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TOTM In November of 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion in Stone v. Ritter dealing with a director’s fiduciary duties in cases where the . . .
In November of 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion in Stone v. Ritter dealing with a director’s fiduciary duties in cases where the complaining plaintiff-shareholder is maintaing that her directors did not sufficiently monitor their corporate charge. (I refer to these “oversight” cases loosely as “asleep at the wheel” cases.) There has been some excellent blogging on the topic by Eric Chiappinelli, Gordon Smith, and Steve Bainbridge. Though I was in the middle of moving such that I could not blog in the middle of that wonderful Ritter blog-fest, I am now ready to stake my blogging ground on Ritter.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Shubha Ghosh, of the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, is predicting that the Supreme Court will not overrule the 1911 Dr. Miles decision, which holds . . .
Shubha Ghosh, of the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, is predicting that the Supreme Court will not overrule the 1911 Dr. Miles decision, which holds that “vertical minimum resale price maintenance” (i.e., a manufacturer’s imposition of minimum resale price for his goods) is per se illegal.
TOTM Becker and Posner take on “libertarian paternalism” this week. The entries are both worth reading, especially for the parts where these co-bloggers disagree. Here are . . .
Becker and Posner take on “libertarian paternalism” this week. The entries are both worth reading, especially for the parts where these co-bloggers disagree. Here are my favorite passages from each. First, Posner attempts to distinguish his previous defense of the NYC trans-fat ban from good old-fashioned paternalism…
TOTM Last Friday was the first day of my Business Organizations class. We began with two articles that have profoundly influenced my thinking about the world . . .
Last Friday was the first day of my Business Organizations class. We began with two articles that have profoundly influenced my thinking about the world in general and the business world in particular. To inaugurate the new semester, I thought I’d take a moment and pay tribute to the insights in those articles (and solicit first day ideas from other business law profs!).
TOTM Professor D’Amato is at it again. And by “it,” I mean making overblown claims that economics is useless (you might recall our last exchange where . . .
Professor D’Amato is at it again. And by “it,” I mean making overblown claims that economics is useless (you might recall our last exchange where I responded to his mistaken assertion that economics had not changed antitrust in “any noticeable way”). Here’s his latest from a comment over at Prawfs.
TOTM Henry Manne is back with another article in the WSJ. This time Manne goes toe-to-toe with the “corporate democrats.” Read the full piece here.
Henry Manne is back with another article in the WSJ. This time Manne goes toe-to-toe with the “corporate democrats.”
Scholarship Summary This article argues that mandatory securities disclosure regulation has unanticipated and ill-considered consequences. Disclosure regulation makes some forms of behavior more expensive relative to . . .
This article argues that mandatory securities disclosure regulation has unanticipated and ill-considered consequences. Disclosure regulation makes some forms of behavior more expensive relative to others. Rational actors will respond by shifting some conduct into comparatively cheaper outlets. And these alternative behaviors may actually be less beneficial than the regulated, deterred behavior. Likewise, required disclosure of corporate information to investors makes shareholder governance less costly and more likely, even where it should be deterred. In essence, disclosure regulation effectively proscribes, it does not prescribe. Thus, depending on the viability of other behaviors, forced disclosure may induce unwanted behavioral responses. The article identifies two broad concepts that encapsulate these dynamics. The first is a “hydraulic theory” of securities disclosure regulation. Under this theory, disclosure regulation triggers behavioral hydraulics which may lead to an undesirable shift in executive behavior, as well as an undesirable shift in the pool of candidates for corporate executive positions. The second is an information cost theory of securities disclosure regulation. Under this theory, mandated disclosure is both unnecessary to market efficiency and affirmatively harmful to firms’ competitive schemes of corporate governance.
TOTM Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a . . .
Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a natural experiment setting in which a card company offers two cards to consumers: (1) a high interest rate, no annual fee card and (2) a low rate card with an annual fee.
TOTM Ed Morrison (Columbia) has a great series of guest blogs at the always worth reading ELS Blog on a few research questions in bankruptcy and . . .
Ed Morrison (Columbia) has a great series of guest blogs at the always worth reading ELS Blog on a few research questions in bankruptcy and torts as well as a methodological entry. I am a little bit late with the link (his guest stint ended December 8th ), but I really enjoyed the posts.
