massive underestimate of the bureaucracy needed to establish and enforce such rules.

Ads Aren’t Stocks

Plenty of markets involve vertical integration with conflicts of interest, but do not require physical separation or impose fiduciary duties. For instance, auction houses provide a venue where buyers and sellers come together to bid on art and antiquities, while also providing services and advice to buyers and sellers, as well as sometimes bidding on items themselves.

The AMERICA Act takes a belt-and-suspenders approach that offers more supposed protection for advertisers and ad buyers than stock traders, even though the potential mischief and consequences are greater in the securities world. Ordinary Americans have their savings and their futures bet in the stock markets, not in ad markets, which are merely places where business-to-business services are bought and sold. There is no investment or speculation in ad markets.

Ultimately, the stock market is regulated as it is because of the profound social importance of accurate stock prices, not because of overriding concerns about conflicts of interests in general. Stocks are regulated as they are because they are stocks. Ads are not stocks, and thus, regulating them like stocks makes no sense.

For a more extensive treatment of this issue, see the ICLE white paper “Ads Aren’t Stocks, or How Bad Analogies Make Bad Law,” as well as other ICLE research on the law & economics of digital advertising here and here.

Executive Summary

Under the auspices of Legislative Decree 9831, the Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR) has set maximum fees for acquiring and issuing banks in payment-card markets, with maximum acquisition fees (MDR) and interchange fees (IRF). Different fees were set for domestic transactions (i.e., those made using locally issued cards) and for cross-border transactions (i.e., those made using foreign-issued cards).

In November 2022, BCCR issued a proposal to retain the cross-border MDR cap at 2.5% and either to leave the cap on cross-border IRF unchanged at 2%, or to lower it to 1.25%. In the same document, BCCR proposed that the MDR for domestically issued cards would be capped at 2% and the IRF capped at 1.5%.

IRF for cross-border transactions typically are significantly higher than those for domestic transactions, primarily because cross-border transactions carry much higher risk of fraud. If BCCR caps cross-border interchange fees at the lower level it has proposed, foreign issuers are likely to respond by de-risking payment requests from acquirers in Costa Rica. This could take various forms, including rejecting payments from certain merchants, or simply increasing rejections rates across the board. Whatever approach, or mix of approaches, is taken, it is likely to cause problems both for merchants in Costa Rica and for their customers.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, roughly 6.25% of Costa Rica’s gross domestic product (GDP) came from tourism, with a significant proportion of those tourist dollars spent using payment cards. Indeed, in 2021, even without a full resumption of pre-COVID rates of tourism, approximately 16% of credit-card payments in Costa Rica were cross-border. If tourists find that they are unable to make reservations at hotels in Costa Rica using their credit or debit cards because the payment is rejected by their issuer, they may well choose an alternative destination for their trip. Meanwhile, if tourists in Costa Rica are unable to pay for goods and services using their credit and debit cards, many will simply not make those payments. This could have a substantial negative effect on Costa Rica’s tourism and business-travel industries.

Introduction

Costa Rica Legislative Decree No. 9831—issued March 24, 2020—created a mandate to regulate acquisition fees (commonly known as the “merchant discount rate,” or MDR) and interchange reimbursement fees (IRF) charged by service providers on “the processing of transactions that use payment devices and the operation of the card system.”[1] The legislation’s stated objective was “to promote its efficiency and security, and guarantee the lowest possible cost for affiliates.”

Implementation was delegated to the Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR), which was tasked with responsibility to issue regulations and monitor compliance; ensure that the rule is “in the public interest”; and guarantee that fees charged to “affiliates” (i.e., merchants) are “the lowest possible … following international best practices.” Beginning Nov. 24, 2020, BCCR set the maximum IRF for domestic cards at 2.00% and the maximum MDR at 2.50%. These fell to 1.75% and 2.25%, respectively, in an updated regulation published in January 2022, and to 1.5% and 2% in February 2023.

