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TOTM The opinion is available here. Yet another super-majority Roberts Court antitrust decision applying consensus economic theory. No more price squeeze claims. Alcoa is not overturned. . . .
The opinion is available here. Yet another super-majority Roberts Court antitrust decision applying consensus economic theory. No more price squeeze claims. Alcoa is not overturned. The Court declares that the price-squeeze claim in the absence of a duty to deal can be handled jointly by a straightforward application of Trinko and Brooke Group to the wholesale and retail prices at issue, respectively. There is also an extended discussion of the common pitfalls of the application of antitrust as price regulation.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM I want to second Josh’s commendation of Ben Klein’s submission to the recent FTC Hearings on Resale Price Maintenance. Klein’s paper, which bears the same . . .
I want to second Josh’s commendation of Ben Klein’s submission to the recent FTC Hearings on Resale Price Maintenance. Klein’s paper, which bears the same title as this post, is lucidly written (blissfully free of equations, Greek letters, etc.) and makes a point that, at this juncture in antitrust’s history, is absolutely crucial.
TOTM Predicting what antitrust enforcement regimes in the current economic environment is a tricky business. I’ve done my best here. One probably cannot think of a . . .
Predicting what antitrust enforcement regimes in the current economic environment is a tricky business. I’ve done my best here. One probably cannot think of a better source for such predictions than those from the soon-to-be AAG Christine Varney, who recently spoke at an American Antitrust Institute panel on Section 2 enforcement (you can hear the panel audio at the link). I had an RA transcribe Varney’s remarks so please note that all remarks attributed as quotations here may not be exact.
TOTM There has been a great deal of speculation and discussion in this blog and around the antitrust community regarding what will happen with the DOJ . . .
There has been a great deal of speculation and discussion in this blog and around the antitrust community regarding what will happen with the DOJ Section 2 Report. Rightly so. It is a document with the potential to influence both agency monopolization enforcement decisions, international antitrust enforcement, and U.S. doctrine itself in federal court. What precisely happens with the Section 2 Report is also of considerable significance given the confluence of events that suggest, at least to me, a significant increase in monopolization enforcement (see also some more general predictions about the Obama antitrust regime).
TOTM One of the highlights of my recent time as Scholar in Residence at the Federal Trade Commission was the opportunity to work with some of . . .
One of the highlights of my recent time as Scholar in Residence at the Federal Trade Commission was the opportunity to work with some of the brightest minds around on antitrust issues on investigations and policy projects as well some academic projects. The subject of this post is one of those academic projects. Motivated by the conventional wisdom that the technical demands placed on federal courts in antitrust cases in terms of evaluating expert economic and econometric evidence has increased substantially over the last twenty years or so, Former Bureau of Economics Director (now returned the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University) Mike Baye and I decided to try to take a swing at measuring the empirical effects of economic complexity of judicial decision-making in antitrust litigation.
TOTM This fascinating OECD document compiling submissions on the topic is a gold mine of observations on purported best practices for presenting economic testimony to judges . . .
This fascinating OECD document compiling submissions on the topic is a gold mine of observations on purported best practices for presenting economic testimony to judges and issues facing competition authorities and judges deciding complex antitrust cases on the basis of complex economic evidence. Here is one excerpt from the U.S. submission that caught my eye…
TOTM The FTC announced today that it has approved a notice adopting interim final rules amending Parts III and IV of its rules of practice. As . . .
The FTC announced today that it has approved a notice adopting interim final rules amending Parts III and IV of its rules of practice. As boring as that sound, this is a big deal. Here is the Federal Register notice. There are a number of changes, for instance, deadlines are imposed to expedite the pre-hearing phase such that the evidentiary hearing will be held five months from the date of complaint in cases in which the FTC is seeking a preliminary injunction under 13(b) and eight months otherwise. The proposed rules generated quite a bit of public comment. As one can imagine, Whole Foods is a vocal opponent to these rule changes.
TOTM The Federal Trade Commission announced a puzzling complaint filed in a new consummated merger & monopolization case in the U.S. District Court for the District . . .
The Federal Trade Commission announced a puzzling complaint filed in a new consummated merger & monopolization case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Here’s the explanation of the case from the press release…
TOTM At Knowledge Problem, Michael Giberson collects anecdotal evidence on New York’s zone pricing ban, i.e. a prohibition on price discrimination. While gasoline prices are falling . . .
At Knowledge Problem, Michael Giberson collects anecdotal evidence on New York’s zone pricing ban, i.e. a prohibition on price discrimination. While gasoline prices are falling all over the country, the anecdotal evidence is that New York’s zone pricing ban is resulting in higher profits for retailers at the expense of consumers. Former George Mason economist (now at Chapman with Vernon Smith) Bart Wilson and Cary Deck have a fascinating experimental paper on the impact of zone pricing which anticipates this result. Of course, most economists agree that zone pricing benefits consumers.
