Executive Summary

In this comment, we argue that the Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of the Durbin amendment has had the opposite effect to that intended by the legislation. Specifically, it has harmed lower-income consumers and benefited the shareholders of large merchants. To understand how and why this has happened, we look at two aspects of the provision’s implementation: the price controls the Board imposed through Regulation II, and the competitive-routing requirement included in the Durbin amendment itself. We then consider the likely effects of the changes proposed in the NPRM and conclude that these will exacerbate the harms already inflicted by Regulation II. We encourage the Board to consider alternative approaches that would mitigate Regulation II’s harms, including raising or, ideally, eliminating the cap on interchange fees.

I. Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) thanks the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) for the opportunity to comment on this notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”), which calls for updates to components of the interchange-fee cap established by Regulation II.[1]

Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)—commonly referred to as the “Durbin amendment”—required the Board to issue regulations that would limit debit-card interchange fees charged by lenders with assets of more than $10 billion (“covered banks”), such that:

The amount of any interchange transaction fee that an issuer may receive or charge with respect to an electronic debit transaction shall be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.[2]

Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) stated in 2010 that his amendment “would enable small businesses and merchants to lower their costs and provide discounts for their customers.”[3] Yet the evidence to date demonstrate that, in practice, the provision has done little, if anything, to reduce costs for small businesses and merchants; indeed, many have seen costs rise.[4] Meanwhile, consumers have seen little, if any, savings from merchants, and have been harmed by higher banking fees.[5]

These problems are, at least in part, a consequence of the way the Board chose to interpret the phrase “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” Specifically, as the Board notes in its summary of the present NPRM:

Under the current rule, for a debit card transaction that does not qualify for a statutory exemption, the interchange fee can be no more than the sum of a base component of 21 cents, an ad valorem component of 5 basis points multiplied by the value of the transaction, and a fraud-prevention adjustment of 1 cent if the issuer meets certain fraud-prevention- standards.

The Board now proposes to reduce further the interchange fees that covered banks may charge for debit-card transactions. Specifically:

Initially, under the proposal, the base component would be 14.4 cents, the ad valorem component would be 4.0 basis points (multiplied by the value of the transaction), and the fraud-prevention adjustment would be 1.3 cents for debit card transactions performed from the effective date of the final rule to June 30, 2025.

In this comment, we question the Board’s interpretation of the underlying legislation by citing, among other things, research conducted by employees of the Board and published by the Board.

II. Can Price Controls Be Reasonable and Proportional?

The heart of the matter is the meaning of “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” In most respects, the Board has chosen to interpret this phrase narrowly to refer to the pecuniary costs directly associated with the electronic processing of each transaction ($0.21 plus 0.05% of the value of the transaction). But even in deploying this narrow interpretation, the Board has been inconsistent, as:

1. These fees represent, at best, an average of the pecuniary cost; and
2. The Board permits issuers to add $0.01 if it “meets certain fraud-prevention standards.” [6]

This latter component clearly is not transaction-specific, as it is intended to cover the cost of investments made in security infrastructure.

A. What’s in a Cost?

The Board’s approach to “cost” fails to consider the two-sided nature of payment-card markets. A 2017 staff working paper by Board economists Mark D. Manuszak and Krzysztof Wozniak notes:

Interchange fees play a central role in theoretical models of payment card networks, which emphasize the card market’s two-sided nature (for example, Rochet and Tirole (2002)).[7] On one side of the market, interchange fees alter acquirers’ costs, influencing the transaction fees they charge merchants. On the other side of the market, inter- change fees provide a source of revenue that defrays issuers’ costs of card services for accountholders, and, thus, influence fees that banks charge accountholders. As a result, these theoretical models broadly predict that a reduction in interchange fees will induce issuers to increase prices for accountholders.

However, theoretical models of two-sided markets rely on an overly simple characterization of issuers, which diverges from reality in three important ways. First, issuers use nonlinear, account-based pricing rather than per-transaction fees typically assumed by the theory but rarely observed in reality. The theoretical literature on nonlinear pricing emphasizes the sensitivity of consumer demand to different price components. For the debit card industry, it predicts that higher costs will result in increases in prices for which consumers’ demand is less sensitive, and lower or no rises in prices to which the demand is more sensitive.

Second, issuers are multiproduct firms, cross-selling a variety of products in addition to card transactions. The theoretical literature on multiproduct pricing predicts that a firm’s price for one good will internalize its impact on the demand for the firm’s other products. In the debit card industry, this implies that, since a bank is best positioned to offer additional services to consumers who are already its accountholders, the price for such an account is less likely to reflect higher costs than it would otherwise.

Finally, issuers are heterogeneous firms, subject to idiosyncratic cost shocks based on their status under the regulation, and compete for customers in the market for banking services. An issuer’s prices are not determined in isolation by its costs and the market demand, but rather jointly with other issuers’ prices…. [8]

In the decade prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, banks had increased the availability of free checking accounts (Figure I) and reduced the fees on non-interest-bearing checking accounts (Figure II), which had widespread benefits. First, it enabled more people to open and maintain bank accounts, thereby reducing the proportion of unbanked and underbanked Americans. Second, it contributed to a shift toward electronic payments, as many consumers who previously lacked access to payment cards now had a debit card (Figure III). This shift was driven along further by banks offering rewards that encouraged the use of debit cards. Since the provision of checking accounts generates associated costs, banks that expanded their offerings of free and/or low-fee accounts had to recoup those costs elsewhere. They did so, in part, through revenue from interchange fees on debit cards.

