Earlier this week I testified before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade regarding several proposed FTC reform bills.

You can find my written testimony here. That testimony was drawn from a 100 page report, authored by Berin Szoka and me, entitled “The Federal Trade Commission: Restoring Congressional Oversight of the Second National Legislature — An Analysis of Proposed Legislation.” In the report we assess 9 of the 17 proposed reform bills in great detail, and offer a host of suggested amendments or additional reform proposals that, we believe, would help make the FTC more accountable to the courts. As I discuss in my oral remarks, that judicial oversight was part of the original plan for the Commission, and an essential part of ensuring that its immense discretion is effectively directed toward protecting consumers as technology and society evolve around it.

Read the full piece here.

Summary

“The Commission undertakes this rulemaking with the commendable goal of enhancing competition. But even the noblest of goals cannot be pursued by plainly illegal means. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what these proposed rules would do.

In our Comments we took issue with the disconnect between the stated goal of competition and the mechanism used to implement it, the unintended results, the vast underestimation of the existing vibrant video marketplace, and the fatal inconsistencies in the logic used to justify the Chairman’s NPRM. In this Reply Comment we highlight another overlooked, but crucial, problem with the proposed rules: they directly violate United States treaty obligations.

As we discussed in our Comments, the proposed rules would violate a number of exclusive rights guaranteed to copyright holders — including the right to license their content to MVPDs on narrow, specific grounds —and will create a high likelihood of exposing MVPDs to secondary liability. But the rules also threaten to violate a host of free trade agreements, to substantially interfere with rights holders’ exclusive right of public performance, and to upend the system of retransmission consent agreements authorized by the Cable Act…”

As we noted in our issue brief on the impending ICANN transition, given the vast scope of the problem, voluntary relationships between registries, registrars and private industry will be a critical aspect of controlling online piracy. Last week the MPAA and registry operator Radix announced a new “trusted notifier” program under which the MPAA will be permitted to submit evidence of large-scale piracy occurring in Radix-managed top-level domains.

Read the full piece here. 

Trade secrets are frequently one of the most powerful forms of intellectual property that a company has in its competitive arsenal. Particularly given the ongoing interest in whittling away at the property rights of patent holders (e.g. the enhanced IPR process, and even the more tame VENUE Act), trade secrets are a critical means for firms to obtain and retain advantages in highly competitive markets.

Yet, historically the scope of federal recognition of these quasi-property rights was exceedingly circumscribed. That is until yesterday when President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) into law. The Act is designed to create a uniform body of federal law that will allow jurisdiction-straddling entities to more effectively enforce their often very valuable interests in proprietary information. Despite the handful of critics of this effort over the last few years, the law passed Congress with minimal friction, and, at least at this early stage, seems like a fairly laudable step in the right direction.

Read the full piece here. 

The lifecycle of a law is a curious one; born to fanfare, a great solution to a great problem, but ultimately doomed to age badly as lawyers seek to shoehorn wholly inappropriate technologies and circumstances into its ambit. The latest chapter in the book of badly aging laws comes to us courtesy of yet another dysfunctional feature of our political system: the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation process.

Read the full piece here. 

Last March, I published an op ed in the the Washington Times on the proposed VENUE Act, a recently introduced bill taken wholesale from a portion of HR 9 (the tendentiously titled “Innovation Act”).  HR 9 has rightly stalled given its widespread and radical changes to the patent system that weaken and dilute all property rights in innovation.  Although superficially more “narrow” because the VENUE Act contains only the proposed venue rule changes in HR 9, the VENUE Act is just the Son of Frankenstein for the innovation industries.  This bill simply continues the anti-patent owner bias in the DC policy debates that has gone almost completely unchecked since before the start of President Obama’s first term in office.

Read the full piece here.