In a study published in May 2022, we reviewed the available evidence regarding interchange fees and argued that it would be contrary to international best practices for Costa Rica to cap acquisition fees and interchange fees.[2] In particular, we raised specific concerns regarding the likely harmful effects of capping fees on cross-border transactions, owing to the higher risks and other costs associated with such transactions.

BCCR developed a technical study that considered the effects of different levels of caps on fees for both domestic and cross-border payment-card transactions and, in November 2022, issued a proposal to retain the cross-border MDR cap at 2.5% and either (1) leave the cap on cross-border IRF unchanged at 2%, or (2) lower the IRF cap for cross-border transactions to 1.25%.

If BCCR leaves the cross-border MDR cap unchanged but reduces the cross-border IRF cap to 1.25%, it might, in principle, appear to solve the immediate problem faced by acquiring banks. It would, however, create new problems for those banks, their customers, and the wider economy. It will also put Costa Rica in the unenviable position of being the only country in the world with a cross-border interchange fee that is below the domestic interchange fee.

This brief considers the international experience with cross-border payment-card transactions, with a focus on issues related to fraud, as well as the negative implications of imposing price caps. It begins with a brief discussion of the economics of interchange fees. Section II describes Costa Rica’s price controls on merchant acquisition and interchange fees. Section III discusses fraud and other costs associated with cross-border and card-not-present transactions. Section IV describes ways in which payment-card networks address issues related to fraud. And Section V assesses the likely implications for Costa Rica of price caps on cross-border interchange fees.

I.        The Economics of Interchange Fees

Payment systems are two-sided markets, with consumers on one side and merchants on the other; the payment network acts as a platform that facilitates interactions between the two sides.7F[3] For such a system to be successful, both merchants and consumers must perceive it as beneficial. If too few merchants accept a particular form of payment, consumers will have little reason to obtain it and issuers will have little incentive to issue it. Likewise, if too few consumers possess a form of payment, merchants will have little reason to accept it.

In any two-sided market, platform operators seek to encourage participation on each side of the market in ways that maximize the joint net benefits of the network to all participants—and to allocate system costs accordingly.8F[4] Among the means they employ to achieve this balance is by setting prices charged, respectively, to participants on each side of the market.9F[5] In the case of payments, if the platform operator sets the price too high for some consumers, they will be unwilling to use the platform; similarly, if the operator sets the price too high for some merchants, they will not be willing to use the platform.

In general, the costs of operating a platform will tend to fall on the party who is least sensitive to such costs (i.e., the party with the lower price elasticity). In the case of payment cards, that party is the merchant.13F[6] Merchants often pay, through transaction fees, not only all the costs of accessing the network, but also effectively subsidize participation by consumers—e.g., through cashback and other rewards programs, insurance, fraud protection, and other cardholder benefits that serve as incentives to card usage.

Merchants are willing to do this because they receive significant benefits from the use of payment cards, including: ticket lift (i.e., higher spending, due to the fact that consumers are not constrained by the cash in their pockets or, in the case of credit cards, the amount of cash currently in their bank accounts), guaranteed payment, reduced cash-management costs, and faster checkout times.

II.      Costa Rica’s Price Controls on Payment Card Fees

Article 14 of Legislative Decree 9831 requires the BCCR to undertake “ordinary reviews” of the price controls on MDR and IRF at least once annually. Its first such review, published in November 2021, set a timetable for maximum domestic-acquisition and interchange fees (see table below) and set maximum cross-border MDR at 2.5% and IRF at 2%.[7]

SOURCE: Banco Central de Costa Rica[8]

BCCR subsequently established a task force to develop proposals for setting payment-card fees. On Nov. 2, 2022, BCCR published the task force’s recommendations, which included, inter alia, the following:[9]

• Use international comparisons of IRFs and MDRs “as the best technical tool currently available to the BCCR to ensure the lowest possible cost for affiliates, in accordance with Legislative Decree 9831.”
• Maintain the differentiation of the ceilings on IRF and MDR between local and cross-border payment transactions, in accordance with Article 4 of Legislative Decree 9831, “as this leads to the proper functioning, efficiency and security of the Costa Rican payment system and the lowest cost for affiliates.”
• For 2023, set maximum fees for local payment transactions at 1.50% for IRF and 2.00% for MDR. This is in line with the proposal made in 2021.
• Maintain the cap of 2.50% on cross-border MDR, “since the information available in the international comparison does not allow modifications to be made to the limit established since 2020.”
• Propose two alternative options regarding the maximum cross-border IRF:
  • Option 1: maintain the current maximum, e., 2.00%; or
  • Option 2: reduce the maximum to 1.25%.

