Summary

Late last year, Tim Wu of Columbia Law School (and now the White House Office of Management and Budget), Michael Luca of Harvard Business School (and a consultant for Yelp), and a group of Yelp data scientists released a study claiming that Google has been purposefully degrading search results from its more-specialized competitors in the area of local search.  The authors’ claim is that Google is leveraging its dominant position in general search to thwart competition from specialized search engines by favoring its own, less-popular, less-relevant results over those of its competitors:

To improve the popularity of its specialized search features, Google has used the power of its dominant general search engine. The primary means for doing so is what is called the “universal search” or the “OneBox.”

This is not a new claim, and researchers have been attempting (and failing ) to prove Google’s “bias” for some time. Likewise, these critics have drawn consistent policy conclusions from their claims, asserting that antitrust violations lie at the heart of the perceived bias.

But the studies are systematically marred by questionable methodology and bad economics. The primary difference now is the saliency of the “Father of Net Neutrality,” Tim Wu, along with a cadre of researchers employed by Yelp (one of Google’s competitors and one of its chief antitrust provocateurs ), saying the same thing in a new research paper, with slightly different but equally questionable methodology, bad economics, and a smattering of new, but weak, social science.

Abstract

This paper is a draft chapter from an ongoing book project I am calling The Corporation and the Twentieth Century. In The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler explained the rise of the large vertically integrated corporation in the United States mostly in terms of forces of technology and economic geography. Institutions, including government policy, played a quite minor role. In my own attempt to explain the decline of the vertically integrated form in the late twentieth century, I stayed true to Chandler’s largely institution-free approach. This book will be an exercise in bringing institutions back in. It will argue that institutions, notably various forms of non-market controls imposed by the federal government, are a critical piece of the explanation of the rise and decline of the multi-unit enterprise in the U. S. Indeed, non-market controls, including those imposed in response to the dramatic events of the century, account in significant measure for the dominance of the Chandlerian corporation in the middle of the twentieth century. One important form of non-market control – though by no means the only form – has been antitrust policy. This chapter traces the history of antitrust and argues that, far from being a coherent attempt to address an actual economic problem of monopoly, the Sherman Antitrust Act emerged from the distributional political economy of the nineteenth century. More importantly, the chapter argues that the form in which antitrust emerged would prove significant for the corporation, as the Sherman Act and its successors outlawed virtually all types of inter-firm coordinating mechanisms, thus effectively evacuating the space between anonymous market transactions and full integration.

 

Summary

The FTC oversees nearly every company in America. It polices competition by enforcing the antitrust laws. It tries to protect consumers by punishing deception and practices it deems “unfair.” It’s the general enforcer of corporate promises made in privacy policies and codes of conduct generated by industry and multi-stakeholder processes. It’s the de facto regulator of the media, from traditional advertising to internet search and social networks. It handles novel problems of privacy, data security, online child protection, and patents, among others.

But perhaps most importantly, the Federal Trade Commission has become, for better or worse, the Federal *Technology* Commission, and technology creates a special problem for regulators.

Inherent limitations on anyone’s knowledge about the future nature of technology, business, and social norms caution skepticism as regulators attempt to predict whether any given business conduct will, on net, improve or harm consumer welfare. In fact, a host of factors suggests that even the best-intentioned regulators may tend toward overconfidence and the erroneous condemnation of novel conduct that benefits consumers in ways that are difficult for regulators to understand.

One thing is certain: A top-down, administrative regulatory model of regulation is ill-suited for technology, and this technocratic model of regulation is inconsistent with the regulatory humility required in the face of fast-changing, unexpected—and immeasurably valuable—technological advance.

In assessing the FTC, three themes emerge as being crucial to the Agency’s continued success: humility, institutional structure, and economic rigor. Together these three elements serve the essential function of restraining this powerful Agency’s discretion.

This essay discusses how these constraints have operated (or failed to operate) in the past, and offers some suggestions for reform to improve their operation in the future.

 

Summary

Armen Alchian was one of the great economists of the twentieth century, and his 1950 paper, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, one of the most important contributions to the economic literature. Anticipating modern behavioral economics, Alchian explains that firms most decidedly do not – cannot – actually operate as rational profit maximizers. Nevertheless, economists can make useful predictions even in a world of uncertainty and incomplete information because market environments “adopt” those firms that best fit their environments, permitting them to be modeled as if they behave rationally. This insight has important and under-appreciated implications for the debate today over the usefulness of behavioral economics.