In a 2014 staff working paper, Board economists Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak, and Cindy M. Vojtech found that Regulation II reduced annual interchange-fee revenue at covered banks by $14 billion.[9] Meanwhile, in their aforementioned 2017 paper, Manuszak and Wozniak showed that, following Regulation II’s implementation, covered banks sought to recoup the revenue lost due to lower interchange fees by increasing fees on checking accounts; reducing the availability of free checking accounts; and increasing the minimum balance required to maintain a free checking account. This resulted in “lower availability of free accounts, higher monthly fees, lower likelihood that the monthly fee could be avoided, and a higher minimum balance to avoid the fee.”[10]

Moreover, Manuszak and Wozniak show that “checking account pricing at covered banks appears primarily driven by the interchange fee restriction rather than other factors related to the financial crisis or subsequent regulatory initiatives.”[11] Finally, in the version of Kay et al.’s paper published in the Journal of Financial Intermediation, the authors “find that retail banks subject to the cap were able to offset nearly all of lost interchange income through higher fees on deposit services.”[12]

In a more recent study, Georgetown University economist Vladimir Mukharlyamov and University of Pennsylvania economist Natasha Sarin estimated that Regulation II caused covered banks to lose $5.5 billion annually, but that they recouped 42% of those losses from account holders. As a result:

the share of free checking accounts fell from 61 percent to 28 percent as a result of Durbin. Average checking account fees rose from $3.07 per month to $5.92 per month. Monthly minimums to avoid these fees rose by 21 percent, and monthly fees on interest-bearing checking accounts also rose by nearly 14 percent. These higher fees are disproportionately borne by low-income consumers whose account balances do not meet the monthly minimum required for fee waiver.[13]

FIGURE 1: Proportion of Banks Offering Free Checking Accounts, 2003-2016

SOURCE: Bankrate

FIGURE II: Average Fees for Checking Accounts, 1998-2023

SOURCE: Bankrate

FIGURE III: US Shares of Noncash Payments by Transaction Volume, 2000-2020

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Federal Reserve payment studies

B. Effects on ‘Exempt’ Banks and Credit Unions

In a letter to Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-Mass.), and the conferees selected to finalize the Dodd-Frank Act, Durbin claimed that:

Under the Durbin amendment, the requirement that debit fees be reasonable does not apply to debit cards issued by institutions with assets under $10 billion. This means that Visa and MasterCard can continue to set the same debit interchange rates that they do today for small banks and credit unions. Those institutions would not lose any interchange revenue that they currently receive.[14]

Yet as can be seen clearly in Figure IV, average per-transaction debit-card interchange fees fell across the board. For covered issuers, average interchange fees per-transaction fell to the regulated maximum for both covered dual-message (signature) transactions and single-message (PIN) transactions immediately following implementation of Regulation II in October 2011. Meanwhile, adjusting for inflation, average fees per-transaction for exempt issuers fell by about 10% for dual-message transactions.

Average fees per-transaction for single-message transactions, however, fell by 30% over the course of eight years. By 2019, they were only marginally higher than the regulated maximum for covered banks, despite the claimed intent to protect smaller issuers from the effects of the debit-interchange cap. The cause of this decline was the addition of the following subsections to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA):[15]

• EFTA Section 920(b)(1) prohibits issuers and payment networks from imposing network-exclusivity arrangements. In particular, all issuers must ensure that debit-card payments can be routed over at least two unaffiliated networks.
• EFTA Section 920(b)(1)(B) prohibits issuers and payment networks from restricting merchants and acquirers’ ability to choose the network over which to route a payment.

These changes, which were dictated by the Durbin amendment, enabled merchants to route transactions over lower-cost networks. That has effectively forced the networks subject to such competition—primarily single-message (PIN) networks—to reduce the fees set for exempt banks so that they are in line with those set for covered banks.

This has inevitably caused many exempt banks and credit unions to experience losses similar to those experienced by covered banks. Indeed, in some cases, the effects have been markedly worse, because smaller banks and credit unions lack the advantage of scale.

FIGURE IV: Fee Per Transaction, Covered v Exempt Users, Single v Dual Message Networks (2011 Dollars)

SOURCE: Federal Reserve, St. Louis FRED^[16]

C. Asymmetric Pass-Through

In a 2014 paper published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Zhu Wang, Scarlett Schwartz, and Neil Mitchell analyzed the results of a then-recent merchant survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Javelin Strategy & Research, which sought to understand the Durbin amendment’s effects on merchants and the response of those merchants. The authors found that, while some merchants enjoyed reductions following Regulation II’s implementation in the merchant-discount rate they paid, others saw their debit-card acceptance costs rise.[17] They also found an asymmetric response: merchants who saw their prices increase typically passed those increased costs onto their customers, while very few of those who saw their debit costs decrease passed those savings onto customers.

Using proprietary data from banks and one of the card networks, economists Vladimir Mukharlyamov and Natasha Sarin estimated that merchants passed through “at most” 28% of their debit-card interchange-fee savings to consumers.[18] The “at most” is worth qualifying: the authors base their analysis on savings at gas stations, but they note that:

It turns out, however, that the standard deviation of per-gallon gas prices ($0.252) is 168 times larger than the average per-gallon debit interchange savings ($0.0015). Relatedly, total Durbin savings for gas merchants amount to less than 0.07% of total sales. These points render the quantification of merchants’ pass-through with statistical significance virtually impossible. The existence of payment instruments exempt from Durbin and the presence of a fixed component in the regulation’s interchange-fee formula further complicate pass-through even for merchants willing to share savings, however small, with consumers.[19]

Meanwhile, as noted, they estimated that banks passed through 42% of their interchange-fee revenue losses to consumers. They estimate that the net result of this was a $4 billion transfer to merchants, of which $3.2 billion came directly from banks and $0.8 billion from consumers, who paid $2.3 billion more in higher checking fees, but received only $1.5 billion in lower retail prices.

