Summary

“A cornerstone of the Initial Determination is that “[u]nder TianRui, the Commission’s discretion cannot be exercised in a way that conflicts with applicable federal law,”1 and, therefore, that “the dispute between U.S. Steel and Respondents in this case must be resolved using the same substantive law that governs federal antitrust cases.” But this conclusion misreads TianRui’s holding, and is misapplied here.

Moreover, because adjudicative process at the ITC, available remedies, and the statutory objectives of Section 337 are substantially different than Article III processes, remedies, and the aims of the antitrust laws when adjudicated in Article III courts, the unmodified importation of standing rules from Article III courts to the ITC is improper.

Finally, the end to which trade laws are directed is not necessarily, or not solely, consumer welfare in an antitrust sense, and a protection of domestic injury — effectively the opposite of what’s required for antitrust standing under the antitrust laws in Article III courts — may be perfectly actionable under Section 337. As Section 337 is a standalone statute, the importation of antitrust rules can be effected only to the extent that such importation furthers the objectives of Section 337 — and certainly not in a way that would contravene them…”

Summary

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 [“Section 5”], is a consumer protection statute, not a data security rule. See Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction, Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, United States Senate (Dec. 17, 1980) [“Unfairness Statement”], reprinted in International Harvester Co., 104 FTC 949, 1073 (1984) [“International Harvester”] (quoting 83 Cong. Rec. 3255 (1938) (remarks of Senator Wheeler)) (“Unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act….’”).

This fundamental point has been lost in the Commission’s approach to data security. The touchstone for Section 5 actions is not “reasonableness,” but consumer welfare: Does this enforcement action deter a preventable “unfair” act or practice that, on net, harms consumer welfare, and do the benefits to consumers from this action outweigh its costs? Section 5’s purpose is neither fundamentally remedial nor prescriptive. Concern for consumer welfare means deterring bad conduct, avoiding over-deterrence of pro-consumer conduct, minimizing compliance costs, and minimizing administrative costs (by focusing only on substantial harms) — not preventing every possible harm. Instead of weighing such factors carefully, or even performing a proper analysis of negligence, as it purports to do, the Commission has effectively created a strict liability standard unmoored from Section 5.

Across the Commission’s purported guidance on data security, it has likewise failed to articulate a standard by which companies themselves should weigh costs and benefits to determine which risks are sufficiently foreseeable that they can be mitigated cost-effectively. Thus, in addition to violating the intent of Congress, the FTC has also violated the Constitution by failing to provide companies like LabMD with “fair notice” of the agency’s interpretation of what Section 5 requires.

Summary

This white paper counsels extreme caution in the use of past statistical studies of the purported effects of health insurance company mergers to infer that today’s proposed mergers — between Aetna/Humana and Anthem/Cigna — will likely have similar effects. Focusing on one influential study — Paying a Premium on Your Premium (“Paying a Premium”) by Dafny, Duggan & Ramanarayanan (“Dafny, et al.”) — as a jumping off point, we highlight some of the many reasons that past is not prologue.

In short: extrapolated, long-term, cumulative, average effects drawn from 17-year old data may grab headlines, but they really don’t tell us much of anything about the likely effects of a particular merger today, or about the effects of increased concentration in any particular product or geographic market.

Earlier this month, Google filed its response to the European Commission’s Android antitrust complaint, which alleges that Google thwarts its competitors in search, mobile apps, and mobile devices by limiting their access to Android users through self-serving licensing terms.

But the EC’s objections, rooted in an outdated understanding of marketplace dynamics, are a contrivance. They go like this: ‘Google Search is dominant’… if you exclude Amazon and Facebook from its market. ‘Android enjoys a monopoly’… if you forget about iPhones. ‘Google excludes competing apps on Android’ … if you ignore the ease with which users install alternatives.

Read the full piece here.

Next week the FCC is slated to vote on the second iteration of Chairman Wheeler’s proposed broadband privacy rules. Of course, as has become all too common, none of us outside the Commission has actually seen the proposal. But earlier this month Chairman Wheeler released a Fact Sheet that suggests some of the ways it would update the rules he initially proposed.

According to the Fact Sheet, the new proposed rules are…

Read the full piece here. 

Summary

Late last year, Tim Wu of Columbia Law School (and now the White House Office of Management and Budget), Michael Luca of Harvard Business School (and a consultant for Yelp), and a group of Yelp data scientists released a study claiming that Google has been purposefully degrading search results from its more-specialized competitors in the area of local search.  The authors’ claim is that Google is leveraging its dominant position in general search to thwart competition from specialized search engines by favoring its own, less-popular, less-relevant results over those of its competitors:

To improve the popularity of its specialized search features, Google has used the power of its dominant general search engine. The primary means for doing so is what is called the “universal search” or the “OneBox.”

This is not a new claim, and researchers have been attempting (and failing ) to prove Google’s “bias” for some time. Likewise, these critics have drawn consistent policy conclusions from their claims, asserting that antitrust violations lie at the heart of the perceived bias.

But the studies are systematically marred by questionable methodology and bad economics. The primary difference now is the saliency of the “Father of Net Neutrality,” Tim Wu, along with a cadre of researchers employed by Yelp (one of Google’s competitors and one of its chief antitrust provocateurs ), saying the same thing in a new research paper, with slightly different but equally questionable methodology, bad economics, and a smattering of new, but weak, social science.

Summary

The proposed guidelines are founded on a commendable set of underlying assumptions: that intellectual property (“IP”) is, for antitrust purposes, amenable to the same sort of analysis that applies to other forms of property, and, that IP licensing presents presumptively procompetitive opportunities for market actors to manage their property rights.
As the proposed guidelines recognize, licensing, along with a variety of vertical arrangements, frequently allows separate firms to realize efficiencies in the production, marketing and commercialization process that are otherwise difficult, if not impossible, to achieve individually.1 As the proposed guidelines note, this translates not merely into single firms commercializing a particular discovery, but also into their undertaking a variety of licensing relationships that, for example, encourage licensees to further improve upon the original invention.

More broadly, in many cases, licensing arrangements allow inventive firms that lack sufficient capital to license inventions to firms that are better positioned to engage in the efficient production of complicated or expensive processes and products. Economic literature broadly recognizes the value of this form of specialization,2 and the proposed guidelines are to be commended for likewise recognizing this reality and generally encouraging the practice.

Although, in short, our assessment of the proposed guidelines is positive, we offer some constructive criticism in the remainder of this comment. In particular, we believe, first, that the proposed guidelines should more strongly recognize that a refusal to license does not deserve special scrutiny; and, second, that traditional antitrust analysis is largely inappropriate for the examination of innovation or R&D markets.

Filed under: antitrust, doj, essential facilities, federal trade commission, truth on the market Tagged: Intellectual property, Patent

Geoffrey Manne took part in a panel on “dominant platforms” hosted by the Capitol Forum, which also featured Jonathan Kanter of Paul Weiss LLP and Barry Lynn of New America and was moderated by the Capitol Forum’s Teddy Downey. Video of the event is embedded below.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Abjx02koEfg

Abstract

This paper is a draft chapter from an ongoing book project I am calling The Corporation and the Twentieth Century. In The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler explained the rise of the large vertically integrated corporation in the United States mostly in terms of forces of technology and economic geography. Institutions, including government policy, played a quite minor role. In my own attempt to explain the decline of the vertically integrated form in the late twentieth century, I stayed true to Chandler’s largely institution-free approach. This book will be an exercise in bringing institutions back in. It will argue that institutions, notably various forms of non-market controls imposed by the federal government, are a critical piece of the explanation of the rise and decline of the multi-unit enterprise in the U. S. Indeed, non-market controls, including those imposed in response to the dramatic events of the century, account in significant measure for the dominance of the Chandlerian corporation in the middle of the twentieth century. One important form of non-market control – though by no means the only form – has been antitrust policy. This chapter traces the history of antitrust and argues that, far from being a coherent attempt to address an actual economic problem of monopoly, the Sherman Antitrust Act emerged from the distributional political economy of the nineteenth century. More importantly, the chapter argues that the form in which antitrust emerged would prove significant for the corporation, as the Sherman Act and its successors outlawed virtually all types of inter-firm coordinating mechanisms, thus effectively evacuating the space between anonymous market transactions and full integration.