Alchian’s explanation of the role of market forces in shaping outcomes poses a serious challenge to behavioralists’ claims. While Alchian’s (and our) conclusions are born out of the same realization that uncertainty pervades economic decision making that preoccupies the behavioralists, his work suggests a very different conclusion: The evolutionary pressures identified by Alchian may have led to seemingly inefficient firms and other institutions that, in actuality, constrain the effects of bias by market participants. In other words, the very “defects” of profitable firms – from conservatism to excessive bureaucracy to agency costs – may actually support their relative efficiency and effectiveness, even if they appear problematic, costly or inefficient. In fact, their very persistence argues strongly for that conclusion.

In Part I, we offer a short summary of Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. In Part II, we explain the implications of Alchian’s paper for behavioral economics. Part III looks at some findings from experimental economics, and the banking industry in particular, to demonstrate how biases are constrained by firms and other institutions – in ways often misunderstood by behavioral economists. In Part IV, we consider what Alchian’s model means for government regulation (with special emphasis on antitrust and consumer protection regulation).

Summary

This article assesses the FCC’s current policies and rules regarding transaction reviews, concluding that the Commission’s current spectrum transfer review process harms consumer welfare. In particular, the FCC’s spectrum screen as currently structured, its standard of review for spectrum transfers, its use of conditions, as well as the scope of its transaction reviews exceed legal limits, impede efficient markets for spectrum, and deter welfare-increasing transactions and investment.

First we explain the FCC’s current policies and decisions regarding transaction reviews and assess their appropriateness with respect to the Commission’s authorizing legislation, regulations and case law. With respect to the scope of its transaction reviews and its use of conditions in particular, we find that the FCC’s practices exceed their permissible limits.

Next we address the economics of the FCC’s policies and decisions, explaining and assessing the animating economic logic behind the FCC’s actions. We demonstrate that the FCC’s current spectrum screen and transaction review standards rest on the premise that spectrum concentration in markets inherently leads to anticompetitive behavior. Further, we explain the flaws in this premise.

In demonstrating and assessing the basis of the FCC’s transaction reviews, we discuss the particulars of the FCC’s spectrum screen in detail, focusing on its use of concentration metrics and claims that its full analysis (beyond the initial screen) investigates competitive conditions more broadly. As we discuss, the Commission uses HHIs and spectrum concentration measures improperly as de facto triggers for per se illegality, rather than triggers for further investigation. Further, none of the full analyses described by the Commission investigates an aspect of competition other than market or spectrum concentration; instead, they simply restate in more detail the structural analysis implied by the HHI test and spectrum screen.

Addressing the economics underlying the FCC’s actions, we demonstrate that both economic theory and evidence indicate that the presence of more competitors in telecommunications markets does not necessarily result in lower prices and better service for consumers. Particularly in industries (like wireless) that are characterized by rapid technological change, non-horizontal competitive constraints and shifting consumer demand, the threat of entry and the need for repeated contracts with input providers with market power operate to constrain strategic behavior, even in heavily concentrated markets.

The welfare effects of spectrum concentration are at worst ambiguous, and, as we demonstrate, as the market has grown more concentrated, investment, coverage and product diversity have increased while prices for consumers have decreased. These results are consistent with a more robust model of firm behavior in the industry that takes account of entry threats and technological change.

Next we undertake a detailed critique of the FCC staff’s analysis of the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, demonstrating that it exhibits the same flaws as the agency’s more cursory transaction reviews.

We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications and suggestions for reform.

 

Summary

In recent months a veritable legal and policy frenzy has erupted around Google generally, and more specifically concerning how its search activities should be regulated by government authorities throughout the world in the name of ensuring “search neutrality.”  Concerns with search engine bias have led to a menu of proposed regulatory reactions.  Although the debate has focused upon possible remedies to the “problem” presented by a range of Google’s business decisions, it has largely missed the predicate question of whether search engine bias is the product of market failure or otherwise generates significant economic or social harms meriting regulatory intervention in the first place.  “Search neutrality” by its very name presupposes that mandatory neutrality or some imposition of restrictions on search engine bias is desirable, but it is an open question whether advocates of search neutrality have demonstrated that there is a problem necessitating any of the various prescribed remedies. This paper attempts to answer that question, and we evaluate both the economic and non-economic costs and benefits of search bias, as well as the solutions proposed to remedy perceived costs. We demonstrate that search bias is the product of the competitive process and link the search bias debate to the economic and empirical literature on vertical integration and the generally-efficient and pro-competitive incentives for a vertically integrated firm to favor its own content. We conclude that neither an ex ante regulatory restriction on search engine bias nor the imposition of an antitrust duty to deal upon Google would benefit consumers. Moreover, in considering the proposed remedies, we find that by they substitute away from the traditional antitrust consumer welfare standard, and would impose costs exceeding any potential benefits.