D. Effects on Lower-Income Consumers

In a 2014 ICLE paper, Todd Zywicki, Geoffrey Manne, and Julian Morris offered a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the best-case scenario for the net effect of Regulation II on the “average” American consumer:

In 2012, the average household spent $30,932 in total on food, apparel, transportation, entertainment, healthcare, and other items that could have been purchased using a payment card (out of a total household expenditure of $51,442). If all of those items were purchased on debit cards and all were purchased from larger retailers and those larger retailers passed on all their savings (averaging 0.7%), then the average household would have saved $216.50. And that is the absolute best case – and most unlikely – scenario. But now assume that average household has two earners, each with a bank account that was previously free but now costs $12 per month. In that case, the household’s costs would have risen by $71.50 as a result of the Durbin Amendment. In other words, even in the best case, lower-middle income and poorer households who have lost access to a free current account—which is likely a majority—will be worse off after the Durbin Amendment.[20]

While the average consumer likely fared poorly, Regulation II was, quite frankly, a disaster for many lower-income consumers. Using data from the Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances, Mukharlyamov and Sarin found that:

over 70 percent of consumers in the lowest income quintile (annual household income of $22,500 or less) bear higher account fees, since they fall below the average post-Durbin account minimum required to avoid a monthly maintenance fee ($1,400). In contrast, only 5 percent of consumers in the highest income quintile (household income of $157,000 or more) fall below this threshold.[21]

Worse, Regulation II almost certainly resulted in an increase in the number of unbanked Americans. Mukharlyamov and Sarin note:

Nearly 8 percent of Americans were unbanked in 2013, with nearly 10 percent of this group becoming unbanked in the last year. Using data from the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, in Table 12 we show that immediately following Durbin there is a significant growth (81 percent increase relative to survey pre-Durbin) in the share of the unbanked population that credits high account fees as the main reason for their not having a bank account. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level.

Respondents in states most impacted by Durbin (those with the highest share of deposits at banks above the $10 billion threshold) are most likely to attribute their unbanked status post-Durbin to high fees (over 15 percent of those surveyed in the highest Durbin tercile). The growth in the recently unbanked (those who had accounts previously but closed them within the last year) is also highest in states with the most Durbin banks, where the increase in account fees is most pronounced. As with the overall sample, these differences are significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that at least some bank customers respond to Durbin fee increases by severing their banking relationship and potentially turning to more expensive alternative financial services providers such as payday lenders and check-cashing facilities.[22]

III. Conclusion

It is worth noting that the Board was well aware of the two-sided nature of payment-network markets and the implications for setting interchange fees prior to issuing Regulation II. A 2009 staff working paper by Robin A. Prager, Mark D. Manuszak, Elizabeth K. Kiser, and Ron Borzekowski stated:

A few characteristics of an efficient interchange fee are worth noting:

• In general, an efficient interchange fee is not solely dependent on the cost of producing a card-based transaction nor is it equal to zero.

• An efficient interchange fee may yield prices for card services to each side of the market that are “unbalanced” in the sense that one side pays a higher price than the other.

• The efficient interchange fee for a particular card network is difficult to determine empirically.[23]

Based on the foregoing analysis, it appears clear that the optimal debit-card interchange fee is higher than that currently permitted for covered banks under Regulation II—and for exempt banks subject to Durbin’s routing mandates. It is, therefore, rather disconcerting that the Board would contemplate reducing the interchange fee further still in the NPRM to which this comment is addressed. If the Board wished to establish a “reasonable and proportional” fee for debit-card interchange, it would instead raise the cap. Indeed, since it remains “difficult to determine empirically” the efficient interchange fee for any card network, the Board should acknowledge that markets are the best mechanism to establish such fees, and remove the price controls altogether.

[1] Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 88 Fed. Reg. 78100 (Nov. 14, 2023), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/11/14/2023-24034/debit-card-interchange-fees-and-routing.

[2] Pub. L. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf.

[3] Press Release, Durbin Sends Letter to Wall Street Reform Conferees on Interchange Amendment, Office of Sen. Richard Durbin (May 25, 2010), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-sends-letter-to-wall-street-reform-conferees-on-interchange-amendment.

[4] Zhu Wang, Scarlett Schwartz, & Neil Mitchell, The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Merchants: A Survey Study, 100 (3) Econ Quar. (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond) 183-208 (2014).

[5] Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne, & Julian Morris, Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-18 (2014); Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, & Todd J. Zywicki, Unreasonable and Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small Businesses, Int’l. Ctr. Law & Econ. (Apr. 25, 2017), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/icle-durbin_update_2017_final-1.pdf.

[6] 76 Fed. Reg. 43394 (Jul. 20, 2011), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/07/20/2011-16861/debit-card-interchange-fees-and-routing and specifically 76 Fed. Reg. 43466 (Jul. 20, 2011), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-20/pdf/2011-16861.pdf; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing (Regulation II), 12 C.F.R. § 235 (2011), https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/part-235.

[7] Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33(4) RAND J. Econ. 549-570 (2002).

[8] Mark D. Manuszak & Krzysztof Wozniak, The Impact of Price Controls in Two-sided Markets: Evidence from US Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-074, Fed. Rsrv. (Jul. 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/the-impact-of-price-controls-in-two-sided-markets-evidence-from-us-debit-card-interchange-fee-regulation.htm.

