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Showing 9 of 521 Publications in Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance
Popular Media Consumer legal funding’s sole purpose is to help individuals and families alleviate cash-flow problems after an accident, while seeking compensation for injuries through lawsuits. Read . . .
Consumer legal funding’s sole purpose is to help individuals and families alleviate cash-flow problems after an accident, while seeking compensation for injuries through lawsuits.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM For many observers, the collapse of the crypto exchange FTX understandably raises questions about the future of the crypto economy, or even of public blockchains . . .
For many observers, the collapse of the crypto exchange FTX understandably raises questions about the future of the crypto economy, or even of public blockchains as a technology. The topic is high on the agenda of the U.S. Congress this week, with the House Financial Services Committee set for a Dec. 13 hearing with FTX CEO John J. Ray III and founder and former CEO Sam Bankman-Fried, followed by a Dec. 14 hearing of the Senate Banking Committee on “Crypto Crash: Why the FTX Bubble Burst and the Harm to Consumers.”
Scholarship Abstract Core organization design issues have emerged in recent popular and influential discussions of managers and organizations, specifically in a genre of writing—the “bossless company . . .
Core organization design issues have emerged in recent popular and influential discussions of managers and organizations, specifically in a genre of writing—the “bossless company narrative”—that declares that the classic managerial hierarchy is dead. In this article, we review our critical discussion of this genre in our book, Why Managers Still Matter, arguing that the narrative manifests bad empiricism and half-baked organization theory. However, we also raise the possibility of a charitable reading of the genre: it points to themes in organization design theory that are currently underdeveloped, notably with respect to, for example, the impact of organizational structure and control on employee motivations and the importance of contingencies such as the characteristics of knowledge for organization design.
Scholarship Abstract “Woke” companies are those that are committed to socially progressive causes, with a particular focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion as these terms are . . .
“Woke” companies are those that are committed to socially progressive causes, with a particular focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion as these terms are understood through the lens of critical theory. There is little evidence of systematic support for woke ideas among executives and the population at large, and going woke does not appear to improve company performance. Why, then are so many firms embracing woke policies and attitudes? We suggest that going woke is an emergent strategy that is largely shaped by middle managers rather than owners, top managers, or employees. We build on theories from agency theory, institutional theory, and intra-organizational ecology to argue that wokeness arises from middle managers and support personnel using their delegated responsibility and specialist status to engage in woke internal advocacy, which may increase their influence and job security. Broader social and cultural trends tend to reinforce this process. We discuss implications for organizational behavior and performance including perceived corporate hypocrisy (“woke-washing”), the potential loss of creativity from restricting viewpoint diversity, and the need for companies to keep up with a constantly changing cultural landscape.
Scholarship Abstract Some state insurance regulators have been using their regulatory muscle to coerce insurers into furthering their political ends. They have protected favored but harmful . . .
Some state insurance regulators have been using their regulatory muscle to coerce insurers into furthering their political ends. They have protected favored but harmful commercial activity and have strangled legal but disfavored individual conduct.
In the process, those regulators have disabled the benefits that a properly functioning insurance market can provide. They have hampered individuals’ ability to engage in desirable activities, like home ownership, that would otherwise be too risky given their incomes; they have made socially desirable but not risk-free activities, like responsible firearm ownership, less safe; and they have deprived the market of data on safety and risks. Such use of government power to abuse an “outgroup” for the benefit of the “ingroup” can also have devastating effects on social stability.
This paper analyzes the situation through two cases and suggests solutions that preserve near-plenary state control over insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act while limiting state regulators’ ability to abuse this special federal-state arrangement.
Popular Media El Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) interpreta la regulación de las comisiones por el uso de tarjetas de crédito o débito como una justificación . . .
El Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) interpreta la regulación de las comisiones por el uso de tarjetas de crédito o débito como una justificación para establecer topes máximos, de tal forma que los emisores recuperen únicamente los costos operacionales y estáticos del sistema.
Read the full piece here/Lea la pieza completa aquí.
Popular Media The use of technology to provide financial services (FinTech) represents one of the most fascinating interplays in economic history in the last 150 years. Beginning with the . . .
The use of technology to provide financial services (FinTech) represents one of the most fascinating interplays in economic history in the last 150 years. Beginning with the introduction of the telegraph in 1838 and the first transatlantic cable in 1866, technological innovation defined the development of global financial markets throughout the 19th century. Similarly, Barclay’s introduction of the automatic teller machine in 1967 represents one of the most important financial innovations in the banking sector in the last century and initiated financial players’ shift toward digital infrastructure. Over the last half-century, the global financial industry has become one of the top purchasers of IT products. Regulation has struggled to keep apace.
Scholarship Abstract The New Keynesian literature focuses on rules-based interest rate policies, abstracting from the role of monetary aggregates. In the background, though, the quantity equation . . .
The New Keynesian literature focuses on rules-based interest rate policies, abstracting from the role of monetary aggregates. In the background, though, the quantity equation must hold — every transaction requires money, with money units used in multiple transactions within a period. What is often overlooked is that imposing a rules-based interest rate policy is equivalent to assuming a particular money velocity specification. Using this alternative specification, we derive the efficient money supply rule and show that determinate equilibria exist with money supply policy and a fixed nominal interest rate. We estimate a New Keynesian model with either conventional interest rate policy or our money market reinterpretation of the model, accounting for the policy rate lower bound (PRLB). The money market estimates exactly match the PRLB duration in the data, whereas the conventional estimates fall short by four years.
Scholarship [The attached was published by La Academia de Centroamérica, a private, nonprofit research center based in Costa Rica, as an adaptation of the ICLE issue . . .
[The attached was published by La Academia de Centroamérica, a private, nonprofit research center based in Costa Rica, as an adaptation of the ICLE issue brief “Regulating Payment-Card Fees: International Best Practices and Lessons for Costa Rica.” Translation by Juan Carlos Hidalgo.]
En el 2020, la Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica aprobó la Ley 9.831, la cual le otorgó al Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) la autoridad para regular las comisiones de las tarjetas de pago. El BCCR, posteriormente, desarrolló una regulación que estableció una comisión máxima para los bancos emisores y adquirentes, la cual entró en efecto el 24 de noviembre del 2020.
En su evaluación ordinaria de dichos controles de precios, realizada en noviembre del 2021, el Banco Central presentó un marco para limitar aún más las comisiones que cobran las tarjetas nacionales e introducir límites a las comisiones que cobran las tarjetas emitidas en el extranjero.
Este documento analiza la evidencia teórica y empírica internacional con las comisiones de intercambio y adquirencia. Encontramos que las mejores prácticas internacionales requieren que las redes de pago sean consideradas como mercados bilaterales dinámicos y, por lo tanto, que los análisis tomen en cuenta los efectos de las regulaciones en ambos lados del mercado: comerciantes y consumidores.
Por el contrario, el análisis del BCCR se enfoca, principalmente, en los costos estáticos que afectan a los comerciantes, prestándole poca atención a los efectos sobre los consumidores —y mucho menos a los efectos dinámicos—. De tal forma, la propuesta de comisiones máximas del BCCR interferirá con la operación eficiente del mercado de tarjetas de pago en maneras que probablemente afecten a los consumidores.
En concreto, las pérdidas de los bancos emisores y adquirentes probablemente se les trasladen a los consumidores en la forma de comisiones bancarias o de tarjetas más altas y menos inversión en mejoras. Los consumidores de menores recursos serán los más afectados.
Con base en la evidencia disponible, las mejores prácticas internacionales conllevan: