In the Ribstein & Alces paper mentioned below by Keith, Ribstein & Alces write…

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Larry points us to a new corporate finance blog, Richard Booth’s The Quant. It looks like a great blog. The most recent post is on executive compensation–particularly on the serious problems of expensing options (and the FASB rule requiring it). Here’s a lengthy and informative excerpt (with a couple words from me following)…

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We know that people respond to incentives, and that behavior will adjust in response to relative changes in price. But I think it’s commonly assumed that the only relevant price change attributable to disclosure regulations is the nominal change in direct costs of compliance. Sure, we all understand that if shareholder or regulatory pressure is brought to bear on corporate actors as a consequence of disclosure, that pressure can change behavior. But for some reason we’re unduly optimistic about this change; we just assume it will be for the better (you know, because “sunlight is a good disinfectant.” Brandeis said so).

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An article in today’s W$J reports on former Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio’s planned defense in a criminal insider trading action brought by the SEC. The defense is perplexing.

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In yesterday’s New York Times Magazine, an anonymous reader posed the following question to The Ethicist…

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The government subpoenas Google’s records, and also Yahoo!’s and Microsoft’s. MSFT and YHOO cave: Their stocks are down a little over and a little under 2%, respectively. Google resists. Its stock drops almost 9%. And yet a headline for an article by MSNBC’s chief economics correspondent–with the relevant stock prices immediately alongside–notes, “Google stand could be good for business.” Maybe he’s talking about Microsoft’s business?

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First, Joel Trachtman of Tufts’ (great and soon-to-be better) Fletcher School has started up a new international trade blog, called International Economic Law and Policy. If you know anything about international trade law and/or economics, you know Joel Trachtman and thus you know that this will be a must-read. He has been joined at the blog by Columbia Law’s Petros Mavroidis.

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We all know that our securities regulatory regime is predominantly a disclosure regime, meaning the regulators, for the most part, don’t impose substantive regulations on securities issuers, but require only accurate, timely disclosure of certain information. And as against a more intrusive, substantive regime, I think this is preferable, even in its current, fairly intrusive form. But too often disclosure is presumed by commentators (and regulators) to be fairly costless — meaning that, even if it doesn’t do what it’s supposed to do, it imposes no great cost, and if it succeeds it does so quite cheaply. This is what Larry means when he refers to regulations as “chicken soup.” I think this presumption is often under-supported.

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Summary

In this short essay, we take on some of the common claims surrounding the law and economics of the backdating of options. Most of these claims are rooted in the basic argument that backdating options amounts to concealment of compensation. While we agree that backdating may have amounted to a technical rule violation in some cases, there is actually no concealment and, in fact, backdated options are fully disclosed when granted, and their value incorporated into stock price. We also challenge a few other myths surrounding the practice of backdating options.