[9] Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak, & Cindy M. Vojtech, Bank Profitability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank Responses to the Durbin Amendment, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-77, Fed. Rsrv. (Sep. 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/bank-profitability-and-debit-card-interchange-regulation-bank-responses-to-the-durbin-amendment.htm.

[10] Supra note 7 at 21.

[11] Id.

[12] Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak, & Cindy M. Vojtech, Competition and Complementarities In Retail Banking: Evidence from Debit Card Interchange Regulation, 34 J. Financ. Intermed. 91–108 (2018), at 104.

[13] Vladimir Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin, Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets: Empirical Evidence from Debit Cards, SSRN (Nov. 24, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3328579.

[14] Supra note 3.

[15] 12 C.F.R. § 235.1

[16] Regulation II (Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing), Fed. Rsrv., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/regii-data-collections.htm; Consumer Price Index: All Items for the United States, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USACPIALLMINMEI (last visited Aug. 10, 2022).

[17]  Wang et al., supra note 4. Some merchants saw their acceptance costs increase because—prior to Dodd-Frank’s price controls—some merchants, especially smaller merchants, had received discounts on acceptance costs. But the imposition of price ceilings also effectively created a price floor, leading some merchants to pay higher fees than previously.

[18] Supra note 13.

[19] Id. at 4.

[20] Manne, Zywicki, & Morris, supra note 5.

[21] Id. at 30.

[22] Id. at 30-31.

[23] Robin A. Prager, Mark D. Manuszak, Elizabeth K. Kiser, & Ron Borzekowski, Interchange Fees and Payment Card Networks: Economics, Industry Developments, and Policy Issues, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009-23, Fed. Rsrv. (Jun. 2009), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200923/200923pap.pdf.

A year after it was created by the Government of India’s Ministry of Corporate Affairs to examine the need for a separate law on competition in digital markets, India’s Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL) in February both published its report[1] recommending adoption of such rules and submitted the draft Digital Competition Act (DCA), which is virtually identical to the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA).[2]

The EU has touted its new regulation as essential to ensure “fairness and contestability” in digital markets. And since it entered into force early last month,[3] the DMA has imposed strict pre-emptive rules on so-called digital “gatekeepers,”[4] a cohort of mostly American tech giants like Google, Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft.

But despite the impressive public-relations campaign[5] that the DMA’s proponents have been able to mount internationally, India should be wary of reflexively importing these ready-made and putatively infallible solutions that promise to “fix” the world’s most successful digital platforms at little or no cost.

I. Not So Fast

The first question India should ask itself is why?[6] Echoing the European Commission, the CDCL argues that strict ex-ante rules are needed because competition-law investigations in digital markets are too time-consuming. But this could be a feature, not a bug, of competition law. Digital markets often involve novel business models and zero or low-price products, meaning that there is nearly always a plausible pro-competitive explanation for the impugned conduct.

When designing rules and presumptions in a world of imperfect information, the general theme is that, as confidence in public harm goes up, the evidentiary burden must go down. This is why antitrust law tilts the field in the enforcer’s favor in cases involving practices that are known to always, or almost always, be harmful. But none of the conduct covered by the DCA falls into this category. Unlike with, say, price-fixing cartels or territorial divisions, there is currently no consensus that the practices the DMA would prohibit are generally harmful or anticompetitive. To the contrary, when assessing a self-preferencing case against Google in 2018, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) found important consumer benefits[7] that outweighed any inconveniences they may impose on competitors.

By imposing per se rules with no scope for consumer-welfare or efficiency exemptions, the DCA could capture swaths of procompetitive conduct. This is a steep—and possibly irrational—price to pay for administrative expediency. Rather than adopt a “speed-at-all-costs” approach, India should design its rules to minimize error costs and ensure the system’s overall efficiency.

II. The Costs of Ignoring Cost-Benefit Analysis

But this cannot be done, or it cannot be done rationally, unless India is crystal clear about what the costs and benefits of digital-competition regulation are. As things stand, it is unclear whether this question has been given sufficient thought.

For one, the DCA’s goals do not seem to align well with competition law. While competition law protects competition for the ultimate benefit of consumers, the DCA—like the DMA—is concerned with aiding rivals, rather than benefiting consumers. Unmooring digital competition regulation from consumer welfare is ill-advised. It opens the enforcer to aggressive rent seeking by private parties with a vested interest in never being satisfied,[8] who may demand far-reaching product-design changes that don’t jibe with what consumers—i.e., the public at-large—actually want.

Indeed, when the system’s lodestar shifts from benefiting consumers to facilitating competitors, there is a risk that the only tangible measure of the law’s success will be the extent to which rivals are satisfied[9] with gatekeepers’ product-design changes, and their relative market-share fluctuations. Sure enough, the European Commission recently cited stakeholders’ dissatisfaction[10] as one of the primary reasons to launch five DMA noncompliance investigations, mere weeks after the law’s entry into force. In the DCA’s case, the Central Government’s ability to control CCI decisions further exacerbates the risk of capture and political decision making.

While digital-competition regulation’s expected benefits remain unclear and difficult to measure, there are at least three concrete types of costs that India can, and should, consider.

First, there is the cost of harming consumers and diminishing innovation. Mounting evidence from the EU demonstrates this to be a very real risk. For example, Meta’s Threads was delayed[11] in the EU block due to uncertainties about compliance with the DMA. The same happened with Gemini, Google’s AI program.[12] Some product functionalities have also been degraded. For instance, in order to comply with the DMA’s strict self-preferencing prohibitions, maps that appear in Google’s search results no longer link to Google Maps, much to the chagrin of European users.[13]

Google has also been forced to remove[14] features like hotel bookings and reviews from its search results. Until it can accommodate competitors who offer similar services (assuming that is even possible), these specialized search results will remain buried several clicks away from users’ general searches. Not only is this inconvenient for consumers, but it has important ramifications for business users.

