This essay is the introduction to a forthcoming volume entitled, Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty (Cambridge U. Press 2009 forthcoming).

In addition to introducing all of the papers in the volume, this essay introduces the organizing themes of the volume. Innovation is critical to economic growth. While it is well understood that legal institutions play an important role in fostering an environment conducive to innovation and its commercialization, much less is known about the optimal design of specific institutions. Regulatory design decisions, and in particular competition policy and intellectual property regimes, can have profoundly positive or negative consequences for economic growth and welfare. However, the ratio of what is known to unknown with respect to the relationship between innovation, competition, and regulatory policy is staggeringly low. In addition to this uncertainty concerning the relationships between regulation, innovation, and economic growth, the process of innovation itself is not well understood.

The regulation of innovation and the optimal design of legal institutions in this environment of uncertainty are two of the most important policy challenges of the 21st century. Any legal regime must attempt to assess the tradeoffs associated with rules that will affect incentives to innovate, allocative efficiency, competition, and freedom of economic actors to commercialize the fruits of their innovative labors and foster economic growth. Unfortunately, as this essay describes, our tools for assessing these tradeoffs are limited.

Any coherent regulatory framework must take account of the low level of empirical knowledge surrounding the complex relationship between regulation – both through competition policy and patent law – and innovation, and the corresponding uncertainty caused by this absence of knowledge. The relationship between regulation and innovation has posed a significant challenge to antitrust economists at least since Schumpeter’s suggestion that dynamic competition would result in “creative destruction,” leading to a competitive process where one monopolist would replace another sequentially as new entrants developed a superior product.

Interfering in this dynamic process for the sake of static efficiency gains is perilous, but, of course, not impossible. But regulators and policy makers must take (more) seriously the condition of fundamental uncertainty in which they act, and the significant costs of their inevitable errors before justifying interventions on grounds of promoting competition or facilitating innovation.

This essay and the chapters in this book, approach this critical set of problems from an economic perspective, relying on the tools of microeconomics, quantitative analysis, and comparative institutional analysis to explore and begin to provide answers to the myriad challenges facing policymakers. The strength of this analysis – often described as the New Institutional Economic approach – is in its recognition that understanding economic performance requires not only economic modeling of narrow behavior, but also an understanding of that behavior in its legal, economic, social, and political institutional context.

Read the full paper here.

DOJ’s top antitrust enforcer Christine Varney had hardly gotten settled in her office before she repudiated the existing DOJ guidelines on policing single-firm conduct. In the spirit of Rahm Emanuel’s famous “never let a serious crisis go to waste” directive, Ms. Varney invoked the current economic crisis as grounds for her decision to throw out the product of more than a year’s worth of hearings (from all sides).

Read the full piece here.

Professor Birdthistle has a very thoughtful reply to my earlier post over at the Conglomerate on Jones v. Harris and behavioral economics.  I thank Professor Birdthistle for his reply.  I’ve learned a great deal about Jones v. Harris from reading his posts at the Conglomerate and have no doubt that I’ll learn more from this exchange.  The thrust of my original post was that, in general, my view was that behavioral law and economics has been too quick to rely on findings in the behavioral/ experimental literature demonstrating systematic deviations from rationality to justify paternalistic regulation.

Read the full piece here.

Much has been made about the importance of Jones v. Harris as a battle in the ongoing war between behavioral economics  and rational choice/neoclassical framework (see, e.g. the NYT).   If the case if to be about the appropriate economic methodology or model for assessing legal questions, it is definitely an interesting turn to have Judge Easterbrook representing the rational choice economists while Judge Posner (who is simultaneously taking some flack for fast and loose and incorrect uses of macroeconomics) defends the behavioral view, considering that the latter wrote an important critique of the behavioral law and economics literature (here is an excellent summary of Posner’s opinion from Professor Birdthistle).  Professor Ribstein frames the issue of Jones v. Harris and the New Paternalism nicely with a prediction…

Read the full piece here.

A big chunk of the fraudulent advertising (diet, exercise, work-at-home, credit repair) prosecuted by the FTC involves a testimonial advertisement that mentions a number, e.g., “I lost 74 pounds wearing slimming insoles.” Some consumers do not seem to understand that the results for the endorsers may not be typical, despite the disclaimer required by the FTC, “results not typical.”

Read the full piece here. 

In light of the recent political focus on healthcare, several Congressional bills propose to single out a class of contracts between pharmaceutical companies for closer antitrust scrutiny.  Oftentimes, a pharmaceutical company will engineer a functionally identical substitute to a “brand name” drug with specific appeal to consumers.  This substitute – with the chemical properties of the known drug but a different name – is known as a “generic drug,” or simply a “generic.”  In an attempt to preserve the legal monopoly a patented brand-name enjoys, the branded drug’s producer will sometimes offer the generic’s producer a payment to delay entry into the market for a fixed amount of time.  Known as a “reverse payment settlement” – or colloquially as “pay for delay” – these agreements are at the intersection of contemporary fears and debates about healthcare and a debate as old as the law of competition itself.

Read the full piece here.

I have said it before and I’ll say it again: All of this hand wringing over executive compensation seems to exist in a parallel world where corporate executives have no risk aversion, where there is no real competition for managerial talent, and where firms can only take on too much–never too little–risk.  And this in a day and age (the age of never-ending financial reform regulation, Lehman/Bear, enormous public scrutiny of financial and banking industries, etc.) when the downside from excessive risk-taking is now either a) extremely large or b) non-existent (but only because of guaranteed government bail-outs).  In either case, fiddling with compensation schemes will not help matters.

Read the full piece here. 

Professor Joe Brodley, after a long and distinguished career as an antitrust scholar, retired at the end of the Spring 2009 semester. Boston University Law School will host a symposium honoring Joe’s contributions to Antitrust on September 18, 2009. The Boston University Law Review will publish the contributions.

Read the full piece here. 

University of Chicago economist (and behavioralist doyen) Richard Thaler thinks “the question of whether a ‘public option’ should be part of the health care solution” is just “one big distraction.” In Sunday’s New York Times, Thaler argues that the debate over the public option is a “red herring” if, as President Obama insists, the public plan will have to break even and won’t be granted “the power to impose special deals with suppliers like hospitals and drug companies.” If those two conditions are satisfied, Thaler contends, the public plan is unlikely to have much success and certainly won’t drive out private insurers.

Read the full piece here.