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Showing 7 of 25 Publications by John M. Yun
Scholarship Abstract On October 25, 2021, in a 3-to-2 vote, strictly along party lines, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced a major policy shift in how . . .
On October 25, 2021, in a 3-to-2 vote, strictly along party lines, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced a major policy shift in how the agency will review and settle mergers. Going forward, all parties who agree to a merger remedy order, including a divestiture, must also agree with the agency’s demand that, for at least a decade, they obtain “prior approval” from the agency before closing a future acquisition within the same relevant market. Further, buyers of any divested assets must also agree to a prior approval condition for a minimum of ten years. Finally, the agency “may decide,” at its discretion, to apply the prior approval condition even to markets beyond those in which the transaction at issue raised competitive concerns.
This new prior approval policy nontrivially weakens parties’ due process protections and puts the FTC more into a regulatory position, implicating significant ongoing costs to businesses and to the economy as a whole. While the Commission may defend its new policy as targeted only at “facially anticompetitive deals,” the practical effect is to trap both anticompetitive and procompetitive acquisitions in the agency’s regulatory net. This increases the cost of merger activity and likely will lead to consequences — whether intended or not — that are detrimental to economic efficiency and overall economic growth.
Scholarship Abstract How should competition agencies and courts consider acquisitions by “big tech” (that is, Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft) of smaller, startup companies? There . . .
How should competition agencies and courts consider acquisitions by “big tech” (that is, Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft) of smaller, startup companies? There are several competing visions. On one end of the spectrum is the view that these companies have strong incentives to engage in anticompetitive acquisitions of nascent and potential competitors; consequently, agencies and courts should implement strong presumptions of harm. On the other end of the spectrum is the view that there is little reason to change current merger presumptions or to treat acquisitions by big tech companies differently than “medium tech” or “small tech” companies.
To inform the issue, this Article reviews a recent FTC report on acquisitions by the largest technology platforms. While the report is largely descriptive using aggregated data and, therefore, offers modest insights, there is little in the findings that raise alarms. As a point of contrast, the Article examines several recent acquisitions by Spotify, a technology company that sits outside of the “big tech” classification. Specifically, Spotify has expanded beyond its core music streaming business through a series of startup acquisitions—namely, into podcasts and audiobooks. Interestingly, these acquisitions have not raised concerns from agencies, practitioners, or academics. Consequently, if Spotify’s recent series of acquisitions can reasonably be considered procompetitive, then why is the same not true for Apple and Amazon, who are chasing Spotify in music streaming services and podcasts? Administering antitrust laws based on the mere identity or market capitalization of a company—rather than on specific market factors—is engaging in what could be called “discriminatory antitrust.”
Regulatory Comments Comments of Scholars of Law, Economics, and Business Draft USPTO, NIST, & DOJ Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies for Standard-Essential Patents Subject to . . .
We are scholars of law, economics, and business who work in areas related to intellectual property, antitrust, strategy, and innovation. We write to express our concerns with the December 6, 2021, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (DOJ) draft statement on remedies for the infringement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) (“Draft Policy Statement”).[1] This statement would effectively repudiate guidance published by these same agencies in 2019.[2]
While the Draft Policy Statement may seem even-handed at first sight, its implementation would have far-reaching consequences that would significantly tilt the balance of power in SEP-reliant industries, in favor of implementers and to the detriment of inventors. In turn, this imbalance is liable to harm consumers through reduced innovation, resulting from higher contract-enforcement costs and lower returns to groundbreaking innovations. And by making it harder for U.S. tech firms to enforce their intellectual property (IP) rights against foreign companies, the Draft Policy Statement threatens to erode America’s tech-sector leadership.
Read the full comments here.
[1] U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Draft Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies for Standard-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (Dec. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1453471/download [hereinafter “Draft Policy Statement”].
[2] U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Policy Statement on Licensing Remedies for Standard-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (Dec. 19, 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SEP%20policy%20statement%20signed.pdf.
Regulatory Comments Abstract This comment by 27 law professors, economists and former government officials was submitted to the Department of Justice in response to a call for . . .
