Policy makers are using the term to describe the effects of social distancing and travel restrictions.  In this post, we use a cellular automata model of infection to show how they might do this.

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In response to the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines released by DOJ and the FTC on January 10, 2020,1 the International Center for Law & Economics convened a blog symposium to discuss the legal and economic implications of the proposed changes. Published on Thursday, February 6, 2020 and Friday, February 7, 2020 on TruthOnTheMarket.com, that symposium included contributions from twenty-six well respected legal academics, economists, and seasoned practitioners. This Comment collects those posts together so that they can form part of the record as DOJ and the FTC consider the final form of the Vertical Merger Guidelines.

Please note, inclusion of the posts in this comment should not be interpreted as indicating that any particular author supports any post that is not his or her own — this was a broad effort that included many different viewpoints.

The proposed Vertical Merger Guidelines provide little practical guidance, especially on the key issue of what would lead one of the Agencies to determine that it will not challenge a vertical merger. Although they list the theories on which the Agencies focus and factors the Agencies “may consider,” the proposed Guidelines do not set out conditions necessary or sufficient for the Agencies to conclude that a merger likely would substantially lessen competition. Nor do the Guidelines communicate generally how the Agencies analyze the nature of a competitive process and how it is apt to change with a proposed merger.

Read the full piece here.

It is not uncommon—in fact it is expected—that parties to a negotiation would have different opinions about the reasonableness of any deal. Every buyer asks for a price as low as possible, and sellers naturally request prices at which buyers (feign to) balk. A recent movement among some lawyers and economists has been to label such disagreements in the context of standard-essential patents not as a natural part of bargaining, but as dispositive proof of “hold-up,” or the innovator’s purported abuse of newly gained market power to extort implementers. We have four primary issues with this hold-up fad.

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Abstract

Owners of standard essential patents (SEPs) are cast as villains for engaging in “patent hold-up,” i.e., taking advantage of the fact that they negotiate royalties with implementer-licensees that already have made sunk investments in the standard. In contrast to “patent ambush,” patent hold-up involves no standard-setting misconduct or harm to any competitive process, and thus cannot violate antitrust law. Commentators taking a contrary positions confuse the ends of antitrust law with its means. Antitrust law promotes consumer welfare only by protecting competition. Casting aside this core principle would expose business decisions, including ordinary price setting, to judicial oversight. Commitments made by SEP owners in the standard-setting process, however, should be enforced, and they are enforced. Without an antitrust cause of action, implementers invoke the powers of the courts to resolve royalty disputes over SEPs.

The new Consumer Financial Protection Agency seems designed to be accountable to no one…

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The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have brought discipline to the unruly world of merger analysis; but have also accommodated advances in our understanding of the myriad ways in which firms compete and how mergers affect such competition.  However, in cases where there is better information about the effects of the merger than there is about the relevant market, I would change the Guidelines to allow analysis that bypasses market delineation.

Read the full piece here.

A big chunk of the fraudulent advertising (diet, exercise, work-at-home, credit repair) prosecuted by the FTC involves a testimonial advertisement that mentions a number, e.g., “I lost 74 pounds wearing slimming insoles.” Some consumers do not seem to understand that the results for the endorsers may not be typical, despite the disclaimer required by the FTC, “results not typical.”

Read the full piece here. 

Abstract

When the winner of one auction gains a cost advantage in the next, bids reflect not only the value of winning the auction, but also the value of gaining an incumbent advantage in future auctions. If a larger firm’s advantage derives from a cost or product advantage, it has a greater chance of holding onto incumbency status which, in turn, increases the value it places on gaining incumbency. As a consequence, larger firms bid more aggressively than their smaller rivals, where “size” is measured by the probability of winning. In this environment, mergers eliminate competition among the merged firms but they also change bidding behavior by both merging and non-merging firms. Computational experiments suggest that the scope for pro-competitive mergers is much wider than in auctions without an incumbent advantage. In particular, mergers among smaller firms are likely to be pro-competitive because they tend to create better losers, i.e., firms who bid more aggressively but still lose a large part of the time.