The BCCR offers various putative justifications for these proposed caps. For example, it notes that Option 2 would result in a maximum cross-border IRF that is midway between “the minimum cross-border IRF established by Mastercard and Visa card brands for the United States and Canada, as well as Visa for Australia in the case of non-Asia Pacific issuers” (i.e., 1.00%) and the IRF “agreed by Mastercard and Visa card brands for card-not-present payments in the EEA” (i.e., 1.50%).

Such justifications, however, are fundamentally inconsistent with the economics of two-sided markets. The current and proposed price caps thus represent essentially arbitrary interventions. By focusing narrowly on the costs incurred by merchants through IRFs and MDRs, BCCR fails to account adequately for the offsetting benefits that accrue to consumers and merchants—and the costs to provide those benefits.

Legislative Decree 9831 does, however, permit BCCR to take into consideration “[a]ny other element that reasonably allows the Central Bank of Costa Rica to guarantee the efficiency and security of the card systems.”[10] As discussed below, one such element that should be considered by BCCR is the potential effect of regulating international IRFs on merchants in Costa Rica, especially those catering to tourists and business travelers, and the wider effects on the economy.

III.    Fraud Risks Associated with Cross-Border Payments

In comparison to domestic payments, cross-border payments entail significantly higher risks of fraud, as be seen by looking at the incidence of payments fraud in the European Union (EU). Data from the European Central Bank (ECB) show unambiguously that the rates of fraud on cross-border transactions—both between EU member states and from outside the EU—is much higher than fraud on domestic transactions. In its 2021 Report on Card Fraud, the ECB found that, between 2015 and 2019, cross-border transactions represented only 10% of transactions by value but 65% of all fraud by value, as can be seen in Figure I.[11] Thus, in value terms, cross-border fraud represents a risk more than six times greater than domestic fraud.

SOURCE: European Central Bank[12]

For most EU member states, the situation is even more dramatic, with cross-border fraud representing more than 90% of all card fraud, as can be seen in Table II.

SOURCE: European Central Bank[13]

Looking at the types of transaction involved in card fraud, the vast majority (83%) are card-not-present (CNP) fraud, as can be seen in Figure II.

SOURCE: European Central Bank[14]

While these data relate to payments fraud in the EU, they are likely indicative of broader international trends. As such, they suggest that cross-border fraud in general and CNP cross-border fraud in particular is a far more significant problem than domestic fraud of all kinds.

IV.    How Card Networks Address Payment-Card Fraud

Card networks have developed numerous processes and technologies to address payment-card fraud, including the following.

Zero liability protection for cardholders. Card networks’ standard terms and conditions include clauses requiring issuers to protect personal cardholders from unauthorized transactions (subject to certain conditions, such as that cardholders report such transactions promptly to the card issuer).[15] This protection is an important benefit to cardholders, who otherwise might be wary of using their cards, especially for online transactions or in foreign countries.

Liability protection for merchants. Just as cardholders are protected from liability for unauthorized transactions, so too are merchants. Issuers are, by default, liable for unauthorized transactions. This is an important benefit to merchants, who might otherwise be reluctant to accept card-based payments.

Chargebacks. The above liability protections apply only to unauthorized transactions. Where a cardholder has authorized a payment, they will be liable. Meanwhile, if a merchant has processed a payment without obtaining the necessary authorization, and where that payment has been disputed by the cardholder, the issuer may initiate a “chargeback”: effectively reversing the payment.