Early estimates suggest that clicks from Google ads to hotel websites decreased by 17.6%[15]as a result of the DMA. Meanwhile, on iOS, rivals like Meta[16] and Epic Games[17] are finding it harder than they expected to offer competing app stores or payment services. At least some of this is due to the reality that offering safe online services is a costly endeavour. Apple reviews millions of apps every year[18] to weed out bad actors, and replicating this business is easier said than done. In other words, the DMA is falling short even on its own terms.

In other cases, consumers are likely to be saddled with a litany of pointless choices, as well as changes in product design that undermine user experience. For example, the European Commission appears to believe that the best way to ensure that Apple doesn’t favor its own browser on iOS is by requiring consumers to sift through 12 browser offerings[19] presented on a choice screen.[20] But consumers haven’t asked for this “choice.” The simple explanation for the policy’s failure is that, despite the DMA’s insistence to the contrary, users were always free to choose their preferred browser.

Supporters of digital-competition regulation will no doubt retort that India should also consider the costs of inaction. This is certainly true. But it should do so against the background of the existing legal framework, not a hypothetical legal and regulatory vacuum. Digital platforms are already subject to general (and fully functional) competition law, as well as to a range of other sector-specific regulations.

For instance, Amazon and Flipkart are precluded by India’s foreign-direct-investment (FDI) policy from offering first-party sales[21] to end-users on their e-commerce platforms. In addition, the CCI has launched several investigations of digital-platform conduct that would presumably be caught by the DCA, including by Google,[22] Amazon,[23] Meta,[24] Apple,[25] and Flipkart.[26]

The facile dichotomy made between digital-competition regulation and “the digital wild west”[27] is essentially a red herring. Nobody is saying that digital platforms should be above the law. Rather, the question is whether a special competition law is necessary and justified considering the costs such a law would engender, as well as the availability of other legal and regulatory instruments to tackle the same conduct.

This is particularly the case when these legal and regulatory instruments incorporate time-honed analytical tools, heuristics, and procedural safeguards. In 2019, India’s Competition Law Review Committee[28] concluded that a special law was unnecessary. In a report titled “Competition Policy for the Digital Era,”[29] a panel of experts retained by the European Commission reached the same conclusion.

Complicating the question further still is that the DCA would mark a paradigm shift for Indian competition policy. In 2000, the Raghavan Committee Report was crucial in aligning Indian competition law with international best practices, including by moving analysis away from blunt structural presumptions and toward the careful observance of economic effects. As such, it paved the way for the 2002 Competition Act—a milestone of Indian law.

The DCA, by contrast, would overturn these advancements to target companies based on size, obviating any effects analysis. This would amount to taking Indian competition law back to the era of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 (MRTP). Again, is the hodgepodge of products and services known collectively as “digital markets” sufficiently unique to warrant such a drastic deviation from well-established antitrust doctrine?

The third group of costs that the government must consider are the DCA’s enforcement costs. The five DMA noncompliance investigations launched recently by the European Commission have served to dispel the once-common belief that the law would be “self-executing”[30] and that its enforcement would be collaborative, rather than adversarial. With just 80 dedicated staff,[31] many believe the Commission is understaffed[32] to enforce the DMA (initially, the most optimistic officials asked for 220 full-time employees).[33] If the EU—a sprawling regulatory superstate[34]—struggles to find the capacity to deploy digital-competition rules, can India expect to fare any better?

Enforcing the DCA would require expertise in a range of fields, including competition law, data privacy and security, telecommunications, and consumer protection, among others. Either India can produce these new experts, or it will have to siphon them from somewhere else. This raises the question of opportunity costs. Assuming that India even can build a team to enforce the DCA, the government would also need to be reasonably certain that, given the significant overlaps in expertise, these resources wouldn’t yield better returns if allocated elsewhere—such as, for example, in the fight against cartels or other more obviously nefarious conduct.

In short, if the government cannot answer the question of how much the Indian public stands to gain for every Rupee of public money invested into enforcing the DCA, it should go back to the drawing board and either redesign or drop the DCA altogether.

III. India Is Not Europe

When deciding whether to adopt digital-competition rules, India should consider its own interests and play to its strengths. These need not be the same as Europe’s and, indeed, it would be surprising if they were. Despite the European Commission’s insistence to the contrary, the DMA is not a law that enshrines general or universal economic truths. It is, and always has been, an industrial policy tool,[35] designed to align with the EU’s strengths, weaknesses, and strategic priorities. One cannot just assume that these idiosyncrasies translate into the Indian context.

As International Center for Law & Economics President Geoffrey Manne has written,[36] promotion of investment in the infrastructure required to facilitate economic growth and provision of a secure environment for ongoing innovation are both crucial to the success of developing markets like India’s. Securing these conditions demands dynamic and flexible competition policymaking.

For young, rapidly growing industries like e-commerce and other digital markets, it is essential to attract consistent investment and industry know-how in order to ensure that such markets are able to innovate and evolve to meet consumer demand. India has already witnessed a few leading platforms help build the necessary infrastructure during the nascent stages of sectoral development; continued investment along these lines will be essential to ensure continued consumer benefits.

In the above context, emulating the EU’s DMA approach could be a catastrophic mistake. Indian digital platforms are still not as mature as the EU’s, and a copy and paste of the DMA may prove unfit for the particular attributes of India’s market. The DCA could potentially capture many Indian companies. Paytm, Zomato, Ola Cabs, Nykaa, AllTheRooms, Squeaky, FlipCarK, MakeMyTrip, and Meesho (among others) are some of the companies that could be stifled by this new regulatory straitjacket.

This would not only harm India’s competitiveness, but would also deny consumers important benefits. Despite India’s remarkable economic growth over the last decade, it remains underserved by the most powerful consumer and business technologies, relative to its peers in Europe and North America. The priority should be to continue to attract and nurture investment, not to impose regulations that may further slow the deployment of critical infrastructure.

Indeed, this also raises the question of whether the EU’s objectives with the DMA are even ones that India would want to emulate. While the DMA’s effects are likely to be varied, it is clear that one major impetus for the law is distributional: to ensure that platform users earn a “fair share” of the benefits they generate. Such an approach could backfire, however, as using competition policy to reduce profits may simply lead to less innovation and significantly reduced benefits for the very consumers it is supposed to help. This risk is significantly magnified in India, where the primary need is to ensure the introduction and maintenance of innovative technology, rather than fine tuning the precise distribution of its rewards.

A DMA-like approach could imperil the domestic innovation that has been the backbone of initiatives like Digital India[37] and Startup India.[38] Implementation of a DMA-like regime would discourage growing companies that may not be able to cope with the increased compliance burden. It would also impose enormous regulatory burdens on the government and great uncertainty for businesses, as a DMA-like regime would require the government to define and quantify competitive benchmarks for industries that have not yet even grown out of their nascent stages. At a crucial juncture when India is seen as an investment-friendly nation,[39] implementation of a DMA-like regime could create significant roadblocks to investment—all without any obligation on the part of the government to ensure that consumers benefit.

This is because ex-ante regimes impose preemptive constraints on digital platforms, with no consideration of possible efficiencies that benefit consumers. While competition enforcement in general may tend to promote innovation, jurisdictions that do not allow for efficiency defenses tend to produce relatively less innovation, as careful, case-by-case competition enforcement is replaced with preemptive prohibitions that impede experimentation.

Regulation of digital markets that have yet to reach full maturity is bound to create a more restrictive environment that will harm economic growth, technological advancement, and investment. For India, it is crucial that a nuanced approach is taken to ensure that digital markets can sustain their momentum, without being bogged down by various and unnecessary compliance requirements that are likely to do more harm than good.

IV. Conclusion

In a multi-polar world, developing countries can no longer be expected to mechanically adopt the laws and regulations demanded of them by senior partners to trade agreements and international organizations. Nor should they blindly defer to foreign legislatures, who may (and likely do) have vastly different interests and priorities than their own.

Nobody is denying that the EU has provided many useful legal and regulatory blueprints in the past, many of which work just as well abroad as they do at home. But based on what we know so far, the DMA is not poised to become one of them. It is overly stringent, ignores efficiencies, is indifferent about effects on consumers, incorporates few procedural safeguards, is lukewarm on cost-benefit analysis, and risks subverting well-established competition-law principles. These notably include that the law should ultimately protect competition, not competitors.

Rather than instinctively playing catch up, India could ask the hard questions that the EU eschewed for the sake of a quick political victory against popular bogeymen. What is this law trying to achieve? What are the DCA’s supposed benefits? What are its potential costs? Do those benefits outweigh those costs? If the answer to these questions is ambivalent or negative, India’s digital future may well lay elsewhere.

[1] Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law, Government of India Ministry of Corporate Affairs (Feb. 27, 2024), https://www.mca.gov.in/bin/dms/getdocument?mds=gzGtvSkE3zIVhAuBe2pbow%253D%253D&type=open.

[2] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal of the European Union, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925.

[3] Press Release, Designated Gatekeepers Must Now Comply With All Obligations Under the Digital Markets Act, European Commission (Mar. 7, 2024), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/designated-gatekeepers-must-now-comply-all-obligations-under-digital-markets-act-2024-03-07_en.

[4] Press Release, Digital Markets Act: Commission Designates Six Gatekeepers, European Commission (Sep. 6, 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4328.

[5] Press Release, Cade and European Commission Discuss Collaboration on Digital Market Agenda Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (Mar. 29, 2023), https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-and-european-commission-discuss-collaboration-on-digital-market-agenda.

[6] Summary of Remarks by Jean Tirole, Analysis Group (Sep. 27, 2018), available at https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/uploadedimages/content/insights/ag_features/summary-of-remarks-by-jean-tirole_english.pdf.

[7] Geoffrey A. Manne, Google’s India Case and a Return to Consumer-Focused Antitrust, Truth on the Market (Feb. 8, 2018), https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/02/08/return-to-consumer-focused-antitrust-in-india.

[8] Adam Kovacevich, The Digital Markets Act’s “Statler & Waldorf” Problem, Chamber of Progress, Medium (Mar. 7, 2024), https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/the-digital-markets-acts-statler-waldorf-problem-2c9b6786bb55.

[9] Id.

[10] Remarks by Executive-Vice President Vestager and Commissioner Breton on the Opening of Non-Compliance Investigations Under the Digital Markets Act, European Commission (Mar. 25, 2024), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_1702.

[11] Makena Kelly, Here’s Why Threads Is Delayed in Europe, The Verge (Jul. 10, 2023), https://www.theverge.com/23789754/threads-meta-twitter-eu-dma-digital-markets.

[12] Andrew Grush, Did You Know Google Gemini Isn’t Available in Europe Yet?, Android Authority (Dec. 7, 2023), https://www.androidauthority.com/did-you-know-google-gemini-isnt-available-in-europe-yet-3392451.

[13] Edith Hancock, ‘Severe Pain in the Butt’: EU’s Digital Competition Rules Make New Enemies on the Internet, Politico (Mar. 25, 2024), https://www.politico.eu/article/european-union-digital-markets-act-google-search-malicious-compliance.