Summary

“Congressional reauthorization of the FTC is long overdue. It has been twenty-two years since Congress last gave the FTC a significant course-correction and even that one, codifying
the heart of the FTC’s 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement, has not had the effect Congress expected. Indeed, neither that policy statement nor the 1983 Deception Policy Statement,
nor the 2015 Unfair Methods of Competition Enforcement Policy Statement, will, on their own, ensure that the FTC strikes the right balance between over- and underenforcement
of its uniquely broad mandate under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

These statements are not without value, and we support codifying the other key provisions of the Unfairness Policy Statement that were not codified in 1980, as well as codifying the Deception Policy Statement. In particular, we urge Congress or the FTC to clarify the meaning of “materiality,” the key element of Deception, which the Commission has effectively
nullified.

But a shoring up of substantive standards does not address the core problem: ultimately, that the FTC’s processes have enabled it to operate with essentially unbounded discretion in developing the doctrine by which its three high level standards are applied in real-world cases. Chiefly, the FTC has been able to circumvent judicial review through what it calls its
“common law of consent decrees,” and to effectively circumvent the rulemaking safeguards imposed by Congress in 1980 through a variety of forms of “soft law”: guidance and recommendations that have, if indirectly and through amorphous forms of pressure, essentially regulatory effect.

At the same time, and contributing to the problem, the FTC has made insufficient use of its Bureau of Economics, which ought to be the agency’s crown jewel: a dedicated, internal
think tank of talented economists who can help steer the FTC’s enforcement and policymaking functions. While BE has been well integrated into the Commission’s antitrust decisionmaking, it has long resisted applying the lessons of law and economics to its consumer protection work.

The FTC is, in short, in need of a recalibration. In this paper we evaluate nine of the seventeen FTC reform bills proposed by members of the Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade Subcommittee, and suggest a number of our own, additional reforms for the agency.”

Summary

Congressional reauthorization of the FTC is long overdue. It has been twenty-two years since Congress last gave the FTC a significant course-correction and even that one, codifying the heart of the FTC’s 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement, has not had the effect Congress expected. Indeed, neither that policy statement nor the 1983 Deception Policy Statement, nor the 2015 Unfair Methods of Competition Enforcement Policy Statement, will, on their own, ensure that the FTC strikes the right balance between over- and underenforcement of its uniquely broad mandate under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

These statements are not without value, and we support codifying the other key provisions of the Unfairness Policy Statement that were not codified in 1980, as well as codifying the Deception Policy Statement. In particular, we urge Congress or the FTC to clarify the meaning of “materiality,” the key element of Deception, which the Commission has effectively nullified.

But a shoring up of substantive standards does not address the core problem: ultimately, that the FTC’s processes have enabled it to operate with essentially unbounded discretion in developing the doctrine by which its three high level standards are applied in real-world cases.

Chiefly, the FTC has been able to circumvent judicial review through what it calls its “common law of consent decrees,” and to effectively circumvent the rulemaking safeguards imposed by Congress in 1980 through a variety of forms of “soft law”: guidance and recommendations that have, if indirectly and through amorphous forms of pressure, essentially regulatory effect.

At the same time, and contributing to the problem, the FTC has made insufficient use of its Bureau of Economics, which ought to be the agency’s crown jewel: a dedicated, internal think tank of talented economists who can help steer the FTC’s enforcement and policymaking functions. While BE has been well integrated into the Commission’s antitrust decisionmaking, it has long resisted applying the lessons of law and economics to its consumer protection work.

The FTC is, in short, in need of a recalibration. In this paper, we evaluate nine of the seventeen FTC reform bills proposed by members of the Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade Subcommittee, and suggest a number of our own, additional reforms for the agency.

Yesterday a federal district court in Washington state granted the FTC’s motion for summary judgment against Amazon in FTC v. Amazon — the case alleging unfair trade practices in Amazon’s design of the in-app purchases interface for apps available in its mobile app store. The headlines score the decision as a loss for Amazon, and the FTC, of course, claims victory. But the court also granted Amazon’s motion for partial summary judgment on a significant aspect of the case, and the Commission’s win may be decidedly pyrrhic.

Read the full piece here.