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Milton Mueller responded to my post Wednesday on the DOJ’s decision to halt the AT&T/T-Mobile merger by asserting that there was no evidence the merger would lead to “anything innovative and progressive” and claiming “[t]he spectrum argument fell apart months ago, as factual inquiries revealed that AT&T had more spectrum than Verizon and the mistakenly posted lawyer’s letter revealed that it would be much less expensive to expand its capacity than to acquire T-Mobile.”  With respect to Milton, I think he’s been suckered by the “big is bad” crowd at Public Knowledge and Free Press.  But he’s hardly alone and these claims — claims that may well have under-girded the DOJ’s decision to step in to some extent — merit thorough refutation.

Read the full piece here. 

From the WSJ:

The Department of Health and Human Services this month notified Howard Solomon of Forest Laboratories Inc. that it intends to exclude him from doing business with the federal government. This, in turn, could prevent Forest from selling its drugs to Medicare, Medicaid and the Veterans Administration. If the government implements its ban, Forest would have to dump Mr. Solomon, now 83 years old, in order to protect its corporate revenue. No drug company, large or small, can afford to lose out on sales to the federal government, a major customer.

….

The Health and Human Services department startled drug makers last year when the agency said it would start invoking a little-used administrative policy under the Social Security Act against pharmaceutical executives. This policy allows officials to bar corporate leaders from health-industry companies doing business with the government, if a drug company is guilty of criminal misconduct. The agency said a chief executive or other leader can be banned even if he or she had no knowledge of a company’s criminal actions. Retaining a banned executive can trigger a company’s exclusion from government business.

Debarment is obviously a very serious remedy.  The increased use of debarment in this context has been controversial, especially in cases in which the executive has not demonstrated that the debarred individual is actually complicit.  The WSJ story discusses the Forest Laboratories example along these lines in more detail:

According to Mr. Westling, “It would be a mistake to see this as solely a health-care industry issue. The use of sanctions such as exclusion and debarment to punish individuals where the government is unable to prove a direct legal or regulatory violation could have wide-ranging impact.” An exclusion penalty could be more costly than a Justice Department prosecution.

He said that the Defense Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, for example, have debarment powers similar to the HHS exclusion authority.

The Forest case has its origins in an investigation into the company’s marketing of its big-selling antidepressants Celexa and Lexapro. Last September, Forest made a plea agreement with the government, under which it is paying $313 million in criminal and civil penalties over sales-related misconduct.

A federal court made the deal final in March. Forest Labs representatives said they were shocked when the intent-to-ban notice was received a few weeks later, because Mr. Solomon wasn’t accused by the government of misconduct.

Forest is sticking by its chief. “No one has ever alleged that Mr. Solomon did anything wrong, and excluding him [from the industry] is unjustified,” said general counsel Herschel Weinstein. “It would also set an extremely troubling precedent that would create uncertainty throughout the industry and discourage regulatory settlements.”

The issue of debarment also arises in the antitrust context as a weapon in the toolkit of antitrust enforcement agencies prosecuting cartels.  Judge Ginsburg and I have argued, in Antitrust Sanctions, that the debarment remedy in that context, along with a shift toward individual responsibility and away from ever-increasing corporate fines, would result in a shift toward efficient deterrence.   In our case, we discuss debarment for the executive actually engaged in the price-fixing as well as officers and directors who negligently supervise the price-fixers (e.g., with failure to institute an antitrust compliance program).   Without safeguards to ensure that debarment is imposed in cases of actual wrongdoing or negligent supervision, and also in the cases of settlement, that there is a factual basis for debarment, imposition of these penalties runs the risk that enforcement agencies will have arbitrary power to banish executives that are disfavored for whatever reason.  If its application is properly constrained, however, debarment can be a more effective tool in prosecuting antitrust offenses and potentially other white-collar crime than ever-increasing corporate fines which are largely borne by shareholders.  I’ll refer interested readers to the Ginsburg & Wright link above for the more detailed case in favor of adding debarment to the cartel-enforcement toolkit, including a discussion of its application in the antitrust context in a variety of other countries as well as non-antitrust settings in the U.S.

Filed under: antitrust, corporate crime, corporate law, economics

Apparently, the detergent industry has entered into what has been described as a “voluntary agreement” to reduce the use of phosphates in detergents (HT: Ted Frank).  A press release from Clean Water Action describes the agreement as follows:

On July 1, 2010 a voluntary ban on phosphates in dishwasher detergents will be implemented by many members of the American Cleaning Council (formerly the Soap and Detergent Association), a manufacturer’s trade group representing most detergent companies.”Industry’s announcement on phosphates in dishwasher detergents is welcome news, indeed, if somewhat overdue,” said Jonathan Scott, a spokesman for Clean Water Action, founded in the early 1970’s to fight for clean, safe water. “Even small amounts of phosphates can wreak havoc when they get into our water,” Scott says, “so it’s the last thing you want as an ingredient in detergents, which are specifically designed to end up in the water by way of household appliances and drain pipes.”

It is also apparent that some our none too pleased with the effects of reducing phosphate levels in detergents — with the primary downside being that the new product doesn’t work too well.  An article in the Weekly Standard describes the impact of the reduction:

The result is detergents that don’t work very well. There have been a handful of stories in the media about consumer complaints. The New York Times noted that on the review section of the website for Cascade—Procter & Gamble’s market-leading brand—ratings plummeted after the switch, with only 11 percent of consumers saying they would recommend the product. One woman in Florida told National Public Radio that she called Procter & Gamble to complain about how its detergent no longer worked. The customer rep told her to consider handwashing the dishes instead.

