Showing 9 of 521 Publications in Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Why Consumer Legal Funding Poses No Risk to National Security

Popular Media Consumer legal funding’s sole purpose is to help individuals and families alleviate cash-flow problems after an accident, while seeking compensation for injuries through lawsuits. Read . . .

Consumer legal funding’s sole purpose is to help individuals and families alleviate cash-flow problems after an accident, while seeking compensation for injuries through lawsuits.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

After the FTX Crash, What’s Next for Crypto?

TOTM For many observers, the collapse of the crypto exchange FTX understandably raises questions about the future of the crypto economy, or even of public blockchains . . .

For many observers, the collapse of the crypto exchange FTX understandably raises questions about the future of the crypto economy, or even of public blockchains as a technology. The topic is high on the agenda of the U.S. Congress this week, with the House Financial Services Committee set for a Dec. 13 hearing with FTX CEO John J. Ray III and founder and former CEO Sam Bankman-Fried, followed by a Dec. 14 hearing of the Senate Banking Committee on “Crypto Crash: Why the FTX Bubble Burst and the Harm to Consumers.”

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

‘Why Managers Matter’ as Applied Organization (Design) Theory

Scholarship Abstract Core organization design issues have emerged in recent popular and influential discussions of managers and organizations, specifically in a genre of writing—the “bossless company . . .

Abstract

Core organization design issues have emerged in recent popular and influential discussions of managers and organizations, specifically in a genre of writing—the “bossless company narrative”—that declares that the classic managerial hierarchy is dead. In this article, we review our critical discussion of this genre in our book, Why Managers Still Matter, arguing that the narrative manifests bad empiricism and half-baked organization theory. However, we also raise the possibility of a charitable reading of the genre: it points to themes in organization design theory that are currently underdeveloped, notably with respect to, for example, the impact of organizational structure and control on employee motivations and the importance of contingencies such as the characteristics of knowledge for organization design.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Why Do Companies Go Woke?

Scholarship Abstract “Woke” companies are those that are committed to socially progressive causes, with a particular focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion as these terms are . . .

Abstract

“Woke” companies are those that are committed to socially progressive causes, with a particular focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion as these terms are understood through the lens of critical theory. There is little evidence of systematic support for woke ideas among executives and the population at large, and going woke does not appear to improve company performance. Why, then are so many firms embracing woke policies and attitudes? We suggest that going woke is an emergent strategy that is largely shaped by middle managers rather than owners, top managers, or employees. We build on theories from agency theory, institutional theory, and intra-organizational ecology to argue that wokeness arises from middle managers and support personnel using their delegated responsibility and specialist status to engage in woke internal advocacy, which may increase their influence and job security. Broader social and cultural trends tend to reinforce this process. We discuss implications for organizational behavior and performance including perceived corporate hypocrisy (“woke-washing”), the potential loss of creativity from restricting viewpoint diversity, and the need for companies to keep up with a constantly changing cultural landscape.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Administrative Browbeating and Insurance Markets

Scholarship Abstract Some state insurance regulators have been using their regulatory muscle to coerce insurers into furthering their political ends. They have protected favored but harmful . . .

Abstract

Some state insurance regulators have been using their regulatory muscle to coerce insurers into furthering their political ends. They have protected favored but harmful commercial activity and have strangled legal but disfavored individual conduct.

In the process, those regulators have disabled the benefits that a properly functioning insurance market can provide. They have hampered individuals’ ability to engage in desirable activities, like home ownership, that would otherwise be too risky given their incomes; they have made socially desirable but not risk-free activities, like responsible firearm ownership, less safe; and they have deprived the market of data on safety and risks. Such use of government power to abuse an “outgroup” for the benefit of the “ingroup” can also have devastating effects on social stability.

This paper analyzes the situation through two cases and suggests solutions that preserve near-plenary state control over insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act while limiting state regulators’ ability to abuse this special federal-state arrangement.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Banco Central Erra en su Enfoque Sobre Comisiones de Tarjetas

Popular Media El Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) interpreta la regulación de las comisiones por el uso de tarjetas de crédito o débito como una justificación . . .

El Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) interpreta la regulación de las comisiones por el uso de tarjetas de crédito o débito como una justificación para establecer topes máximos, de tal forma que los emisores recuperen únicamente los costos operacionales y estáticos del sistema.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

How Should the Law Tackle Rapidly Evolving Financial Technologies?

Popular Media The use of technology to provide financial services (FinTech) represents one of the most fascinating interplays in economic history in the last 150 years. Beginning with the . . .

The use of technology to provide financial services (FinTech) represents one of the most fascinating interplays in economic history in the last 150 years. Beginning with the introduction of the telegraph in 1838 and the first transatlantic cable in 1866, technological innovation defined the development of global financial markets throughout the 19th century. Similarly, Barclay’s introduction of the automatic teller machine in 1967 represents one of the most important financial innovations in the banking sector in the last century and initiated financial players’ shift toward digital infrastructure. Over the last half-century, the global financial industry has become one of the top purchasers of IT products. Regulation has struggled to keep apace.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

If It Were A Snake, It Would Have Bitten You: Money In The New Keynesian Model

Scholarship Abstract The New Keynesian literature focuses on rules-based interest rate policies, abstracting from the role of monetary aggregates. In the background, though, the quantity equation . . .

Abstract

The New Keynesian literature focuses on rules-based interest rate policies, abstracting from the role of monetary aggregates. In the background, though, the quantity equation must hold — every transaction requires money, with money units used in multiple transactions within a period. What is often overlooked is that imposing a rules-based interest rate policy is equivalent to assuming a particular money velocity specification. Using this alternative specification, we derive the efficient money supply rule and show that determinate equilibria exist with money supply policy and a fixed nominal interest rate. We estimate a New Keynesian model with either conventional interest rate policy or our money market reinterpretation of the model, accounting for the policy rate lower bound (PRLB). The money market estimates exactly match the PRLB duration in the data, whereas the conventional estimates fall short by four years.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Regulación a las comisiones de tarjetas de pago

Scholarship [The attached was published by La Academia de Centroamérica, a private, nonprofit research center based in Costa Rica, as an adaptation of the ICLE issue . . .

[The attached was published by La Academia de Centroamérica, a private, nonprofit research center based in Costa Rica, as an adaptation of the ICLE issue brief “Regulating Payment-Card Fees: International Best Practices and Lessons for Costa Rica.” Translation by Juan Carlos Hidalgo.]

Resumen Ejecutivo

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance