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Showing 9 of 119 Results in Market Definition
TOTM Leah Brannon and co-author Kathleen Bradish, both of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, offer a skeptical view… Read the full piece here.
Leah Brannon and co-author Kathleen Bradish, both of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, offer a skeptical view…
Read the full piece here.
TOTM The opinion in Ovation (i.e. FTC v. Lundbeck) is now available. The first footnote in Judge Ericksen’s opinion notes that “the FTC and Minnesota began . . .
The opinion in Ovation (i.e. FTC v. Lundbeck) is now available. The first footnote in Judge Ericksen’s opinion notes that “the FTC and Minnesota began their closing argument by disclaiming the notion that these cases were ‘about unhappiness about the high price of Indocin.’ Nevertheless, the FTC and Minnesota cited in their post-trial response a press release issued by the FTC to announce the action’s commencement. The press release asserts that the acquisition of NeoProfen resulted in the increase of Indocin IV’s price by almost 1300%; characterizes the prices charged by Lundbeck as ‘artificially high;’ and notes one commissioner’s view that Lundbeck’s ‘profiteering on the backs of critically ill premature babies is not only immoral, it is illegal.”
TOTM There are some new developments in the Federal Trade Commission’s consummated merger case brought against Ovation. Namely, the FTC has lost. TOTM readers may recall . . .
There are some new developments in the Federal Trade Commission’s consummated merger case brought against Ovation. Namely, the FTC has lost. TOTM readers may recall that I spent some time criticizing the Federal Trade Commission’s complaint, back in 2008, in FTC v. Ovation in federal district court in Minnesota. As I described the stylized facts back then…
TOTM Economist and occasional TOTM guest blogger Steve Salop (Georgetown) recently sent me the following questions spurred by the local debate over Governor McConnell’s proposal to . . .
Economist and occasional TOTM guest blogger Steve Salop (Georgetown) recently sent me the following questions spurred by the local debate over Governor McConnell’s proposal to private the retailing of alcoholic beverages…
TOTM One of the primary concerns with the Proposed HMGs was that the new approach would lead to small relevant markets in order to better reflect . . .
One of the primary concerns with the Proposed HMGs was that the new approach would lead to small relevant markets in order to better reflect the Agencies’ views that the traditional approach understated the importance of competition between close substitutes. I highlighted one analytical concern with this approach in a previous blog post…
TOTM Commissioner Rosch has offered an interesting separate statement on the new HMGs. While favoring the new guidelines generally, Commissioner Rosch offers several criticisms. I concur . . .
Commissioner Rosch has offered an interesting separate statement on the new HMGs. While favoring the new guidelines generally, Commissioner Rosch offers several criticisms. I concur with a few of these criticisms, for example, Commissioner Rosch also argues for a more empirical approach to merger analysis. I agree with that general proposition despite, as we shall see below, the fact that the Commissioner offers it along with the peculiar distinction between “economic evidence” which he rejects and “empirical evidence”. The Commissioner should be applauded for putting these criticisms, as well as those with which I disagree of course, on the record.
Scholarship Abstract The market definition analysis endorsed by the 2010 Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“new HMGs”) tends toward narrower relevant markets. Because the merging parties cannot . . .
The market definition analysis endorsed by the 2010 Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“new HMGs”) tends toward narrower relevant markets. Because the merging parties cannot point to the consumer gains outside of the narrowly defined product market, the new approach could lead to Section 7 liability for mergers that result in net increases in consumer welfare. This “out of market” efficiency problem obviously does not originate with the new HMGs, nor with the HMGs at all. However, the value of diversion approach to market definition is likely to dramatically increase its practical significance. Failure to incorporate “out of market” efficiencies into merger analysis flies in the face of the modern trend in favor of analyzing actual competitive effects rather than adopting simplifying and potentially misleading proxies. Further, the value of diversion approach adopted by the new HMGs is likely to increase the need for guidance on this score. This comment proposed that the new HMGs amend note 11 to make clear that they would not bring enforcement actions where the Agencies can prove anticompetitive effects in a narrower market, but where the evidence also supports the conclusion that out of market efficiencies are sufficient to eliminate consumer harm in the aggregate. A commitment to forbear from challenging mergers where out of market efficiencies outweigh anticompetitive effects merely updates the new HMGs in a manner consistent with the modern intellectual foundation of merger analysis.
TOTM Apparently, the Illinois Attorney General is investigating Lollapalooza for potential antitrust violations arising out of exclusivity clauses that the concert promoter includes in the contracts . . .
Apparently, the Illinois Attorney General is investigating Lollapalooza for potential antitrust violations arising out of exclusivity clauses that the concert promoter includes in the contracts signed with artists who play the show.
ICLE White Paper Abstract The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section . . .
The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Commission alleges that, through the use of loyalty discounts offered to microprocessor purchasers, Intel unlawfully excluded rivals and harmed consumers in the microprocessor and graphics processor markets. This article analyzes the Commission’s claims. The Commission’s reliance on Section 5 should be viewed with suspicion because it allows the Commission to evade the more stringent standards of proof that have been emerged in the Supreme Court’s Section 2 jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Commission’s actions surrounding its prosecution of Intel reflect an adversarial attitude that undermines the Commission’s stated comparative advantages over private litigants. Moreover, the Commission’s allegations form a weak case when evaluated under the conventional Section 2 standard. Unlike many Section 2 cases alleging speculative future consumer harm, the disputed conduct in this case has been in the marketplace for nearly a decade, and its competitive footprint is readily observable. The available data do not support the Commission’s theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers. To the contrary, it is almost certain that Intel’s distribution contracts led to tangible, demonstrable consumer welfare gains in the form of lower prices. Accordingly, the Commission’s complaint against Intel threatens to harm consumers directly in the computer industry as well as indirectly by undermining the stability and certainly which longstanding Section 2 jurisprudence has afforded the business community by requiring the plaintiffs offer rigorous proof of competitive harm.