Some NPR commenters agreed. “Like so many -others, I had disassembled my dishwasher, run multiple empty ‘cleaning cycles’ using all kinds of various chemical treatments, all trying to get my dishwasher ‘fixed,’ ” said one. “We assumed that something was wrong with the machine, that it was limed up, and we tried vinegar and other remedies with limited success,” wrote another. “We do wash some dishes by hand now, using more hot water than before, and also have simply lowered our standards for what constitutes ‘clean.’ ” Another commenter complained: “I live in AZ and had the same thing happen last year when it was introduced out here. I thought it was a reaction between the ‘Green’ soap and the hard water. I wrote to the company and they sent me about $30 in coupons—for other items and for their non-green soap. I dumped the 3 unopened bottles plus the one I was using.”

The detergents were so problematic that they caused environmental delinquency even among NPR listeners. One disappointed commenter rationalized his backsliding:

We first heard about the new phosphate-free detergent formulations almost a year ago. Wanting to do the Right Thing we rushed out and bought some and immediately began using it. The results, although not as bad as reported by some, were still pretty underwhelming. Our dishes and glassware were covered by a gritty film and so was the inside of the dishwasher. We are in Southern California and have very hard water. Adding vinegar to the rinse cycle helped *some* but still we found excessive buildup on our dishes. Disgusted with the new detergent, we decided to go back to something with phosphate. We were not able to find phosphate detergent at the supermarket, but some local discount stores sell supplies that are apparently remaindered by the manufacturers. We bought six boxes of old Cascade with phosphate—about a year’s supply. We figured someone would buy it—might as well be us.

When Consumer Reports did laboratory testing on the new nil-phosphate detergents, they concluded that none of them “equaled the excellent (but now discontinued) product that topped our Ratings in August 2009.”

There is, of course, an interesting antitrust angle here.  Thom has posted previously on another voluntary industry agreement in the soda industry to refrain from selling high calorie soda (and limiting the size of even healthy drinks) in schools.  In the comments to that post I suggest that one important issue is whether the soda players actually reached an agreement:

The passing or collective endorsement of a set of “best practices” to which members of the industry can voluntary choose to adhere to or not is not necessarily an actionable antitrust conspiracy. Of course, calling something “voluntary guidelines” won’t immunize an actual agreement if it is there. But it seems that the parties were pretty careful — EXCEPT for in their commercials and in print!!! — to make sure to emphasize that the antitrust-relevant choices were made unilaterally. But I can’t imagine antitrust counsel would have given the thumbs up to the commercials…

So it is here.  I’ve no doubt that such an agreement, if it exists, is reachable under Section of the Sherman Act.  The question is whether the detergent industry has taken some steps to protect themselves from an “agreement” finding under Section 1.  I don’t have enough detail to know whether that is the case — but if anybody does, please send it along.

Filed under: antitrust, cartels, economics, environment

As a sea of oil slops over sand, oysters and pelicans in the Gulf, it seems natural to blame the entity that made this happen– BP . The Gulf disaster could have easily been avoided–from the well design, to the defective seals, to the haphazard response, topped off with the lack of any backup plan. It doesn’t help that BP is a big, rich, oil company. The company will likely be sued and castigated in courts and markets.

We live in a time of optimism about government’s ability to improve upon the unregulated state of affairs. From health insurance to financial markets to the types of fats we eat, cars we drive, and sources of energy we consume, there is a sense among our political, media, and academic elites that our privately ordered affairs are out of whack and can be improved by government rules. These elites rarely stop to ask whether the private ordering whose malfunctions they are seeking to correct is, in fact, private; in reality, it’s often not (see, e.g., the role of Fannie and Freddie in creating the housing bubble at the heart of the financial crisis, the role of the tax deduction for employer-provided health insurance in eviscerating the price competition that would constrain health care costs). Rather than asking how government meddling may have contributed to an undesirable situation, the elites usually look for a market failure — some systematic defect in the system of private ordering — and then invoke that failure as the rationale for a governmental fix.

Read the full piece here. 

Global warming critics have taken two primary approaches. First, deny the facts based on the incentives for scientists to fudge the data to get prestige and research dollars (see, for example, the East Anglia emails), based on the inherent limitations of humans to build global weather models to predict the temperature 100 years from now, and based on humans’ Chicken-Little tendencies.

Read the full piece here. 

I love our national parks as much as the next guy (probably more, having visited every major one and dozens of smaller ones, and loving every minute of nearly every visit), but can someone tell me why the federal government owns so much of our country? Some maps tell the story. See here and here. Now comes news from the Obama administration that there are plans to make more land off limits to economic uses. See here. I understand the temptation to think of nature as benign, aesthetically valuable, and like a piece of antiquity to be preserved, but I think we go too far when we sacrifice economic progress for desert plants, tall trees, fish, and other nonhuman things. Fundamentally the claims of favoring these things for some abstract goals of preservation are antihuman. They are also often ways for politicians to serve their own interests and those of favored constituents over the general welfare.

Read the full piece here.

That’s the punchline of a recent paper by Pierre Desrochers (U Toronto). Pierre has written some interesting papers on a range of topics related to economic development, technological innovation, and the intersection of business and the environment.   He argues that it is governmental (regulatory) failures that distort the environmental consequences of corporate behavior, not market failures. Should be an interesting read.

Read the full piece here. 

Today the SEC voted 3-2 to approve an interpretive release offering guidance to companies on disclosure obligations as they relate to climate change.  Commissioners Casey and Paredes voted to reject the proposed guidance.

Read the full piece here.