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Showing 9 of 67 Results in Barriers to Entry
TOTM Not very, according to the President in his recent health care speech, making the case that lack of competition and for-profit monopolists are what ails . . .
Not very, according to the President in his recent health care speech, making the case that lack of competition and for-profit monopolists are what ails the health care market…
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman have posted an insightful DOJ working paper on antitrust safe harbors for unilateral conduct involving quantity discounts and bundling. The . . .
Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman have posted an insightful DOJ working paper on antitrust safe harbors for unilateral conduct involving quantity discounts and bundling. The discussion is very timely in light of the Microsoft CFI decision, AMC Report, Section 2 Hearings, and various monopolization cases in the United States, EU, and other antitrust jurisdictions. The Carlton & Waldman paper is short, very accessible, and makes several very important points about the benefits of safe harbors to guide antitrust policy in this area generally and some weaknesses in the proposed AMC approach to bundling. Anybody interested in single firm conduct issues in antitrust should read this paper.
TOTM Within the last few days, the nation’s two most prominent newspapers have reported an interesting trend: businesses are seeking more government regulation. On Sunday, the . . .
Within the last few days, the nation’s two most prominent newspapers have reported an interesting trend: businesses are seeking more government regulation. On Sunday, the New York Times ran an article entitled In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulation. Yesterday’s Wall Street Journal featured Food Makers Get Appetite for Regulation.
TOTM WSJ has a fascinating story this morning about a group of restaurants in Utah, Washington, Colorado and other places adopting a completely voluntary pricing system. . . .
WSJ has a fascinating story this morning about a group of restaurants in Utah, Washington, Colorado and other places adopting a completely voluntary pricing system. No registers. No prices. No “suggested” prices and no tips. The business model is essentially to provide food and allow customers to put whatever they want in a lock box at the front of the store. This is similar to the former economist turned Bagel Man in Freakonomics who delivered bagels to DC area offices on a quasi-honor system.
TOTM One of the more interesting parts of Senator Herbert Kohl’s recent Antitrust interview, in which he also discussed airline mergers, concerned antitrust’s treatment of media . . .
One of the more interesting parts of Senator Herbert Kohl’s recent Antitrust interview, in which he also discussed airline mergers, concerned antitrust’s treatment of media consolidation.
TOTM Securities fraud class-actions are down. In an op-ed in yesterday’s WSJ, Joseph Grundfest observed that both the number of such actions and the dollar value . . .
Securities fraud class-actions are down. In an op-ed in yesterday’s WSJ, Joseph Grundfest observed that both the number of such actions and the dollar value of total damages claims have dropped dramatically since mid-2005. Why has this decline occurred? Grundfest considers several possible reasons.
TOTM I have had occasion to think about the relationship between property rights and barriers to entry lately, and was reminded of the following line which . . .
I have had occasion to think about the relationship between property rights and barriers to entry lately, and was reminded of the following line which I thought well worth posting on its own…
TOTM Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. . . .
Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. Both call for bright-line, administrable liability rules for all forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct, and have important things to say about designing antitrust rules for bundled discounts. Both are worth reading in their entirety. Administrable rules that sensibly balance Type I and II errors are certainly an indisputably admirable goal for antitrust analysis and bundled discounts have proven to be a particularly tricky form of conduct for Section 2 analysis. Despite all of the agreement around here between Thom, Dan and I on the design of antitrust rules in a world of costly Type I errors, I think I have found a topic upon which I can at least offer a mild dissent (or at least a different perspective) regarding the usefulness of the analogy of various anticompetitive theories of bundled discounting practices to exclusive dealing.
TOTM Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am . . .
Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am looking forward to Thom’s review in the Texas Law Review, and wholeheartedly agree with him that Hovenkamp’s book is an important and significant contribution to the antitrust literature (see also Randy Picker’s book review here describing “The Antitrust Enterprise as The Antitrust Paradox for a post-Chicago antitrust landscape”). I’m still digesting most of the book, and perhaps will share some more thoughts in this space later on, but thought I would chime in with some thoughts on two issues relevant to my own research on slotting contracts, discounts, and competition for product distribution.
