In Brussels, the talk of the town is that the European Commission (“Commission”) is casting a new eye on the old antitrust conjecture that prophesizes a negative relationship between industry concentration and innovation. This issue arises in the context of the review of several mega-mergers in the pharmaceutical and AgTech (i.e., seed genomics, biochemicals, “precision farming,” etc.) industries.

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Summary

A novel theory of harm is crystalising in European Union (“EU”) merger control. Under this theory, the EU Commission (“Commission”) can intervene in mergers that it considers generally reduce innovation incentives in an industry as a whole. This theory of harm can be referred to as the Significant Impediment to Industry Innovation (“SIII”) theory. This policy paper first attempts to describe the content and extent of the SIII theory (I). Second, it shows that the SIII theory marks a departure from established EU merger control practice (II). Third, it discusses the economic foundations of the SIII theory (III). Finally, it puts forward best practices for the assessment of mergers in R&D intensive industries (IV). With this, the present paper hopes to assist in the development of sound merger control policy in innovative markets, and undermine crude conjectures on the relationship between market structure, patent statistics and industry innovation theory.

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I’ve been struck of late by the level of activity surrounding antitrust exemptions: health care, insurance, beer and wine wholesalers, retail merchants for the purpose of negotiate interchange fees, newspapers, agricultural cooperatives, and sports leagues.  Throw in the high-stakes games being played between rivals to influence the decision-making processes of competition agencies in the US and abroad (and of course, private suits in the US), and it would appear that the insights of public choice for understanding antitrust has never been more important.  Or maybe not.  Consider the following 1982 NY Times article I found discussing the major push for antitrust exemptions in the early 1980s.  There are, of course, earlier examples.  But this one struck me as having some interesting parallels with current times…

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Danny Sokol points to the Obama administration’s most recent effort to “reinvigorate” competition policy: some new proposed rules adding new sections to the existing regulations under the Packers & Stockyards Act. Emerging from the joint DOJ/ USDA agriculture workshops (see comments from Manne & Wright here; TOTM archives on agricultural antitrust here), the USDA must not have come away to impressed with the DOJ’s ability to enforce the antitrust laws on the behalf of consumers.  Either that, or the USDA was never too interested in consumers in the first place.

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Abstract

There are very few industries that can attract the attention of Congress, multiple federal and state agencies, consumer groups, economists, antitrust lawyers, the business community, farmers, ranchers, and academics as the agriculture workshops have. Of course, with intense interest from stakeholders comes intense pressure from potential winners and losers in the political process, heated disagreement over how gains from trade should be distributed among various stakeholders, and certainly a variety of competing views over the correct approach to competition policy in agriculture markets. These pressures have the potential to distract antitrust analysis from its core mission: protecting competition and consumer welfare. While imperfect, the economic approach to antitrust that has generated remarkable improvements in outcomes over the last fifty years has rejected simplistic and misleading notions that antitrust is meant to protect “small dealers and worthy men” or to fulfill non-economic objectives; that market concentration is a predictor of market performance; or that competition policy and intellectual property cannot peacefully co-exist. Unfortunately, in the run-up to and during the workshops much of the policy rhetoric encouraged adopting these outdated antitrust approaches, especially ones that would favor one group of stakeholders over another rather than protecting the competitive process. In this essay, we argue that a first principles approach to antitrust analysis is required to guarantee the benefits of competition in the agricultural sector, and discuss three fundamental principles of modern antitrust that, at times, appear to be given short-shrift in the recent debate.

Abstract

Consolidation and increased concentration in the agrifood sector over the past two decades, combined with an increased use of alternative marketing agreements in the poultry and livestock industries, have fueled concerns of anti-competitive behavior among large agribusinesses such as the major meat packing companies. The DOJ and USDA have partnered together in a pledge to strengthen enforcement both of antitrust restrictions and of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 (“PSA”). This paper provides a brief overview of the ongoing changes in the meat and livestock industries and the role of the PSA. The paper then outlines several challenges facing the successful and efficient use of the PSA as a competition policy from both theoretical and empirical economic perspectives. I argue that regulators need to tread carefully into their newly launched enforcement partnership given how little is well understood of the factors leading to the existing system and, therefore, the likely consequences associated with more aggressive enforcement in the name of competition.

Will someone remind me just why the USDA and DOJ are hosting their little Antitrust in Ag roadshow this year?

The Associated Press reports today that the USDA is set to release a new set of regulations on the livestock and poultry industries. Reporter Christopher Leonard describes the new regulations as “the most sweeping antitrust rules covering the meat industry in decades, potentially altering the balance of power between meat companies and the farmers who raise their animals.”

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Wednesday, April 7, J.P. Stadtmueller, U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, gave the green light for DOJ’s antitrust case against Dean Foods to move forward. Dean had filed a motion to dismiss based on its assertion that the DOJ had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the DOJ’s antitrust claim and had failed to provide a sufficiently specific definition of the relevant market in which the anti-competitive effects were alleged to exist.  Stadtmueller concludes his ruling by stating…

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The DOJ has posted the transcript from the recent DOJ/USDA hearings on antitrust in agriculture here.  I figured our readers might be especially interested in seeing Christine Varney’s comments (especially without having to slog through all 350 pages to find them!).  I have bolded some of the most interesting parts of her comments.

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