Judge Frank Easterbrook once opined that observing predatory pricing was a bit like seeing a unicorn —  in the sense that it was a phenomena around which there was much lore but not much empirical evidence.  The debate over the current expansion of Section 5 liability increasingly has become about the search for a different sort of “unicorn” — follow-on actions. The conventional wisdom is that private rights of action in the US, ceteris paribus, militate in favor of less aggressive enforcement of Section 2 relative to other countries.  It follows, some have argued, that an expansive view of Section 5 is appropriate because it avoids the social costs —  and in particular the chilling effects on efficient behavior associated with potential antitrust liability — associated with false positives.

Read the full piece here. 

Two weeks ago I highlighted the promising looking Cato Unbound forum on the new paternalism kicked off by Glen Whitman, with follow up posts and responses from the King (or co-King along with Cass Sunstein) of Nudge, Richard Thaler, along with Jonathan Klick and Shane Frederick.  I was really excited about the forum, because I have research interests in this area and consider myself a “skeptic” of the new paternalism generally (hey, the Weekly Standard says “prominent skeptic,” but even I don’t go that far).  So — now that the exchange is over — I find myself, well, better off for having read it but disappointed.  I’m going to blog about the disappointing part.  Don’t get me wrong, it started off really well.  Glen came out swinging, Thaler responds (there no slopes, paternalism is inevitable, and by the way, a really odd choice of example for the lack of evidence in favor of slopes: prohibition), Klick and Frederick chime in.

Read the full piece here. 

I’m still working through the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and like Dan, I find myself puzzling over some of the revisions, and in favor of others.  I wanted to start with some first impressions.  The big movement here, is that the new HMGs repudiate the market definition requirement in the new Section 4 and in Section 6 on Unilateral Effects.  Consider the language in Section 4 on market definition…

Read the full piece here. 

We live in a time of optimism about government’s ability to improve upon the unregulated state of affairs. From health insurance to financial markets to the types of fats we eat, cars we drive, and sources of energy we consume, there is a sense among our political, media, and academic elites that our privately ordered affairs are out of whack and can be improved by government rules. These elites rarely stop to ask whether the private ordering whose malfunctions they are seeking to correct is, in fact, private; in reality, it’s often not (see, e.g., the role of Fannie and Freddie in creating the housing bubble at the heart of the financial crisis, the role of the tax deduction for employer-provided health insurance in eviscerating the price competition that would constrain health care costs). Rather than asking how government meddling may have contributed to an undesirable situation, the elites usually look for a market failure — some systematic defect in the system of private ordering — and then invoke that failure as the rationale for a governmental fix.

Read the full piece here. 

This week the Senate is scheduled to hear debate over the latest financial regulation reform bill (also known as the Dodd Bill).  Part of the Dodd Bill incorporated aspects from a bill from Senator Schumer introduced last summer, against which I testified, called the “Shareholder’s Bill of Rights.”  In light of this week’s momentous events, I thought it might be a good time to post my draft of an “Investor’s Bill of Rights” that I have been thinking about.

Read the full piece here. 

David Balto has penned a short apologia of the FTC’s Intel case (HT: Danny Sokol).  Unfortunately his defense (and, unfortunately, the FTC’s case) is woefully misguided.

Balto writes…

Read the full piece here. 

Will someone remind me just why the USDA and DOJ are hosting their little Antitrust in Ag roadshow this year?

The Associated Press reports today that the USDA is set to release a new set of regulations on the livestock and poultry industries. Reporter Christopher Leonard describes the new regulations as “the most sweeping antitrust rules covering the meat industry in decades, potentially altering the balance of power between meat companies and the farmers who raise their animals.”

Read the full piece here.

Washington Post columnist Steve Pearlstein offers a novel explanation for “regulatory failure.”  The D.C. Circuit, has, Pearlstein asserts, “has intimidated, undermined and demoralized the regulatory apparatus” by giving insufficient deference to regulators and “opinions that routinely ignore the plain language of statute and the clear intent of Congress.”   Pearlstein holds up three Republican appointees as examples of this sort of runaway anti-regulatory judicial activism.  Strong stuff.  What’s the evidence?  Pearlstein relies on the recent Comcast v. FCC, an opinion authored by Judge Tatel (Clinton appointee, in case you were wondering).  It is also worth noting that two of the judges cited have taken senior status and only Kavanaugh joined recently.  Pearlstein then refers to the D.C. Circuit’s review of the Federal Trade Commission’s case against Rambus.  He describes it as follows…

Read the full piece here. 

Wednesday, April 7, J.P. Stadtmueller, U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, gave the green light for DOJ’s antitrust case against Dean Foods to move forward. Dean had filed a motion to dismiss based on its assertion that the DOJ had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the DOJ’s antitrust claim and had failed to provide a sufficiently specific definition of the relevant market in which the anti-competitive effects were alleged to exist.  Stadtmueller concludes his ruling by stating…

Read the full piece here.