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Summary

We would like to thank you for the opportunity to comment on these important and timely issues. In the preamble to this Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) the NTIA notes that is responsible for “protecting and promoting an open and interoperable internet, advocating for the free flow of information, and strengthening the global marketplace for American digital products and services.” We agree with the implicit assumption of this statement that it is possible to both promote an open Internet as well as protect the interests of American creators.

With this in mind, we would like to offer some comments on how best to assess the oft-asserted tension between policies that purport to maximize freedom online and those that seek to protect the interests of rightsholders.

It is undeniable that, in some cases, the unfettered flow of information can contribute to the infringement of the intellectual property rights of American citizens and companies, and that this is contrary to NTIA’s mission to promote the marketplace for American digital products and services. But it is also undeniable that the protection of intellectual property rights can promote both the creation of information and its dissemination. Our intellectual property laws reflect the congressional and judicial balancing of these dynamics: There is little reason to think that the legislative and legal principles that determine when content or its distribution is illegal offline apply any less when content is distributed online.

The flow of information is, in fact, never “unfettered.” When considering the free flow of information online, the goal should be the same as it is offline: to increase the flow of legitimate information and to decrease the flow of illegitimate information.

Properly considered, there is no novel conflict between promoting the flow of information and protecting intellectual property rights online. While the specific mechanisms employed to mediate between these two principles may differ — and, indeed, while technological change can alter the distribution of costs and benefits in ways that must be accounted for — the fundamental principles that determine the dividing line between “legal” and “illegal” content and its distribution offline can and should be respected online.

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The EC’s Android decision is expected sometime in the next couple of weeks. Current speculation is that the EC may issue a fine exceeding last year’s huge 2.4B EU fine for Google’s alleged antitrust violations related to the display of general search results. Based on the statement of objections (“SO”), I expect the Android decision will be a muddle of legal theory that not only fails to connect to facts and marketplace realities, but also will perversely incentivize platform operators to move toward less open ecosystems.

Read the full piece here.

There are some who view a host of claimed negative social ills allegedly related to the large size of firms like Amazon as an occasion to call for the company’s break up. And, unfortunately, these critics find an unlikely ally in President Trump, whose tweet storms claim that tech platforms are too big and extract unfair rents at the expense of small businesses. But these critics are wrong: Amazon is not a dangerous monopoly, and it certainly should not be broken up.  

Read the full piece here.

Summary

The relationship between classical liberalism and technology is surprisingly fraught. The common understanding is that technological advance is complementary to the principles of classical liberalism – especially in the case of contemporary, information-age technology. This is most clearly on display in Silicon Valley, with its oft-professed libertarian (classical liberalism’s kissing cousin) affinities. The analytical predicate for this complementarity is that classical liberalism values liberty-enhancing private ordering, and technological advance both is generally facially liberty-enhancing and facilitates private ordering.

This analysis, however, is incomplete. Classical liberalism recognizes that certain rules are necessary in a well-functioning polity. The classical liberal, for instance, recognizes the centrality of enforceable property rights, and the concomitant ability to seek recourse from a third party (the state) when those rights are compromised. Thus, contemporary technological advances may facilitate private transactions – but such transactions may not support private ordering if they also weaken either the property rights necessary to that ordering or the enforceability of those rights.

This chapter argues that technological advance can at times create (or, perhaps more accurately, highlight) a tension within principles of classical liberalism: It can simultaneously enhance liberty, while also undermining the legal rules and institutions necessary for the efficient and just private ordering of interactions in a liberal society. This is an important tension for classical liberals to understand – and one that needs to be, but too rarely is, acknowledged or struggled with. Related, the chapter also identifies and evaluates important fracture lines between prevalent branches of modern libertarianism: those that tend to embrace technological anarchism as maximally liberty-enhancing, on the one hand, and those that more cautiously protect the legal institutions (for example, property rights) upon which individual autonomy and private ordering are based, on the other.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces our understanding of classical liberalism’s core principles: an emphasis on individual liberty; the recognition of a limit to the exercise of liberty when it conflicts with the autonomy of others; and support for a minimal set of rules necessary to coordinate individuals’ exercise of their liberty in autonomy-respecting ways through a system of private ordering. Part II then offers an initial discussion of the relationship between technology and legal institutions and argues that technology is important to classical liberalism insofar as it affects the legal institutions upon which private ordering is based. Part III explores how libertarian philosophies have embraced contemporary technology, focusing on “extreme” and “moderate” views – views that correspond roughly to liberty maximalism and autonomy protectionism. This discussion sets the stage for Part IV, which considers the tensions that technological change – especially the rapid change that characterizes much of recent history – creates within the classical liberal philosophy. The central insight is that classical liberalism posits a set of relatively stable legal institutions as the basis for liberty-enhancing private ordering – institutions that are generally developed through public, not private ordering – but that technology, including otherwise liberty-enhancing technology, can disrupt these institutions in ways that threaten both individual autonomy and the private ordering built upon extant institutions.

Today, following a six year investigation into Google’s business practices in India, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) issued its ruling.

Read the full piece here.

