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Against Consumer Choice as an Antitrust Standard (Some Preliminary Thoughts)

TOTM The “consumer choice” approach to antitrust is increasingly discussed in a variety of settings, and endorsed by regulators and in scholarship, especially but not exclusively . . .

The “consumer choice” approach to antitrust is increasingly discussed in a variety of settings, and endorsed by regulators and in scholarship, especially but not exclusively in the Section 5 context.  The fundamental idea is that the “conventional” efficiency approach embedded in the total and/or consumer welfare standards is too cramped and does not measure the “right” things. The consumer choice is a standard focusing on the options available to consumers and is proposed as an alternative to efficiency-based standards.  Preliminary, I do not think the approach as I understand it is an improvement for modern antitrust methods, nor do I think that its adoption would be a good development for the coherence of antitrust jurisprudence or consumers.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The Limits of Behavioral Law and Economics, Australia Edition

TOTM At the excellent Core Economics blog, Andreas Ortman discusses an Australian policy debate involving the Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure and Operation of Australia’s Superannuation System . . .

At the excellent Core Economics blog, Andreas Ortman discusses an Australian policy debate involving the Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure and Operation of Australia’s Superannuation System (also known as the Cooper Review), and more specifically, retirement savings and the superannuation system.  The Cooper Review drafters contend that the behavioral economics literature strongly supports a mandated default option (MySuper).

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Amicus Brief in Fifth Circuit Tobacco Master Settlement Case

Amicus Brief On November 23, 1998, the Attorneys General of 46 states signed an agreement settling allegations that the largest four tobacco manufacturers defrauded the states of Medicaid expenses.

Summary

On November 23, 1998, the Attorneys General of 46 states signed an agreement settling allegations that the largest four tobacco manufacturers defrauded the states of Medicaid expenses. The Master Settlement Agreement obligates the Majors and other manufacturers who opt in to the MSA to make annual payments totaling $206 billion. Under the MSA‘s terms, PMs‘ payments are calculated on the basis of their current national market shares. The annual payments are then allocated to the settling states. The MSA also prohibits PMs from various tobacco-related lobbying and advertising activity. MSA §§ III(b)-(i); III(m)-(p). The MSA raises the costs of cigarettes by approximately 35 cents per pack.

Structuring damage payments in this way would have created a significant competitive advantage for NPMs, which would have been able to undercut PMs‘ resulting inflated prices. The MSA contemplates this consequence by including several provisions that provide incentives for NPMs to join the settlement, thereby mitigating the competitive consequences of the PMs‘ annual payments to the states. These NPMs are often smaller companies which would stand to gain substantial market share by not joining the MSA. The MSA‘s incentives are accordingly generous.

First, new participants in the settlement which subject themselves to the tax increase within 90 days make zero MSA payments at all on sales at or below a benchmark level, defined as the higher of their 1998 sales or 125 percent of their 1997 sales. MSA § IX(i). To put the magnitude of this subsidy in perspective, a small manufacturer with sales of $100,000 per month would be entitled to a $1.5 million annual tax subsidy. See Jeremy Bulow, Director, Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm‘n, The State Tobacco Set- tlements and Antitrust (June 25, 2007).

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Lynn Stout on “criminogenic” hedge funds and insider trading

TOTM Lynn Stout, writing in the Harvard Business Review’s blog, claims that hedge funds are uniquely “criminogenic” environments.  (Not surprisingly, Frank Pasquale seems reflexively to approve)… . . .

Lynn Stout, writing in the Harvard Business Review’s blog, claims that hedge funds are uniquely “criminogenic” environments.  (Not surprisingly, Frank Pasquale seems reflexively to approve)…

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Why can’t we have a better press corps?: WaPo Google antitrust edition

TOTM Steven Pearlstein at the Washington Post asks if it’s “Time to loosen Google’s grip.”  The article is an analytical mess.  Pearlstein is often a decent . . .

Steven Pearlstein at the Washington Post asks if it’s “Time to loosen Google’s grip.”  The article is an analytical mess.  Pearlstein is often a decent business reporter–I’m not sure what went wrong here, but this is a pretty shoddy piece of antitrust journalism.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The non-constitutional problem with a health care mandate

TOTM There’s been much teeth-gnashing following yesterday’s ruling by a Virginia judge that the “individual mandate” portion of Obamacare is unconstitutional.  Among many other places, see . . .

There’s been much teeth-gnashing following yesterday’s ruling by a Virginia judge that the “individual mandate” portion of Obamacare is unconstitutional.  Among many other places, see the ongoing discussion at The Volokh Conspiracy.  I have a quick, non-constitutional response.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

A&P Files for Bankruptcy

TOTM Recent coverage of the A&P bankruptcy has alluded to its era of “dominance” in grocery retail, describing it as “the Wal-Mart of its day.”   See . . .

Recent coverage of the A&P bankruptcy has alluded to its era of “dominance” in grocery retail, describing it as “the Wal-Mart of its day.”   See this earlier post on the unconvincing antitrust case against Wal-Mart.  However, what the A&P bankruptcy brings to mind for me is Justice Stewart’s famous dissent in Von’s Grocery.  The famous line from Stewart’s powerful dissent objecting to the majority’s analysis, devoid of economic analysis and full of now well known contradictions, is his description of the merger law: “the only consistency is that the government always wins.”

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Richard Thaler’s Rejoinder to the TOTM Free to Choose Symposium

TOTM I have now had a chance to read through the contributions to this event and have a few thoughts to share.  I cannot, of course, . . .

I have now had a chance to read through the contributions to this event and have a few thoughts to share.  I cannot, of course, reply to everything that has been said here, and in any case, most of what I would say already appears in print.  Before getting into specifics let me say one thing up front:  take a deep breath!  These posts have a lot of emotion.  I am not sure why.

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Dodd-Frank and Criminal Consumer Protection Liability

TOTM Tiffany Joslyn provides a useful summary of the criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act at the Federalist Society National Federal Initiatives Project.  One of the . . .

Tiffany Joslyn provides a useful summary of the criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act at the Federalist Society National Federal Initiatives Project.  One of the things Joslyn points out is that the Act includes new criminal consumer protection liability…

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance