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TOTM With the Econ Nobel (or for those who feel better using the official label, the “Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred . . .
With the Econ Nobel (or for those who feel better using the official label, the “Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel” … ) to be announced on Monday, the time is ripe for speculation. Greg Mankiw, Don Boudreaux, the WSJ, and Tyler Cowen have chimed in on the frontrunners. Cowen predicts Eugene Fama and Richard Thaler for empirical finance while registering his own vote in favor of GMU’s Gordon Tullock (seconded by Boudreaux).
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Life in the inner city can be hard. Jobs are scarce, prices are high, and transportation is difficult, making it hard to travel significant distances . . .
Life in the inner city can be hard. Jobs are scarce, prices are high, and transportation is difficult, making it hard to travel significant distances to work or shop. So when major retailers announce plans to enter the inner city, hire lots of employees, turn their neighborhoods into shopping destinations (thereby encouraging the creation of more jobs and conveniences), and offer signficantly lower prices than are currently available, you’d think “moral” folks would be pretty happy.
TOTM Securities Mosaic is a fantastic resource for anyone working in the securities field. It provides comprehensive information in six key areas: disclosure, laws, rules, guidance, . . .
Securities Mosaic is a fantastic resource for anyone working in the securities field. It provides comprehensive information in six key areas: disclosure, laws, rules, guidance, news, and compliance centers. In addition, the site features SM Blogwatch, which republishes posts from various securities-related blogs, including this one.
TOTM This new chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (Polinsky & Shavell, eds.) from Avery Katz, Benjamin Hermalin, and Richard Craswell looks like . . .
This new chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (Polinsky & Shavell, eds.) from Avery Katz, Benjamin Hermalin, and Richard Craswell looks like essential reading for anyone interested in economic analysis of contracts and contract law.
TOTM Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am . . .
Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am looking forward to Thom’s review in the Texas Law Review, and wholeheartedly agree with him that Hovenkamp’s book is an important and significant contribution to the antitrust literature (see also Randy Picker’s book review here describing “The Antitrust Enterprise as The Antitrust Paradox for a post-Chicago antitrust landscape”). I’m still digesting most of the book, and perhaps will share some more thoughts in this space later on, but thought I would chime in with some thoughts on two issues relevant to my own research on slotting contracts, discounts, and competition for product distribution.
TOTM Larry Solum was kind enough to link to my post on economics and arguments about social justice, and raises the following concerns about my argument :
Larry Solum was kind enough to link to my post on economics and arguments about social justice, and raises the following concerns about my argument…
TOTM Warning: shameless plug of my own research to follow! Slotting allowances, or payments for shelf space, have been a central part of my research agenda . . .
Warning: shameless plug of my own research to follow!
Slotting allowances, or payments for shelf space, have been a central part of my research agenda for the last several years. My work with Ben Klein, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, presents a procompetitive theoretical explanation (and some aggregate data in support of our theory) for slotting contracts which I have blogged about from time to time. One of the reasons that I enjoy this topic is because payments for distribution are pervasive.
TOTM Today’s New York Times reports on a new cigarette bar in Chicago, where the city council has just imposed a sweeping smoking ban. (I recently . . .
Today’s New York Times reports on a new cigarette bar in Chicago, where the city council has just imposed a sweeping smoking ban. (I recently criticized the ban at Ideoblog.) The proprietors of the Marshall McGearty Tobacco Lounge insist that the lounge is permitted because of a loophole allowing smoking in retail tobacco shops. Not surprisingly, Chicago’s anti-smoking zealots are seeking to shut down the business, which they say violates the intent of the anti-smoking ordinance.
Scholarship Abstract Behavioral law and economics scholars who advance paternalistic policy proposals typically employ static models of decision-making behavior, despite the dynamic effects of paternalistic policies. . . .
Behavioral law and economics scholars who advance paternalistic policy proposals typically employ static models of decision-making behavior, despite the dynamic effects of paternalistic policies. In this article, we consider how paternalistic policies fare under a dynamic account of decision-making that incorporates learning and motivation effects. This approach brings out two important limitations on the efficiency effects of paternalistic regulations. First, if preferences and biases are endogenous to institutional forces, paternalistic government regulations may perpetuate and even magnify a given bias and cause other adverse psychological effects. Second, for some biases, it will be more efficient to invest resources in debiasing than to change legal rights and remedies or, in some cases, to do nothing in light of the natural variation in irrational propensities. We propose dynamic models for determining ex ante and ex post when accommodation of bias will be second-best efficient. These models direct decision-makers to consider (1) the efficiency cost of the bias; (2) the extent to which accommodation worsens the bias or, alternatively, the extent to which non-accommodation improves the bias or has other benefits; and (3) the potential for education or other mechanisms to debias an individual. We argue that the concept of “cognitive hazard” – the potential for the costs of a bias to increase as individuals are insulated from the adverse effects of the bias – should be added to the concept of moral hazard as important qualifications to paternalistic proposals.
