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TOTM Though details remain scant (and thus, any final judgment would be premature), initial word on the new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework agreed to, in principle, by the . . .
Though details remain scant (and thus, any final judgment would be premature), initial word on the new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework agreed to, in principle, by the White House and the European Commission suggests that it could be a workable successor to the Privacy Shield agreement that was invalidated by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2020.
Read the full piece here.
Amicus Brief In this amicus brief for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, ICLE and a dozen scholars of law & economics address the broad consensus disfavoring how New York and other states seek to apply the “unilateral refusal to deal” doctrine in an antitrust case against Facebook.
Amici are leading scholars of economics, telecommunications, and/or antitrust. Their scholarship reflects years of experience and publications in these fields.
Amici’s expertise and academic perspectives will aid the Court in deciding whether to affirm in three respects. First, amici provide an explanation of key economic concepts underpinning how economists understand the welfare effects of a monopolist’s refusal to deal voluntarily with a competitor and why that supports affirmance here. Second, amici offer their perspective on the limited circumstances that might justify penalizing a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal—and why this case is not one of them. Third, amici explain why the District Court’s legal framework was correct and why a clear standard is necessary when analyzing alleged refusals to deal.
This brief addresses the broad consensus in the academic literature disfavoring a theory underlying plaintiff’s case—“unilateral refusal to deal” doctrine. The States allege that Facebook restricted access to an input (Facebook’s Platform) in order to prevent third parties from using that access to export Facebook data to competitors or compete directly with Facebook. But a unilateral refusal to deal involves more than an allegation that a monopolist refuses to enter into a business relationship with a rival.
Mainstream economists and competition law scholars are skeptical of imposing liability, even on a monopolist, based solely on its choice of business partners. The freedom of firms to choose their business partners is a fundamental tenet of the free market economy, and the mechanism by which markets produce the greatest welfare gains. Thus, cases compelling business dealings should be confined to particularly delineated circumstances.
In Part I below, amici describe why it is generally inefficient for courts to compel economic actors to deal with one another. Such “solutions” are generally unsound in theory and unworkable in practice, in that they ask judges to operate as regulators over the defendant’s business.
In Part II, amici explain why Aspen Skiing—the Supreme Court’s most prominent precedent permitting liability for a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal—went too far and should not be expanded as the States’ and some of their amici propose.
In Part III, amici explain that the District Court correctly held that the conduct at issue here does not constitute a refusal to deal under Aspen Skiing. A unilateral refusal to deal should trigger antitrust liability only where a monopolist turns down more profitable dealings with a competitor in an effort to drive that competitor’s exit or to disable its ability to compete, thereby allowing the monopolist to recoup its losses by increasing prices in the future. But the States’ allegations do not describe that scenario.
In Part IV, amici address that the District Court properly considered and dismissed the States’ “conditional dealing” argument. The States’ allegations are correctly addressed under the rubric of a refusal to deal—not exclusive dealing or otherwise. The States’ desire to mold their allegations into different legal theories highlights why courts should use a strict, clear standard to analyze refusals to deal.
Read the full brief here.
Popular Media In the wake of Russia’s invasion, Europe’s plans to regulate technology look like a relic from a bygone era. An urgent need exists to rethink . . .
In the wake of Russia’s invasion, Europe’s plans to regulate technology look like a relic from a bygone era. An urgent need exists to rethink the assumptions and the goals of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the AI Act (AIA) – indeed, Europe’s entire digital sovereignty agenda.
Scholarship Abstract Collective action at impersonal scale involves losses to autonomy by definition because of the need to centralize some measure of authority. This stands as . . .
Collective action at impersonal scale involves losses to autonomy by definition because of the need to centralize some measure of authority. This stands as an important cost to collective action that varies in predictable ways depending on the extent of organizational choice available to members. By identifying characteristics at the fundamental institutional level linked to increases in self-determination relative to other organizational forms, I identify a structural tradeoff between exit costs and constitutional constraints with respect to the ideal of unanimity. Despite the long recognition of these institutional features as central to the processes of human social ordering, my analysis is centered in how each institutional solution to representative losses to collective decision making at scale reduces these losses relative to the other. As exit costs decrease, the losses to self-determination that collective action poses are increasingly resolved through individual choice, which makes the need for costly constitutional constraints fall in comparison. In a world of zero collective action costs, organizational choice would be infinite, and the initial distribution of organizations would always dynamically adjust to optimally reflect every individual’s preferences. But because collective action costs are never zero, some measure of constitutional constraints are therefore always optimal in the governance of impersonal organizations due to the representative losses these organizations entail.
Scholarship Abstract The Federal Trade Commission’s initiative to use rulemaking powers to target “unfair methods of competition” under the FTC Act is part of a broader . . .
The Federal Trade Commission’s initiative to use rulemaking powers to target “unfair methods of competition” under the FTC Act is part of a broader package of dramatic recent changes in antitrust enforcement policy and practice by FTC leadership. These changes, which have rejected the consumer-welfare standard and rule-of-reason balancing tests, represent a strategic effort to bypass the rigorous standards of federal antitrust case law and qualify for the deference generally accorded agency rulemaking by federal courts. Principal-agent analysis suggests that these changes, by detaching antitrust enforcement from antitrust case law and substituting regulatory discretion for structured guidelines, raise a significant risk that the agency will undertake actions that depart from its statutory mandate by targeting practices that do not pose any credible threat of competitive harm.
Popular Media Four years after Congress passed an exception to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that made it possible to hold websites liable for user-generated . . .
Four years after Congress passed an exception to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that made it possible to hold websites liable for user-generated content that facilitates sex trafficking, some lawmakers want to examine what the impact has been. In the process, we may learn more about the tradeoffs required to strike a reasonable balance between holding online platforms accountable and protecting venues for user-generated content.
TOTM After years of debate and negotiations, European Lawmakers have agreed upon what will most likely be the final iteration of the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”), following the March . . .
After years of debate and negotiations, European Lawmakers have agreed upon what will most likely be the final iteration of the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”), following the March 24 final round of “trilogue” talks.
TOTM All too frequently, vocal advocates for “Internet Freedom” imagine it exists along just a single dimension: the extent to which it permits individuals and firms . . .
All too frequently, vocal advocates for “Internet Freedom” imagine it exists along just a single dimension: the extent to which it permits individuals and firms to interact in new and unusual ways.
TOTM For decades, consumer-welfare enhancement appeared to be a key enforcement goal of competition policy (antitrust, in the U.S. usage) in most jurisdictions… Read the full . . .
For decades, consumer-welfare enhancement appeared to be a key enforcement goal of competition policy (antitrust, in the U.S. usage) in most jurisdictions…
