Governing the Patent Commons
We suggest that antitrust authorities and courts should draw inspiration from acclaimed scholarship regarding both the evolution of cooperation and the management of common-pool resources.
Governing the Patent Commons
Chevron ‘s Political Domain: W(h)ither Step Three
This Essay takes prior work on Chevron in a new direction, arguing that broad deference doctrines have the largely unrecognized but particularly pernicious effect of increasing the political gridlock and politicization of the legislative process.
Response to McGeveran’s The Duty of Data Security: Not the Objective Duty He Wants, Maybe the Subjective Duty We Need
This response argues that in his efforts to locate a clear duty in existing data security law he has identified a standard that, in all meaningful ways, is one of subjective (not objective) reasonableness – and therefore offers no clarity at all.
Amazon is not essential, except to the EU’s flawed investigations
Amazon has largely avoided the crosshairs of antitrust enforcers to date (leaving aside the embarrassing dangerous threats of arbitrary enforcement by some US presidential candidates). The reasons seem obvious: in the US it handles a mere 5% of all retail sales (with lower shares in the EU), and it consistently provides access to a wide array of affordable goods.
In defence of the Supreme Court’s ‘single market’ definition in Ohio v American Express
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio, et al v Am Express Co, et al (‘Amex’)[1] is uniquely important for the antitrust analysis of firms . . .
Is European Competition Law Protectionist? Unpacking the Commission’s Unflattering Track record
Last month, the European Commission slapped another fine upon Google for infringing European competition rules (€1.49 billion this time). This brings Google’s contribution to the EU budget to a dizzying total of €8.25 billion (to put this into perspective, the total EU budget for 2019 is €165.8 billion).
In defence of the Supreme Court’s ‘single market’ definition in Ohio v American Express
In this article, Geoffrey Manne evaluates the Supreme Court’s approach, discusses the economic and legal underpinnings of how it approached market definition and effects analysis, and demonstrates why the primary criticisms of the Court’s Ohio v American Express decision are misguided.
STRUCTURALIST INNOVATION: A SHAKY LEGAL PRESUMPTION IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL
How does a market’s structure affect innovation? This crucial question has occupied the world’s brightest economists for almost a century, from Schumpeter who found that monopoly was optimal, through Arrow who concluded that competitive market structures were key, to the endogenous growth scholars who empirically derived an inverted-U relationship between market concentration and innovation.
Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Rebates, and Drug Prices: Conflicts of Interest in the Market for Prescription Drugs
Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) manage the drug benefits for over 95 percent of Americans with prescription drug coverage. However, conflicts of interest inherent in . . .