Summary

Search engines produce immense value by identifying, organizing, and presenting the Internet´s information in response to users´ queries.1 Search engines efficiently provide better and faster answers to users´ questions than alternatives.

Recently, critics have taken issue with the various methods search engines use to identify relevant content and rank search results for users. Google, in particular, has been the subject of much of this criticism on the grounds that its organic search results—those generated algorithmically—favor its own products and services at the expense of those of its rivals. It is widely understood that search engines´ algorithms for ranking various web pages naturally differ. Likewise, there is widespread recognition that competition among search engines is vigorous, and that differentiation between engines´ ranking functions is not only desirable, but a natural byproduct of competition, necessary to survival, and beneficial to consumers.2 Nonetheless, despite widespread recognition of the consumer benefits of such differentiation, complaints from rival search engines have persisted and succeeded in attracting attention from a number of state, federal and international regulatory agencies. Unfortunately, much of this attention has focused on the impact upon individual websites of differences among search engines´ algorithmic methods of identifying and ranking relevant content, rather than analyzing these differences from a conventional consumer?welfare driven antitrust analysis.

For example, many of these complaints ignore the fact that search engine users self?select into different engines or use multiple engines for different types of searches when considering the competitive implications of search rankings.3 Rather than focus upon competition among search engines in how results are identified and presented to users, critics and complainants craft their arguments around alleged search engine “discrimination” or “bias.”4 The complainants must have in mind something other than competitive decisions to rank content that differ from the decisions made by rivals; bias in this sense is both necessary to and inherent within any useful indexing tool. Yet, critics have generally avoided a precise definition of the allegedly troublesome conduct. Indeed, the term “bias” is used colloquially and is frequently invoked in the search engine debate to encompass a wide array of behavior—generally suggesting a latent malignancy within search engine conduct—with some critics citing mere differences in results across engines as evidence of harmful conduct.5

The more useful attempts to define “bias,” however, focus upon differences in organic rankings attributable to the search engine ranking its own content (“owncontent bias”); that is, a sufficient condition for own?content bias is that a search engine ranks its own content more prominently than its rivals do. To be even more precise about the nature of the alleged “own?content bias,” it should be clear that this form of  bias refers exclusively to organic results, i.e., those results the search engine produces algorithmically, as distinguished from the paid advertisements that might appear at the top, bottom, or right?hand side of a search result page.6 Critics at the Senate’s recent hearing on the “Power of Google” were particularly vociferous on this front, accusing Google of having “cooked”7 its algorithm and of “rig[ging] its results, biasing in favor of Google.”8

Competition economists and regulatory agencies are familiar with business arrangements which give rise to concerns of own?content bias.9 Complaints and economic theories of harm assert that a vertically integrated firm (in this case, Google offers search results as well as products like YouTube and Google Maps) might discriminate against its rivals by “foreclosing” them from access to a critical input. Here, the critical input necessary for rivals´ success is alleged to be prominent placement in Google´s search results. The economics of the potential anticompetitive exclusion of rivals involving vertically integrated firms are well understood in antitrust. The conditions that must be satisfied for these concerns to generate real risk to consumers are also well known. Over a century of antitrust jurisprudence, economic study, and enforcement agency practice have produced a well?understood economic analysis of the competitive effects of a vertically integrated firm´s “discrimination” in favor of its own products or services, including widespread recognition that such arrangements generally produce significant benefits for consumers. Modern competition policy recognizes that vertical integration and contractual arrangements are generally procompetitive; it also understands that discrimination of this sort may create the potential for competitive harm under some conditions. Sensible competition policy involving vertical integration and contractual arrangements requires one to be sensitive to the potential consumer welfare?enhancing potential of such vertical integration while also taking seriously the possibility that a firm might successfully harm competition itself (and not merely a rival).