Summary

Concern about both fake news and the size of Internet mega-platforms like Facebook is popular these days. In each case the concern is intuitively obvious yet the pathway by which it manifests into tangible harm ambiguous. There are clear examples of “fake news” being used for illegitimate purposes, as well as examples of platforms engaging in (or facilitating) alarming behavior – but it is challenging to draw a clean line between such problematic conduct and other non-problematic or even desirable conduct. Better understanding these delineations is a pressing task.

Fake news is largely distributed via social media platforms like Facebook. Indeed, the more malicious of such news is often designed specifically to take advantage of these platforms. It is reasonable to think that the concerns that we have about each may therefore be related – that fake news is a Facebook problem. This is the approach put forth in recent work by Sally Hubbard, who argues that fake news is an antitrust problem. Her basic thesis is that platforms with substantial market-share, such as Facebook, have pushed quality news organizations out of the market and that those news organizations would be better able to compete for consumer attention if there were more competition between platforms like Facebook.

It is a clever and provocative argument. But it is ultimately not a compelling one. Facebook isn’t what’s killing quality news – the Internet did that, and Facebook (and other social media) are merely the deformed phoenices that arose from the traditional media’s online ashes. Facebook and its ilk may be “killing news,” but it is not because these mega-platforms are harming competition – rather, the problem is that traditional media simply cannot effectively compete with social media in the winner-take-all marketplace for consumer attention. This may be a problem – it is certainly an issue that we as a society are and will continue to consider from law and policy perspectives – but it is not an antitrust problem.

I address these issues in more depth in the following three parts. I start by reviewing the evidence about what is killing the news (it’s not Facebook!). I then look at competition in the information economy and at the horizontal and vertical relationships between Facebook and the news media. I then turn the argument on its head, looking at how the problem we face – both with too little quality news and too much fake news – may be better addressed with less competition rather than more.

Throughout this discussion I will treat two recent articles as urtext: Hubbard’s piece in Forbes in which she explains “Why Fake news Is An Antitrust Problem,”2 and a follow-up interview on the topic that she did with Vox.3 I also note that throughout I will follow Hubbard’s lead and use Facebook as the poster-example of a significant social-media platform – though both she and I recognize that other tech platforms operate in this space. Indeed, the fact that Facebook, Twitter, and Google are all important platform-sources of news (fake and otherwise) demonstrates the most basic concern with the argument, that there is no lack of competition for information, true or otherwise.

David Chavern (News Media Alliance, whose members include NYT, WSJ, Tronc (Chicago Tribune, LA Times)), in a July 9, 2017 Wall Street Journal op-ed and subsequent press release, called for an antitrust exemption from Congress that would allow newspapers to negotiate collectively with Facebook and Google for stronger intellectual property protections, better support for subscription models, and a “fair share” of revenue and data.

From his Op Ed, “How Antitrust Undermines Press Freedom: Facebook and Google dominate online ads, and news companies can’t join forces to compete”:

…[E]xisting laws are having the unintended consequence of preventing news organizations from working together to negotiate better deals that will sustain local, enterprise journalism that is critical to a vibrant democracy. News organizations are limited with disaggregated negotiating power against a de facto duopoly that is vacuuming up all but an ever-decreasing segment of advertising revenue.

As part of the argument, the long decline in newspaper advertising revenues are compared to the relatively large control that Facebook and Google have over the online portion of the advertising market as part of an effort to paint online platforms as the sole, or a primary, driver for the decline in the fortunes of newspapers.

Geoffrey Manne joined the ABA Teleconference forum to discuss these issues and their broad antitrust implications. In particular, Mr. Manne noted that:

• It is difficult to today trace a single, important driver of the decline of newspaper revenues in the face of changing consumer preferences in news consumption such that coordination among large publishers would “fix” current revenue problems.
• Complicating this analysis is the fact that the first, and the largest, drop in newspaper ad revenue happened well over a decade ago when sites like Craigslist and eBay displaced newspapers as the long dominant players classified ads.
• Newspapers already collect upwards of 70% of the advertising revenue on Google’s and Facebook’s networks — the remaining share to be collected would barely put a dent in the ad losses attributed to alternative classifieds.
• The benefits of permitting (or more likely facilitating) this sort of group action are unclear given the large competition on every level of the news industry from local news to national news to topic-specific blogging.
• Moreover, any facilitation of coordination in this manner is more likely to benefit the large incumbent papers to the detriment of smaller news producers — a tradeoff that is likewise unclear (and probably negative) in its effects on consumer welfare.

The full call is embedded below.

https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Manne-et-al-ABA-Teleconference-on-Newspaper-Antitrust-Exemption-2017.mp3

 

 

Last week the editorial board of the Washington Post penned an excellent editorial responding to the European Commission’s announcement of its decision in its Google Shopping investigation. Here’s the key language from the editorial…

Read the full piece here. 

Regardless of the merits and soundness (or lack thereof) of this week’s European Commission Decision in the Google Shopping case — one cannot assess this until we have the text of the decision — two comments really struck me during the press conference.

Read the full piece here.