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Showing 9 of 963 Results for "net%20neutrality"
TOTM Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a . . .
Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a natural experiment setting in which a card company offers two cards to consumers: (1) a high interest rate, no annual fee card and (2) a low rate card with an annual fee.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Those of us who defend the right to outsource are frequently criticized for lacking compassion and for being concerned only with the bottom line. I’ll . . .
Those of us who defend the right to outsource are frequently criticized for lacking compassion and for being concerned only with the bottom line. I’ll admit that profitability concerns generally motivate decisions to outsource (and most other business decisions), but I won’t concede that outsourcing imposes a net harm on the economically disadvantaged. If we’re really concerned with alleviating the worst instances of poverty and are not focused only on protecting our own kind, we should support the right to outsource.
TOTM Hanno Kaiser at Antitrust Review discusses the implications of Google’s acquisition of YouTube for the net neutrality debate. Hanno opines that the deal may increase . . .
Hanno Kaiser at Antitrust Review discusses the implications of Google’s acquisition of YouTube for the net neutrality debate. Hanno opines that the deal may increase the likelihood of a neutrality result even without legislation. While Google’s public pro-neutrality stance is well known, GMU’s Tom Hazlett (my office neighbor and fellow UCLA Economics alum) has a great column in the Financial Times highlighting the difference between Google’s “public policy” stance on net neutrality and its business model. Here’s Hazlett on Google’s now well-known position on net neutrality legislation…
TOTM Ok, not really. But the Antitrust Modernization Committee voted overwhelmingly in favor to repeal the Act (HT: Antitrust Review). Apparently, nine Commissioners voted in support . . .
Ok, not really. But the Antitrust Modernization Committee voted overwhelmingly in favor to repeal the Act (HT: Antitrust Review). Apparently, nine Commissioners voted in support of a the statement: “that Congress should repeal the Act in its entirety” on the grounds that: (1) the Act does not serve any purposes not already served by the Sherman Act, and (2) the Act is a net cost to consumers and competition. Though I doubt that Congress will accept the AMC’s invitation to act on behalf of consumers and repeal the Act, this the right result.
TOTM The Internet (read: inexpensive information dissemination) comes to the notoriously informationally-challenged housing market. The WSJ reports on a new website, zillow.com, which, as the WSJ . . .
The Internet (read: inexpensive information dissemination) comes to the notoriously informationally-challenged housing market. The WSJ reports on a new website, zillow.com, which, as the WSJ says…
TOTM My friend and co-author, Wes Hartmann (Stanford Graduate School of Business) has posted a very interesting paper with Ricard Gil (UC Santa Cruz Economics) entitled, . . .
My friend and co-author, Wes Hartmann (Stanford Graduate School of Business) has posted a very interesting paper with Ricard Gil (UC Santa Cruz Economics) entitled, “Airing your Dirty Laundry: Social Networks, Reputational Capital, and Vertical Integration.” As the title implies, Hartmann and Gil examine the role of social networks (ethnic-based networks in this case) on the “make or buy” decision. The abstract is here…
Scholarship In this short essay, we take on some of the common claims surrounding the law and economics of the backdating of options. Most of these claims are rooted in the basic argument that backdating options amounts to concealment of compensation.
In this short essay, we take on some of the common claims surrounding the law and economics of the backdating of options. Most of these claims are rooted in the basic argument that backdating options amounts to concealment of compensation. While we agree that backdating may have amounted to a technical rule violation in some cases, there is actually no concealment and, in fact, backdated options are fully disclosed when granted, and their value incorporated into stock price. We also challenge a few other myths surrounding the practice of backdating options.
Scholarship In this article we examine the use of business documents to prove antitrust violations. Such usage has long occurred in the courts and regulatory agencies. More recently, there has been a scholarly effort to justify the use of such documents and the rhetoric they contain in antitrust analysis.
This Article considers the implications for antitrust law and policy of the relationship between business rhetoric and economic analysis. We maintain that antitrust analysis should remain firmly rooted in economics and that courts must be wary of the role of business rhetoric in antitrust analysis and adjudication. This is not to say that “market realities” reflected in business documents and testimony should not be considered in antitrust cases. Rather, courts and policy makers should recognize the distinction between the market realities themselves and expressions or characterizations of those realities for legally irrelevant business purposes. An important implication is that regulators’ and courts’ reliance on business documents is misplaced, and much of this material should be excluded from consideration by courts.
Scholarship This article uses property rights theory and the theory of the firm to analyze the behavior of the participants in nonprofit organizations. It locates the failure of nonprofit oversight in the confluence of strict standing rules and nearly insurmountable agency costs.
This article uses property rights theory and the theory of the firm to analyze the behavior of the participants in nonprofit organizations. It locates the failure of nonprofit oversight in the confluence of strict standing rules and nearly insurmountable agency costs. The article repudiates the conventional solutions to the problem (ranging from relaxing standing limitations to restricting the use of the nonprofit form), and proposes a contractual solution through which nonprofits or their founders would secure the services of a set of independent agents to monitor and, where appropriate, enforce the nonprofit’s charter and the relevant fiduciary rules through judicial action. Because the monitoring agents would function within a market framework, market controls should operate to constrain the behavior of these agents. Thus donors, philanthropists, and beneficiaries would receive the benefit of effectively monitored corporate (or trust) agents who do not present a significant agency cost problem. The result should be increased accountability on the part of nonprofit agents to their donors or patrons without the serious threat of frivolous suits or politically-selective attorney general enforcement.