Authorization, verification, and fraud monitoring. To complement the system of liability protection and chargebacks, payment networks have developed increasingly sophisticated and effective systems for transaction authorization and fraud monitoring, including:

• Tokenization—which underpins EMV (Europay, Mastercard, and Visa) chips, contactless cards, and smartphone-based payments—uses encrypted data to enable authorization without sharing personal account numbers;
• Machine-learning-based transaction monitoring, which creates a dynamic model of each cardholder’s transactions and flags as potentially fraudulent those payments that do not fit the model; and
• Contingent multifactor authentication, whereby transactions flagged as potentially fraudulent result in the cardholder being asked for secondary authentication.

These systems reduce the incidence of fraud and thereby reduce the liability of card issuers. For example, in 2015, payment networks changed the liability rules for U.S. merchants to encourage adoption of EMV cards. Estimates by Visa suggest that merchants that subsequently adopted EMV-compliant point-of-sale (POS) machines experienced an 87.5% reduction in fraud.[16] Nonetheless, as is clear from Section III, fraud remains a problem, especially for cross-border and CNP transactions.

The liability rules summarized above mean that the cost of fraud falls disproportionately on card issuers. In 2020, issuers bore nearly two-thirds of all card fraud losses worldwide.[17] The equitable and economically efficient solution is for issuers to charge higher fees for transactions that are more likely to be fraudulent.

In some cases, it may make sense to pass on some or all of these costs to consumers. In the case of cross-border transactions, some issuers do this by charging foreign-transaction fees on some cards.[18] Such fees can, however, discourage consumers from using their cards, so it may be preferable for merchants to pay higher fees instead. Thus, cards aimed at international travelers typically offer cardholders “no foreign-transaction fee” as a benefit. These cards instead charge a higher interchange fee for foreign transactions. Holders of such premium cards typically spend more, thereby benefiting the merchants (who pay slightly higher fees, if they are not on a blended rate).

V.      Possible Responses to Caps on Cross-Border Interchange Fees

As noted in Section II, the BCCR Task Force made two alternative proposals with respect to cross-border IRFs. The first would leave the current cap unchanged at 2.00%, while the second would reduce the cap to 1.25%.

Even the current cap is lower than the standard IRF charged for many credit cards that offer no foreign-transaction fee. Payments made using such cards in Costa Rica are thus effectively subsidized by merchants in other jurisdictions that do not impose such caps.

At the lower proposed rate, foreign issuers will receive a lower IRF than domestic-card issuers. Given the much higher fraud rate on cross-border payments, this is likely to cause significant problems, especially for premium cards that offer cardholders “no foreign-transaction fee” as well as other benefits, such as vehicle insurance, purchase-protection insurance, and rewards. The IRF revenue simply will not be sufficient to cover these benefits. As such, to reduce fraud, payments using such cards will be subject to greater scrutiny and many may well simply be rejected.

This is a problem not only for the cardholders, who will be frustrated when attempting to make purchases. It is also a problem for Costa Rica’s tourism and business-travel sectors. Consider what might happen when a prospective visitor attempts to book a room at a resort such as Tortuga Lodge, which takes bookings directly on its website and processes payments through its acquirer in Costa Rica.[19] The prospective visitor first tries their World Elite Mastercard and finds that it is rejected; they then try their Visa Infinite card and again find that the payment is rejected. Frustrated but undaunted, they instead decide to book rooms at Tortuga Lodge on Expedia.com, which uses a U.S. acquirer; this time, they have no problem making and paying for the booking, albeit at a higher price than was offered directly by the hotel. When they arrive in Costa Rica, however, they find that, once again, their cards are repeatedly rejected when they attempt to make purchases, whether it be at restaurants, tour agencies, or even an art gallery where they had hoped to buy a beautiful piece of local artwork.

The above scenario might already be happening, because the standard IRF for such transactions on the cards mentioned is higher than the current capped rate of 2.00%.[20] At the alternative lower proposed rate of 1.25%, rejections are a near certainty for at least some travelers. Worse, some prospective travelers who are looking for a more bespoke offering and want to book directly with the hotel are likely to abandon their plans to travel to Costa Rica at all and choose a different destination where they do not encounter such difficulties.