This comment by 27 law professors, economists and former government officials was submitted to the Department of Justice in response to a call for comments on a draft policy statement on standard essential patents (SEPs). Although the draft policy statement is right to seek a “balanced, fact-based analysis [that] will facilitate and help to preserve competition and incentives for innovation and continued participation in voluntary, consensus-based standard-setting activity,” the comment identifies how its proposals fail to accomplish this goal. First, the draft policy statement fails to account for the extensive scholarly research and rigorous empirical studies identifying numerous substantive and methodological flaws in the “patent holdup” theory, including its failed predictions of high prices, less innovation, and less market competition; instead, a growing mobile communications marketplace has existed for several decades. Second, the draft policy statement micro-manages the negotiation and litigation process for SEPs, which would make injunctions and exclusion orders at the International Trade Commission a de facto nullity for SEPs. This special rule effectively prohibiting injunctions contradicts repeated court decisions in both the U.S. and Europe concerning the general availability of all patent remedies for SEPs. Ultimately, the draft policy statement incentivizes strategic holdout by implementers and de facto prohibits injunctive relief for ongoing infringement of an SEP by an unwilling licensee. This would harm U.S. innovators facing increasing economic and strategic competition from China. It also threatens U.S. economic leadership and its national security, which contradicts the expressly stated goal of President Joseph Biden’s Executive Order, the progenitor of this draft policy statement, of “preserving America’s role as the world’s leading economy.” Thus, the 27 legal academics, economists, and former government officials urge the agencies to reconsider its draft policy statement on SEPs. The comment includes an Appendix of the literature on the licensing and enforcement of SEPs.
Written Testimonies & Filings Pursuant to the House Judiciary Committee’s request for information to aid its inquiry concerning the state of existing antitrust laws, Antitrust Economists, Legal Scholars, and Practitioners offer the following joint submission.
Pursuant to the Committee’s request for information to aid its inquiry concerning the state of existing antitrust laws, we offer the following joint submission:
We are economists, legal scholars, and practitioners—focused on antitrust law, economics, and policy—who believe in maintaining healthy markets and well-functioning antitrust institutions. We value the important role of antitrust as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise,” which sets the rules that govern how firms compete against one another in our modern economy. Many of us have served in antitrust enforcement agencies. Each of us believes it is vital that the antitrust laws promote competitive markets, innovation, and productivity by deterring anticompetitive conduct throughout our economy, including in digital markets.
We write because the modern antitrust debate has become characterized by sustained attacks on the integrity of antitrust institutions and by unsubstantiated dismissals of debate. This atmosphere has led to a variety of proposals for radical changes to the antitrust laws and their enforcement that we believe are unsupported by the evidence, counterproductive to promoting competition and consumer welfare, and offered with an unwarranted degree of certainty.
Vigorous debate and disagreement have long been a hallmark of antitrust scholarship and policy. Competition policy has been formed through an iterative process echoed in the courts’evolving doctrine over more than a century. Today, however, efforts to sidestep the discussion, or to declare it over, and to force hasty and far-reaching changes have come to the fore. These proposals are numerous and include: (1) abandoning the consumer welfare standard; (2) overturning unanimous and supermajority judicial precedents, which are foundational to modern antitrust law; (3) imposing obsolete and arbitrary market share tests to determine the legality of mergers; (4) shifting the burden of proof from plaintiffs to defendants to render large swaths of business behavior presumptively unlawful; (5) creating another federal regulator to oversee competition in digital markets; (6) breaking up major tech companies or their products without evidence of antitrust harm or that the remedy would make consumers better off; and (7) imposing a general prohibition on all mergers either involving specific firms or during the current health crisis.
Such proposals would abandon the legal and political traditions that helped transform antitrust from an unprincipled and incoherent body of law, marred by internal contradictions, into a workable system that contributes positively to American competitiveness and consumer welfare. It should be noted that we use the term “consumer welfare” throughout this letter, consistent with modern parlance about competition policy, to include the benefits of competition to the welfare of workers and other input suppliers, as well as consumers. Thus, the consumer welfare standard is not a narrowly circumscribed objective, but rather a prescription for the general social wellbeing generated by the competitive process. By contrast, many of the current proposals would (1) undermine the rule of law; (2) undo the healthy evolution of antitrust law in the courts over time; (3) require antitrust agencies to micromanage the economy by picking winners and losers; (4) abandon a focus on consumer welfare in favor of vague and politically-oriented goals; and (5) undermine successful American businesses and their competitiveness in the global economy at the worst-imaginable time.
