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TOTM Courtesy of ContractsProf Blog, here is what purports to be a copy of the elusive complaint in CBS v. Howard Stern. ContractsProf Blog includes the . . .
Courtesy of ContractsProf Blog, here is what purports to be a copy of the elusive complaint in CBS v. Howard Stern. ContractsProf Blog includes the following disclaimer regarding the authenticity of the complaint…
Read the full piece here.
TOTM The AALS Section on Securities Regulation will hold its seventh meeting during the AALS Annual Meeting in San Francisco, California from January 3-6, 2007. (The . . .
The AALS Section on Securities Regulation will hold its seventh meeting during the AALS Annual Meeting in San Francisco, California from January 3-6, 2007. (The Section meeting is tentatively scheduled for Saturday, January 6, 2007).
TOTM Daniel Akst in the NYT has an interesting piece on executive compensation and disclosure (HT: Tyler Cowen). He calls for more shame — more reliance . . .
Daniel Akst in the NYT has an interesting piece on executive compensation and disclosure (HT: Tyler Cowen). He calls for more shame — more reliance on norms to manage intractable agency problems…
TOTM Dale Oesterle has called Gretchen Morgenson a “national treasure.” Today Larry Ribstein exposes the treasure for fool’s gold. I’m with Larry on this one. Morgenson’s . . .
Dale Oesterle has called Gretchen Morgenson a “national treasure.” Today Larry Ribstein exposes the treasure for fool’s gold. I’m with Larry on this one.
Morgenson’s article on executive compensation is yellow journalism at its worst (well, at least a far as business journalism goes. And really — what else is there?).
TOTM The Council on Foreign Relations puts on some really impressive webcasts/conference calls. Here’s one TOTM readers may be especially interested in (if, that is, you’re . . .
The Council on Foreign Relations puts on some really impressive webcasts/conference calls. Here’s one TOTM readers may be especially interested in (if, that is, you’re one of those lucky people who doesn’t get hives listening to extended bouts of highly-politicized self rationalization)…
TOTM Yesterday’s W$J reported on an effort by oil companies to change the way reserves are reported in securities filings. SEC rules, it seems, mandate that . . .
Yesterday’s W$J reported on an effort by oil companies to change the way reserves are reported in securities filings. SEC rules, it seems, mandate that reserves be measured in a manner that understates the actual amount of available oil. For example, the rules (available here) require that only proven reserves (those for which there is a “reasonable certainty” of actual recovery) be reported. On first glance, this doesn’t sound unreasonable, but the manner in which “reasonable certainty” is determined essentially translates the criterion into one of “virtual certainty.”
TOTM In the Ribstein & Alces paper mentioned below by Keith, Ribstein & Alces write… Read the full piece here.
In the Ribstein & Alces paper mentioned below by Keith, Ribstein & Alces write…
TOTM Larry points us to a new corporate finance blog, Richard Booth’s The Quant. It looks like a great blog. The most recent post is on executive compensation–particularly . . .
Larry points us to a new corporate finance blog, Richard Booth’s The Quant. It looks like a great blog. The most recent post is on executive compensation–particularly on the serious problems of expensing options (and the FASB rule requiring it). Here’s a lengthy and informative excerpt (with a couple words from me following)…
TOTM We know that people respond to incentives, and that behavior will adjust in response to relative changes in price. But I think it’s commonly assumed . . .
We know that people respond to incentives, and that behavior will adjust in response to relative changes in price. But I think it’s commonly assumed that the only relevant price change attributable to disclosure regulations is the nominal change in direct costs of compliance. Sure, we all understand that if shareholder or regulatory pressure is brought to bear on corporate actors as a consequence of disclosure, that pressure can change behavior. But for some reason we’re unduly optimistic about this change; we just assume it will be for the better (you know, because “sunlight is a good disinfectant.” Brandeis said so).
