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TOTM One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of . . .
One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of a number of “propositions” advanced, for purposes of discussion only, by the agencies. Unfortunately, we didn’t have time to discuss all the propositions. I’ve reproduced them below the fold, along with my own thoughts on whether they’re sound. (Please note the agencies’ insistence that “[t]hese propositions are solely for the purpose of discussion and do not necessarily represent the agencies’ views.”)
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. . . .
Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. Both call for bright-line, administrable liability rules for all forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct, and have important things to say about designing antitrust rules for bundled discounts. Both are worth reading in their entirety. Administrable rules that sensibly balance Type I and II errors are certainly an indisputably admirable goal for antitrust analysis and bundled discounts have proven to be a particularly tricky form of conduct for Section 2 analysis. Despite all of the agreement around here between Thom, Dan and I on the design of antitrust rules in a world of costly Type I errors, I think I have found a topic upon which I can at least offer a mild dissent (or at least a different perspective) regarding the usefulness of the analogy of various anticompetitive theories of bundled discounting practices to exclusive dealing.
TOTM As promised, I am posting here my powerpoint slides for my testimony on exclusive dealing at the FTC/DOJ Section 2 Hearings, as well as the . . .
As promised, I am posting here my powerpoint slides for my testimony on exclusive dealing at the FTC/DOJ Section 2 Hearings, as well as the two papers upon which my analysis is based…
TOTM The FTC/ DOJ Section 2 Hearings (aka Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Single Firm Conduct as Related to Competition) continued earlier this . . .
The FTC/ DOJ Section 2 Hearings (aka Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Single Firm Conduct as Related to Competition) continued earlier this week with a session on tying Wednesday featuring David Evans, Robin Cooper Feldman, Mark Popofsky, Donald Russell, Michael Waldman, and Robert Willig.
TOTM After a year long investigation, Michael Giberson (of the excellent Knowledge Problem) points to the DC Attorney General’s announcement that a single retailer has agreed . . .
After a year long investigation, Michael Giberson (of the excellent Knowledge Problem) points to the DC Attorney General’s announcement that a single retailer has agreed to pay a fine of $897.61 without admitting any wrongdoing. Yes, 900 bucks.
TOTM Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am . . .
Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am looking forward to Thom’s review in the Texas Law Review, and wholeheartedly agree with him that Hovenkamp’s book is an important and significant contribution to the antitrust literature (see also Randy Picker’s book review here describing “The Antitrust Enterprise as The Antitrust Paradox for a post-Chicago antitrust landscape”). I’m still digesting most of the book, and perhaps will share some more thoughts in this space later on, but thought I would chime in with some thoughts on two issues relevant to my own research on slotting contracts, discounts, and competition for product distribution.
TOTM Hanno Kaiser at the Antitrust Review reports (courtesy of the ABA listserv) that SCOTUS has granted cert in Weyerhauser (predatory buying) and Twombly (pleading standards), . . .
Hanno Kaiser at the Antitrust Review reports (courtesy of the ABA listserv) that SCOTUS has granted cert in Weyerhauser (predatory buying) and Twombly (pleading standards), but not Schering-Plough (reverse payments).
TOTM Economist Michael Salinger, Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics for the past year, comments on the recent FTC Report and price gouging . . .
Economist Michael Salinger, Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics for the past year, comments on the recent FTC Report and price gouging in Sunday’s WSJ (HT: Greg Mankiw). I have blogged a bit about the FTC Report previously: once about its findings (that “market manipulation” did not explain post-Katrina price increases), once about media reactions to the Report, and again criticizing the ill-advised proposed federal price gouging legislation.
TOTM The Federal Trade Commission was directed to investigate the possibility of price gouging and manipulation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The FTC released its . . .
The Federal Trade Commission was directed to investigate the possibility of price gouging and manipulation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The FTC released its 222 page report today (HT: Antitrust Review). It is a comprehensive analysis of local, regional, and national prices before and after Katrina and Rita. One of the key tasks charged to the FTC was the search for “gouging” and other anticompetitive practices.