The assertions about the state of antitrust law and policy that purportedly justify these radical changes are not supported by the evidence. A more accurate reading of the evidence supports the following view of the American economy and the role of antitrust law:
We believe open discussion of existing evidence is necessary to advance contemporary debates about the performance of antitrust institutions in the digital economy. We welcome that discussion. We discuss below various dimensions of antitrust law, economics, and institutions that have been the targets of radical reform proposals. The signatories to this letter hold a steadfast belief that antitrust institutions, including the courts, are up to the task of protecting competition, and that the federal antitrust laws as written are effective in accomplishing that goal. While many signatories have offered diverse proposals to improve the functioning of those institutions—a few of which we share in this letter—we hold the common view that the proposed radical reforms would make consumers worse off in the short run and over the long haul by chilling efficient behavior and stymieing innovation.
Read the full submission here.
TOTM After much anticipation, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission released a draft of the Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) on January . . .
After much anticipation, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission released a draft of the Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) on January 10, 2020. The Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) will be submitting formal comments to the agencies regarding the VMGs and this post summarizes our main points.
Read the full piece here.
Amicus Brief Summary While the three-step burden-shifting framework for evaluating antitrust cases under the rule of reason is conceptually well-accepted and understood, case law remains unclear regarding . . .
While the three-step burden-shifting framework for evaluating antitrust cases under the rule of reason is conceptually well-accepted and understood, case law remains unclear regarding what suffices to satisfy each party’s burden at each of the three stages. This case offers the Court an opportunity both to clarify what constitutes harm to competition and to explain the nature of the shifting burdens in rule of reason analysis.
In their merits briefing, rather than offer tools for providing structure to the rule of reason, Petitioners urge the Court to adopt an amorphous standard that would permit plaintiffs to satisfy their burden without evidence of durable market power— and even without direct proof of anticompetitive effects as the term is traditionally and properly understood in Section 1 jurisprudence. Acquiescing to Petitioners’ vague conception of a plaintiff’s prima facie burden would untether antitrust law from rigorous economic analysis and harm consumers by increasing significantly the risk of error in lower courts. This would leave litigants with little to no certainty regarding what evidence they should introduce, let alone what evidence a court would find persuasive in any given case, and no clarity as to what businesses can and cannot do.
Without an approach to establishing plaintiff’s burden disciplined by economic analysis and proof, the balance of false positive (Type I) and false negative (Type II) errors—which is critical to proper adjudication of the antitrust laws—would be thrown off keel. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to foster consumer welfare by enhancing or increasing output in a relevant market. Output is the touchstone of antitrust analysis because a dominant firm’s ability to constrain market-wide output is what allows it to anticompetitively raise prices and harm consumers. Petitioners’ approach, however, would flip this analysis on its head and allow price effects to dictate results, thereby permitting courts to ignore output effects—the sine qua non of antitrust analysis—in ascertaining whether a plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden.
Such a result is contrary to this Court’s precedent and particularly problematic here. This Court has recognized that vertical restraints might “[increase prices] in the course of promoting procompetitive effects.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 (2007) (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988)). And modern economics provides no basis for assuming that a demonstration of price effects on only one side of a two-sided market accurately represents the market-wide effects of a course of conduct. Rather, economics predicts that market-wide welfare might increase, decrease, or remain neutral given price effects on a single side. Only an analysis of the market as a whole can illuminate the true competitive implications.
This brief explains amici’s understanding of the relevant economic analysis. It explains why basic economic principles underlying the analysis of multi-sided markets lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff should be required to demonstrate, at a minimum, that: (1) the allegedly unlawful restraint caused anticompetitive effects in the form of actual or probable restricted output market-wide—a showing that logically requires analyzing both sides of a two-sided market; and (2) the defendant had sufficient market power to restrict output in a properly defined market. These two requirements align with sound economics and would also provide clear guidance for courts in applying the rule of reason.