In addition to the failure to distinguish procompetitive conduct from anticompetitive behavior, critics´ allegations of own?content bias suffer deeper conceptual ambiguities. The perceived issue for Google´s rivals is not merely that Google links to a map when responding to search queries, suggesting one might be  relevant for the user; indeed, rival search engines frequently respond to similar user queries with their own or other map products. Rather, critics find problematic that Google responds to user queries with a Google Map. This is a critical distinction because it concedes that rivals´ complaints are not satisfied by the response that consumers are better off with the map; nor do critics pause to consider that perhaps the Google search user prefers the Google Map to rival products.10 Thus, critics brazenly take issue with the relationship between Google and the search result even where they concede Google produces more relevant results for consumers.11 Rather than focusing upon consumers, critics argue that the fact that Google is affiliated with the referred search result is itself prima facie evidence of competitively harmful bias.12 On its face, this argument turns conventional antitrust wisdom on its head. Conduct that harms rivals merely because it attracts consumers from rivals is the essence of competition and the logical core of the maxim that antitrust protects “competition, not competitors.?13

Critics´ failure to account for the potential consumer benefits from ?own?content bias? extends beyond ignoring the fact that users might prefer Google´s products to rivals´. Most critics simply ignore the myriad of procompetitive explanations for vertical integration in the economics literature. This omission by critics, and especially by economist critics, is mystifying given that economists have documented not only a plethora of procompetitive justifications for such integration, but also that such vertical relationships are much more likely to be competitively beneficial or benign than to raise serious threats of foreclosure.14

The critical antitrust question is always whether the underlying conduct creates or maintains monopoly power and thus reduces competition and consumer welfare, or is more likely efficient and procompetitive. To be clear, documenting the mere existence of own?content bias itself does little to answer this question. Bias is not a sufficient condition for competitive harm as a matter of economics because it can increase, decrease, or have no impact at all upon consumer welfare; neither is bias, without more, sufficient to state a cognizable antitrust claim.15

Nonetheless, documenting whether and how much of the alleged bias exists in Google´s and its rivals´ search results can improve our understanding of its competitive implications—that is, whether the evidence of discrimination in favor of one´s own content across search engines is more consistent with anticompetitive foreclosure or with competitive differentiation.

Critically, in order to generate plausible competitive concerns, search bias must, at minimum, be sufficient in magnitude to foreclose rivals from achieving minimum efficient scale (otherwise, if it merely represents effective competition that makes life harder for competitors, it is not an antitrust concern at all). It follows from this necessary condition that not all evidence of ?bias? is relevant to this competitive concern; in particular, Google referring to its own products and services more prominently than its rivals rank those same services has little to do with critics´ complaints unless they implicate general or vertical search.

Despite widespread discussion of search engine bias, virtually no evidence exists indicating that bias abounds—and very little that it exists at all. Edelman & Lockwood recently addressed this dearth of evidence by conducting a small study focused upon own?content bias in 32 search queries. They contend that their results are indicative of systemic and significant bias demanding antitrust intervention.16 The authors define and measure ?bias? as the extent to which a search engine´s ranking of its own content differs from how its rivals rank the same content. This approach provides some useful information concerning differences among search engine rankings. However, the study should not be relied upon to support broad sweeping antitrust policy concerns with Google.

The small sample of search queries provides one reason for caution. Perhaps more importantly, the non?random sample of search queries undermines its utility for addressing the critical antitrust policy questions focusing upon the magnitude of search bias, both generally and as it relates to whether the degree and nature of observed bias satisfies the well?known conditions required for competitive foreclosure. Further, evaluating their evidence at face value, Edelman & Lockwood misinterpret its relevance (Edelman & Lockwood in fact find almost no evidence of bias) and, most problematically, simply assume that own?content bias is inherently suspect from a consumer welfare perspective rather than considering the well?known consumer benefits of vertical integration. Despite these shortcomings, Edelman & Lockwood´s study has received considerable attention, both in the press and from Google´s critics, who cite it as evidence of harmful and anticompetitive search engine behavior.17 In the present analysis, as a starting point, we first “replicate” and analyze Edelman & Lockwood´s earlier study of a small, non?random sample of search queries in the modern search market. We then extend this methodology to a larger random sample of search queries in order to draw more reliable inferences concerning the answers to crucial questions for the competition policy debate surrounding search engine bias, including: (1) what precisely is search engine bias?; (2) what are its  competitive implications?; (3) how common is it?; (4) what explains its existence and relative frequency across search engines?; and, most importantly, (5) does observed search engine bias pose a competitive threat or is it a feature of competition between search engines?

Part I of this paper articulates an antitrust?appropriate framework for analyzing claims of “own?content bias” and delineates its utility and shortcomings as a theory of antitrust harm; it further evaluates Edelman & Lockwood’s study, methodology and analysis using this framework. Part II lays out the methodology employed in our own studies. Part III presents the results of our replication of Edelman & Lockwood and analyzes antitrust implications for the search engine bias debate; Part IV does the same for our larger, random sample of search queries. Part V concludes.