David Fischer at Antitrust Review posts an excerpt from Information Resources, Inc.’s (IRI) press release issued to explain the recent settlement of their ten year long litigation against VNU (A.C. Nielsen, IMS Health, and Dun and Bradstreet). IRI’s claims were based on an “above cost” bundling theory that Thom has discussed in detail here. In that post, Thom expressed optimism (like me) about Justice Alito’s influence on the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence in large part because of his sensible dissent in LePage’s. It looks like we do not have to wait long to for evidence of that influence.

Read the full piece here.

Warren Grimes of the American Antitrust Institute (and Southwestern Law School) defends the Korea Fair Trade Commission’s recent Microsoft decision holding that Microsoft abused its dominant position by bundling Instant Messenger and Windows Media Player technologies to its operating system, and its order that Microsoft must sell unbundled versions. Grimes central point is that not we should expect such divergent views in an antitrust environment of “world federalism,” but on that the KFTC was in good company in viewing Microsoft’s bundling practices as anticompetitive.

Read the full piece here. 

Dave Hoffman over at Concurring Opinions asks: “Is Apple Exploiting Consumer Irrationality?” Dave is worried that consumers’ continuing iPod purchases may be irrational in the face of evidence that many iPod’s fail within their one year warranty period or shortly after, and that this strategy might explain Apple’s “growing market strength.” How likely are consumer biases to explain Apple’s success? In short, not very.

Read the full piece here. 

My friend and co-author, Wes Hartmann (Stanford Graduate School of Business) has posted a very interesting paper with Ricard Gil (UC Santa Cruz Economics) entitled, “Airing your Dirty Laundry: Social Networks, Reputational Capital, and Vertical Integration.” As the title implies, Hartmann and Gil examine the role of social networks (ethnic-based networks in this case) on the “make or buy” decision. The abstract is here…

Read the full piece here.

Thom recently posted about Judge Alito’s comments on the recent Lepage’s decision involving bundled discounts offered to retailers. There is presently much debate among antitrust scholars regarding the proper treatment of “above-cost” price cuts, such as the bundled discounts in Lepage’s. The anticompetitive theory in these cases is not that discounts mask what is effectively “predatory pricing.” Rather, the theory is that the payments will deprive rivals from achieving minimum efficient scale for a period of time long enough to prohibit meaningful competition.

Read the full piece here.

For those of you who are not familiar with work of the Antitrust Modernization Committee, and I suspect that this includes most of our readers, the AMC was created by the Antitrust Modernization Committee Act of 2002, and is charged with the following tasks:

Read the full piece here.

Price gouging regulations (PGRs) have been a popular topic of late in the blogosphere, particularly in the wake of increased post-Katrina (and Rita) gasoline prices. Becker and Posner make the now familiar economic case against PGRs here and here. The basic economic argument against PGRs is well tread ground which I will not repeat here. Suffice it to say, however, that the economic logic has not been sufficient to win the day with state legislatures for one reason or another. According to Federal Trade Commission Chairman Majoras’ Statement to Congress, at least 28 states currently have statutes that provide remedies for short term price spikes in the aftermath of a disaster. For example, Eliot Spitzer recently penned a new bill updating NY’s PGR to trigger upon a 25% markup rather than a “gross disparity” between cost and price. Some of the failure is for obvious reasons.

Read the full piece here.

It is a pretty exciting time in the antitrust world. This, of course, is bad news for firms. SCOTUS will decide three antitrust cases this term, each offering a promising opportunity to clarify murky doctrine or undo an erroneous application of relatively clear antitrust principles. Texaco v Dagher falls into the latter category. The bulk of the commentary I’ve seen has been critical. For example, Christine Hurt at the Glom describes the plaintiff’s theory “somewhat strained.” Ron Davis goes a bit further, describing Dagher as “The Worst Antitrust Case of the 21st Century.” That is saying something. Yet, given the impact of the decision on integrative activity if affirmed, I’m inclined to agree.

Read the full piece here.

Summary

In this short essay, we take on some of the common claims surrounding the law and economics of the backdating of options. Most of these claims are rooted in the basic argument that backdating options amounts to concealment of compensation. While we agree that backdating may have amounted to a technical rule violation in some cases, there is actually no concealment and, in fact, backdated options are fully disclosed when granted, and their value incorporated into stock price. We also challenge a few other myths surrounding the practice of backdating options.