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Showing 9 of 119 Results in Market Definition
TOTM Much has been made of Judge Sullivan’s recent decision in City of New York v. Group Health Incorporated and its implications for the UPP test . . .
Much has been made of Judge Sullivan’s recent decision in City of New York v. Group Health Incorporated and its implications for the UPP test and market definition in merger cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Given the 2010 Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ (2010 HMGs) shift toward diversion ratios and margins and away from market shares, the blogosphere has sold Judge Sullivan’s decision as sign that the agencies might have a tough time selling the UPP to federal courts in the post-2010 HMG world.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM I’m still working through the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and like Dan, I find myself puzzling over some of the revisions, and in favor of . . .
I’m still working through the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and like Dan, I find myself puzzling over some of the revisions, and in favor of others. I wanted to start with some first impressions. The big movement here, is that the new HMGs repudiate the market definition requirement in the new Section 4 and in Section 6 on Unilateral Effects. Consider the language in Section 4 on market definition…
Popular Media News items continue to pile up suggesting that the FTC is likely to challenge Google’s acquisition of mobile application and website advertising provider, AdMob. See this . . .
News items continue to pile up suggesting that the FTC is likely to challenge Google’s acquisition of mobile application and website advertising provider, AdMob. See this recent article from the Wall Street Journal and this from Yahoo!, for example.
TOTM Yesterday the final Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review workshop was held and, among other antitrust luminaries, our own Josh Wright participated. We look forward to a . . .
Yesterday the final Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review workshop was held and, among other antitrust luminaries, our own Josh Wright participated. We look forward to a report from the front lines.
TOTM Thanks to all of our participants in the Merger Guidelines Symposium. We hope many of you, as well as our readers, will look back over . . .
Thanks to all of our participants in the Merger Guidelines Symposium. We hope many of you, as well as our readers, will look back over the collected posts and engage in an ongoing dialogue in the comments over the many interesting ideas raised here. You will find all of the posts from the symposium by clicking on the “merger guidelines symposium” link to the right, under the “blog symposia” heading. For you reference, we have also collected all of the posts below.
TOTM Do the Merger Guidelines need revision? No. Thanks for having me. OK. Yes–and market definition/market shares, and in particular the effective incorporation of supply-side effects, . . .
Do the Merger Guidelines need revision? No. Thanks for having me.
OK. Yes–and market definition/market shares, and in particular the effective incorporation of supply-side effects, seem to me like the most pressing issues in need of attention.
TOTM Yes, the Merger Guidelines should be revised; in particular: a. The discussion of concentration thresholds for collusion facilitating mergers must be aligned more closely with . . .
a. The discussion of concentration thresholds for collusion facilitating mergers must be aligned more closely with both recent case law and actual enforcement practices; otherwise they fail to provide guidance. The current Guidelines indicate that concentrations greater than 1800 HHI and a post-merger increase exceeding 100HHI presumptively indicates a challenge. In fact, mergers with post-merger HHIs in excess of both these numbers are routinely permitted. While the standards in the current Guidelines are too aggressive, the George W. Bush administration policy was too lenient. More fundamentally, the HHI creates an illusion of precision in coordinated effects analysis that is simply not warranted, particularly not when market definitions are ambiguous or when the merger market is subject to product differentiation. Further, the “other factors” portion of the Guidelines tends to dominate the analysis. A better approach is reduced reliance on the HHI and more on simpler observations about who the 3 or 4 largest firms in the market are, the effects of eliminating the acquired firm as an independent market entity, and the likely responses of rivals to an output reduction by the post-merger firm.
TOTM Yes, the Merger Guidelines should be revised. The Guidelines primary purpose is to “articulate the analytical framework the Agency applies in determining whether a merger . . .
Yes, the Merger Guidelines should be revised.
The Guidelines primary purpose is to “articulate the analytical framework the Agency applies in determining whether a merger is likely substantially to lessen competition.” While the Guidelines have been very successful in articulating a useful economic framework for analyzing mergers, their performance in terms of satisfying that goal has been largely mediocre. If the goal articulated by the Guidelines is an important one, and I do believe that providing some modicum of legal certainty to businesses contemplating merger decisions is valuable goal, then the Merger Guidelines do need revising in order to fulfill their purpose.
TOTM The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have brought discipline to the unruly world of merger analysis; but have also accommodated advances in our understanding of the myriad . . .
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have brought discipline to the unruly world of merger analysis; but have also accommodated advances in our understanding of the myriad ways in which firms compete and how mergers affect such competition. However, in cases where there is better information about the effects of the merger than there is about the relevant market, I would change the Guidelines to allow analysis that bypasses market delineation.
