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The Aftermath of a Type I Error: The Case of Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco

TOTM It looks like California consumers, unlike their counterparts in several other states, will be getting cash instead of coupons in their settlement against U.S. Tobacco . . .

It looks like California consumers, unlike their counterparts in several other states, will be getting cash instead of coupons in their settlement against U.S. Tobacco in one of the many follow-on actions to Conwood Co. v. United States TobaccoThe settlement looks to be in the range of $96 million with qualifying customers taking home anywhere between $195 and $585 depending on how many consumers are willing to sign a sworn statement that they purchased more than 30 cans of certain brands in the relevant time period.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Nobel Prize to Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson

TOTM Congratulations to the winners! Here’s Tyler and Alex at Marginal Revolution on mechanism design generally and this year’s Nobel winners.

for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory.” Here’s a blurb from the Nobel website on mechanism design…

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Peking University IEPR Antitrust Conference

TOTM Today marked the completion of the J. Mirrlees Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Conference on China’s Competition Policy and Anti-Monopoly Law at Peking University . . .

Today marked the completion of the J. Mirrlees Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) Conference on China’s Competition Policy and Anti-Monopoly Law at Peking University in Beijing. I was thrilled to be invited to participate in the conference. A special thanks to Hongbin Cai of Peking University for the invitation, and for organizing an all around wonderful event.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Are Chimps Smarter than Humans?

TOTM I’ve previously hypothesized that the persistence of legal rules that lead to less overall wealth but seemingly more equitable distributions (rules such as the insider . . .

I’ve previously hypothesized that the persistence of legal rules that lead to less overall wealth but seemingly more equitable distributions (rules such as the insider trading ban and Regulation FD) may stem from the fact that individuals are “hard-wired” to favor fairness, even if they must sacrifice some wealth to achieve it. That seems to be one of the lessons of the Ultimatum Game, in which offerees routinely sacrifice wealth in order to protest proposed allocations they deem to be unfair. (I describe the Ultimatum Game in the post linked above.)

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Glen Whitman on Waldfogel’s Tyranny of the Market

TOTM Over at Agoraphilia, Glen Whitman has a series of entertaining posts applying economic logic to a number of interesting topics. If you read Glen on . . .

Over at Agoraphilia, Glen Whitman has a series of entertaining posts applying economic logic to a number of interesting topics. If you read Glen on a regular basis, than you won’t be surprised that the topics include things like restroom hand dryers and toilet seat signaling.

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Innovation & the New Economy

Bootleggers and Baptists, Madison Style

TOTM Last Wednesday, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard oral argument on whether to reinstate an antitrust lawsuit against taverns around the University of Wisconsin (story here). . . .

Last Wednesday, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard oral argument on whether to reinstate an antitrust lawsuit against taverns around the University of Wisconsin (story here). In 2002, the taverns agreed to eliminate drink specials after 8:00 PM on Fridays and Saturdays. A group of students filed a class action lawsuit against the taverns for injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the agreement constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance

Scholarship Abstract Building on the success of prediction markets at forecasting political elections and other matters of public interest, firms have made increasing use of prediction . . .

Abstract

Building on the success of prediction markets at forecasting political elections and other matters of public interest, firms have made increasing use of prediction markets to help make business decisions. This Article explores the implications of prediction markets for corporate governance. Prediction markets can increase the flow of information, encourage truth telling by internal and external firm monitors, and create incentives for agents to act in the interest of their principals. The markets can thus serve as potentially efficient alternatives to other approaches to providing information, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s internal controls provisions. Prediction markets can also produce an avenue for insiders to profit on and thus reveal inside information while maintaining a level playing field in the market for a firm’s securities. This creates a harmless way around existing insider trading laws, undercutting the argument for the repeal of these laws. In addition, prediction markets can reduce agency costs by providing direct assessments of corporate policies, thus serving as an alternative or complement to shareholder voting as a means of disciplining corporate boards and managers. Prediction markets may thus be particularly useful for issues where agency costs are greatest, such as executive compensation. Deployment of these markets, whether voluntarily or perhaps someday as a result of legal mandates, could improve alignment between shareholders and managers on these issues better than other proposed reforms. These markets might also displace the business judgment rule because they can furnish contemporaneous and relatively objective benchmarks for courts to evaluate business decisions.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Goolsbee (and Obama?) on Free Trade

TOTM Here is Senator Obama’s economic advisor Austan Goolsbee on globalization and free trade (as described by George Will in his recent column)… Read the full . . .

Here is Senator Obama’s economic advisor Austan Goolsbee on globalization and free trade (as described by George Will in his recent column)…

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Predicting the Nobel Again …

TOTM Greg Mankiw and Tyler Cowen have started the speculation. Cowen prefers “Anne Krueger, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Gordon Tullock for their work on rent-seeking” but predicts . . .

Greg Mankiw and Tyler Cowen have started the speculation. Cowen prefers “Anne Krueger, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Gordon Tullock for their work on rent-seeking” but predicts a behavioral finance prize to Fama, Thaler & French or a prize for research on the principal-agent theory of the firm to Williamson and/or Tirole. Mankiw predicts Fama, Feldstein, or Barro based on some citation analysis. Thomson Scientific adds their own predictions here.

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