Ironically, prospective visitors who have standard debit or credit cards that charge foreign-transaction fees are much less likely to have their payments rejected.

Some other payment methods are not covered by the caps on MDRs and IRFs: specifically, wire transfers and other bank-to-bank transfers that do not involve the use of payment-card networks. Most likely, there will be a shift toward the use of such payment methods, as a result both of individuals paying directly through such transfers and an increase in payments from overseas agencies. In general, such alternative payment methods involve greater counterparty risk than payments made using cards due to their greater finality, which means it is more difficult to reverse a payment once made, and the lack of purchase insurance. To the extent that visitors to Costa Rica are limited to wire and bank transfers, as a result of their payment cards being declined, they are likely to reduce their spending.

These anecdotes and observations suggest a number of likely effects of the cap on interchange fees:

• First, booking and payment for accommodation and other pre-bookable tourism activities will shift from Costa Rica-based agents and acquirers to U.S.-based agents and acquirers. This will reduce margins for Costa Rican hotels and other tourism businesses.
• Second, higher–end tourists will likely spend less in Costa Rica because they will be less able to use their payment cards.
• Third, there will likely be an overall reduction in high-spending tourists visiting Costa Rica, with a concomitant reduction in total spending.

In 2019, Costa Rica received about 3.1 million visitors who stayed for one night or more, spending about $4 billion, roughly 6.25% of the country’s GDP.[21] The tourism industry employed more than 170,000 people, about 5% of the country’s working-age population.[22] Tourist numbers fell dramatically in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to a dramatic decline in income and employment. Visitor numbers began to rise again in 2021 and, while total numbers remained below their pre-COVID highs, the number of visitors from the United States (245,000) was not far off the number for 2019 (280,000). In March 2022. Costa Rica announced its national tourism plan for 2022-2027, in which it sought to increase the number of annual visitors to 3.8 million by 2027, targeting tourism revenue of $4.8 billion.[23]

In 2019, Costa Rican merchants processed around 19 million cross-border payment-card transactions, with a total value of around $2 billion—representing about half the total tourism revenue and 16% of the value of all card transactions.[24] After falling in 2020, the number of cross-border payment-card transactions rose in 2021 to nearly 23 million, with a total value of $2 billion, which is consistent with the return of higher-spending tourists from the United States.[25]

If BCCR chooses to cap interchange fees on cross-border transactions at 1.25%, it is likely to impede Costa Rica’s national tourism plan, both by discouraging tourism and, more importantly, by reducing revenue from higher-spending tourists.

VI.    Conclusion

Based on this assessment, there are significant costs associated with caps on cross-border MDRs and IFRs. As noted above, Legislative Decree 9831 permits BCCR to take into consideration such costs to the extent that they affect BCCR’s ability “to guarantee the efficiency and security of the card systems.”[26] As such it is incumbent on BCCR to consider the potential economic harm that is likely to arise if it were to lower the cap on cross-border IFR to 1.25%.

[1] Note, translations from the Spanish original are approximate.

[2] Julian Morris, Regulating Payment Card Fees: International Best Practice and Lessons for Costa Rica, International Center for Law & Economics (May 25, 2022), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/regulating-payment-card-fees-international-best-practices-and-lessons-for-costa-rica.

[3] Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 Rand J. Econ. 645 (2006); See also Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation, International Center for Law and Economics, ICLE Financial Regulatory Program White Paper Series (Jun. 2, 2010), available at http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf.

[4] Bruno Jullien, Alessandro Pavan, & Marc Rysman, Two-Sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 4), 485-592 (2021).

[5] Thomas Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker, & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Strategies for Two-Sided Markets, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Oct. 2006).

[6] Id., at 33.

[7] Fijación Ordinaria de Comisiones Máximas del Sistema de Tarjetas de Pago 2021, Banco Central de Costa Rica, (Nov. 2021).

