With the COVID-19 vaccine made by Moderna joining the one from Pfizer and BioNTech in gaining approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, it should be time to celebrate the U.S. system of pharmaceutical development. The system’s incentives—notably granting patent rights to firms that invest in new and novel discoveries—have worked to an astonishing degree, producing not just one but as many as three or four effective approaches to end a viral pandemic that, just a year ago, was completely unknown.

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As the Biden administration and the Senate wrangle over the next nominee to chair the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), they will likely debate the nominee’s views on contentious policy issues such as net neutrality and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. But a key element of current Chairman Ajit Pai’s legacy is a commitment to improved rulemaking processes and quality. That commitment is evident in changes to the structure and processes of the FCC made to ensure that quality economic analysis informs policy decisions.

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ICLE Executive Director Ian Adams joined the Regulatory Transparency Project’s Fourth Branch Podcast for an episode focused on how insurance is regulated in the United States. You can listen to the full episode below.

It would not be reasonable for service providers to be held culpable for every possible misuse of copyright material in the vast amount of user-generated content they carry. That would create massive risk of lawsuits, with ill effects for internet users and even for copyright holders who benefit from the legal distribution of their content.

But proper safe harbors should encourage online companies to help prevent copyright content from being improperly disseminated in the first place. For example, such rules could encourage online companies to license content upfront, which they can do more easily than copyright holders can with each of the service providers’ many users.

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U.S. antitrust regulators have a history of narrowly defining relevant markets—often to the point of absurdity—in order to create market power out of thin air. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) famously declared that Whole Foods and Wild Oats operated in the “premium natural and organic supermarkets market”—a narrowly defined market designed to exclude other supermarkets carrying premium natural and organic foods, such as Walmart and Kroger. Similarly, for the Staples-Office Depot merger, the FTC narrowly defined the relevant market as “office superstore” chains, which excluded general merchandisers such as Walmart, K-Mart and Target, who at the time accounted for 80% of office supply sales.

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If passed into law, this Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) would fundamentally alter the way these platforms conduct business in Europe. But European Commission officials have been so preoccupied with how to regulate Big Tech that they never stopped to consider whether they should. Indeed, these new rules could have unintended consequences that hamper digital markets in the EU.

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The European Commission has unveiled draft legislation (the Digital Services Act, or “DSA”) that would overhaul the rules governing the online lives of its citizens. The draft rules are something of a mixed bag. While online markets present important challenges for law enforcement, the DSA would significantly increase the cost of doing business in Europe and harm the very freedoms European lawmakers seek to protect. The draft’s newly proposed “Know Your Business Customer” (KYBC) obligations, however, will enable smoother operation of the liability regimes that currently apply to online intermediaries.

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Google is facing a series of lawsuits in 2020 and 2021 that challenge some of the most fundamental parts of its business, and of the internet itself — Search, Android, Chrome, Google’s digital-advertising business, and potentially other services as well.

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It is my endeavor to scrutinize the questionable assessment articulated against default settings in the U.S. Justice Department’s lawsuit against Google. Default, I will argue, is no antitrust fault. Default in the Google case drastically differs from default referred to in the Microsoft case. In Part I, I argue the comparison is odious. Furthermore, in Part II, it will be argued that the implicit prohibition of default settings echoes, as per listings, the explicit prohibition of self-preferencing in search results. Both aspects – default’s implicit prohibition and self-preferencing’s explicit prohibition – are the two legs of a novel and integrated theory of sanctioning corporate favoritism. The coming to the fore of such theory goes against the very essence of the capitalist grain. In Part III, I note the attempt to instill some corporate selflessness is at odds with competition on the merits and the spirit of fundamental economic freedoms.

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