[14] Oliver Bethell, An Update on Our Preparations for the DMA, Google Blog (Jan. 17, 2024), https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/an-update-on-our-preparations-for-the-dma.

[15] Mirai, Linkedin (Apr. 17, 2024), https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7161330551709138945.

[16] Alex Heath, Meta Says Apple Has Made It ‘Very Difficult’ To Build Rival App Stores in the EU, The Verge (Feb. 2, 2024), https://www.theverge.com/2024/2/1/24058572/zuckerberg-meta-apple-app-store-iphone-eu-sideloading.

[17] Id.

[18] 2022 App Store Transparency Report, Apple Inc. (2023), available at https://www.apple.com/legal/more-resources/docs/2022-App-Store-Transparency-Report.pdf.

[19] About the Browser Choice Screen in iOS 17, Apple Developer, (Feb. 2024), https://developer.apple.com/support/browser-choice-screen.

[20] Remarks by Executive-Vice President Vestager and Commissioner Breton on the Opening of Non-Compliance Investigations Under the Digital Markets Act, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_1702.

[21] Saheli Roy Choudhury, If You Hold Amazon Shares, Here’s What You Need to Know About India’s E-Commerce Law, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/05/amazon-how-india-ecommerce-law-will-affect-the-retailer.html.

[22] Press Release, CCI Imposes a Monetary Penalty of Rs.1337.76 Crore on Google for Anti-Competitive Practices in Relation to Android Mobile Devices, Competition Commission of India (Oct. 20, 2022), https://www.cci.gov.in/antitrust/press-release/details/261/0; CCI Orders Probe Into Google’s Play Store Billing Policies, The Economic Times, (Sep. 7, 2023), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/startups/competition-watchdog-orders-probe-into-googles-play-store-billing-policies/articleshow/108528079.cms.

[23] Why Competition Commission of India Is Investigating Amazon, Outlook, (May. 1, 2022), https://business.outlookindia.com/news/explained-why-is-competition-commission-of-india-probing-amazon-news-194362.

[24] HC Dismisses Facebook India’s Plea Challenging CCI Probe Into Whatsapp’s 2021 Privacy Policy, The Economic Times (Sep. 7, 2023), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/women-participation-in-tech-roles-in-non-tech-sectors-to-grow-by-24-3-by-2027-report/articleshow/109374509.cms.

[25] Case No. 24 of 2021, Competition Commission of India, (Dec. 31, 2021), https://www.cci.gov.in/antitrust/orders/details/32/0.

[26] Supra note 23.

[27] Anne C. Witt, The Digital Markets Act: Regulating the Wild West, 60(3) Common Market Law Review 625 (2023).

[28] Report of Competition Law Review Committee, Indian Economic Service (Jul. 2019), available at https://www.ies.gov.in/pdfs/Report-Competition-CLRC.pdf.

[29] Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, & Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, European Commission Directorate-General for Competition (2019), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/407537.

[30] Strengthening the Digital Markets Act and Its Enforcement, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz (Sep. 7, 2021), available at https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/XYZ/zweites-gemeinsames-positionspapier-der-friends-of-an-effective-digital-markets-act.pdf.

[31] Meghan McCarty Carino, A New EU Law Aims to Tame Tech Giants. But Enforcing It Could Turn out to Be Tricky Marketplace (Mar. 7, 2024), https://www.marketplace.org/2024/03/07/a-new-eu-law-aims-to-tame-tech-giants-but-enforcing-it-could-turn-out-to-be-tricky.

[32] Id.

[33] Luca Bertuzzi & Molly Killeen, Digital Brief: DSA Fourth Trilogue, DMA Diverging Views, France’s Fine for Google, EurActiv (Apr. 1, 2022), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/digital-brief-dsa-fourth-trilogue-dma-diverging-views-frances-fine-for-google.

[34] Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: The Rise of a Regulatory Superstate in Europe, Columbia Law School (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/brussels-effect-rise-regulatory-superstate-europe.

[35] Lazar Radic, Gatekeeping, the DMA, and the Future of Competition Regulation, Truth on the Market (Nov. 8, 2023), https://truthonthemarket.com/2023/11/08/gatekeeping-the-dma-and-the-future-of-competition-regulation.

[36] Geoffrey A. Manne, European Union’s Digital Markets Act Not Suitable for Developing Economies, Including India, The Times of India (Feb. 14, 2023), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/european-unions-digital-markets-act-not-suitable-for-developing-economies-including-india.

[37] Digital India, Common Services Centre (Apr. 18, 2024), https://csc.gov.in/digitalIndia.

[38] Startup India, Government of India (Apr. 16, 2024), https://www.startupindia.gov.in.

[39] Invest India, Government of India (Mar. 20, 2024), https://www.investindia.gov.in/why-india.

 

In an April 17 address to United Steelworkers in Pittsburgh, President Joe Biden vowed that his administration would “thwart the acquisition of U.S. Steel by a Japanese company,” Nippon Steel, telling the assembled union members that U.S. Steel “has been an iconic American company for more than a century and it should remain totally American.”

Aside from the impropriety of apparently prejudging a proposed combination currently under investigation by the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ), would blocking this merger make any sense on national security or economic grounds? The answer is no.

Read the full piece here.

Last week was the occasion of the “spring meeting”; that is, the big annual antitrust convention in Washington, D.C. hosted by the American Bar Association (ABA) Antitrust Section. To engage in a bit of self-plagiarism (efficient for me, at least), I had this to say about it last year…

Read the full piece here.

