One of my summer writing projects is a response to Einer Elhauge’s recent, highly acclaimed article, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory.  In the article, which appeared in the December 2009 Harvard Law Review, Elhauge defends current tying doctrine, which declares tie-ins to be per se illegal when the defendant has market power in the tying product market and the tie-in affects a “not insubstantial” volume of commerce in the tied product market.

Read the full piece here. 

Danny Sokol points to the Obama administration’s most recent effort to “reinvigorate” competition policy: some new proposed rules adding new sections to the existing regulations under the Packers & Stockyards Act. Emerging from the joint DOJ/ USDA agriculture workshops (see comments from Manne & Wright here; TOTM archives on agricultural antitrust here), the USDA must not have come away to impressed with the DOJ’s ability to enforce the antitrust laws on the behalf of consumers.  Either that, or the USDA was never too interested in consumers in the first place.

Read the full piece here. 

I don’t know.  But apparently, industry analysts preliminarily think not.   I tend to disagree.  At least, I think its far too early to be confident in either direction. Press reports, such as this one,  are primarily relying on the report of an analyst who correctly points out that Apple’s market share would be an obstacle for a case against Apple…

Read the full piece here. 

One of the most significant issues in current US antitrust policy has been the Federal Trade Commission’s attempt to avoid some of the rigorous requirements imposed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act in monopolization cases by expanding FTC authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). This issue is nothing new. FTC leadership has made clear its view that the limitations the Supreme Court has imposed on antitrust plaintiffs apply only in the context of private plaintiff cases – not in cases brought by the agencies. Thus, according to the FTC’s current line of thought, the Supreme Court’s restrictions on the agencies have been imposed erroneously on the agencies both by the Supreme Court and lower courts misinterpreting those decisions. Chairman Leibowitz frames the argument as follows…

Read the full piece here. 

Intel’s rebates are apparently given rise to a potentially whole new class of suits based on the notion recipients of the rebates at the center of the Commission’s antitrust action should have been disclosed.   The WSJ reports…

Read the full piece here. 

Abstract

The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Commission alleges that, through the use of loyalty discounts offered to microprocessor purchasers, Intel unlawfully excluded rivals and harmed consumers in the microprocessor and graphics processor markets. This article analyzes the Commission’s claims. The Commission’s reliance on Section 5 should be viewed with suspicion because it allows the Commission to evade the more stringent standards of proof that have been emerged in the Supreme Court’s Section 2 jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Commission’s actions surrounding its prosecution of Intel reflect an adversarial attitude that undermines the Commission’s stated comparative advantages over private litigants. Moreover, the Commission’s allegations form a weak case when evaluated under the conventional Section 2 standard. Unlike many Section 2 cases alleging speculative future consumer harm, the disputed conduct in this case has been in the marketplace for nearly a decade, and its competitive footprint is readily observable. The available data do not support the Commission’s theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers. To the contrary, it is almost certain that Intel’s distribution contracts led to tangible, demonstrable consumer welfare gains in the form of lower prices. Accordingly, the Commission’s complaint against Intel threatens to harm consumers directly in the computer industry as well as indirectly by undermining the stability and certainly which longstanding Section 2 jurisprudence has afforded the business community by requiring the plaintiffs offer rigorous proof of competitive harm.

We are a group of economists (listed at the end of this letter) with extensive experience working on antitrust issues, including horizontal mergers. We applaud the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice for inviting comments from the public on the proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMGs). The proposed HMGs represent a substantial advance over the existing guidelines by better explaining the methodologies actually employed at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in their evaluations of mergers. We are writing to comment on one specific aspect of the proposed HMGs: the use of price/cost margins in merger analysis.

One of my antitrust students recently pointed me to a television commercial that could inspire a great exam question. Unfortunately, I didn’t see the ad until I’d finished drafting this semester’s antitrust exam (which I’ve been grading…hence the absence from TOTM).

Read the full piece here. 

I’ve recently finished reading Jonathan Baker’s Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, forthcoming in the Antitrust Law Journal.

Baker’s central thesis in Preserving a Political Bargain builds on earlier work concerning competition policy as an implicit political bargain that was reached during the 1940s between the more extreme positions of laissez-faire on the one hand and regulation on the other.  The new piece tries to explain what Baker describes as the “non-interventionist” critique of monopolization enforcement within this framework.

Read the full piece here.