[8] Id. at 3.

[9] Alcance No 237 A La Gaceta No 212, Imprenta Nacional de Costa Rica (Nov. 7, 2022).

[10] Decreta: Comisiones Máximas Del Sistema De Tarjetas, No. 9831, Art. 15(j), Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Costa Rica, (“Cualquier otro elemento que razonablemente permita al Banco Central de Costa Rica garantizar la eficiencia y seguridad de los sistemas de tarjetas.”), http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&nValor1=1&nValor2=90791&nValor3=119755&strTipM=TC (last visited Apr. 12, 2023).

[11]Seventh Report on Card Fraud, European Central Bank 2022 (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/cardfraud/html/ecb.cardfraudreport202110~cac4c418e8.en.html#toc1.

[12] Id. SEPA refers to the Single Euro Payments Area.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. EA19 refers to the 19 EU member states that are members of the Euro zone.

[15] Zero Liability Protection, Mastercard (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/personal/get-support/zero-liability-terms-conditions.html; Zero Liability Policy, Visa, https://usa.visa.com/pay-with-visa/visa-chip-technology-consumers/zero-liability-policy.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2023).

[16] Visa EMV Chip Cards Help Reduce Counterfeit Fraud by 87 Percent, Visa (Sep. 3, 2019), https://usa.visa.com/visa-everywhere/blog/bdp/2019/09/03/visa-emv-chip-1567530138363.html.

[17] Card Issuers Accounted for 65.40% of Gross Losses to Fraud Worldwide in 2020, Nilson Report (Dec. 2021), Issue 1209, at 6.

[18] Jacqueline DeMarco & Poonkulali Thangavelu, A Guide to Foreign Transaction Fees, Bankrate.com (Feb. 24, 2023), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit-cards/a-guide-to-foreign-transaction-fees.

[19] Author’s personal communication with reservation specialist at Tortuga Lodge, April 2023.

[20] Mastercard 2022–2023 U.S. Region Interchange Programs and Rates, Effective April 22, 2022, Mastercard (2022), available at https://www.mastercard.us/content/dam/public/mastercardcom/na/us/en/documents/merchant-rates-2022-2023-apr22-2022.pdf; Visa USA Interchange Reimbursement Fees, Visa (Apr. 23, 2022), available at   https://usa.visa.com/content/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-fees.pdf.

[21] OECD Tourism Trends and Policies 2022: Costa Rica, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2022), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/a99a4da2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/a99a4da2-en.

[22] Id.; see also, OECD Economic Surveys: Costa Rica 2023, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2023), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/8e8171b0-en/1/2/2/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/8e8171b0-en&_csp_=0b8e1c4cf7b4fb558e396a4008a8398a&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book.

[23] Plan Nacional de Turismo de Costa Rica 2022-2027, Aprobado en la sesión N° 6210 de la Junta Directiva del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Apartado 3.II, celebrada (Mar. 21, 2022),English summary: Costa Rica: National Tourism Development Plan 2022–2027, Tourism Analytics, https://tourismanalytics.com/news-articles/costa-rica-national-tourism-development-plan-2022-2027.

[24] Supra note 9, Table 9. Assumes an average Colones:USD exchange rate during 2019 of 0.0017.

[25] Id. The Colones:USD exchange rate averaged around 0.0016 during 2021.

[26] Decreta: Comisiones Máximas Del Sistema De Tarjetas, No. 9831, Art. 15(j), Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Costa Rica, (“Cualquier otro elemento que razonablemente permita al Banco Central de Costa Rica garantizar la eficiencia y seguridad de los sistemas de tarjetas.”), http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&nValor1=1&nValor2=90791&nValor3=119755&strTipM=TC (last visited Apr. 12, 2023).

Imagine that Florida’s financial regulators told banks and insurance companies that they should consider the risk that working with Planned Parenthood might pose to them. Or that Texas’s regulators said that banks and insurance companies should consider whether serving organizations that support undocumented migrants might damage their reputations. Alarming, right?

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