Abstract

The use of antitrust in the context of food is problematic because it so clearly violates the Consumer Welfare Standard as prescribed by the courts. Ultimately, antitrust rhetoric promoting ad nauseam enforcement will not improve consumer welfare. Advancing consumer welfare in the food industry must mean prioritizing lower food prices over some arbitrary threshold of market competition or protecting small farms. Courts can and should begin distinguishing these goals immediately.

Read at SSRN.

The U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) recent complaint charging Apple with monopolizing smartphone markets is, according to Assistant U.S. Attorney General Jonathan Kanter, intended as a contribution to the agency’s “enduring legacy of taking on the biggest and toughest monopolies in history.”

Unfortunately, the case has fundamental weaknesses in its assessment of both Apple’s alleged monopoly power and the “exclusionary” nature of its business strategies. These infirmities have been discussed at-length by, among others, Alden Abbott, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Randall Picker.

What appears to have flown under the radar, however, is the DOJ’s flawed understanding of the goals and scope of what it calls “our system of antitrust laws.”

Read the full piece here.

TL;DR

Background: There has been recent legislative movement on a pair of major bills related to children’s online safety and privacy. H.R. 7891, the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) has 62 cosponsors in the U.S. Senate. Meanwhile, H.R. 7890, the Children and Teens’ Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA 2.0) also has bipartisan support within the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee. At the time of publication, these and a slate of other bills related to children’s online safety and privacy were scheduled to be marked up April 17 by the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee.

But… If enacted, the primary effect of these bills is likely to be less free online content for minors. Raising the regulatory burdens on online platforms that host minors, as well as restricting creators’ ability to monetize their content, are both likely to yield greater investment in identifying and excluding minors from online spaces, rather than creating safe and vibrant online ecosystems and content that cater to them. In other words, these bills could lead to minors losing the many benefits of internet usage. A more cost-effective way to address potential online harms to teens and children would be to encourage parents and minors to make use of available tools to avoid those harms and to dedicate more resources to prosecuting those who use online platforms to harm minors.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

RAISING THE COST TO SERVE MINORS COULD LEAD TO THEIR EXCLUSION

If the costs of serving minors surpass the revenues that online platforms can generate from serving them, those platforms will invest in excluding underage users, rather than creating safe and vibrant content and platforms for them. 

KOSA will substantially increase the costs that online platforms bear for serving minors. The bill would require a “high impact online company” to exercise “reasonable care” in its design features to “prevent and mitigate” certain harms. These harms include certain mental-health disorders and patterns indicating or encouraging compulsive use by minors, as well as physical violence, cyberbullying, and discriminatory harassment. Moreover, KOSA requires all covered platforms to implement default safeguards to limit design features that encourage minors’ use of the platforms and to control the use of personalized recommendation systems.

RESTRICTING TARGETED ADVERTISING LEADS TO LESS FREE CONTENT

A significant portion of internet content is delivered by what economists call multisided platforms. On one side of the platform, users enjoy free access to content, while on the other side, advertisers are granted a medium to reach users. In effect, advertisers subsidize users’ access to online content. Platforms also collect data from users in order to serve them targeted ads, the most lucrative form of advertising. Without those ads, there would be less revenue to fund access to, and creation of, content. This is no less true when it comes to content of interest to minors.

COPPA 2.0 would expand the protections granted by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 to users under age 13 to also cover those between 13 and 17 years of age. Where the current law requires parental consent to collect and use persistent identifiers for “individual-specific advertising” directed to children under age 13, COPPA 2.0 would require the verifiable consent of the teen or a parent to serve such ads to teens. 

Obtaining verifiable consent has proven sufficiently costly under the current COPPA rule that almost no covered entities make efforts to obtain it. COPPA has instead largely prevented platforms from monetizing children’s content, which has meant that less of it is created. Extending the law to cover teens would generate similar results. Without the ability to serve them targeted ads, platforms will have less incentive to encourage the creation of teen-focused content.

DE-FACTO AGE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

To comply with laws designed to protect minors, online platforms will need to verify whether its users are minors. While both KOSA and COPPA 2.0 disclaim establishing any age-verification requirements or the collection of any data not already collected “in the normal course of business,” they both establish constructive knowledge standards for violators (i.e., “should have known” or “knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances”). Online platforms will need to be able to identify their users who are minors in order to comply with the prohibition on serving them personalized recommendations (KOSA) or targeted advertising (COPPA 2.0). 

Age-verification requirements have been found to violate the First Amendment, in part because they aren’t the least-restrictive means to protect children online. As one federal district court put it: “parents may rightly decide to regulate their children’s use of social media—including restricting the amount of time they spend on it, the content they may access, or even those they chat with. And many tools exist to help parents with this.”

A BETTER WAY FORWARD

Educating parents and minors about those widely available practical and technological tools to mitigate the harms of internet use is a better way to protect minors online, and would pass First Amendment scrutiny. Another way to address the problem would be to increase the resources available to law enforcement to go after predators. The Invest in Child Safety Act of 2024 is one such proposal to give overwhelmed investigators the necessary resources to combat child sexual exploitation.

For more on how to best protect minors online, see “A Law & Economics Approach to Social Media Regulation” and “A Coasean Analysis of Online Age-Verification and Parental-Consent Regimes.” 

In this “Age of the Administrative State,” federal agencies have incredible latitude to impose policies without much direction or input from Congress. President Barack Obama fully pulled off the mask in 2014, when he announced “[w]e are not just going to be waiting for legislation,” declaring “I’ve got a pen, and I’ve got a phone.” Subsequent presidents have similarly discovered that they had pens and phones, too.

Read the full piece here.